Re: [Bitcoin-development] questions about bitcoin-XT code fork non-consensus hard-fork

2015-06-16 Thread Pindar Wong
On Tue, Jun 16, 2015 at 2:03 AM, Adam Back a...@cypherspace.org wrote:

 Hi Mike

 Well thank you for replying openly on this topic, its helpful.

 I apologise in advance if this gets quite to the point and at times
 blunt, but transparency is important, and we owe it to the users who
 see Bitcoin as the start of a new future and the$3b of invested funds
 and $600m of VC funds invested in companies, we owe it to them that we
 be open and transparent here.

 I would really prefer on a personal nor professional basis to be
 having this conversation period, never mind in public, but Mike - your
 and Gavin's decision to promote a unilateral hard-fork and code fork
 are extremely high risk for bitcoin and so there remains little
 choice.  So I apologise again that we have to have this kind of
 conversation on a technical discussion list.  This whole thing is
 hugely stressful and worrying for developers, companies and investors.

 I strongly urge that we return to the existing collaborative
 constructive review process that has been used for the last 4 years
 which is a consensus by design to prevent one rogue person from
 inserting a backdoor, or lobbying for a favoured change on behalf of a
 special interest group, or working for bad actor (without accusing you
 of any of those - I understand you personally just want to scale
 bitcoin, but are inclined to knock heads and try to force an issue you
 see, rather than work collaboratively).

 For you (and everyone)

 - Should there be a summit of some kind, that is open attendance, and
 video recorded so that people who are unable to attend can participate
 too, so that people can present the technical proposals and risks in
 an unbiased way?


Dear Adam, All:

At the community's convenience, it would be an honour to arrange an initial
open summit to meet with representatives of the Chinese miners in Hong Kong
(UTC+8) to facilitate a better understand between the different
stakeholders of the Bitcoin ecosystem on this important issue.   This could
be arranged for this October, or earlier, if deemed necessary.

Remote online participation would be welcome from those who might not be
able to attend in person.

However,  it is hoped that such a meeting would be primarily document
driven to facilitate orderly translation, discussion and decision.

p.



 (It is not theoretical question, I may have a sponsor and host - not
 Blockstream, an independent, its a question for everyone, developers,
 users, CTOs, CEOs.)



 So here I come back to more frank questions:

 Governance

 The rest of the developers are wise to realise that they do not want
 exclusive control, to avoid governance centralising into the hands of
 one person, and this is why they have shared it with a consensus
 process over the last 4 years.  No offence but I dont think you
 personally are thinking far enough ahead to think you want personal
 control of this industry.  Maybe some factions dont trust your
 motives, or they dont mind, but feel more assured if a dozen other
 people are closely reviewing and have collective review authority.

 - Do you understand that attempting to break this process by
 unilateral hard-fork is extremely weakening of Bitcoin's change
 governance model?

 - Do you understand that change governance is important, and that it
 is important that there be multiple reviewers and sign-off to avoid
 someone being blackmailed or influenced by an external party - which
 could potentially result in massive theft of funds if something were
 missed?

 - Secondarily do you understand that even if you succeed in a
 unilateral fork (and the level of lost coins and market cap and damage
 to confidence is recoverable), that it sets a precedent that others
 may try to follow in the future to introduce coercive features that
 break the assurances of bitcoin, like fungibility reducing features
 say (topically I hear you once proposed on a private forum the concept
 of red-lists, other such proposals have been made and quickly
 abandoned), or ultimately if there is a political process to obtain
 unpopular changes by unilateral threat, the sky is the limit - rewrite
 the social contract at that point without consensus, but by
 calculation that people will value Bitcoin enough that they will
 follow a lead to avoid risk to the system?


 Security

 As you probably know some extremely subtle bugs in Bitcoin have at
 times slipped past even the most rigorous testings, often with
 innocuous but unexpected behaviours, but some security issues  Some
 extremely intricate and time-sensitive security defect and incident
 response happens from time to time which is not necessarily publicly
 disclosed until after the issue has been rolled out and fixed, which
 can take some time due to the nature of protocol upgrades,
 work-arounds, software upgrade via contacting key miners etc.  We
 could take an example of the openSSL bug.

 - How do you plan to deal with security  incident response for the
 duration 

Re: [Bitcoin-development] The Bitcoin Node Market

2015-06-16 Thread justusranvier
On 2015-06-16 07:55, Aaron Voisine wrote:
 Suppose a billion mobile phones wanted to run SPV wallets tomorrow. 
 Who
 would provide the nodes they would need connect to?
 
 The SPV wallet author would if they wanted their wallet to function.

How will the SPV wallet users pay for this service? With their money, or 
with their privacy?

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] questions about bitcoin-XT code fork non-consensus hard-fork

2015-06-16 Thread Peter Todd
On Tue, Jun 16, 2015 at 08:33:31PM +0800, Pindar Wong wrote:
 On Tue, Jun 16, 2015 at 2:03 AM, Adam Back a...@cypherspace.org wrote:
 Dear Adam, All:
 
 At the community's convenience, it would be an honour to arrange an initial
 open summit to meet with representatives of the Chinese miners in Hong Kong
 (UTC+8) to facilitate a better understand between the different
 stakeholders of the Bitcoin ecosystem on this important issue.   This could
 be arranged for this October, or earlier, if deemed necessary.

Great!

FWIW there Constance Choi and Primavera De Filippi (CC'd) are holding a
blockchain-tech conference October 14th-15th in Hong Kong as well;
coordinating your summit with that conference could be useful.

http://blockchainworkshops.org/

This workshop series has been attracting audiences of people looking to
use blockchain tech in general; many of these use-cases will likely
involve the Bitcoin blockchain in unpredictable ways. Importantly, these
ways can drive demand significantly beyond our current assumptions based
on most demand being consumer-merchant transactions.

In addition, many of the attendees have significant experience with
regulatory issues and interacting with governments on regulation of
blockchain tech. Bitcoin faces existential risks to its existence by
these regulation efforts, which include things like efforts to setup
industry wide Anti-Money-Laundering/Know-Your-Customer programs,
including programs that would tie on-chain transactions to identity
information. Any blocksize discussion needs to be informed by these
potential threats to usage of the technology, as well as challenges to
using scaling solutions.

 Remote online participation would be welcome from those who might not be
 able to attend in person.
 
 However,  it is hoped that such a meeting would be primarily document
 driven to facilitate orderly translation, discussion and decision.

Agreed. Pieter Wuille's recent work is a great example of the kind of
science-driven investigations that need to be done - and haven't been
done very much - to get us some hard data to make decisions on.

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP for Proof of Payment

2015-06-16 Thread Kalle Rosenbaum
Another thing worth mentioning is that an SPV wallet cannot validate a
PoP without fetching the input transactions of the PoP from an
external (not bitcoin network) source, for example chain.com or some
other trusted full node's API.

The validation of the PoP depends on the external source(s) being
honest. It can make a valid pop look invalid, but it cannot make an
invalid pop look valid.

/Kalle



2015-06-16 14:12 GMT+02:00 Kalle Rosenbaum ka...@rosenbaum.se:
 2015-06-16 7:26 GMT+02:00 Tom Harding t...@thinlink.com:

 Kalle goes to some trouble to describe how merchants need to ensure that
 they only accept a PoP provided as a response to their challenge.


 Do you mean that it will be hard to explain to merchants that they
 must check the nonce in the PoP so that it matches the nonce in the
 pop request? I think not, this is a commonly used pattern that anyone
 should be able to grasp. Anyway, merchants will probably use a library
 (though yet non-existing) for PoP, that will hide the gory details. I
 also think that payment providers may want to add PoP to their
 offering to customers (merchants).

 Regards,
 /Kalle



 On 6/15/2015 3:00 AM, Pieter Wuille wrote:

 I did misunderstand that. That changes things significantly.

 However, having paid is not the same as having had access to the input
 coins. What about shared wallets or coinjoin?

 Also, if I understand correctly, there is no commitment to anything you're
 trying to say about the sender? So once I obtain a proof-of-payment from you
 about something you paid, I can go claim that it's mine?

 Why does anyone care who paid? This is like walking into a coffeshop,
 noticing I don't have money with me, let me friend pay for me, and then have
 the shop insist that I can't drink it because I'm not the buyer.

 Track payments, don't try to assign identities to payers.

 On Jun 15, 2015 11:35 AM, Kalle Rosenbaum ka...@rosenbaum.se wrote:

 Hi Pieter!

 It is intended to be a proof that you *have paid* for something. Not
 that you have the intent to pay for something. You cannot use PoP
 without a transaction to prove.

 So, yes, it's just a proof of access to certain coins that you no longer
 have.

 Maybe I don't understand you correctly?

 /Kalle

 2015-06-15 11:27 GMT+02:00 Pieter Wuille pieter.wui...@gmail.com:
  Now that you have removed the outputs, I don't think it's even a intent
  of
  payment, but just a proof of access to certain coins.
 
  On Jun 15, 2015 11:24 AM, Kalle Rosenbaum ka...@rosenbaum.se wrote:
 
  Hi all!
 
  I have made the discussed changes and updated my implementation
  (https://github.com/kallerosenbaum/poppoc) accordingly. These are the
  changes:
 
  * There is now only one output, the pop output, of value 0.
  * The sequence number of all inputs of the PoP must be set to 0. I
  chose to set it to 0 for all inputs for simplicity.
  * The lock_time of the PoP must be set to 4 (max block height
  lock
  time).
 
  The comments so far has been mainly positive or neutral. Are there any
  major objections against any of the two proposals? If not, I will ask
  Gregory Maxwell to assign them BIP numbers.
 
  The two BIP proposals can be found at
  https://github.com/kallerosenbaum/poppoc/wiki/Proof-of-Payment-BIP and
  https://github.com/kallerosenbaum/poppoc/wiki/btcpop-scheme-BIP. The
  source
  for the Proof of Payment BIP proposal is also in-lined below.
 
  A number of alternative names have been proposed:
 
  * Proof of Potential
  * Proof of Control
  * Proof of Signature
  * Signatory Proof
  * Popo: Proof of payment origin
  * Pots: Proof of transaction signer
  * proof of transaction intent
  * Declaration of intent
  * Asset-access-and-action-affirmation, AAaAA, or A5
  * VeriBit
  * CertiBTC
  * VBit
  * PayID
 
  Given this list, I still think Proof of Payment is the most
  descriptive
  to non-technical people.
 
  Regards,
  Kalle
 
 
  #
  pre
BIP: BIP number
Title: Proof of Payment
Author: Kalle Rosenbaum ka...@rosenbaum.se
Status: Draft
Type: Standards Track
Created: date created on, in ISO 8601 (-mm-dd) format
  /pre
 
  == Abstract ==
 
  This BIP describes how a wallet can prove to a server that it has the
  ability to sign a certain transaction.
 
  == Motivation ==
 
  There are several scenarios in which it would be useful to prove that
  you
  have paid for something. For example:
 
  * A pre-paid hotel room where your PoP functions as a key to the door.
  * An online video rental service where you pay for a video and watch it
  on
  any device.
  * An ad-sign where you pay in advance for e.g. 2 weeks exclusivity.
  During
  this period you can upload new content to the sign whenever you like
  using
  PoP.
  * Log in to a pay site using a PoP.
  * A parking lot you pay for monthly and the car authenticates itself
  using
  PoP.
  * A lottery where all participants pay to the same address, and the
  winner
  is 

Re: [Bitcoin-development] questions about bitcoin-XT code fork non-consensus hard-fork

2015-06-16 Thread Pindar Wong
On Tue, Jun 16, 2015 at 9:33 PM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote:

 On Tue, Jun 16, 2015 at 08:33:31PM +0800, Pindar Wong wrote:
  On Tue, Jun 16, 2015 at 2:03 AM, Adam Back a...@cypherspace.org wrote:
  Dear Adam, All:
 
  At the community's convenience, it would be an honour to arrange an
 initial
  open summit to meet with representatives of the Chinese miners in Hong
 Kong
  (UTC+8) to facilitate a better understand between the different
  stakeholders of the Bitcoin ecosystem on this important issue.   This
 could
  be arranged for this October, or earlier, if deemed necessary.

 Great!

 FWIW there Constance Choi and Primavera De Filippi (CC'd) are holding a
 blockchain-tech conference October 14th-15th in Hong Kong as well;
 coordinating your summit with that conference could be useful.

 http://blockchainworkshops.org/

 This workshop series has been attracting audiences of people looking to
 use blockchain tech in general; many of these use-cases will likely
 involve the Bitcoin blockchain in unpredictable ways. Importantly, these
 ways can drive demand significantly beyond our current assumptions based
 on most demand being consumer-merchant transactions.

 In addition, many of the attendees have significant experience with
 regulatory issues and interacting with governments on regulation of
 blockchain tech. Bitcoin faces existential risks to its existence by
 these regulation efforts, which include things like efforts to setup
 industry wide Anti-Money-Laundering/Know-Your-Customer programs,
 including programs that would tie on-chain transactions to identity
 information. Any blocksize discussion needs to be informed by these
 potential threats to usage of the technology, as well as challenges to
 using scaling solutions.

  Remote online participation would be welcome from those who might not be
  able to attend in person.
 
  However,  it is hoped that such a meeting would be primarily document
  driven to facilitate orderly translation, discussion and decision.

 Agreed. Pieter Wuille's recent work is a great example of the kind of
 science-driven investigations that need to be done - and haven't been
 done very much - to get us some hard data to make decisions on.


Thank you very much Peter for pointing this out! That is very kind of you.

It would be great to work with Constance Choi, Primavera De Filippi, your
goodself and others to make this happen.

As you may know, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority considers bitcoin a
virtual 'commodity' and not a currency per se.

Regards,

p.



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Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP for Proof of Payment

2015-06-16 Thread Kalle Rosenbaum
Thank you for the clarification Tom!

/Kalle

2015-06-16 16:05 GMT+02:00 Tom Harding t...@thinlink.com:
 On 6/16/2015 5:12 AM, Kalle Rosenbaum wrote:
 2015-06-16 7:26 GMT+02:00 Tom Harding t...@thinlink.com:
 Kalle goes to some trouble to describe how merchants need to ensure that
 they only accept a PoP provided as a response to their challenge.

 Do you mean that it will be hard to explain to merchants that they
 must check the nonce in the PoP so that it matches the nonce in the
 pop request?

 Sorry for the idiomatic language.  No, I just meant that you have
 thought it out in detail!  You standardize a latent capability of the
 cryptosystem.  It seems very powerful for some classes of users.



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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Reusable payment codes

2015-06-16 Thread odinn
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

This is very well done.

Have you seen this discussion that I started regarding BIP 63?

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1083961.0

I have no response from Peter Todd back on it other than my time is
better spent focusing on more fundemental issues and I've also got
no-one interested in funding stealth address development right now,
when several people (myself included) offered to send donations to see
the BIP (63) advance, no donation address was posted, so... waiting
for him to act on that.

I'm definitely supportive of seeing what you've written up here as
Reusable payment codes move to draft in https://github.com/bitcoin/bips
When you can, please write up something on bitcointalk as well.


On 04/24/2015 01:00 PM, Justus Ranvier wrote:
 Hash: SHA1
 
 
 https://github.com/justusranvier/rfc/blob/payment_code/bips/bip-pc01.m
ediawiki

 
 
 This link contains an RFC for a new type of Bitcoin address called
 a payment code
 
 
 Payment codes are SPV-friendly alternatives to DarkWallet-style
 stealth addresses which provide useful features such as positively
 identifying senders to recipients and automatically providing for
 transaction refunds.
 
 
 Payment codes can be publicly advertised and associated with a
 real-life identity without causing a loss of financial privacy.
 
 
 Compared to stealth addresses, payment codes require less
 blockchain data storage.
 
 
 Payment codes require 65 bytes of OP_RETURN data per
 sender-recipient pair, while stealth addresses require 40 bytes per
 transaction.
 
 
 
 
 
 --
- 

 
One dashboard for servers and applications across Physical-Virtual-Cloud
 Widest out-of-the-box monitoring support with 50+ applications 
 Performance metrics, stats and reports that give you Actionable
 Insights Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM
 Insight. http://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/290420510;117567292;y
 
 
 
 ___ Bitcoin-development
 mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net 
 https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
 

- -- 
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a protocol concept to enable decentralization
and expansion of a giving economy, and a new social good
https://keybase.io/odinn
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Scaling Bitcoin with Subchains

2015-06-16 Thread Andrew
On Tue, Jun 16, 2015 at 6:17 PM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote:

 Merge-mined sidechains are not a scaling solution any more than SPV is a
 scaling solution because they don't solve the scaling problem for
 miners.

 Some kind of treechain like sidechain / subchains where what part of the
 tree miners can mine is constrained to preserve fairness could be both a
 scaling solution, and decentralized, but no-one has come up with a solid
 design yet that's ready for production. (my treechains don't qualify for
 transactions yet; maybe for other proof-of-publication uses)


Well doesn't my proposal solve the miner decentralization problem. Only the
direct parent and children chains are merge mined. To be more clear, let
the top chain to have level 1. Each chain that is a child of a chain of
level n has level n+1. For any chain C, a block is accepted if the hash of
its header has an appropriate number of trailing zeros (as usual). It can
also be accepted with special transactions as I will explain. Let C be a
chain of level n. Let C0,C1,,C9 be its children (each of level n+1).
For any i in {0,1,...,9}, any solution to the mining problem of C can be
inserted as a special transaction inside Ci and this enables the block to
be accepted in Ci (so C and C0,C1,...,C9 are merge mined. But, for any i in
{0,1,...,9} and any j in {0,1,...,9}, any solution to the mining problem of
C cannot be inserted as a special transaction inside of child Cij of Ci. So
that means all of the chains are not merge mined, only localised parts,
right?

By the way, we can eventually get rid of the block size 1 MB limit by
requiring more than just the header to be hashed, but that can be done in
the future as soft fork with sidechains, and is a side topic.


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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Reusable payment codes

2015-06-16 Thread Peter Todd
On Tue, Jun 16, 2015 at 09:26:07AM -0700, odinn wrote:
 This is very well done.
 
 Have you seen this discussion that I started regarding BIP 63?
 
 https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1083961.0
 
 I have no response from Peter Todd back on it other than my time is
 better spent focusing on more fundemental issues and I've also got
 no-one interested in funding stealth address development right now,
 when several people (myself included) offered to send donations to see
 the BIP (63) advance, no donation address was posted, so... waiting
 for him to act on that.

Sorry, but I'm looking at the huge amount of work that I'll likely have
responding to the blocksize issue, so I think I'm inclined to shelve
work on BIP63 for now.

Feel free to take it up; a (=2)-part standard describing the resuable
codes aspect, and separately how the ephemeral key is transmitted to the
recipient makes sense to me.

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Scaling Bitcoin with Subchains

2015-06-16 Thread Peter Todd
On Mon, Jun 15, 2015 at 01:15:14PM -0400, Jeff Garzik wrote:
 On Mon, Jun 15, 2015 at 1:09 PM, Pieter Wuille pieter.wui...@gmail.com
 wrote:
 
  It's simple: either you care about validation, and you must validate
  everything, or you don't, and you don't validate anything. Sidechains do
  not offer you a useful compromise here, as well as adding huge delays and
  conplexity.
 
 
 As noted to Adam last night - although I agree it adds complexity - side
 chains are one solution that will indeed help with scaling long term.
 Similar to the graph you see with git repos and merges, having aggregation
 chains that arbitrarily fork and then rejoin the main chain are both
 feasible and useful.
 
 That code  future is a ways away from production, so doesn't help us
 here.  Still, let's not dismiss it as a solution either.

To be clear, it depends on what kind of sidechain.

My off-chain transaction notions are federated sidechains with an
economic incentive to not commit fraud using fidelity bonds; they were
definitely proposed as a scaling solution.

Merge-mined sidechains are not a scaling solution any more than SPV is a
scaling solution because they don't solve the scaling problem for
miners.

Some kind of treechain like sidechain / subchains where what part of the
tree miners can mine is constrained to preserve fairness could be both a
scaling solution, and decentralized, but no-one has come up with a solid
design yet that's ready for production. (my treechains don't qualify for
transactions yet; maybe for other proof-of-publication uses)

Keep in mind that other than preserving mining
decentralization/resisting censorship, we've known how to scale up
blockchains for ages w/ things like (U)TXO commitments and fraud proofs.

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP for Proof of Payment

2015-06-16 Thread Pieter Wuille
I don't see why existing software could create a 40-byte OP_RETURN but not
larger? The limitation comes from a relay policy in full nodes, not a
limitation is wallet software... and PoPs are not relayed on the network.

Regarding sharing, I think you're talking about a different use case. Say
you want to pay for 1-week valid entrance to some venue. I thought the
purpose of the PoP was to be sure that only the person who paid for it, and
not anyone else can use it during that week.

My argument against that is that the original payer can also hand the
private keys in his wallet to someone else, who would then become able to
create PoPs for the service. He does not lose anything by this, assuming
the address is not reused.

So, using a token does not change anything, except it can be provided to
the payer - instead of relying on creating an implicit identity based on
who seems to have held particular private keys in the past.
On Jun 16, 2015 9:41 PM, Kalle Rosenbaum ka...@rosenbaum.se wrote:

 2015-06-16 21:25 GMT+02:00 Pieter Wuille pieter.wui...@gmail.com:
  You can't avoid sharing the token, and you can't avoid sharing the
 private
  keys used for signing either. If they are single use, you don't lose
  anything by sharing them.

 Forwarding the PoP request would be a way to avoid sharing keys, as
 suggested above.

 
  Also you are not creating a real transaction. Why does the OP_RETURN
  limitation matter?

 This was discussed in the beginning of this thread: The idea is to
 simplify implementation. Existing software can be used as is to sign
 and validate PoPs

 Regards,
 Kalle

 
  On Jun 16, 2015 9:22 PM, Kalle Rosenbaum ka...@rosenbaum.se wrote:
 
  Thank you for your comments Pieter! Please find my answers below.
 
  2015-06-16 16:31 GMT+02:00 Pieter Wuille pieter.wui...@gmail.com:
   On Mon, Jun 15, 2015 at 1:59 PM, Kalle Rosenbaum ka...@rosenbaum.se
   wrote:
  
   2015-06-15 12:00 GMT+02:00 Pieter Wuille pieter.wui...@gmail.com:
   I'm not sure if we will be able to support PoP with CoinJoin. Maybe
   someone with more insight into CoinJoin have some input?
  
  
   Not really. The problem is that you assume a transaction corresponds
 to
   a
   single payment. This is true for simple wallet use cases, but not
   compatible
   with CoinJoin, or with systems that for example would want to combine
   multiple payments in a single transaction.
  
 
  Yes, you are right. It's not compatible with CoinJoin and the likes.
 
  
   48 bits seems low to me, but it does indeed solve the problem. Why not
   128
   or 256 bits?
 
  The nonce is limited because of the OP_RETURN output being limited to
  40 bytes of data: 2 bytes version, 32 bytes txid, 6 bytes nonce.
 
  
Why does anyone care who paid? This is like walking into a
 coffeshop,
noticing I don't have money with me, let me friend pay for me, and
then
have
the shop insist that I can't drink it because I'm not the buyer.
  
   If you pay as you use the service (ie pay for coffee upfront),
 there's
   no need for PoP. Please see the Motivation section. But you are right
   that you must have the wallet(s) that paid at hand when you issue a
   PoP.
  
   
Track payments, don't try to assign identities to payers.
  
   Please elaborate, I don't understand what you mean here.
  
  
   I think that is a mistake. You should not assume that the wallet who
   held
   the coins is the payer/buyer. That's what I said earlier; you're
   implicitly
   creating an identity (the one who holds these keys) based on the
   transaction. This seems fundamentally wrong to me, and not necessary.
   The
   receiver should not care who paid or how, he should care what was
 payed
   for.
 
  You are saying that it's a problem that the wallet used to pay, must
  also be used to issue the PoP? That may very well be a problem in some
  cases. People using PoP should of course be aware of it's limitations
  and act accordingly, i.e. don't pay for concert tickets for a friend
  and expect your friend to be able to enter the arena with her wallet.
  As Tom Harding noted, it is possible to transfer keys to your friend's
  wallet, but that might not be desirable if those keys are also used
  for other payments. Also that would weaken the security of an HD
  wallet, since a chain code along with a private key would reveal all
  keys in that tree. Another solution is that your friend forwards the
  PoP request to your wallet, through twitter or SMS, and you send the
  PoP for her. Maybe that forwarding mechanism can be built into wallets
  and automated so that the wallet automatically suggests to sign the
  PoP for your friend. This is probably something to investigate
  further, but not within the scope of this BIP.
 
  Of course the simplest solution would be to send money to your friend
  first so that she can pay for the ticket from her own wallet, but
  that's not always feasible.
 
  
   The easiest solution to this IMHO would be an extension to the 

Re: [Bitcoin-development] [BIP draft] Consensus-enforced transaction replacement signalled via sequence numbers

2015-06-16 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Wed, Jun 17, 2015 at 1:00 AM, Mark Friedenbach m...@friedenbach.org wrote:
 Given that we have had more than two weeks of public discussion, code is
 available and reviewed, and several community identified issues resolved, I
 would like to formally request a BIP number be assigned for this work. Will
 the BIP editor be so kind as to do so to allow the BIP consensus process to
 proceed?

BIP 68, unless you have objections.

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Reusable payment codes

2015-06-16 Thread odinn
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

Peter, my response below

On 06/16/2015 10:46 AM, Peter Todd wrote:
 On Tue, Jun 16, 2015 at 09:26:07AM -0700, odinn wrote:
 This is very well done.

 Have you seen this discussion that I started regarding BIP 63?

 https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1083961.0

 I have no response from Peter Todd back on it other than my time is
 better spent focusing on more fundemental issues and I've also got
 no-one interested in funding stealth address development right now,
 when several people (myself included) offered to send donations to se
e
 the BIP (63) advance, no donation address was posted, so... waiting
 for him to act on that.
 
 Sorry, but I'm looking at the huge amount of work that I'll likely hav
e
 responding to the blocksize issue, so I think I'm inclined to shelve
 work on BIP63 for now.


I seriously find this pretty sad... you said that paying rent was an
issue and your time was better spent on more fundamental issues... but
the very least you could do is post a donation address... Is there
someone who was working with you closely on the concept who could take
it up since you are not going to be working on it?

 
 Feel free to take it up; a (=2)-part standard describing the resuable
 codes aspect, and separately how the ephemeral key is transmitted to t
he
 recipient makes sense to me.
 

I don't want to camp on Justus's thread on reusable payment codes ~ but
on the subject of BIP 63, it just did make sense to mention... so if
someone does have interest in working on it... please go to
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1083961.0
and reply there.


- -- 
http://abis.io ~
a protocol concept to enable decentralization
and expansion of a giving economy, and a new social good
https://keybase.io/odinn
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal: Move Bitcoin Dev List to a Neutral Competent Entity

2015-06-16 Thread grarpamp
Please no GoogleGroups. Stick with mailman or some other open
source thing you can move around from place to place as needed.

Also, online third party archives die, their web interfaces suck
ass, they're bloated, don't export, aren't offline capable or
authoritative, etc.

You need to make the raw archives (past and future) downloadable
in mbox format and updated daily, with full unobfuscated headers
for threading and replying, with signatures and attachments.
Commonly for newcomers wishing to seed their own MUA's and archives,
mirrors, search, and so on.

One such breakage of archives by mailman defaults was discussed and
corrected here:
https://cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/

You also need to get rid of the tag in the subject, it wastes
valuable space and mail filters work just the same without it.

Please no forums (see suck above). Unless they have bidirectional
realtime message copying between list and forum. Or at least make
available exports of their message database.

Further, when will the crypto P2P communities develop and use
distributed messaging systems... bitmessage, blockchain, etc as
rough examples... to avoid old centralized issues. At some point you
have to start eating your own dog food and make people run the
clients and come to you instead. Disruptive tech is the new good.

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] [RFC] Canonical input and output ordering in transactions

2015-06-16 Thread Jorge Timón
On Jun 15, 2015 11:43 PM, Rusty Russell ru...@rustcorp.com.au wrote:

 Though Peter Todd's more general best-effort language might make more
 sense.  It's not like you can hide an OP_RETURN transaction to make it
 look like something else, so that transaction not going to be
 distinguished by non-canonical ordering.

What about commitments that don't use op_return (ie pay2contract
commitments)?

In any case, if the motivation is ordering in multi-party transactions
there should be ways to do it without any consequences for other
transaction types' privacy. For example you could have a deterministic
method that depends on a random seed all parties in the transaction
previously share. That way the ordering is deterministic for all parties
involved in the transaction (which can use whatever channel they're using
to send the parts to also send this random seed) while at the same time the
order looks random (or at least not cannonical in a recognisable way) to
everyone else.
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] The Bitcoin Node Market

2015-06-16 Thread Aaron Voisine
 Suppose a billion mobile phones wanted to run SPV wallets tomorrow. Who
 would provide the nodes they would need connect to?

The SPV wallet author would if they wanted their wallet to function.


Aaron Voisine
co-founder and CEO
breadwallet.com

On Mon, Jun 15, 2015 at 10:28 PM, justusranv...@riseup.net wrote:

 On 2015-06-16 03:49, Kevin Greene wrote:
  ​Hah, fair enough, there is no such thing as the right way to do
  anything. But I still think punishing users who use SPV wallets is ​a
  less-than-ideal way to incentive people to run full nodes. Right now
  SPV is
  the best way that exists for mobile phones to participate in the
  network in
  a decentralized way. This proposal makes the user experience for mobile
  wallets a little more confusing and annoying.

 Suppose a billion mobile phones wanted to run SPV wallets tomorrow. Who
 would provide the nodes they would need connect to? The decentralization
 fairy?

 There's absolutely no reason that paying for connectivity would be any
 more confusing or annoying than transaction fees are.

 If some full nodes in the network started offering paid connection
 slots, that would just mean that users who checked the pay subscription
 fee box in their wallet configuration would have an easier time
 connecting than the users who did't, just like how your transaction
 might eventually get mined without a fee but paying one makes it faster
 and more probable.


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Re: [Bitcoin-development] questions about bitcoin-XT code fork non-consensus hard-fork

2015-06-16 Thread Mike Hearn
Hi Bryan,

Specifically, when Adam mentioned your conversations with non-technical
 people, he did not mean Mike has talked with people who have possibly not
 made pull requests to Bitcoin Core, so therefore Mike is a non-programmer.


Yes, my comment was prickly and grumpy. No surprises, I did not sleep well
last night.

I am upset about this constant insistence from Adam, Gregory and others
that the technical community or technical majority agree with them and
anyone who doesn't is non technical or not a contributor or not an
expert or not had things properly explained to them.

This is not true and needs to stop. Gavin and I have both been working on
Bitcoin in substantial ways for longer than Gregory and Adam have been in
the community at all. We are extremely technical, as are many of the people
who want us to release XT+larger blocks. We cannot make progress in any
kind of negotiation if one side constantly blows off the other and refuses
to take anything they say seriously, which has been a feature of this
debate from the start.

In contrast Gavin and I have written vast amounts of analysis on the
concerns raised by larger blocks. So many hours were spent, we could
probably fill a small book by now. We have carefully read and addressed
*dozens* of points raised by the 1mb camp. We have also done our best to
open this debate to the whole community.

So it would be nice if the people who are so keen on 1mb blocks show the
same respect to us.
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] questions about bitcoin-XT code fork non-consensus hard-fork

2015-06-16 Thread Mike Hearn

 How do you plan to deal with security  incident response for the
 duration you describe where you will have control while you are deploying
 the unilateral hard-fork and being in sole maintainership control?


How do we plan to deal with security  incident response - exactly the same
way as before. Remember that XT is basically Core plus a few patches.

Gavin and myself are both on the bitcoin-security mailing list and have
been for years. Both of us have experience of responding to very serious
and tight-deadline security incidents, for example, the accidental bdb hard
fork and (in my case) when we discovered that Android phones had so little
entropy in them that different devices were actually generating the same
keys!

That one required co-ordinated crash rollouts of multiple wallets across
the Bitcoin ecosystem because there was a parallel investigation into key
collisions taking place in an open forum and they were not far from
discovering the truth about how badly the Android RNG was broken   (I knew
because at the time I had access to the Google internal Android bug
tracker). I organised the whole thing.

So I think we'll manage. But I don't expect things to exist in a state of
disjointness for very long. XT will rebase on top of Core and follow it's
releases for as long as there seems to be interest in bigger blocks and as
long as I have the time/energy/interest. If the 1mb chain wins then Core
will have to adopt the new ruleset or simply stop being relevant, as it
will have no users. That wouldn't make much sense.

Now, there have been concerns raised that a hard fork is unbelievably
risky, the sky will fall, the value of Bitcoin will drop to zero, etc. I
don't believe it's anywhere near that risky. The patch Gavin is working on
requires both a miner majority *and* also has a date trigger in it. Much
like previous forks, in fact. So nobody should be taken by surprise if/when
bigger blocks appear, because it will have been known for a long time
beforehand that there was sufficiently strong consensus, there will have
been messages printed to the node logs, announcements in various places and
so on.

Does that help clear things up?
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