Re: Delta CAPPS-2 watch: decrypt boarding passes!
John Gilmore writes: And, besides identifying what cities they're doing this in, we should also start examining a collection of these boarding passes, looking for the encrypted let me through without searching me information. Or the Don't let me fly information. Then we can evaluate how easy it would be to turn one into another. (Don't mistake a system that claims to provide security for one that actually does.) May I suggest as a non-violent civil disobedience measure, that if anyone gains the ability to change the insecurity level, that they should be careful to change it from green to yellow, or yellow to red. In that manner, you cannot be accused to trying to escape scrutiny. You make your point[1] more effectively by demonstrating that you are willing to suffer for your cause. Like the guy who wouldn't take off the T-shirt that he *bought* in the mall. [1] that the only thing worse than taking away our freedom is by doing it using insecure cryptography. -- -russ nelson http://russnelson.com | What Problem Are You Trying Crynwr sells support for free software | PGPok | To Solve? is a service mark 521 Pleasant Valley Rd. | +1 315 268 1925 voice | of Crynwr Software. Potsdam, NY 13676-3213 | +1 315 268 9201 FAX | - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Re: Delta CAPPS-2 watch: decrypt boarding passes!
John Ioannidis writes: (they [TSA] still picked up random people without the search string on their boarding passess). HHH! If this list was to have a subtitle it would be Practical uses of randomness. Surely they're rolling dice, or cutting a well-shuffled deck, or consulting a book of random numbers, or using some other secure source of randomness. Somebody please tell me that they're not just picking people at random. I am reminded of a six-year-old's idea of randomness: eenie, meenie, miney, moe. -- -russ nelson http://russnelson.com | What Problem Are You Trying Crynwr sells support for free software | PGPok | To Solve? is a service mark 521 Pleasant Valley Rd. | +1 315 268 1925 voice | of Crynwr Software. Potsdam, NY 13676-3213 | +1 315 268 9201 FAX | - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Crypto in court Friday
[ quoted from the qmail mailing list. -russ ] For those of you wondering when qmail is going to start protecting mail messages against eavesdropping and forgery: I'll be in San Francisco Friday morning in front of Judge Patel arguing that the remaining crypto regulations are unconstitutional. If you're interested, check out my web pages at http://export.cr.yp.to, and join either the discussion list (export) or the announcement list (export-announce) for more detailed information in a couple of days. ---D. J. Bernstein, Associate Professor, Department of Mathematics, Statistics, and Computer Science, University of Illinois at Chicago - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: trade-offs of secure programming with Palladium (Re: Palladium: technical limits and implications)
Adam Back writes: So there are practical limits stemming from realities to do with code complexity being inversely proportional to auditability and security, but the extra ring -1, remote attestation, sealing and integrity metrics really do offer some security advantages over the current situation. You're wearing your programmer's hat when you say that. But the problem isn't programming, but is instead economic. Switch hats. The changes that you list above may or may not offer some security advantages. Who cares? What really matters is whether they increase the cost of copying. I say that the answer is no, for a very simple reason: breaking into your own computer is a victimless crime. In a crime there are at least two parties: the victim and the perpetrator. What makes the so-called victimless crime unique is that the victim is not present for the perpetration of the crime. In such a crime, all of the perpetrators have reason to keep silent about the comission of the crime. So it will be with people breaking into their own TCPA-protected computer and application. Nobody with evidence of the crime is interested in reporting the crime, nor in stopping further crimes. Yes, the TCPA hardware introduces difficulties. If there is way around them in software, then someone need only write it once. The whole TCPA house of cards relies on no card ever falling down. Once it falls down, people have unrestricted access to content. And that means that we go back to today's game, where the contents of CDs are open and available for modification. Someone could distribute a pile of random bits, which, when xored with the encrypted copy, becomes an unencrypted copy. -- -russ nelson http://russnelson.com | Crynwr sells support for free software | PGPok | businesses persuade 521 Pleasant Valley Rd. | +1 315 268 1925 voice | governments coerce Potsdam, NY 13676-3213 | +1 315 268 9201 FAX | - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: Challenge to David Wagner on TCPA
Jim Choate writes: On Mon, 5 Aug 2002, Russell Nelson wrote: AARG!Anonymous writes: So don't read too much into the fact that a bunch of anonymous postings have suddenly started appearing from one particular remailer. For your information, I have sent over 400 anonymous messages in the past year to cypherpunks, coderpunks, sci.crypt and the cryptography list (35 of them on TCPA related topics). We have, of course, no way to verify this fact, since your messages are not cryptographically signed. For someone who claims to be knowledgable about cryptography, this seems like a suspicious omission. Bullshit Russ, plausable deniability alone justifies such behaviour. Who sent them is irrelevant except to cultists of personality (eg CACL adherents). I agree that it's irrelevant. So why is he trying to argue from authority (always a fallacy anyway) without *even* having any way to prove that he is that authority? Fine, let him desire plausible deniability. I plausibly deny his appeal to (self-)authority as being completely without merit. -- -russ nelson http://russnelson.com | Crynwr sells support for free software | PGPok | businesses persuade 521 Pleasant Valley Rd. | +1 315 268 1925 voice | governments coerce Potsdam, NY 13676-3213 | +1 315 268 9201 FAX | - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Challenge to TCPA/Palladium detractors
AARG!Anonymous writes: I'd like the Palladium/TCPA critics to offer an alternative proposal for achieving the following technical goal: Allow computers separated on the internet to cooperate and share data and computations such that no one can get access to the data outside the limitations and rules imposed by the applications. Can't be done. I don't have time to go into ALL the reasons. Fortunately for me, any one reason is sufficient. #1: it's all about the economics. You have failed to specify that the cost of breaking into the data has to exceed the value of the data. But even if you did that, you'd have to assume that the data was never worth more than that to *anyone*. As soon as it was worth that, they could break into the data, and data is, after all, just data. Ignore economics at your peril. -- -russ nelson http://russnelson.com | Crynwr sells support for free software | PGPok | businesses persuade 521 Pleasant Valley Rd. | +1 315 268 1925 voice | governments coerce Potsdam, NY 13676-3213 | +1 315 268 9201 FAX | - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
1024-bit RSA key safety still unknown
Dan Bernstein has a response to the June 2002 Lenstra-Shamir-Tomlinson-Tromer paper (and similarly, Bruce Schneier's comments) about his research into the cost of circuits for integer factorization. http://cr.yp.to/nfscircuit.html -- -russ nelson http://russnelson.com | New Internet Acronym: Crynwr sells support for free software | PGPok | 521 Pleasant Valley Rd. | +1 315 268 1925 voice | IANAE Potsdam, NY 13676-3213 | +1 315 268 9201 FAX | I Am Not An Economist - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Schneier on Bernstein factoring machine
Derek Atkins writes: Russell Nelson [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: The union of the two sets of cryptography users and paranoid people is necessarily non-empty. Who would bother to use cryptography sans a threat model? And if you've got a non-empty threat model, then by definition you're paranoid. I think it's really about degree. I don't agree that having a non-empty threat model implies you a paranoid. Yes, you're right (and Phil Pennock points out that I meant intersection, not union). Dictionary.com defines paranoia as Extreme, irrational distrust of others. I'm not using the correct word here (nor are other people), because there are rational reasons to distrust nosyparkers. So what *is* the right word for having a non-empty threat model for moderate and rational reasons? -- -russ nelson http://russnelson.com | Economic ignoramuses find Crynwr sells support for free software | PGPok | economics easy to criticize, 521 Pleasant Valley Rd. | +1 315 268 1925 voice | because none of it makes Potsdam, NY 13676-3213 | +1 315 268 9201 FAX | any sense to them! - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Schneier on Bernstein factoring machine
Dan Geer writes: The union of the two sets of cryptography users and paranoid people is necessarily non-empty. Who would bother to use cryptography sans a threat model? And if you've got a non-empty threat model, then by definition you're paranoid. Uh, I don't have to run faster than the bear I just have to run faster than you ? But a bear is a decidedly non-empty threat model. Here's two of my favorite quotes (I made 'em up, myself, so natch I like 'em): Crypto without a threat model is like cookies without milk. and Security is never without cost. I think that the reason that the vast majority of computer users don't use cryptography is because the value of cryptography in addressing their threat model is lower than the cost of dealing with cryptography (user interfaces ++ key management ++ not leaking information ++ secure storage). Okay, so some people might say But if it weren't for the NSA opposing widespread crypto use, it *would* be easy to use. Dealing with the NSA's opposition is part of the cost of dealing with cryptography. -- -russ nelson http://russnelson.com | Economic ignoramuses find Crynwr sells support for free software | PGPok | economics easy to criticize, 521 Pleasant Valley Rd. | +1 315 268 1925 voice | because none of it makes Potsdam, NY 13676-3213 | +1 315 268 9201 FAX | any sense to them! - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: PGP GPG compatibility
Lucky Green writes: On Sat, 9 Feb 2002, Russell Nelson wrote: I think the only worthwhile way forward is to create a cryptographic email standard de novo, which is free of export, trademark, and patent problems. I believe such a standard already exists. It is called S/MIME. Best of all, this email encryption standard is supported out-of-the-box by the overwhelming majority of deployed MUA's in the world. Well, one of the things that PGP/GPG/OpenPGP got right is the web of trust model. Given that model, there is nothing preventing someone from imposing a certificate authority on top of that web. On the other hand, I know of know way to make S/MIME work without a certificate from an authority. -- -russ nelson http://russnelson.com | Crypto without a threat Crynwr sells support for free software | PGPok | model is like cookies 521 Pleasant Valley Rd. | +1 315 268 1925 voice | without milk. Potsdam, NY 13676-3213 | +1 315 268 9201 FAX | - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: PGP GPG compatibility
Werner Koch writes: Things would get much better if a PGP 2 version with support for CAST5 would get more into use. [ etc. ] I know that you're working hard, Werner, but I believe that the recent few years have destroyed the PGP brandname. I think the only worthwhile way forward is to create a cryptographic email standard de novo, which is free of export, trademark, and patent problems. Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2000 21:22:18 -0500 (EST) To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Is PGP broken? -- -russ nelson http://russnelson.com | Crypto without a threat Crynwr sells support for free software | PGPok | model is like cookies 521 Pleasant Valley Rd. | +1 315 268 1925 voice | without milk. Potsdam, NY 13676-3213 | +1 315 268 9201 FAX | - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: CFP: PKI research workshop
Andrew Odlyzko writes: 1. Cryptography does not fit human life styles easily. 2. Novel technologies take a long time to diffuse through society. to which I would add: 3. Cryptography, and therefore PKI, is meaningless unless you first define a threat model. In all the messages with this Subject, I've only see one person even mention threat model. Think about the varying threat models, and the type of cryptography one would propose to address them. Even the most common instance of encryption, encrypted web forms for hiding credit card numbers, suffers from addressing a limited threat model. There's a hell of a lot of known plaintext there. -- -russ nelson [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://russnelson.com Crynwr sells support for free software | PGPok | If you argue with someone 521 Pleasant Valley Rd. | +1 315 268 1925 voice | who is not rational, he will Potsdam, NY 13676-3213 | +1 315 268 9201 FAX | always win, in his own mind. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
forwarded message from tylera19@hotmail.com
This is the goofiest spam I've ever gotten. How many bits are contained in the message below the % signs? Could be quite a few, depending on your dictionary of nouns, verb, adjectives, and adverbs. Sure looks like a message to me. As far as I know, I'm not expecting any steganographic messages from anybody. Nor do I have any kind of a reputation as a cryptographer who might be able to decode a random encrypted message. Maybe it really has been spammed in an effort to avoid traffic analysis? -russ Dear Sir/Madam, We develop high quality Flash Animation websites at extremely low prices. (Excellent Quality Animation and it loads Extremely Fast - CHECK OUT our Website!!!) I am requesting your permission to send you examples of our work. One of our Designers was invited to demonstrate his work at the macromedia flash convention. I believe you will be quite impressed! We specialize in flash introductions, flash websites, ecommerce and database websites. Again, only with your permission will I send you some samples to look at and our price guide. Regards, The Design Team For more information CALL: 516-256-3507 or email us at: [EMAIL PROTECTED] This message is sent in compliance with the new email bill section 301. Under Bill S.1618 TITLE III passed by the 105th USCongress,this message cannot be considered SPAM as long as we include the way to be removed, Paragraph (a)(c) of S.1618, further transmissions to you by the sender of this email may be stopped at no cost to you by sending a response of REMOVE in the subject line of the email sent to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] We really will remove you immediately. % We will bring evidence in favor of the following thesis: any exponential Folklife coefficient effects a significant implementation of all deeper structuralistic conceptualization. As Levi-Strauss contends, the descriptive power of the base component seems to me to be weakly equivalent to the system of base rules exclusive of the lexicon. Presumably, the interrelation of system and/or subsystem technologies cannot be arbitrary in the system of base rules exclusive of the lexicon. In this regard, the independent functional principle does not affect the structure of a descriptive fact. % -- -russ nelson will be speaking at http://www.osdn.com/conferences/handhelds/ Crynwr sells support for free software | PGPok | Mailing lists should not set 521 Pleasant Valley Rd. | +1 315 268 1925 voice | Reply-To: back to the list! Potsdam, NY 13676-3213 | +1 315 268 9201 FAX | http://russnelson.com/rt.html
