Re: [CTRL] RUSSIA IN DEFAULT

1999-02-08 Thread Gerry Forbes

 -Caveat Lector-

Wow! I could barely read this, it's so thick with fnords.
An amazing piece of sophistry. I wonder how long ago it
was that they were recommending that the IMF give money
to Russia for exactly the same reasons they say not to now.
How do they market this Econmist (sic. see end)? "Comes with
its very own Memory Hole!"

G.

> -Caveat Lector-
>
>from:
>http://www.economist.com
>http://www.economist.com/">The Economist
>
>
>Russia, financial outcast
>
>Russia has been in default since last August on most debts and will soon
>want more money from the West so it can roll over the rest. The West
>should say no
>
>Russia, financial outcast
>Russia in default
>Russia’s economy
>
>Search archive
>
>
>THE jar is all but empty, and once again Russia is looking to the West
>for more honey. Once again, the spectre of bankruptcy looms. Once again,
>Russia’s apologists present the prospect of the bear, once rebuffed,
>sinking even further into resentful degradation and nerve-racking
>unpredictability, and bristling all the while with nuclear missiles.
>This time, however, the rich countries should steel themselves and say,
>“Sorry, not until you’ve put your house in order.” Unless Russia gets a
>radically new economic regime, any further western money is likely to be
>squandered—at best used to prop up a system that does not work, at worst
>to find its way into the pockets of corrupt politicians, officials and
>businessmen.

So the system does work; and what percentage of the "corrupt
politicians, officials and businessmen" that it works for are
Russian?

>
>Since the rouble’s crash last August, many of the tentative gains of the
>preceding few years have been blown away. Misfortune has been piled on
>misfortune. Last autumn’s worst harvest in 45 years means that even
>bread may soon be in short supply. The price of oil, Russia’s main
>earner of foreign exchange, has tumbled. Investors, bruised by the
>collapse of Asian markets, do not wish now to be crushed in Russia.

"Tentative gains" - what kind of intangible thing is that?
And which of these misfortunes is Russia's fault? Of course!
The price of oil is so low because Russia sells so much oil.
They should stop selling oil - they'll make more money that way.

The
>inflation rate, judging by December’s figures, may rise to 100%, or even
>higher if the government decides to pay off wage arrears by printing
>money. As it is, many public-sector workers—teachers, for instance, who
>are supposed to get a princely $20 a month—have not been paid for a
>whole year. Much of Russia’s nascent middle-class has been pulverised.

"As it is" - implying that the action contemplated in the
first sentence will exacerbate the problem mentioned in the
second; in other words, if they print money to pay workers
then it will take even longer for workers to get paid. Very
sound reasoning: bring up the inflation bugaboo and Econmist
readers will believe any gibberish. Anyways, 100% inflation
would probably result in an economy which is more efficient
than one where household goods are bartered for food, and
even big companies barter because they can't afford to pay
taxes on money that they can't even borrow.

>
>The monetised economy is barely half the size of the Netherlands’.

Remember that: they have no money. We must not give them
any and they certainly musn't print any. That way they
can buy more.

The
>murder rate may be the world’s highest. Male life expectancy has fallen
>to African levels: 58 years is now the average life-span, and the
>population is contracting by 800,000 souls a year. The country seems to
>be dying on its feet.
>
>True, Russia now has in Yevgeny Primakov a prime minister who, as a
>former head of the KGB, is gathering power and has the experience to
>make use of it. But he is not a man with a vision of the future or the
>determination to make changes for the better, more someone to manage the
>country’s decline. With Boris Yeltsin yet again shoved to the margin by
>ill health, Russia has no presidential guidance. The federation
>threatens to fragment. It has no real leader, no moral compass, no
>tangible hope that things material will soon improve.


"Russia now has" - implying change. But the rest of the
paragraph confirms that things are exactly as before. But
Econmist subscribers are being prompted to change their
opinions and actions regarding Russia. Kick 'em while they're
down! It'll make you feel better for waiting until you read it
in the Econmist to pull out of Russia long after the pirates
have pillaged the investments the Econmist told you to make in
Russia.


>
>Mr Primakov has chosen the path of least political resistance, eschewing
>virtually anything t

[CTRL] RUSSIA IN DEFAULT

1999-02-06 Thread Kris Millegan

 -Caveat Lector-

from:
http://www.economist.com
http://www.economist.com/">The Economist


Russia, financial outcast

Russia has been in default since last August on most debts and will soon
want more money from the West so it can roll over the rest. The West
should say no


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=

Russia, financial outcast
Russia in default
Russia’s economy

Search archive


THE jar is all but empty, and once again Russia is looking to the West
for more honey. Once again, the spectre of bankruptcy looms. Once again,
Russia’s apologists present the prospect of the bear, once rebuffed,
sinking even further into resentful degradation and nerve-racking
unpredictability, and bristling all the while with nuclear missiles.
This time, however, the rich countries should steel themselves and say,
“Sorry, not until you’ve put your house in order.” Unless Russia gets a
radically new economic regime, any further western money is likely to be
squandered—at best used to prop up a system that does not work, at worst
to find its way into the pockets of corrupt politicians, officials and
businessmen.

Since the rouble’s crash last August, many of the tentative gains of the
preceding few years have been blown away. Misfortune has been piled on
misfortune. Last autumn’s worst harvest in 45 years means that even
bread may soon be in short supply. The price of oil, Russia’s main
earner of foreign exchange, has tumbled. Investors, bruised by the
collapse of Asian markets, do not wish now to be crushed in Russia. The
inflation rate, judging by December’s figures, may rise to 100%, or even
higher if the government decides to pay off wage arrears by printing
money. As it is, many public-sector workers—teachers, for instance, who
are supposed to get a princely $20 a month—have not been paid for a
whole year. Much of Russia’s nascent middle-class has been pulverised.

The monetised economy is barely half the size of the Netherlands’. The
murder rate may be the world’s highest. Male life expectancy has fallen
to African levels: 58 years is now the average life-span, and the
population is contracting by 800,000 souls a year. The country seems to
be dying on its feet.

True, Russia now has in Yevgeny Primakov a prime minister who, as a
former head of the KGB, is gathering power and has the experience to
make use of it. But he is not a man with a vision of the future or the
determination to make changes for the better, more someone to manage the
country’s decline. With Boris Yeltsin yet again shoved to the margin by
ill health, Russia has no presidential guidance. The federation
threatens to fragment. It has no real leader, no moral compass, no
tangible hope that things material will soon improve.

Mr Primakov has chosen the path of least political resistance, eschewing
virtually anything that smacks of economic risk or reform. He has hired
old sweats from the days of Soviet central planning to run the central
bank and what passes for economic policy. He has salvaged a shred or two
of national pride by continuing to behave awkwardly abroad. Above all,
he has managed to avert civil strife, at least tempering Russia’s steady
decline with a measure of political stability.

Soon Russia will face some big bills for the repayment of various loans
(see article). It has no chance of paying them all without more
borrowing. The argument for helping it out rests mainly on the belief
that a refusal to do so could upset whatever equilibrium exists. A
general default on debt, of which some $17 billion falls due this year,
would mean Russia’s exclusion from the world’s financial markets. In the
short term, Russia wants “only” $7 billion, partly to roll over
repayments to the IMF that fall due throughout this year; it is not
asking for budgetary support.

A bankrupted Russia, say those who would give it the money, would become
an economic outlaw deprived of any incentive to co-operate on many
issues, foreign and financial. It would turn its back on democracy. It
could bully its neighbours with impunity. It would topple backwards into
nostalgic communism or forwards into Slavophile fascism.

Really? The benefit of the doubt that the West has repeatedly granted
Russia on a range of questions, from abiding by IMF conditions to
rooting out corruption or behaving better on such matters as Iraq,
Kosovo and the sale of nuclear technology, has reaped but the scantest
of rewards. Why should the record change? Mr Primakov, after all, is a
past-master at reassuring the West of Russia’s good intentions at one
moment and then abetting the West’s enemies at the next.

When the importuning has to stop

Not that the West should turn its back on Russia for ever. It is still a
land of mag