Re: Fw: Median voter theorem
--- Alypius Skinner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > we can expect a couple of large parties to split that vote. > > Fred Foldvary > > Polls show these positions are supported by large, not slim, > majorities--landslide majorities. So why don't the two established > parties seek to split the vote of the great majority on these issues--in other words, why aren't they competing for the median voter on the basis of the median voter's political opinions?< I'm with you on that. There was a discussion here earlier on median voter versus special interests. My belief was and is that special interests have much clout, and override the median voters in such issues as you mentioned. That is partly because voters must select candidates on a package of issues. On such issues, the special interests can have clout, whereas the median voter is influential mainly in the most visible or basic issues. It does also show why the two political parties are close together on the most basic issues. > Is there some > way the market for votes could be made more competitive? Yes, see my paper on "Recalculating consent": http://www.gmu.edu/jbc/fest/files/foldvary.htm Fred Foldvary = [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Fw: Median voter theorem
The question is why there seems to be a > political duopoly in most countries. I think that may be due to the > bell-shaped curve of political views. If most voters are near the median, > we can expect a couple of large parties to split that vote. > > Fred Foldvary > > = > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Let's see. In the United States, opinions polls show: 1. Most voters want less immigration. 2. Most voters want prayer in public schools. 3. Most voters support restricting abortion to rape, incest, and imminent danger to the mother's life. 4. Most voters think no one should pay more than 25% of his income in federal income taxes. 5. Most voters want a constitutional amendment to prohibit flag burning. 6. Most voters want congressional term limits. 7. Most voters want less money spent on foreign aid (even if they don't know how much money is currently being spent). 8. Most voters oppose race-based affirmative action laws. Polls show these positions are supported by large, not slim, majorities--landslide majorities. So why don't the two established parties seek to split the vote of the great majority on these issues--in other words, why aren't they competing for the median voter on the basis of the median voter's political opinions? The only answer that comes to mind is that some special interests opposed to the majority of voters wield enough influence to generally keep these questions off the table. Is there some way the market for votes could be made more competitive? Also, how much capital does it take to launch a serious third party challenge to an entrenched duopoly? ~Alypius Skinner
Re: Fw: Median voter theorem
--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Proportional representation doesn't allow--or at least hasn't > allowed--the fringe parties there to stop being fringe parties. > David Yes, if by oligopoly you mean there are only a few parties, then proportional representation does not prevent that, as we don't see a distribution of just tiny parties. The question is why there seems to be a political duopoly in most countries. I think that may be due to the bell-shaped curve of political views. If most voters are near the median, we can expect a couple of large parties to split that vote. Fred Foldvary = [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Fw: Median voter theorem
In a message dated 12/5/02 9:32:09 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: << > Democratic politics appear to be (inherently?) oligopolistic. > ~Alypius Skinner This depends on the size of the voting pool and the method of electing. With proportional representation (each political party gaining representation based on its percentage of the vote) or tiny voting pools, there is no inherent oligopolicity. Fred Foldvary >> I wonder... So far as I know in the 54 years since the creation of the modern state of Israel, only two parties have ever controlled Knesset--Labor and Likud. Proportional representation doesn't allow--or at least hasn't allowed--the fringe parties there to stop being fringe parties. The fringe parties there tend to pull the main parties out from the perceived center the way that party activitists pull the two major American parties (and the way that the Libertarian Party wishes it could in American, but can't because every time it helps elect a Democrat the news media report it as a mandate for more government). I'm not sure that proportional representation precludes duopoly, or indeed makes it any less likely. I think it may just bring more of the voters toward the tail of the distribution out from the major party primaries and into their own parties. David
Re: Fw: Median voter theorem
> Democratic politics appear to be (inherently?) oligopolistic. > ~Alypius Skinner This depends on the size of the voting pool and the method of electing. With proportional representation (each political party gaining representation based on its percentage of the vote) or tiny voting pools, there is no inherent oligopolicity. Fred Foldvary = [EMAIL PROTECTED]
