Bug#1026430: profanity: If an OMEMO msg to 2+ recipients & 1 recipient’s pubkey is bad, the msg is sent anyway (a logistical mess)
It looks like bug 2 is similar to upstream bug 1185: https://github.com/profanity-im/profanity/issues/1185
Bug#1071610: pm-utils: with molly-guard, pm-suspend.no-molly-guard won't suspend
Package: pm-utils Version: 1.4.1-21 Severity: important Dear Maintainer, * What led up to the situation? Install molly-guard: ii molly-guard0.8.4 * What exactly did you do (or not do) that was effective (or ineffective)? With molly-guard installed, /sbin/pm-suspend is replaced: ~# ll /sbin/pm-suspend* lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 30 9. Mär 22:38 /sbin/pm-suspend -> ../lib/molly-guard/molly-guard* lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 30 9. Mär 22:38 /sbin/pm-suspend-hybrid -> ../lib/molly-guard/molly-guard* lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 31 26. Jan 12:14 /sbin/pm-suspend-hybrid.no-molly-guard -> /usr/lib/pm-utils/bin/pm-action* lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 31 26. Jan 12:14 /sbin/pm-suspend.no-molly-guard -> /usr/lib/pm-utils/bin/pm-action* * What was the outcome of this action? Calling /sbin/pm-suspend.no-molly-guard is not suspending the system. * What outcome did you expect instead? Calling /sbin/pm-suspend.no-molly-guard should suspend the system. Rationale: molly-guard will create symlinks upon installation. These symlinks may be used in cirumstances. pm-action is not aware of those links and fails to suspend. With the patch supplied below pm-action is molly-guard-aware and the /sbin/pm-suspend.no-molly-guard link is usable to suspend the system. proposed PATCH: --- /usr/lib/pm-utils/bin/pm-action 2024-05-22 10:25:03.506813817 +0200 +++ /usr/lib/pm-utils/bin/pm-action.bkp 2024-05-22 10:24:11.605425986 +0200 @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ # The rule here? Simplicity. export STASHNAME=pm-suspend -export METHOD="$(echo ${0##*pm-} |tr - _)" +export METHOD="$(echo ${0##*pm-} | sed 's/\.no-molly-guard//g' |tr - _)" . "/usr/lib/pm-utils/pm-functions" # return code tracking for when suspend fails -- System Information: Debian Release: bookworm/sid APT prefers testing APT policy: (500, 'testing') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 6.0.0-2-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads; PREEMPT) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_WARN, TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Shell: /bin/sh linked to /usr/bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages pm-utils depends on: ii powermgmt-base 1.37 -- no debconf information
Bug#628815: coreutils: pinky makes crazy DNS queries
/etc/acpi/lid.sh calls getXuser, that's defined in /usr/share/acpi-support/power-funcs which has on line 36 plist=$(pinky -fw) || pwf_error "pinky lost" On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 08:50:59AM -0400, Michael Stone wrote: > On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 11:54:30AM +0100, you wrote: > > For example on a debian system with acpi-support, /etc/acpi/lid.sh will > > make many requests to find the host $WAYLAND_DISPLAY every time the lid > > is opened. > > I don't see anything in lid.sh that calls pinky.
Bug#628815: coreutils: pinky makes crazy DNS queries
I looked into this and found that pinky tries to canonicalize the information in the "Where" column automaticaly, and it has no option to disable this behaviour. see line 285 pinky.c: if (*ut_host) /* See if we can canonicalize it. */ host = canon_host (ut_host); this results in many unnecessary dns queries. For example on a debian system with acpi-support, /etc/acpi/lid.sh will make many requests to find the host $WAYLAND_DISPLAY every time the lid is opened. "who" has the --lookup (attempt to canonicalize hostnames via DNS) option, and doesn't do it by default. Maybe it would be more lightweight to forget about canonicalization altogether.
Bug#1067057: tcpdump: Environment undocumented in the man page, yet the TZ variable has effect on the timezone
Package: tcpdump Version: 4.99.0-2+deb11u1 Severity: minor Tags: upstream X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.tcpd...@sideload.33mail.com Normally by convention useful environmental variables are documented in an ENVIRONMENT section of the man page. There is no coverage of any env vars in the man page. I was trying to work out how to make timestamps print in terms of the UTC timezone. It’s undocumented. As a guess, I tried: $ env TZ=UTC tcpdump -r session.pcap It worked as expected. Is that because tcpdump reads the TZ variable? Or does tcpdump make a system call to obtain the time and the system uses the TZ variable? If it’s the former, then TZ should be documented in the man page. If it’s the latter, then it’s unclear to me how to document that but nonetheless users should be informed somehow. Along these lines, it’s worth noting that the man page says this: “A packet trace that crosses a daylight savings time change will give skewed time stamps (the time change is ignored).” Perhaps a TZ that’s shifted by 12 hours or set to a timezone that does not honor daylight savings will work around that problem? If so, the man page could suggest that. -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers oldstable-updates APT policy: (990, 'oldstable-updates'), (990, 'oldstable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'oldstable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages tcpdump depends on: ii adduser 3.118 ii libc6 2.31-13+deb11u5 ii libpcap0.8 1.10.0-2 ii libssl1.1 1.1.1n-0+deb11u3 tcpdump recommends no packages. Versions of packages tcpdump suggests: ii apparmor 2.13.6-10 -- no debconf information
Bug#1067056: libpcap0.8: man page gives incorrect syntax specification for 'proto ICMP'
Package: libpcap0.8 Version: 1.10.0-2 Severity: normal Tags: upstream X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.libpcap...@sideload.33mail.com >From the pcap-filter man page: > proto proto qualifiers restrict the match to a particular protocol. >Possible protos are: ether, fddi, tr, wlan, ip, ip6, arp, >rarp, decnet, tcp and udp. E.g., `ether src foo', `arp net >128.3', `tcp port 21', `udp portrange 7000-7009', `wlan addr2 >0:2:3:4:5:6'. If there is no proto qualifier, all protocols >consistent with the type are assumed. E.g., `src foo' means >`(ip or arp or rarp) src foo' (except the latter is not legal >syntax), `net bar' means `(ip or arp or rarp) net bar' and >`port 53' means `(tcp or udp) port 53'. > … > > proto protocol > > True if the packet is an IPv4 or IPv6 packet of protocol type > protocol. Note that this primitive does not chase the protocol > header chain. > > tcp, udp, icmp > Abbreviations for: >proto \protocol > where protocol is one of the above protocols. It’s a bit screwy because the “proto” conditional is specified twice in the man page. The first time it presents a mostly different set of possible arguments than the 2nd time. When a user searches the man page for “ICMP” they only see the 2nd syntax spec for “proto”. This 2nd occurance does not supply the BNF for the argument. The very next paragraph is not intented but appears to list the arguments. A speed-reading user sees “tcp, udp, icmp” and stops reading. Not that it matters, because this abbreviation clause seems to suggest “tcp, udp, icmp” are in fact valid parameters for “proto”. Yet this fails: $ tcpdump -Avvv -r session.pcap 'proto icmp' reading from file session.pcap, link-type LINUX_SLL2 (Linux cooked v2), snapshot length 262144 Warning: interface names might be incorrect tcpdump: can't parse filter expression: syntax error I was stumped. I could not work out why my usage was syntactically incorrect. I had to get support from someone who suggested simply removing “proto”. That worked. But according to the man page my original attempt should have also worked. -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers oldstable-updates APT policy: (990, 'oldstable-updates'), (990, 'oldstable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'oldstable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages libpcap0.8 depends on: ii libc62.31-13+deb11u5 ii libdbus-1-3 1.12.24-0+deb11u1 libpcap0.8 recommends no packages. libpcap0.8 suggests no packages. -- no debconf information
Bug#1067053: qa.debian.org: Documented policy needed for bug archival + archival transparency needed
Package: qa.debian.org Severity: normal X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.qa.debian@sideload.33mail.com Control: affects -1 +www.debian.org There are essentially no documented policies or procedures for bug report archival. The only disclosure on the website is here: https://www.debian.org/Bugs/server-control#unarchive It’s so minimal I will just copy it here: > archive bugnumber > > Archives a bug that had been archived at some point in the past but > is currently not archived if the bug fulfills the requirements for > archival, ignoring time. > > unarchive bugnumber > > Unarchives a bug that was previously archived. Unarchival should > generally be coupled with reopen and found/fixed as > appropriate. Bugs that have been unarchived can be archived using > archive assuming the non-time based archival requirements are > met. You should not be using unarchive to make trivial changes to > archived bugs, such as changing the submitter; its primary purpose > is to allow for the reopening of bugs which have been archived > without the intervention of BTS administrators. That’s it. There is no further guidance in the www.debian.org/Bugs/* tree. It seems to say artificial archival can only be requested on bugs that were previously archived. Yet there are bugs that have been archived just 1 month after opening. This indicates undisclosed / non-transparent procedures are in play. Then it says unarchival should only be requested on naturally archived bugs (due to aging). Should that “policy” be revisited? Is archival a synonym for bug closure? What are the reasons a bug report can or should be artificially archived by intervention? The Debian Social Contract (DSC) has a transparency clause: > 3. We will not hide problems > >We will keep our entire bug report database open for public view >at all times. Reports that people file online will promptly >become visible to others. That’s a good start but IMO it would improve quality if that were to go a step further and (by extension) state that open public /discussion/ of problems will also be facilitated. The archival of a bug report has the speech/idea-chilling effect of closing it and blocking further discussion. This bug report is motivated by another. I thought of a new feature that would improve the reportbug application. A search of bug reports showed that someone already put forward the same idea (bug 1002906). There’s more to say on that, so I responded. My contribution was suppressed because the bug was archived. In fact it was archived just a month or so after it was opened. Big transparency problem: even the verbose view of the bug report showing extraneous control messages gives no indication of /how/ or /why/ the bug was archived, or /who/ initiated it. We can only guess that based on the very short timeframe open that it was archived by intervention. Which means requesting unarchival goes against what I quoted from the server control page. I don’t imagine that whoever initiated the archival actually intended to suppress the discussion. It was likely maintainers looking to get the bug report out of their view (out of sight, out of mind) for organizational reasons. But since archival has the effect of suppressing discussion, it’s not a proper mechanism for that. ** Proposal ** I propose several actions to remedy all this. ① Revision to the DSC to include public discourse w.r.t bug reports. ② Drafting a clear and comprehensive policy informing everyone as to proper and improper usage of bug archival and unarchival. Adapt Bugs/server-control#unarchive as needed. ③ Modify the BTS as needed to include basic archival information in the public views of bug reports, such as: * who initiated the archival * why it was archived (age or intervention; and if intervention then the rationale for the intervention) ④ Reopen bug 1002906 if it’s deemed to have been archived without good cause.
Bug#1066034: tech-ctte: proposed constitution fix and social contract chg to make documentation accessible to all people
Package: tech-ctte Severity: normal Tags: a11y X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.tech-c...@sideload.33mail.com # The DSC needs to become meaningful Chuck Zmudzinski filed a bug report saying that the Debian Social Contract (DSC) is “meaningless”: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1028557 He is correct in the sense that there is no enforcement mechanism. At the same time, the Debian Constitution (DC) also neglects to acknowledge jurisdiction over DSC enforcement. This is a bug. I think it’s assumed that the technical committee is tasked with DSC enforcement. But this should be explicit and without guesswork. Is the DSC a guaranteed protection whereby non-compliances have a complaint mechanism and corrective procedure? Or is the DSC actually intended to be comparable to a meaningless pushover license? # Transparency In a sense, the transparency problem is joined with a dog food problem. Consider ¶3: > “3. We will not hide problems > > We will keep our entire bug report database open for public view at > all times. Reports that people file online will promptly become > visible to others.” (off-topic bug: “others” should be changed to “the public”, but security bugs should be exempt from “promptly”) Problems in the DSC and calls for improvement thereof should itself be a transparent process. It was unclear to me where to submit this bug herein: tech-ctte, qa.debian.org, or general? The DSC shows “Version 1.2 ratified on October 1st, 2022.” But where and how? The public should have transparent access to the discussions, decisions, and changes. # DSC change proposal: make documentation accessible to ALL people There is a growing problem of documentation being locked into walled gardens which discriminate against several demographics of people, such as blind people being forced to solve a CAPTCHA that requires vision. The access-restricted documentation problem is particularly rampant on the Linux Mint and (ironically) Ubuntu projects. Debian does not proactively impose any walled gardens on people at the moment but whenever a package makes reference to external documentation served from an access-restricted location, Debian passively allows this. Debian can (and should) do better than this. The problem and proposal is described in detail here: * https://linux.community/post/649372 * https://kbin.social/m/debian/t/889598/Debian-Social-Contract-Should-all-Debian-users-inclusively-have-open Those two links ↑ give two different views of the same article. I reference both because of a minor formatting bug in kbin.
Bug#620756: Please adapt code of conduct
* Carsten Hey [2011-04-03 22:08]: > > * Because some new Debian users (i.e., not Debian Developers nor people >posting to Debian lists regularly) might expect to get a carbon copy >even without explicitly requesting one, sending a CC to them could be >appropriate in rare cases. Some would consider that negative training, whereby new users are taught bad habits and form wrong expectations. There is also a risk of missed messages. If just one person breaks the rule in that circumstance and others follow the rule, the OP might only see messages from the rule breaker. If Adrian had uniquely followed the rules, the OP might see only Henrique’s reply and look no further. If they had both followed the rules, the OP would have received no reply (if unsubscribed) which would potentially prompt them to check the list. “Potentially” is a key there.. The current policy facilitates a /zero personal reply zero check/ anomaly, where the user does not consider checking the list for replies and misses all replies. I wonder if a technical change could mitigate that. In principle, when an unsubscribed author sends a message, perhaps the mailing list should autorespond saying: “Your message was posted here: $URL. That is where you should check for replies.” That would be a good enhancement request for whatever mailing list software they are using. Or alternatively/additionally, the mailing list software could go above and beyond and track msgs by non-subscribers and either signal them on replies to just their message or send a periodic digest of replies. That feature could even be user-togglable. Maybe overkill, but worth consideration IMO. > Additionally the following could be added: > > * Explicitly setting Mail-Followup-To: to the list's address reduces >the chance to wrongly receive an unwanted carbon copy. Good point.. I would concur with that amendment. (not that it matters.. I have no sway on these changes)
Bug#1065879: openvpn: protocol configs have contradictory and confusing meanings in the man page + broken link + links to walled gardens
Package: openvpn Version: 2.5.1-3 Severity: normal Tags: upstream X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.open...@sideload.33mail.com The --proto option is documented to accept these args: udp tcp-client tcp-server The --remote option is documented to accept these args in the last position: udp / udp4 / udp6 tcp / tcp4 / tcp6 The --proto-force option is documented to accept these args: udp tcp What happens when you have: remote 198.19.34.56 443 # host 1 proto tcp-client remote 198.19.34.57 1194 udp4 # host 2 remote 198.19.34.58 1194# host 3 http-proxy 192.168.0.8 8080 proto udp ? The proto parameter is documented to specify a default setting when a connection profile is used. But the above example has two profile-free connections. Users can (hopefully) assume that “tcp-client” will be internally modified to “tcp” when connecting to host 1. But what happens when host 2 is tried? In principle if proto is not merely specifying a /default/, then this is a conflict that should cause an error. The man page should state whether proto is: 1) a default (overridden by the remote setting); 2) an override (to replace the remote setting); or 3) a mutually weighted option that errors upon conflicts The option “--proto tcp” often appears in configuration files given to users by VPN suppliers. OpenVPN accepts it without error despite contradiction with the man page. So it seems the man page needs to clarify what that means. If openVPN is able to disambiguate *-client / *-server, then do those suffixes even serve a necessary purpose? W.r.t. connection profiles, the man page states that the “proto” option can be embedded in the grouping, and as a consequence when proto is specified /outside/ the grouping, it serves as a default /only/ if it comes before the profile. Is it safe to assume that sequence is irrelevant when it comes to interplay between profile-free connections and the proto setting? Another interesting example: proto-force tcp proto tcp-client remote 198.19.34.56 443 tcp4 remote 198.19.34.58 1194 udp The proto parameter gives no way to specify IPv4 or IPv6. So would the above indicate an option conflict, or does the tcp4 take precedence? Or is “tcp4” overridden by “tcp-client”? And which protocol is used on port 1194? And considering proto-force only has effect on connection profiles, is it simply ignored in this case? Users can perhaps experiment to work out which of the various possible behaviors result, but the man page should be written unambiguously. The man page mentions this bad URL: http://sites.inka.de/sites/bigred/devel/tcp-tcp.html Naturally some users would try the InternetArchive version, which first redirects to: https://web.archive.org/web/20240114052848/http://sites.inka.de/sites/bigred/devel/tcp-tcp.html and then that redirects to a page telling users to visit a Github profile belonging to Barbarossa. From there, it’s unclear where to go. ** Docs in access-restricted walled gardens ** Many of the man page URLs link into an access-restricted walled garden. E.g. all openvpn.net links go to a Cloudflare site that is not open to all people. It’s an injustice for a Debian man page to refer users to exclusive resources that may exclude them. This is perhaps something that should be fixed in the Debian version as the upstream project has no duty to the users. Debian has a quality standard as well as a social contract and users to give equitable treatment to. Therefore IMO the Debian project should remove the access-restricted links from the man page and ideally replace them with openly accessible links. The most convenient way to do that would be to find mirrored versions of the pages in the Wayback Machine. This one-liner would perhaps do the job well enough: sed -e '/http.*.openvpn.net/s@https://\([[:alnum:].]*openvpn.net\)@https://web.archive.org/web/\1@' ietf.org has the same problem. -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers oldstable-updates APT policy: (990, 'oldstable-updates'), (990, 'oldstable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'oldstable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages openvpn depends on: ii debconf [debconf-2.0] 1.5.77 ii iproute2 5.10.0-4 ii libc6 2.31-13+deb11u5 ii liblz4-1 1.9.3-2 ii liblzo2-2 2.10-2 ii libpam0g 1.4.0-9+deb11u1 ii libpkcs11-helper1 1.27-1 ii libssl1.1 1.1.1n-0+deb11u3 ii libsystemd0247.3-7+deb11u1 ii lsb-base 11.1.0 Versions of packages openvpn recommends: ii easy-rsa 3.0.8-1 Versions of
Bug#1028557: general: The Debian Social Contract is enforced extrajudicially but wording is missing
Package: general Followup-For: Bug #1028557 X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.1028...@sideload.33mail.com Why do you say enforcement is necessarily bound to the judicial system of a state? Rules can be written and enforced entirely without a state-backed authority. Consider a scenario as simple as a bar having rules and then bouncing a rule-breaking customer. Or more formally, a university campus has their own rules. If you break the rules they have an arbitration process where you can address a panel of your peers and argue your case. The school argues their case, and the panel of peers decides the outcome. That process happens entirely without any lawyers, judges, or state actors involved. The Debian Project is staffed and those people have powers¹. E.g. the “technical committee” can: 4. Overrule a Developer (requires a 3:1 majority). The Technical Committee may ask a Developer to take a particular technical course of action even if the Developer does not wish to; this requires a 3:1 majority. For example, the Committee may determine that a complaint made by the submitter of a bug is justified and that the submitter's proposed solution should be implemented. It’s a bit vague though in terms of the actions and penalties. But I guess it’s implied that a project can be removed from the Debian system. The procedures are described here: https://www.debian.org/devel/tech-ctte ** Still a bug ** I agree there is a bug here. The Debian Social Contract does not refer to the Debian Constitution as the enforcement mechanism, and the Debian Constitution does not claim jurisdiction over enforcement of the Debian Social Contract. It seems a bit sloppy that the Debian Constitution only says statements may be made about the social contract in paragraph 4.1.5.2. Some verbiage needs to be added to both docs to establish enforcability. (footnotes) ① https://www.debian.org/devel/constitution
Bug#1064836: rsync: Escape code %P treated literally in --out-format spec
Package: rsync Version: 3.2.3-4+deb11u1 Severity: normal X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.rs...@sideload.33mail.com The following simplified command was used to backup a whole drive: $ rsync -vahHAXS --out-format='%i %n%L %P' --delete --relative --numeric-ids --prune-empty-dirs --dry-run\ --exclude '/proc/'\ --exclude '/dev/'\ --exclude '/sys/'\ --exclude '/run/'\ --exclude '/mnt/'\ --exclude '/tmp/'\ / /mnt/backup/ The --out-format supplied above is essentially the same as the -i option but with “ %P” appended, which is documented in the rsyncd.conf manpage as follows: %P the module path This term “module” is non-intuitive and the first occurance of the word in the rsync manpage is unexplained (which should be fixed.. the first use of a term like that should be explained on the spot). It’s explained further down on the manpage. In any case, I just wanted to see what %P would show because there seems to be no mechanism to print the filename on the *receiving* destination side (%f is the long form of the sender side, and %n is a short form [apparently on the sender side though this is not specified and thus should be clarified]). I ultimately need to troubleshoot a problem of files being dumped one directory level higher than expected on the receiving side. The output looks like this: ===8< … >f+ /home/user/foo.txt %P … ===8< So %P is being printed literally. In summary, these are the bugs: * --out-format='%i %n%L %P' results in %P being printed literally. * “module” is mentioned on the rsync man page before it’s defined. * %n on the rsyncd.conf manpage omits sender/receiver. * Neither manpage states how to print the full *receiving* side filename. -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers oldstable-updates APT policy: (990, 'oldstable-updates'), (990, 'oldstable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'oldstable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages rsync depends on: ii init-system-helpers 1.60 ii libacl1 2.2.53-10 ii libc62.31-13+deb11u5 ii liblz4-1 1.9.3-2 ii libpopt0 1.18-2 ii libssl1.11.1.1n-0+deb11u3 ii libxxhash0 0.8.0-2 ii libzstd1 1.4.8+dfsg-2.1 ii lsb-base 11.1.0 ii zlib1g 1:1.2.11.dfsg-2+deb11u2 rsync recommends no packages. Versions of packages rsync suggests: ii openssh-client 1:8.4p1-5+deb11u1 ii openssh-server 1:8.4p1-5+deb11u1 ii python3 3.9.2-3 -- no debconf information
Bug#1060012: rsync: docs insufficient for --partial, -W, --no-whole-file, and SIGNALS
Package: rsync Version: 3.2.3-4+deb11u1 Severity: minor X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.rs...@sideload.33mail.com Rsync was producing some baffling behavior. But after some investigation, it turns out rsync is apparently well-behaved. The docs are lacking in ways that slowed down my ability to figure out what was going wrong and hindered my ability to work out the needed parameters going forward. In the case at hand, I ran a command like this: $ rsync -va -P $local_source_file $local_destination A ~20gb file was being pushed through a USB2 bus which can be quite slow. I had to shutdown in the middle of the transfer thus hit ctrl-c. The partial file was left as expected (though hard to find because the date was 1970 and I did an “ls -ltr” to look for recent files). So at first I thought the partial file was not saved. This caused me to distrust ctrl-c as a signal that would be treated as an “interruption” (vs. a deliberate cancelation by a user which might cause an assumption that the user does not want the effects of the transfer to play out). Kill signals are not well documented. I later realized the partial file was in fact present but with a 1970 timestamp. Then I later ran the original command, but it started transferring from zero and did not crash-recover. Again I was astonished and thought there was a functionality bug. It’s finally clear that there are no functionality bugs in this episode. In the interest of mitigating user astonishment, I suggest the following man-page updates: 1. The docs for --partial should state the requirements for crash-recovery to function. Specifically, it should state that -W must be switched off in the recovery session. This is particularly important because it’s certainly not obvious from the summary of options that there is interplay between -W and --partial. 2. The docs for --whole-file should also mention its affect after --partial is used. Someone searching the man-page for partial should also be brought to the --whole-file option, and vice versa. The docs for --whole-file also neglect to state how to disable the option. The only reason I was able to discover the existence of the --no-whole-file option was because it incidentally happened to be an example given in the docs for --no-OPTION. Otherwise if that example had not existed, I would have been at a dead-end. 3. Man-pages normally have a “SIGNALS” section. I looked for that section because I wanted to see what signal results in a graceful abort that respects the --partial option. So a “SIGNALS” section should be created with that in mind. -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers oldstable-updates APT policy: (990, 'oldstable-updates'), (990, 'oldstable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'oldstable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages rsync depends on: ii init-system-helpers 1.60 ii libacl1 2.2.53-10 ii libc62.31-13+deb11u5 ii liblz4-1 1.9.3-2 ii libpopt0 1.18-2 ii libssl1.11.1.1n-0+deb11u3 ii libxxhash0 0.8.0-2 ii libzstd1 1.4.8+dfsg-2.1 ii lsb-base 11.1.0 ii zlib1g 1:1.2.11.dfsg-2+deb11u2 rsync recommends no packages. Versions of packages rsync suggests: ii openssh-client 1:8.4p1-5+deb11u1 ii openssh-server 1:8.4p1-5+deb11u1 ii python3 3.9.2-3 -- no debconf information
Bug#1026430: more bugs to account for than upstream is aware of
Package: profanity Version: 0.13.1-1~bpo11+1 Followup-For: Bug #1026430 X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.1026...@sideload.33mail.com The scenario captured in bug 1026430 actually expands into 4 bugs. Upstream bug report 1615¹ seems to capture sub bug 1 (the mere fact that fingerprints are lost) but not sub bugs 2—4. If upstream bug 1615 is resolved by merely mitigating the key loss, what happens when there is no key for someone to begin with? Or when a key expires? More guard conditionals are needed to ensure a msg doesn’t go out to a group without everyone’s pubkey first being completely resolved. This check should ideally be performed before the sender even begins typing a msg. 1. https://github.com/profanity-im/profanity/issues/1615
Bug#1043109: imagemagick: metadata leaks into body on TIFF → PDF conversion
Package: imagemagick Version: 8:6.9.11.60+dfsg-1.3 Severity: normal Tags: upstream X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.imagemag...@sideload.33mail.com Metadata from a TIFF file is being transfered to the *body* of the target file when “converting” to a PDF file. This results in a PDF file that falsely appears to have searchable text. One side-effect of that is OCR programs raise errors saying the PDF has already been OCR-processed. Steps to reproduce: ① Use Gimp to save a TIFF file. The options to save metadata should probably be enabled. ② Verify that the “PageName” field is populated: $ tiffinfo gimp_output.tif TIFFReadDirectory: Warning, Unknown field with tag 326 (0x146) encountered. TIFFReadDirectory: Warning, Unknown field with tag 327 (0x147) encountered. TIFFReadDirectory: Warning, Unknown field with tag 328 (0x148) encountered. TIFF Directory at offset 0x8 (8) Image Width: 3544 Image Length: 6240 Resolution: 204, 196 pixels/inch Bits/Sample: 1 Sample Format: unsigned integer Compression Scheme: None Photometric Interpretation: min-is-white Orientation: row 0 top, col 0 lhs Samples/Pixel: 1 Rows/Strip: 128 Planar Configuration: single image plane SubIFD Offsets: 5392 PageName: pg04-5.tiff Software: GIMP 2.10.22 DateTime: 2023:08:05 20:24:13 XMLPacket (XMP Metadata): ③ Use ImageMagick-convert to produce a PDF: $ convert gimp_output.tif imagemagick_output.pdf convert-im6.q16: Unknown field with tag 326 (0x146) encountered. `TIFFReadDirectory' @ warning/tiff.c/TIFFWarnings/985. convert-im6.q16: Unknown field with tag 327 (0x147) encountered. `TIFFReadDirectory' @ warning/tiff.c/TIFFWarnings/985. convert-im6.q16: Unknown field with tag 328 (0x148) encountered. `TIFFReadDirectory' @ warning/tiff.c/TIFFWarnings/985. convert-im6.q16: Unknown field with tag 327 (0x147) encountered. `TIFFReadDirectory' @ warning/tiff.c/TIFFWarnings/985. convert-im6.q16: Unknown field with tag 328 (0x148) encountered. `TIFFReadDirectory' @ warning/tiff.c/TIFFWarnings/985. ④ Use pdf2txt to see the stray text that was injected into the PDF body: $ pdf2txt imagemagick_output.pdf pg04-5.tiff ⑤ Use pdfinfo to prove that the TIFF metadata (“PageName:”) did not make it into the PDF metadata: $ pdfinfo imagemagick_output.pdf Title: imagemagick_output Producer: https://imagemagick.org CreationDate: Sun Aug 6 10:14:34 2023 CEST ModDate:Sun Aug 6 10:14:34 2023 CEST Tagged: no UserProperties: no Suspects: no Form: none JavaScript: no Pages: 1 Encrypted: no Page size: 1250.82 x 2292.24 pts Page rot: 0 File size: 27485613 bytes Optimized: no PDF version:1.7 ⑥ Use ocrmypdf to attempt making the text contained within the PDF searchable: $ ocrmypdf imagemagick_output.pdf searchable.pdf Scanning contents: 100%|| 1/1 [00:00<00:00, 68.27page/s] Using Tesseract OpenMP thread limit 2 OCR: 0%| | 0.0/1.0 [00:00https://imagemagick.org compare: ImageMagick 6.9.11-60 Q16 x86_64 2021-01-25 https://imagemagick.org convert: ImageMagick 6.9.11-60 Q16 x86_64 2021-01-25 https://imagemagick.org composite: ImageMagick 6.9.11-60 Q16 x86_64 2021-01-25 https://imagemagick.org conjure: ImageMagick 6.9.11-60 Q16 x86_64 2021-01-25 https://imagemagick.org display: ImageMagick 6.9.11-60 Q16 x86_64 2021-01-25 https://imagemagick.org identify: ImageMagick 6.9.11-60 Q16 x86_64 2021-01-25 https://imagemagick.org import: ImageMagick 6.9.11-60 Q16 x86_64 2021-01-25 https://imagemagick.org mogrify: ImageMagick 6.9.11-60 Q16 x86_64 2021-01-25 https://imagemagick.org montage: ImageMagick 6.9.11-60 Q16 x86_64 2021-01-25 https://imagemagick.org stream: ImageMagick 6.9.11-60 Q16 x86_64 2021-01-25 https://imagemagick.org -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers oldstable-updates APT policy: (990, 'oldstable-updates'), (990, 'oldstable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'oldstable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages imagemagick depends on: ii imagemagick-6.q16 8:6.9.11.60+dfsg-1.3 imagemagick recommends no packages. imagemagick suggests no packages. -- no debconf information
Bug#1042487: neomutt: ANSI headers not decoded
Package: neomutt Version: 20201127+dfsg.1-1.2 Severity: normal Tags: upstream X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.neom...@sideload.33mail.com When the From: field contains an umlaut (“ö”), such as: Andreas Rönnquist it then gets encoded for transport and the literal text is: From: Andreas =?UTF-8?B?UsO2bm5xdWlzdA==?= Neomutt properly treats that UTF-8 encoding. However, the 33mail.com forwarding service apparently re-encodes it in ANSI as follows: From: "=?ANSI_X3.4-1968?Q?Andreas_R=3Fnnquist?= 'redacted' via 33Mail" Neomutt does not decode that particular string. In Neomutt the =?ANSI… junk appears literally. Steps to reproduce: 1. Download the mbox file for the following comment: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1027753;msg=10 2. Replace the /From:/ field with: From: "=?ANSI_X3.4-1968?Q?Andreas_R=3Fnnquist?= 'redacted' via 33Mail" 3. Launch neomutt: $ neomutt -f "$mbox_file" I am probably running an old version of neomutt, but I have searched both bug trackers (Debian & upstream) for “ANSI” & found no mention of this bug. I also searched the debian change logs. So AFAICT the latest neomutt would have this bug as well. -- Package-specific info: NeoMutt 20201127 Copyright (C) 1996-2020 Michael R. Elkins and others. NeoMutt comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; for details type 'neomutt -vv'. NeoMutt is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it under certain conditions; type 'neomutt -vv' for details. System: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (x86_64) ncurses: ncurses 6.2.20201114 (compiled with 6.2.20201114) libidn: 1.33 (compiled with 1.33) GPGME: 1.14.0-unknown GnuTLS: 3.7.1 libnotmuch: 5.3.0 storage: tokyocabinet Configure options: --build=x86_64-linux-gnu --prefix=/usr {--includedir=${prefix}/include} {--mandir=${prefix}/share/man} {--infodir=${prefix}/share/info} --sysconfdir=/etc --localstatedir=/var --disable-option-checking --disable-silent-rules {--libdir=${prefix}/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu} {--libexecdir=${prefix}/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu} --disable-maintainer-mode --disable-dependency-tracking --mandir=/usr/share/man --libexecdir=/usr/libexec --with-mailpath=/var/mail --gpgme --lua --notmuch --with-ui --gnutls --gss --idn --mixmaster --sasl --tokyocabinet --sqlite --autocrypt Compilation CFLAGS: -g -O2 -ffile-prefix-map=/build/neomutt-aFsTyZ/neomutt-20201127+dfsg.1=. -fstack-protector-strong -Wformat -Werror=format-security -std=c99 -D_ALL_SOURCE=1 -D_GNU_SOURCE=1 -D__EXTENSIONS__ -I/usr/include -I/usr/include/lua5.4 -DNCURSES_WIDECHAR -isystem /usr/include/mit-krb5 Default options: +attach_headers_color +compose_to_sender +compress +cond_date +debug +encrypt_to_self +forgotten_attachments +forwref +ifdef +imap +index_color +initials +limit_current_thread +multiple_fcc +nested_if +new_mail +nntp +pop +progress +quasi_delete +regcomp +reply_with_xorig +sensible_browser +sidebar +skip_quoted +smtp +status_color +timeout +tls_sni +trash Compile options: +autocrypt +bkgdset +color +curs_set +fcntl -flock -fmemopen +futimens +getaddrinfo +gnutls +gpgme +gss +hcache -homespool +idn +inotify -locales_hack +lua +meta +mixmaster +nls +notmuch -openssl +pgp +regex +sasl +smime +sqlite +start_color +sun_attachment +typeahead MAILPATH="/var/mail" MIXMASTER="mixmaster" PKGDATADIR="/usr/share/neomutt" SENDMAIL="/usr/sbin/sendmail" SYSCONFDIR="/etc" To learn more about NeoMutt, visit: https://neomutt.org If you find a bug in NeoMutt, please raise an issue at: https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt/issues or send an email to: -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages neomutt depends on: ii libc6 2.31-13+deb11u5 ii libgnutls30 3.7.1-5+deb11u2 ii libgpg-error0 1.38-2 ii libgpgme111.14.0-1+b2 ii libgssapi-krb5-2 1.18.3-6+deb11u3 ii libidn11 1.33-3 ii liblua5.4-0 5.4.2-2 ii libncursesw6 6.2+20201114-2 ii libnotmuch5 0.31.4-2 ii libsasl2-22.1.27+dfsg-2.1+deb11u1 ii libsqlite3-0 3.34.1-3 ii libtinfo6 6.2+20201114-2 ii libtokyocabinet9 1.4.48-13 ii sensible-utils0.0.14 Versions of packages neomutt recommends: ii libsasl2-modules 2.1.27+dfsg-2.1+deb11u1 ii locales 2.31-13+deb11u5 ii mime-support 3.66 Versions of packages neomutt suggests: ii aspell 0.60.8-3 ii ca-certificates 20210119 ii gnupg 2.2.27-2+deb11u2 ii ispell 3.4.02-2 pn mixmaster
Bug#1041769: geeqie: TIFF renders as an upside-down mirror of former CCITT docs
Package: geeqie Version: 1:1.6-9+deb11u1 Severity: important X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.gee...@sideload.33mail.com TIFF files display as an upside-down mirror image. The reproduction steps are: 1. Scan a text document on a Konica Minolta bizhub C360i MFD & save to USB 2. $ pdfimages -all $scanned_pdf innards 3. $ fax2tiff $(https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=646982 Bug 646982 reports a problem with correcting the orientation, but we have to ask why the TIFF orientation needed correction in the first place. This entry in the release notes looks interesting: ===8<-- geeqie (1:1.5.1+git20200708-1) unstable; urgency=medium * Update README.Debian - mention GDK_CORE_DEVICE_EVENT, remove obsolete info about gqview * New upstream git snapshot 1.5.1+git20200708 - Fixes rendering under wayland (Closes: #964441) * Remove patches applied upstream: 0001-Fix-710-Apply-the-orientation-to-image-content-not-w.patch 0002-Fix-736-Please-migrate-from-gnome-doc-tool-to-yelp-b.patch 0004-Fix-741-Crash-when-creating-new-dir-with-same-name-a.patch fix_multiple_definitions_with_gcc_10.patch * Refresh patch 0003-Remove-changelog-from-menu-item.patch * Add patch to fix version number on git snapshot and add Forwarded: not-needed to silence lintian ===8<-- Might that removed patch (0001-…) be related? Because of that possibility, I did not mark this bug as upstream. Unfortunately I have no sample to attach. Perhaps I can scan an arbitrary non-personal document in the future to supply a sample, if needed. -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages geeqie depends on: ii geeqie-common1:1.6-9+deb11u1 ii libc62.31-13+deb11u5 ii libcairo21.16.0-5 ii libchamplain-0.12-0 0.12.20-1 ii libchamplain-gtk-0.12-0 0.12.20-1 ii libclutter-1.0-0 1.26.4+dfsg-2 ii libclutter-gtk-1.0-0 1.8.4-4 ii libcogl201.22.8-2 ii libdjvulibre21 3.5.28-2 ii libexiv2-27 0.27.3-3+deb11u1 ii libffmpegthumbnailer4v5 2.1.1-0.2+b1 ii libgcc-s110.2.1-6 ii libgdk-pixbuf-2.0-0 2.42.2+dfsg-1+deb11u1 ii libglib2.0-0 2.66.8-1 ii libgtk-3-0 3.24.24-4+deb11u2 ii libheif1 1.11.0-1 ii libjpeg62-turbo 1:2.0.6-4 ii liblcms2-2 2.12~rc1-2 ii liblirc-client0 0.10.1-6.3 ii liblua5.1-0 5.1.5-8.1+b3 ii libopenjp2-7 2.4.0-3 ii libpango-1.0-0 1.46.2-3 ii libpangocairo-1.0-0 1.46.2-3 ii libpoppler-glib8 20.09.0-3.1+deb11u1 ii libstdc++6 10.2.1-6 ii libtiff5 4.2.0-1+deb11u1 ii libwebp6 0.6.1-2.1 ii sensible-utils 0.0.14 Versions of packages geeqie recommends: ii cups-bsd [lpr] 2.3.3op2-3+deb11u2 ii exiftran 2.10-4 ii exiv20.27.3-3+deb11u1 ii imagemagick 8:6.9.11.60+dfsg-1.3 ii imagemagick-6.q16 [imagemagick] 8:6.9.11.60+dfsg-1.3 ii librsvg2-common 2.50.3+dfsg-1 ii zenity 3.32.0-6 Versions of packages geeqie suggests: pn geeqie-dbg ii gimp 2.10.22-4 pn libjpeg-progs pn xpaint -- no debconf information
Bug#1041373: toot: bug suppression must be thwarted
Package: toot Version: 0.27.0-1 Followup-For: Bug #1041373 X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.1041...@sideload.33mail.com > yet you wont receive any updates There are countless factors in determining the version that best serves any particular user. It is not for you to decide or control what version a user runs. When you suggest that users upgrade their whole system in order to run a more recent version of a social media app to overcome a trivial flaw, this is reckless advice. You need to understand that every package has dependencies. Those version dependencies either support or break other packages. Every dist upgrade results in gains /and losses/. You cannot competently prescribe arbitrarily to all users that they “chase the shiny” at all costs. It’s an absurdity to impose this on others most particularly when they are still running officially supported versions. > and instead you spam the debian bug tracking system with "reports" > that are just noise (like this one, since it's fixed upstream). You’ve misidentified the problem. The problem was not with the version I was running; it’s that I did not check the release notes first. Please re-read my message from the top. I admitted to that error which AFAIK only involves bug 1041373, not the others. Users can run a range of different officially supported versions and the Debian BTS is rightfully designed to accommodate this. > if i go in a bakery and scream "my chair broke, i want a new one!" > it serves no one purpose. The misunderstanding here is that you think I am an individual looking for personalized support. The bugs I have reported are *community* bugs. So the /fallacy of analogy/ here is that you say “my” chair broke, when in fact it’s a community resource that broke. By extension, community bug reports serve the community, not the individual. In fact the individual bug submitter finds workarounds because bugs are not fixed overnight and a Debian user won’t often see the change for years out. By the time the lifecycle of the bug runs its course, any benefit to the original submitter is marginal since their workaround or alternate workflow is already established. The beneficiaries of fixes are future users. > You need to submit the requests in the right place for the right > people to act on. The “right place” differs from one user to the next. It is walled gardens who decide who may enter, not users who decide whether a walled garden must serve them. Often there is no “right place” for a given user. Some bugs go entirely unreported because of obnoxious CAPTCHAs or surveillance capitalist MitMs. Yes it’s clear that you’re a gmail pawn but try not to view everyone through the “surveillance capitalism is fine for everyone” lens. That’s not for you to control. Users will contribute bug reports wherever they /can/. It’s rightfully their choice. Demanding that voluntary contributors bend to your needs is quite obnoxious. > yeah which you conveniently omitted to report the big `if` before > hand: "If you file a bug in Debian, don't send a copy to the upstream > software maintainers yourself" I simply pointed you to the whole document. How can that be an omission? The only omission I see is in your cherry picked requoting of the doc, which omitted: “If necessary, the maintainer of the package will forward the bug upstream.” > -- what we are telling you Speak for youself please. > is to NOT file these bugs at all in the debian bts, but directly > upstream. On what authority do you believe you can override the bug reporting procedure document? Clearly the policy you were shown gives contributors a choice. If you don’t like that, it’s on you to change it. This is not the appropriate place for that. > you dont like github? Github doesn’t like me either. Red herring nonetheless. Who likes who is irrelevent when the Debian procedure gives contributors a choice. > If i were the maintainer of this package, i'd bulk close all your > report and invalid and ask the BTS maintainer to temporarily ban you > from submitting more. Then you would be a reckless maintainer. Nothing is worse for quality than a bug suppressing emotionally hot-headed maintainer.
Bug#1041373: toot: release notes overlooked
Package: toot Version: 0.27.0-1 Followup-For: Bug #1041373 X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.1041...@sideload.33mail.com Ivan Habunek said: > This has been fixed in 0.28.1 (2022-11-12). > > -- Ivan Thanks Ivan. I searched for this bug both in Github and in the Debian BTS and found nothing prior to filing the report, but I did not review the release notes. Sorry about that. In attempt to improve my own procedure, I found the Debian release notes here: https://metadata.ftp-master.debian.org/changelogs//main/t/toot/toot_0.34.1-1_changelog They neglect to mention the fix, which is documented here: https://github.com/ihabunek/toot/releases?page=2 In the future, I will try to remember to check both sets of release notes (Debian & upstream) before filing. Since the upstream release notes are made available, the Debian policy suggests that maintainers to include them in the distro release notes. So I have submitted a separate (downstream) bug report for this but it has not yet been assigned a number. -- Sandro Tosi said: > this is the version in oldstable, it's probably time to upgrade to > something newer, Perhaps eventually. I appreciate the information. But it’s important to realize that upgrading a whole Debian system is not to be taken lightly. People like myself keep various quite fragile pkgs on life-support which are easily broken in upgrades. I’ve seen the havoc and catastrophe dist upgrade can cause. Risks often far outweight the benefits particularly in this case. It also requires having high-speed unlimited broadband access. Sometimes either a hot site or cold site, backups, roll-back contingencies, etc. It’s a big deal. The undertaking would a crazy remedy to the bug herein, or for anything toot related for that matter. Most importantly: oldstable is still officially supported for another year¹ from now. > which hopefully will stop this stream of bug reports Bug reports are essential for QA. It’s better to advocate for bug reports, not push for their suppression. > that do not belong to the debian tracking system (as mentioned > before already). Please read the “Don't file bugs upstream” section of the bug reporting procedure². Footnotes: ① https://wiki.debian.org/DebianReleases ② https://www.debian.org/Bugs/Reporting#filedalready
Bug#1041403: toot: upstream release notes not imported
Package: toot Version: 0.27.0-1 Severity: wishlist X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.t...@sideload.33mail.com The downstream release notes here: https://metadata.ftp-master.debian.org/changelogs//main/t/toot/toot_0.34.1-1_changelog exclude the upstream release notes which are available here: https://github.com/ihabunek/toot/releases Section 12.7 of the Debian policy states¹: “If an upstream release notes file is available, containing a summary of changes between upstream releases intended for end users of the package and often called NEWS, it should be accessible as /usr/share/doc/package/NEWS.gz” … “If there is an upstream changelog available, it may be made available as /usr/share/doc/package/changelog.gz.” … “[10] Rationale: People should not have to look in places for upstream changelogs merely because they are given different names or are distributed in HTML format.” Note that the Debian policy language does not strictly require² the above (which uses wording like “should” and “may” and not “must”). So it’s optional and hence why this bug herein is filed with /wishlist/ severity. Even if the upstream release notes continue to be excluded, it would be useful if the Debian release notes would at least link to the upstream notes in light of footnote 10 above. One benefit to comprehensive release notes is that it might mitigate reports of fixed bugs, apart from helping users determine which version is best for their situation. Footnotes: ① https://www.debian.org/doc/debian-policy/ch-docs.html#changelog-files-and-release-notes ② https://www.debian.org/doc/debian-policy/ch-scope.html#definitions
Bug#1041373: toot: posts cannot begin with a hashtag
Package: toot Version: 0.27.0-1 Severity: normal Tags: upstream X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.t...@sideload.33mail.com When posting from the commandline, if -e is used then a template states that lines beginning with a hash (“#”) are ignored. This is a problem because it’s very often useful to begin a line with a hashtag. It’s in fact common to write just hashtags on the last line of a message. It’s unclear¹ why users would want to put comments in a temporary text file that will be destroyed right after posting, but certainly a hash symbol should be avoided. Possible alternatives: % LaTeX and Erlang comments go from percent symbol to EOL /* comments in C, graphviz and many other languages² begin with forward slash asterisk and end with */ // C++ comments go from // to EOL -- Ada comments go from -- to EOL ; Forgot where I’ve seen this but some app’s comments go from semicolon to EOL [//]: # (markdown comments are complicated) Considering some simplified subset of HTML is specified for activitypub posts, HTML comments may be the most suitable. Possible other bugs: I’ve only identified this bug in the CLI version specifically in conjunction with using an editor. I have not tested what happens to lines beginning with hash when the text body is supplied on the commandline, or what happens in the TUI. If the pure non-interactive CLI approach is affected, then it would be a bug that the man page does not cover it. footnotes: ① implementation of https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1038664 would make comments more useful ② https://web.archive.org/web/20230301231734/geekflare.com/how-to-add-comments/
Bug#1040640: toot: crash with stack dump when posting a JPEG
Package: toot Version: 0.27.0-1 Severity: important Tags: upstream X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.t...@sideload.33mail.com I tried to post a JPG image and it crashed with a stack dump: ===8<-- $ torsocks toot post -u b...@example.com -m ./some_pic.jpg -e emacs Uploading media: ./some_pic.jpg Traceback (most recent call last): File "/usr/bin/toot", line 11, in load_entry_point('toot==0.27.0', 'console_scripts', 'toot')() File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/toot/console.py", line 550, in main run_command(app, user, command_name, args) File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/toot/console.py", line 532, in run_command return fn(app, user, parsed_args) File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/toot/commands.py", line 104, in post args.text = "\n".join(m['text_url'] for m in media) TypeError: sequence item 0: expected str instance, NoneType found ===8<-- Notice that it was over a Tor circuit though I don’t suppose that’s likely a factor. ===8<-- $ identify ./some_pic.jpg ./some_pic.jpg JPEG 1024x763 1024x763+0+0 8-bit sRGB 26324B 0.000u 0:00.000 ===8<-- -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages toot depends on: ii python3 3.9.2-3 ii python3-bs4 4.9.3-1 ii python3-requests 2.25.1+dfsg-2 ii python3-urwid 2.1.2-1 ii python3-wcwidth 0.1.9+dfsg1-2 toot recommends no packages. toot suggests no packages. -- no debconf information
Bug#1040221: dealing with upstream bugs
Package: toot Version: 0.27.0-1 Followup-For: Bug #1040221 X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.1040...@sideload.33mail.com I have added the “upstream” tags to a couple bug reports and noticed the search form provides a tag criteria. So if you want to filter out upstream bugs, this link does that: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/pkgreport.cgi?archive=both;exclude=tags%3Aupstream;package=toot We can also filter out downstream bug reports by including bugs tagged “upstream”: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/pkgreport.cgi?archive=both;include=tags%3Aupstream;package=toot Perhaps it would be useful to submit just one bug report upstream, call it a meta bug report of sorts, which simply references the link above. Ideally the upstream maintainer would then just leave that bug report open indefinitely and pin it to the top if possible so all upstream users are steered toward browsing upstream bugs in the Debian BTS as well.
Bug#1040221: toot: auth output needs a raw option
control: tags -1 upstream * Jonathan Carter 'j...@debian.org' via 33Mail [2023-07-07 17:34]: > On 2023/07/03 19:51, Sandro Tosi wrote: > > It would be nice if you could report all the issues you opened > > upstream at the link above and forward > > (https://www.debian.org/Bugs/server-control#forwarded) the debian bugs > > to the upstream once. > > +1, that would be ideal, we don't write code for toot or add new features > for it in Debian, we package the upstream version, and might carry some bug > fixes in the form of patches until they're fixed upstream, but other than > that, I suggest filing ideas for improvement on the upstream bug tracker. > > thanks and keep well! I’m not keen on using MS Github. The 2fa system blocks me because the registered email address there forces me to login to an account with a typically broken CAPTCHA. I also have ethical problems with using Microsoft assets. I understand the frustration though. I wouldn’t want your job. I’m glad the Debian BTS gives an easy way to report bugs so they are at least captured somewhere. There are plans to move the toot upstream bug tracker to a more accessible location (Sourceforge). Is there any issue with letting the bugs sit until that happens? I suppose the worst that could happen is they get archived during the wait, but at least they’re still reachable after archiving. I’ve noticed other maintainers being (understandably) reluctant to forward bugs upstream. What can be improved in the Debian BTS? It seems automation is lacking. Shouldn’t there be a simple control signal to the BTS to say “forward this upstream”, and the machinery does the rest? There is a developer tag “upstream”: https://www.debian.org/Bugs/Developer#tags Suppose that tag is applied to the bug reports I submitted. Would it help the management of the bug reports? Perhaps we could use that to tag bug reports waiting to be forwarded so they can be filtered out in searches, and so someone willing and able to use MS assets could perhaps use that tag to query bugs to forward.
Bug#1040577: toot: color lost when piping
Package: toot Version: 0.27.0-1 Severity: minor Tags: upstream X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.t...@sideload.33mail.com CLI output is normally in color but when piping the output to another tool, the color is lost. It’s useful to be able to pipe to “less -R”, which is a pager that preserves ANSI control codes and thus color. Apparently toot is detecting the pipeline as non-interactive and automatically stripping out the color codes even when the “--no-color” option is not supplied. It may be deliberate & it’s probably a sensible default behavior. But if that’s going to be the default then we need a way to force color. The convention is typically a “--color=always” option. -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages toot depends on: ii python3 3.9.2-3 ii python3-bs4 4.9.3-1 ii python3-requests 2.25.1+dfsg-2 ii python3-urwid 2.1.2-1 ii python3-wcwidth 0.1.9+dfsg1-2 toot recommends no packages. toot suggests no packages. -- no debconf information
Bug#1040221: toot: auth output needs a raw option
Package: toot Version: 0.27.0-1 Severity: wishlist X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.t...@sideload.33mail.com The “auth” command outputs a banner line followed by an asterisk-prefixed list of accounts. It’s readable to humans but requires some extra work to make usable for scripts. A common need is to see the notifications on all accounts. For that I run: $ toot auth | awk '/^[*]/{print $2}' | while read acct; do toot notifications -r -u "$acct"; done The status quo of human-readable output could be beautified at any point, or perhaps more information could be added to the auth output in the future. Whenever that changes, it may break scripts and complicate the above hack to act on all accounts. So I suggest adding a “--raw” option of sorts to make the awk command pipe above unnecessary. -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages toot depends on: ii python3 3.9.2-3 ii python3-bs4 4.9.3-1 ii python3-requests 2.25.1+dfsg-2 ii python3-urwid 2.1.2-1 ii python3-wcwidth 0.1.9+dfsg1-2 toot recommends no packages. toot suggests no packages. -- no debconf information
Bug#1040218: toot: superscript digits replaced with full-sized digits
Package: toot Version: 0.27.0-1 Severity: minor X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.t...@sideload.33mail.com When a message contains a superscript digit¹, the superscript is enlarged to a full-sized character. ¹ So “digit¹” is printed as “digit1”, even though the terminal can handle superscripts just fine. -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages toot depends on: ii python3 3.9.2-3 ii python3-bs4 4.9.3-1 ii python3-requests 2.25.1+dfsg-2 ii python3-urwid 2.1.2-1 ii python3-wcwidth 0.1.9+dfsg1-2 toot recommends no packages. toot suggests no packages. -- no debconf information
Bug#1039563: qa.debian.org: Bug vs. feature bug suppression tactic
Package: qa.debian.org Followup-For: Bug #1039563 X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.1039...@sideload.33mail.com >> This is an example of different opinions about bug >< feature. > … > Trying to pick apart the example is an unhelpful distraction to the > discussion of whether the Debian project should have a procedure for > tracking mishandled bugs. I should elaborate further. The “bug vs. feature” bug suppression tactic is so effective and common that it has become a knee-jerk response by anyone looking to refuse a bug report, or those just looking for a quick and dirty way to push bugs out of the triage effort. Bug 1026922 demonstrates an abuse of the bug-feature bug-swatting technique. So actually the “bug vs. feature” debate is relevant to 1039563 in the sense that it showcases an irrational action-- one that solving bug 1039563 mitigates. That is, if bugs reach the wontfix stage as a consequence of a bug-vs-feature tactic, it could be marked as such. The quality of Debian packages can then improve by isolating these cases and counting them. If it’s happening often enough, the QA team could draft a criteria which would distinguish the more genuine bug-vs-feature cases from the irrational ones like that of bug 1026922.
Bug#1039563: qa.debian.org: Procedure needed to report mishandled bug reports
Package: qa.debian.org Followup-For: Bug #1039563 X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.1039...@sideload.33mail.com * Bart Martens 'ba...@debian.org' via 33Mail [2023-06-29 07:39]: > > This is an example of different opinions about bug >< feature. Do you really believe it’s an /opinion/ to say a SOCKS proxy is an HTTP proxy? It’s not a matter of opinion. It’s a factual matter. When someone botches the facts, we don’t call it an opinion. It’s a falsehood. An HTTP proxy is not a SOCKS proxy, and a SOCKS proxy is not an HTTP proxy. Trying to pick apart the example is an unhelpful distraction to the discussion of whether the Debian project should have a procedure for tracking mishandled bugs. > Quoting from 1026922: > > Directing users to report bugs upstream goes against Debian > > conventions. It’s the duty of the maintainer to mirror bugs upstream: > > https://www.debian.org/Bugs/Reporting > > This text is about preventing duplicate effort. No it’s not. It’s about following Debian guidelines. Whether those guidelines call for “duplicate effort” is irrelevant here. If someone doesn’t like the documented Debian procedure of reporting bugs to the Debian BTS first and then escalating upstream from there, bug 1039563 is not the place for that discussion. > I understand your frustration. I doubt however that wrapping 1026922 > in a request for addressing mishandled bugs would be helpful. Bug 1026922 is about as perfect of an example as you’re going to get because unlike most bug reports there is little room for subjectivity. Proper handling of the bug was to mirror upstream and send “control: forwarded 1026922 http://github.com/…”. That did not happen. There needs to be a mechanism by which these cases can be flagged so the community can assess the quality of a package and so developers can easily find and fix suppressed bugs.
Bug#1039563: qa.debian.org: Procedure needed to report mishandled bug reports
Package: qa.debian.org Severity: wishlist X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug@sideload.33mail.com Control: affects -1 +www.debian.org When a bug report is mishandled there should be a documented procedure in place by which the mishandling can be reported to the Debian QA team. There should be metrics in place to make it easy to look for patterns of bug mishandling. And there should be some oversight so a QA member can intervene on specific bugs if a constructive action can be taken. Currently there is no such procedure (or I failed to find it). I expected to find it in these locations: https://wiki.debian.org/BTS https://www.debian.org/Bugs Debian bugs are mishandled too often, which suggests there is no oversight of mishandled cases. I have an example at hand: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1026922 A valid, credible bug report was tagged “wontfix”, which in itself is often fair enough but in this case the action /should/ have been to mirror the bug report upstream because upstream is the source of the bug. “wontfix” would only be sensible if the source of the bug was in the debian pkging & the Debian maintainer opts not to fix it in Debian. A possible secondary mishandling of that bug was early archival as a means of suppression: “Bug archived. Request was from Debbugs Internal Request to internal_cont...@bugs.debian.org. (Sat, 04 Mar 2023 07:26:51 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).” Whether an intervention on bug 1026922 is a good move or not doesn’t matter. Perhaps it’d be over-the-top. But regardless, there should be some record of the mishandling so if a pattern develops it can be noticed & acted on summarily. Or at least users could use bug mishandling stats to appraise the quality of a package before deciding to depend on it.
Bug#1038664: toot: save local copies of every new outbound message
Package: toot Version: 0.27.0-1 Severity: wishlist X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.t...@sideload.33mail.com The Mastodon export feature is insufficient: * countless events can separate users from their data at any unannounced spontaneous moment * users can only request archives once every 7 days, thus ≥3½ days of dataloss is expected on avg. * the request is a cumbersome manual process (thus not done every 7 days) There is a request to implement CLI-driven archival: https://github.com/ihabunek/toot/issues/201 That feature would be useful, but it’s still only a partial solution. In addition to periodic archivals it would be very useful for individual messages to be stored locally to mitigate the loss of data generated since the last fetched archival, just as an email client would do. Bonus points if those messages are formatted in mbox format or maildir format, so we can simply use a mail user agent to browse recent outbound msgs. Optionally, it would be interesting if users had the /option/ of having these cached msgs deleted upon the successful fetching of their archive (assuming GH bug 201 is satisfied). -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages toot depends on: ii python3 3.9.2-3 ii python3-bs4 4.9.3-1 ii python3-requests 2.25.1+dfsg-2 ii python3-urwid 2.1.2-1 ii python3-wcwidth 0.1.9+dfsg1-2 toot recommends no packages. toot suggests no packages. -- no debconf information
Bug#1038659: toot: polls are useless in the CLI
Package: toot Version: 0.27.0-1 Severity: normal X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.t...@sideload.33mail.com Polls are void in CLI output. The body is there, but the ballot is simply omitted. And it’s omitted in a such a way that you don’t even know there is a poll. So you end up seeing /part/ of a status that ends up being confusing & useless. I’m sure it’s not an oversight at this point. Perhaps there is some complexity involved. If so, I suggest doing a quick placeholder of some kind so users at least know that a poll is missing. E.g. print in red letters somewhere: “[poll output not implemented in this version]”. Users would at least then know to get a dump of the raw post whenever this feature gets added: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1038651 or to view it in the tui. In the long term, it’s worth noting that *no client* does polls well. You only ever see the votes that your server has received. In principle, these are subset and can be misleading. So ideally the votes should be counted at the server that hosted the poll, not the local server (if possible). -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages toot depends on: ii python3 3.9.2-3 ii python3-bs4 4.9.3-1 ii python3-requests 2.25.1+dfsg-2 ii python3-urwid 2.1.2-1 ii python3-wcwidth 0.1.9+dfsg1-2 toot recommends no packages. toot suggests no packages. -- no debconf information
Bug#1038651: toot: a CLI mechanism to dump the raw source of a status would be useful
Package: toot Version: 0.27.0-1 Severity: wishlist X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.t...@sideload.33mail.com The plaintext of a status given on the commandline is an incomplete representation of the status. There are lots of metadata attributes being hidden from view as well as poll data. Most of the time it’s sufficient. But it would be very useful to be able to dump the raw JSON record for a given status. As the app matures, the need for raw record dumps will diminish. But until then the full contents of the JSON record would be useful. -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages toot depends on: ii python3 3.9.2-3 ii python3-bs4 4.9.3-1 ii python3-requests 2.25.1+dfsg-2 ii python3-urwid 2.1.2-1 ii python3-wcwidth 0.1.9+dfsg1-2 toot recommends no packages. toot suggests no packages. -- no debconf information
Bug#1038629: toot: whois command lacks follow status & follower/following lists unreachable
Package: toot Version: 0.27.0-1 Severity: wishlist X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.t...@sideload.33mail.com The /whois/ command gives the profile of a user as expected, but it neglects to state whether that user follows me & also neglects to disclose whether I am following that other account. It would be *very* useful if that information were included in the whois output. It’s the most basic info you generally want to know when visiting a profile. Apart from the /whois/ command (which operates on one account at a time), it would also be very useful to query for the whole list of accounts who follow me and accounts I am following. One use-case (apart from account migration) is follow reciprocity. If someone follows me, I look at their timeline. If a substantial portion of their posts are in a language I understand and the content is generally acceptible, I follow back. If I do not follow back (e.g. they have no timeline at the time), it would be useful to periodically examine the asymetric follow cases and re-review whether to follow or unfollow. -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages toot depends on: ii python3 3.9.2-3 ii python3-bs4 4.9.3-1 ii python3-requests 2.25.1+dfsg-2 ii python3-urwid 2.1.2-1 ii python3-wcwidth 0.1.9+dfsg1-2 toot recommends no packages. toot suggests no packages. -- no debconf information
Bug#1038379: toot: display name sticks after erasure
Package: toot Version: 0.27.0-1 Severity: minor X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.t...@sideload.33mail.com I created a new Mastodon account with a display name. Then established that account in /toot/ using the “login” CLI command. I later erased the display name in the web client. But in subsequent usage of the /toot/ app, references to the original display name still persisted. I don’t recall where, but likely when doing a “toot post” from the CLI. It’s a bit surprising that /toot/ would keep a copy of it since it’s unlikely needed for any operations. In principle it should be the server that conveys that sort of profile information. -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages toot depends on: ii python3 3.9.2-3 ii python3-bs4 4.9.3-1 ii python3-requests 2.25.1+dfsg-2 ii python3-urwid 2.1.2-1 ii python3-wcwidth 0.1.9+dfsg1-2 toot recommends no packages. toot suggests no packages. -- no debconf information
Bug#1038378: toot: Capability to import external statuses needed
Package: toot Version: 0.27.0-1 Severity: normal X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.t...@sideload.33mail.com When viewing posts in a logged-out GUI browser and there is a need to interact with some arbitrary post, toot is nearly useless. All the toot interaction commands rely on having a local msg ID which may or may not exist. And even when it exists it’s sometimes impossible to obtain. It’s a serious hassle to search hashtags within /toot/ in attempt to reveal the local msg ID. If no hashtag exists & the user is unknown to the local instance, toot users are stuffed. The web client is capable of searching using the URL of an external post as the query. If a local copy of the msg does not exist, it is imported so users can interact with it. Toot needs this import capability. Running this: $ toot search "$URL_to_post" yields the response “nothing found”. Running: $ toot timeline --help reveals that there is no way to specify an URL to a post, only tags or the typical timeline selections. Ideally users should be able to run: $ toot search "$URL_to_post" and it should either respond with: “that post has a local copy with an ID of 1234…” OR “that post does not exist locally. Would you like to import it? [Y/n]” -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages toot depends on: ii python3 3.9.2-3 ii python3-bs4 4.9.3-1 ii python3-requests 2.25.1+dfsg-2 ii python3-urwid 2.1.2-1 ii python3-wcwidth 0.1.9+dfsg1-2 toot recommends no packages. toot suggests no packages. -- no debconf information
Bug#1038338: toot: “toot post --media” lacks URL support
Package: toot Version: 0.27.0-1 Severity: wishlist X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.t...@sideload.33mail.com It’s quite cool that we can simply upload an image using the CLI “upload” command and make no reference to it in a toot, effectively using any Mastodon node as an image pastebin. But surely this was not the intent. There should be an in-band usage for the URL that is returned after uploading media. There is no documented way to use those URLs. Naturally the CLI /post/ command should be able to make use of media URLs. Intuitively, this should do the job: $ toot post --media "$media_url"; ← does not work The parameter supplied with the --media option must be a path to a local file. So what happens is users upload an image using the /upload/ CLI command, they get a useless URL back, and then they use the /post/ command which forces them to specify a local filename again. The user does so, which then presumably results in two copies of the same media on the server. If the --media option is coded to support URLs, this would not only make the /upload/ command more useful, it would even make it possible for multiple posts to refer to the same media file, thus not wasting disk space on the server. It would also enable users to embed references to external images without storing them on the local server at all. -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages toot depends on: ii python3 3.9.2-3 ii python3-bs4 4.9.3-1 ii python3-requests 2.25.1+dfsg-2 ii python3-urwid 2.1.2-1 ii python3-wcwidth 0.1.9+dfsg1-2 toot recommends no packages. toot suggests no packages. -- no debconf information
Bug#1038337: sway: mouse clicking dead region on external display device (negative Y coordinates zeroized)
Package: sway Version: 1.5-7 Severity: important X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.s...@sideload.33mail.com Laptop has a larger external display positioned to the right of the laptop and raised a bit, like this: +-+ | | | | +---+ | | | | | external display| | laptop | | | | | +-+ +---+ The configuration requires using a negative coordinate so the pointer arrow can move seamlessly between the displays. ~/.config/sway/config: ===8<-- output LVDS-1 pos 0 0 output VGA-1 pos 1280 -275 ===8<-- The top area on the external display is non-responsive to clicks. This is likely the whole area where the Y coordinate is negative. This is perhaps slightly related to this issue: https://github.com/swaywm/sway/issues/7528 But in my case, the output is fine. It’s just the mouse clicking that is clipped. The mouse can move the pointer around in dead area fine-- it’s apparently just clicking that is not possible. Keyboard input is also fine in that region. If a text editor is open with the cursor is low on the screen and the dead region is clicked, the cursor moves to the first line below the dead region. Clicking on a scrollbar in the dead area causes the top of the scrollbar to jump to the top of the non-dead region, but never higher. So clicking is not entirely ignored but rather treated as if clicked on the zero Y coordinate screen. ===8<-- $ swaymsg -t get_version sway version v1.5 $ swaymsg -t get_outputs Output LVDS-1 'Lenovo…' Current mode: 1280x800 @ 60.001999 Hz Position: 0,0 Scale factor: 1.00 Scale filter: nearest Subpixel hinting: rgb Transform: normal Workspace: 1 Max render time: off Adaptive sync: disabled Available modes: 1280x800 @ 50.002998 Hz 1280x800 @ 60.001999 Hz Output VGA-1 'Dell Inc.…' Current mode: 1920x1080 @ 60.00 Hz Position: 1280,-275 Scale factor: 1.00 Scale filter: nearest Subpixel hinting: unknown Transform: normal Workspace: 2 Max render time: off Adaptive sync: disabled Available modes: 720x400 @ 70.082001 Hz 640x480 @ 59.93 Hz 640x480 @ 75.00 Hz 800x600 @ 60.317001 Hz 800x600 @ 75.00 Hz 1024x768 @ 60.004002 Hz 1024x768 @ 75.028999 Hz 1152x864 @ 75.00 Hz 1280x1024 @ 60.02 Hz 1280x1024 @ 75.025002 Hz 1920x1080 @ 60.00 Hz ===8<-- -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages sway depends on: ii libc62.31-13+deb11u5 ii libcairo21.16.0-5 ii libevdev21.11.0+dfsg-1 ii libgdk-pixbuf2.0-0 2.40.2-2 ii libgl1-mesa-dri 20.3.5-1 ii libgles2 1.3.2-1 ii libglib2.0-0 2.66.8-1 ii libinput10 1.16.4-3 ii libjson-c5 0.15-2 ii libpango-1.0-0 1.46.2-3 ii libpangocairo-1.0-0 1.46.2-3 ii libpcre3 2:8.39-13 ii libpixman-1-00.40.0-1.1~deb11u1 ii libsystemd0 247.3-7+deb11u1 ii libwayland-client0 1.18.0-2~exp1.1 ii libwayland-cursor0 1.18.0-2~exp1.1 ii libwayland-server0 1.18.0-2~exp1.1 ii libwlroots6 0.11.0-3 ii libxcb1 1.14-3 ii libxkbcommon01.0.3-2 ii policykit-1 0.105-31+deb11u1 ii swaybg 1.0-2 Versions of packages sway recommends: ii foot 1.6.4-1 ii suckless-tools46-1 ii sway-backgrounds 1.5-7 Versions of packages sway suggests: pn swayidle pn swaylock pn xdg-desktop-portal-wlr -- no debconf information
Bug#1026922: golang-go: how HTTP*_PROXY should work v.s. how it operates currently
Package: golang-go Version: 2:1.15~1 Followup-For: Bug #1026922 X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.1026...@sideload.33mail.com HD> I’d suppose there is a misunderstanding: HTTP_PROXY is used to HD> specify the proxy options of all HTTP connections, and HTTPS_PROXY HD> is used by HTTPS connections. Only in this way the names of HD> ALL_PROXY and NO_PROXY could make sense. What you describe is how the HTTP*_PROXY variables *should* work. But that’s not the case. For example, users of the Hydroxide app (written in Go) are being told to run: HTTPS_PROXY='socks5://127.0.0.1:9050' hydroxide $args See the problem? SOCKS has nothing to do with HTTP(S). SOCKS proxies cannot serve as an HTTP proxy because HTTP proxies are protocol-specific. A SOCKS proxy is protocol independant.
Bug#1026922: golang-go: more action needed
Package: golang-go Version: 2:1.15~1 Followup-For: Bug #1026922 X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.1026...@sideload.33mail.com > This is exactly feature that Go upstream provides for a long time. > If you think differently, you should open a "proposal" in Go upstream, > https://github.com/golang/proposal#the-proposal-process “Feature” is the wrong word here. Use of incorrect terminology & misstating a usage is a plainly obvious defect. The incorrectness of (e.g.) calling a “potato” a “tomato” leaves no room for subjectivity. It’s a bug. Consequently, a bug report was filed (not a feature proposal). To say it’s been that way “a long time” is known as a /Conventional Wisdom/ fallacy. The bug does not become less of a bug over time. The only effect that time has in this case is to do more damage, as more and more code creates dependencies on the defect. Go lang itself is also a quite young language, coming into existence in 2009. So nothing about the language has existed for “a long time”. Directing users to report bugs upstream goes against Debian conventions. It’s the duty of the maintainer to mirror bugs upstream: https://www.debian.org/Bugs/Reporting Not everyone has MS Github. Not everyone is willing to have transactions with Microsoft. I cannot login to Github because the 2fa process forces me to check an account that blocks access to the verification code with a broken CAPTCHA. Please follow the Debian procedure and mirror this bug report upstream; not as a proposed new feature but as a bug report. Thank you.
Bug#1027985: tesseract-ocr: document gets rotated on its side when converting from jpg to pdf
Package: tesseract-ocr Version: 4.1.1-2.1 Severity: normal X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.tesser...@sideload.33mail.com When tesseract is fed a JPG image of an upright document and instructed to produce a searchable PDF, it flips the image on its side. The rotation apparently happens before OCR is performed judging from the text produced (as pdf2txt shows it as one character per line). This is the syntax used: $ tesseract color_document.jpg sideways_doc -l eng+nld pdf The workaround is quite ugly: $ pdftk doc_sideways_doc.pdf cat 1-r1east output upright_doc.pdf $ ocrmypdf --force-ocr -l eng+nld upright_doc.pdf proper.pdf I don’t think this bug affects every document. It’s perhaps trying to be smart and detect the orientation of the doc & misjudging it. If that’s true, it’s a shame that tesseract does this automatically and beyond the control of the user. There is no option to force tesseract to leave the orientation as-is. -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages tesseract-ocr depends on: ii libarchive13 3.4.3-2+deb11u1 ii libc62.31-13+deb11u5 ii libcairo21.16.0-5 ii libfontconfig1 2.13.1-4.2 ii libgcc-s110.2.1-6 ii libglib2.0-0 2.66.8-1 ii libicu67 67.1-7 ii liblept5 1.79.0-1.1 ii libpango-1.0-0 1.46.2-3 ii libpangocairo-1.0-0 1.46.2-3 ii libpangoft2-1.0-01.46.2-3 ii libstdc++6 10.2.1-6 ii libtesseract44.1.1-2.1 ii tesseract-ocr-eng1:4.00~git30-7274cfa-1.1 ii tesseract-ocr-osd1:4.00~git30-7274cfa-1.1 tesseract-ocr recommends no packages. tesseract-ocr suggests no packages. -- no debconf information
Bug#1027923: vorbis-tools: Ogg123 fails to play streams (“Error opening - using the oggvorbis module. The file may be corrupted.”)
Package: vorbis-tools Version: 1.4.0-11+b1 Severity: normal X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.vorbis-to...@sideload.33mail.com Ogg streams cannot be played. Three different approaches were tested: $ ogg123 http://ice.audionow.com/4692NationwideNewsNetworkLtdopus.ogg $ curl -L -v http://ice.audionow.com/4692NationwideNewsNetworkLtdopus.ogg | ogg123 - 2-step approach also fails: $ curl -L -v http://ice.audionow.com/4692NationwideNewsNetworkLtdopus.ogg > /tmp/stream.ogg $ ogg123 /tmp/stream.ogg Output: Error opening - using the oggvorbis module. The file may be corrupted. Diagnosis: $ file /tmp/stream.ogg /tmp/stream.ogg: Ogg data, Opus audio, $ ogginfo /tmp/stream.ogg Processing file "/tmp/stream.ogg"... New logical stream (#1, serial: 09e3c2b7): type unknown WARNING: sequence number gap in stream 1. Got page 75226 when expecting page 2. Indicates missing data. WARNING: EOS not set on stream 1 FWIW, some info on the audio stream used in the above tests can be found here: https://www.radio-browser.info/history/96149bcc-0601-11e8-ae97-52543be04c81 -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages vorbis-tools depends on: ii libao4 1.2.2+20180113-1.1 ii libc62.31-13+deb11u5 ii libcurl3-gnutls 7.74.0-1.3+deb11u3 ii libflac8 1.3.3-2+deb11u1 ii libogg0 1.3.4-0.1 ii libspeex11.2~rc1.2-1.1 ii libvorbis0a 1.3.7-1 ii libvorbisenc21.3.7-1 ii libvorbisfile3 1.3.7-1 ii sensible-utils 0.0.14 vorbis-tools recommends no packages. vorbis-tools suggests no packages. -- no debconf information
Bug#1026928: wget: “Cannot write to ‘myfile.mp3’ (Permission denied).” when using the default profile.
Package: firejail Version: 0.9.64.4-2 Followup-For: Bug #1026928 X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.firej...@sideload.33mail.com > I can't reproduce it yet. What do you mean with "local directory"? > Your home directory? Is there anything special about this directory? > Please provide full output when running firejail with --debug. I meant the "$CWD", which was something like /collection/music. There is nothing special about the directory. I have write permission and in fact it has no problem writing the file if I use --noprofile. I ran it again using --debug. There is a huge amount of output which would be cumbersome to sanitize, but not enough output at the very end where it fails: ===8<-- Current directory: /collection/music … Connecting to web.archive.org (web.archive.org)|207.241.237.3|:80... connected. HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 302 FOUND Location: http://web.archive.org/web/«url» [following] --«timestamp»-- http://web.archive.org/web/«url» Reusing existing connection to web.archive.org:80. HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK Length: 33763692 (35M) [audio/mpeg] myfile.mp3: Permission denied Cannot write to ‘myfile.mp3’ (Permission denied). Sandbox monitor: waitpid 15 retval 15 status 768 ===8<-- Perhaps it was fixed in a later version. I’m using Firejail 0.9.64.4-2 (apparently with cgroup=no for some reason) & GNU Wget 1.21.
Bug#1026928: wget: “Cannot write to ‘myfile.mp3’ (Permission denied).” when using the default profile.
Package: firejail Version: 0.9.64.4-2 Severity: normal X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.firej...@sideload.33mail.com There is no problem if the --noprofile option is given. But if firejail is allowed to use the default profile (/etc/firejail/wget.profile), fetched files cannot be written to the local directory. ===8<-- $ firejail --net=vnet0 --dns="$mydns" --noblacklist=. wget --no-netrc "$url" --«timestamp»-- «url» Resolving web.archive.org (web.archive.org)... 207.241.237.3 Connecting to web.archive.org (web.archive.org)|207.241.237.3|:80... connected. HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 302 FOUND Location: http://web.archive.org/web/«url» [following] --«timestamp»-- http://web.archive.org/web/«url» Reusing existing connection to web.archive.org:80. HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK Length: 33763692 (36M) [audio/mpeg] myfile.mp3: Permission denied Cannot write to ‘myfile.mp3’ (Permission denied). ===8<-- This is /etc/firejail/wget.profile: ===8<-- # Firejail profile for wget # Description: Retrieves files from the web # This file is overwritten after every install/update quiet # Persistent local customizations include wget.local # Persistent global definitions include globals.local noblacklist ${HOME}/.netrc noblacklist ${HOME}/.wget-hsts noblacklist ${HOME}/.wgetrc blacklist /tmp/.X11-unix blacklist ${RUNUSER} include disable-common.inc include disable-devel.inc include disable-exec.inc include disable-interpreters.inc include disable-passwdmgr.inc include disable-programs.inc include disable-shell.inc # depending on workflow you can uncomment the below or put 'include disable-xdg.inc' in your wget.local #include disable-xdg.inc include whitelist-usr-share-common.inc include whitelist-var-common.inc apparmor caps.drop all ipc-namespace machine-id netfilter no3d nodvd nogroups nonewprivs noroot nosound notv nou2f novideo protocol unix,inet,inet6 seccomp seccomp.block-secondary shell none tracelog private-bin wget private-cache private-dev # depending on workflow you can uncomment the below or put this private-etc in your wget.local #private-etc alternatives,ca-certificates,crypto-policies,pki,resolv.conf,ssl,wgetrc #private-tmp dbus-user none dbus-system none memory-deny-write-execute ===8<-- -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages firejail depends on: ii libapparmor1 2.13.6-10 ii libc6 2.31-13+deb11u5 ii libselinux1 3.1-3 Versions of packages firejail recommends: ii firejail-profiles 0.9.64.4-2+deb11u1 ii iproute2 5.10.0-4 ii iptables 1.8.7-1 ii xauth 1:1.1-1 ii xdg-dbus-proxy 0.1.2-2 ii xpra 3.0.13+dfsg1-1 ii xvfb 2:1.20.11-1+deb11u3 firejail suggests no packages. -- Configuration Files: /etc/firejail/firejail.config changed: cgroup no -- no debconf information
Bug#1026922: golang-go: The HTTP_PROXY variable is incorrectly implemented to accept SOCKS proxies. HTTP≠SOCKS
Package: golang-go Version: 2:1.15~1 Severity: normal X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.gol...@sideload.33mail.com The go standard libraries apparently include some automatic proxy support for /go/ apps when the HTTPS_PROXY variable is populated. The problem is that SOCKS proxies are accepted. A SOCKS proxy is a different beast than an HTTP proxy. The HTTP*_PROXY variables are conventially used by browsers to specify HTTP proxies. It’s misleading and wrong to use it to specify SOCKS proxies. Here is an example of an app that uses the /go/ standard libs in this way: https://github.com/emersion/hydroxide/issues/110#issuecomment-751387567 URLs with the socks*:// scheme should be refused & trigger an error. -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages golang-go depends on: ii golang-1.15-go 1.15.15-1~deb11u4 ii golang-src 2:1.15~1 golang-go recommends no packages. Versions of packages golang-go suggests: ii git 1:2.30.2-1 -- no debconf information
Bug#1026430: profanity: If an OMEMO msg to 2+ recipients & 1 recipient’s pubkey is bad, the msg is sent anyway (a logistical mess)
Package: profanity Version: 0.13.1-1~bpo11+1 Severity: normal X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.profan...@sideload.33mail.com If a message is sent in a chat room with multiple recipients, and Profanity fails to get a handle on the public key for one of the recipients, Profanity simply neglects to use the key it needs and sends the msg anyway to all recipients. So the recipient whose pubkey was neglected receives a non-decryptable message which then manifests into a bogus error falsely telling the recipient that their XMPP client does not support OMEMO (which apparently is the text portion of the message). Scenario: Suppose Rob & Rennae are recipients of Sam’s msg, and Rennae’s pubkey was lost. Rob receives the msg okay but he does not likely know that the msg failed for Rennae. Sam expected both recipients to receive the same msg at roughly the same time. So Sam is forced to scramble to solve the pubkey problem and quickly send a copy to Rennae. But Sam does not want Rob to recieve duplicate copy of the same message, so Sam must resend the msg just to Rennae. Sam also must tell Rennae that he botched the transmission, and also tell Rennae that Rob already received the same message. Rennae must trust that Sam did not alter the message. This nightmare of a bug causes embarrassment for Sam and demoralizes Rob & Rennae as far as XMPP goes. There are actually 4 bugs here: 1. (already reported) Profanity failed to find the public key for recipient even though Profanity recently just used the pubkey successfully. This bug has already been reported separately (bug 1024899) 2. All or nothing policy needed-- when a msg is known to fail for a group, Profanity should not send the msg to anyone. Profanity did not even warn the sender of the problem; it just took the liberty of encrypting the msg to X recipients and transmitting it to Y recipients, where X > Y. Only after the transmission does Profanity inform the sender of the problem. This creates a logistical mess for the sender. In the scenario given, Profanity should either refuse the send the message entirely, or it should give Sam an informed choice to send the message anyway knowing that delivery will be botched and problematic. 3. When a msg is expected to fail for one recipient among many, Profanity should not send it to recipients where it is known to fail. Notwithstanding bug 2 above, even if a sender opts to send a message anyway, there is still no reason to transmit the msg to the recipient who Profanity knows cannot decrypt it. 4. The error msg seen by the recipient is (apparently) the text portion of the encrypted payload, which generically tells the recipient that their client does not support OMEMO. The receiving client simply presents that text to the user of that client. This message is bogus. Just because Profanity cannot find the pubkey does not mean the receiving client does not support OMEMO. The text msg should not take liberties of making speculative or unlikely claims about what the issue is. Profanity also should not assume when phrasing the text that the bug or deficiency is necessarily on the recipient’s side. -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages profanity depends on: ii libc6 2.31-13+deb11u5 ii libcurl3-gnutls7.74.0-1.3+deb11u3 ii libgcrypt201.8.7-6 ii libgdk-pixbuf-2.0-02.42.2+dfsg-1+deb11u1 ii libglib2.0-0 2.66.8-1 ii libgpgme11 1.14.0-1+b2 ii libgtk-3-0 3.24.24-4+deb11u2 ii libncursesw6 6.2+20201114-2 ii libnotify4 0.7.9-3 ii libotr54.1.1-4 ii libpython3.9 3.9.2-1 ii libreadline8 8.1-1 ii libsignal-protocol-c2.3.2 2.3.3-1 ii libsqlite3-0 3.34.1-3 ii libstrophe00.12.2-1~bpo11+1 ii libtinfo6 6.2+20201114-2 profanity recommends no packages. profanity suggests no packages. -- no debconf information
Bug#1026109: firejail: “Error fbuilder: invalid program” when pairing --build & --env options together
Package: firejail Version: 0.9.64.4-2 Severity: normal X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.firej...@sideload.33mail.com Ran this: ===8<-- $ LC_ALL=C firejail --build=kalium.profile --net=vnet0 --dns=$mydns --env=XDG_CONFIG_HOME="${myconfig_dir}" /usr/local/src/kalium/gradlew jvmTest ===8<-- Output: ===8<-- Error fbuilder: invalid program Firejail profile builder Usage: firejail [--debug] --build[=profile-file] program-and-arguments ===8<-- Omitting “--build=kalium.profile” is syntactically accepted, but it craps out with lots of other errors. Omitting “--env=…” is also syntactically accepted. Apparently “--build=kalium.profile” & “--env=…” options cannot be used together. -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages firejail depends on: ii libapparmor1 2.13.6-10 ii libc6 2.31-13+deb11u5 ii libselinux1 3.1-3 Versions of packages firejail recommends: ii firejail-profiles 0.9.64.4-2+deb11u1 ii iproute2 5.10.0-4 ii iptables 1.8.7-1 ii xauth 1:1.1-1 ii xdg-dbus-proxy 0.1.2-2 ii xpra 3.0.13+dfsg1-1 ii xvfb 2:1.20.11-1+deb11u3 firejail suggests no packages. -- Configuration Files: /etc/firejail/firejail.config changed: cgroup no -- no debconf information
Bug#1025856: tesseract-ocr: (regression) File descriptors no longer work for input (“Error in fopenReadStream: file not found”)
Package: tesseract-ocr Version: 4.1.1-2.1 Severity: normal X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.tesser...@sideload.33mail.com I have this line in an old shell script: $ tesseract <(convert "$jpgFile" +dither -colors 2 -normalize -resize 1 pbm:-) - -l eng Today that line fails with this output: =8<-- Error in fopenReadStream: file not found Error in pixRead: image file not found: P4 Image file P4 cannot be read! Error during processing. =8<-- The fact that the command was in an old shell script suggests that it likely worked at one point in time. But certainly version 4.1.1-2.1 of tesseract-ocr cannot handle shell-substituted files. This report actually covers two bugs: 1) tesseract-ocr fails to process shell-substituted files. 2) tesseract-ocr does not inform the user. It should give a graceful error msg. That is, if there is no intent to support shell-substituted files, then the app should detect when such a file is specified and inform the user using plain English in the error msg stating that shell-substituted files are unsupported. The man page should also disclose this limitation either in the paragraph that covers the input file spec and/or in a new section titled “LIMITATIONS”. Or if there is intent to support substitution files, then it should be explicitly stated in the man page. Workaround: If ImageMagick is executed separately to populate a regular file, tesseract has no problem with using that regular file as input. -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages tesseract-ocr depends on: ii libarchive13 3.4.3-2+deb11u1 ii libc62.31-13+deb11u5 ii libcairo21.16.0-5 ii libfontconfig1 2.13.1-4.2 ii libgcc-s110.2.1-6 ii libglib2.0-0 2.66.8-1 ii libicu67 67.1-7 ii liblept5 1.79.0-1.1 ii libpango-1.0-0 1.46.2-3 ii libpangocairo-1.0-0 1.46.2-3 ii libpangoft2-1.0-01.46.2-3 ii libstdc++6 10.2.1-6 ii libtesseract44.1.1-2.1 ii tesseract-ocr-eng1:4.00~git30-7274cfa-1.1 ii tesseract-ocr-osd1:4.00~git30-7274cfa-1.1 tesseract-ocr recommends no packages. tesseract-ocr suggests no packages. -- no debconf information
Bug#1024899: profanity: some Profanity → Beagle OMEMO msgs give “This message cannot be decrypted for any recipient.”
Package: profanity Version: 0.13.1-1~bpo11+1 Severity: important X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.profan...@sideload.33mail.com Configuration: Bob has 2 clients → linux:Profanity & Android:Snikket Alice has 2 clients → macos:Beagle & iOS:Snikket server → snikket.org Bob’s Profanity and Snikket installations both trust both of Alice’s fingerprints. Alice → Bob works Bob (Snikket) → Alice works Bob (Profanity) → Alice broken When Bob executes: /msg al...@foo.snikket.org Some text here. Profanity gives: ===8<-- 01:23:45 ! This message cannot be decrypted for any recipient. You should trust your recipients' device fingerprint(s) using "/omemo trust FINGERPRINT". It could also be that the key bundle of the recipient(s) have not been received. In this case, you could try "omemo end", "omemo start", and send the message again. ===8<-- The error msg suggestion to do “omemo end…start” worked, but it should not have been necessary because the chat session was working previously. That is, Bob successfully sent msgs already, then this error came out of the blue. A snip of the OMEMO session went like this: ===8<-- Alice (text) → Bob [success] Bob (text from Profanity) → Alice [success] Alice (images) → Bob [success] Bob (text from Profanity) → Alice [success] Bob (text from Profanity) → Alice [success] Alice (text) → Bob [success] Bob (text from Profanity) → Alice [failure!] Bob (text from Snikket) → Alice [success] (Bob) /omemo end (Bob) /omemo start Bob (text from Profanity) → Alice [apparent success from sending side but not yet confirmed by Alice] ===8<-- Bob must have had Alice’s keys all along since the past msgs were sent without issue. It looks as if Profanity lost Alice’s keys spontaneously. Bob should not have been interrupted with the missing keys error which then forced Bob to stop & start OMEMO all of the sudden. -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages profanity depends on: ii libc6 2.31-13+deb11u5 ii libcurl3-gnutls7.74.0-1.3+deb11u3 ii libgcrypt201.8.7-6 ii libgdk-pixbuf-2.0-02.42.2+dfsg-1+deb11u1 ii libglib2.0-0 2.66.8-1 ii libgpgme11 1.14.0-1+b2 ii libgtk-3-0 3.24.24-4+deb11u2 ii libncursesw6 6.2+20201114-2 ii libnotify4 0.7.9-3 ii libotr54.1.1-4 ii libpython3.9 3.9.2-1 ii libreadline8 8.1-1 ii libsignal-protocol-c2.3.2 2.3.3-1 ii libsqlite3-0 3.34.1-3 ii libstrophe00.12.2-1~bpo11+1 ii libtinfo6 6.2+20201114-2 profanity recommends no packages. profanity suggests no packages. -- no debconf information
Bug#1017049: profanity: version 0.13 status
Package: profanity Version: 0.13.1-1~bpo11+1 Followup-For: Bug #1017049 X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.profan...@sideload.33mail.com After upgrading, bugs 1 & 3 from the OP still exist in version 0.13.1-1~bpo11+1. Bug 2 seems to be resolved. That is, “[OMEMO]” indeed appears in the title bar when the channel is encrypted and “[unencrypted]” appears in red otherwise. That’s good. Bug 1: One could suggest that the title bar indicator is sufficient, but I’d say it’s still too subtle to serve as acknowdgement to a command. It’s important that the “[OMEMO]” continuously show how the conversation is secured, but also when a user enters a command it’s a better UX if an ack is received like other non-msg info (leading with a bang “!”). Bug 3: The /help omemo page still does not make it clear that for group chats the command must be entered from within the window and the “[]” must be omitted. -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.5 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-19-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages profanity depends on: ii libc6 2.31-13+deb11u5 ii libcurl3-gnutls7.74.0-1.3+deb11u3 ii libgcrypt201.8.7-6 ii libgdk-pixbuf-2.0-02.42.2+dfsg-1+deb11u1 ii libglib2.0-0 2.66.8-1 ii libgpgme11 1.14.0-1+b2 ii libgtk-3-0 3.24.24-4+deb11u2 ii libncursesw6 6.2+20201114-2 ii libnotify4 0.7.9-3 ii libotr54.1.1-4 ii libpython3.9 3.9.2-1 ii libreadline8 8.1-1 ii libsignal-protocol-c2.3.2 2.3.3-1 ii libsqlite3-0 3.34.1-3 ii libstrophe00.12.2-1~bpo11+1 ii libtinfo6 6.2+20201114-2 profanity recommends no packages. profanity suggests no packages. -- no debconf information
Bug#1018218: bugs.debian.org: Pseudo-header needed for “affects” relationship
> Yes, you can, because this: > > > 3) add support for a placeholder bug number like “-1” (similar to how > > the clone command works) > > is an intrinsic part of how the "Control" pseudo-header works. Somehow I missed that, even though I was looking. There are several docs on the bug tracker and the doc I found seemed to only indicate that -1 was used in the cloning context. Sorry for the trouble.
Bug#1018218: bugs.debian.org: Pseudo-header needed for “affects” relationship
Package: bugs.debian.org Severity: wishlist X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.deb...@sideload.33mail.com When composing a bug report where another package is affected by the bug, there is no way to express that because the control command makes bug number a required field: http://5ekxbftvqg26oir5wle3p27ax3wksbxcecnm6oemju7bjra2pn26s3qd.onion/Bugs/server-control#affects So you cannot write the header: control: affects $bugNumber $otherPkg because you don’t yet have a bug# for the report you are writing. The workaround is cumbersome: You must submit the bug report and wait for a bug# to be generated. Then you must compose a separate control msg that references the new bug number. It shouldn’t be that tedious because you know at the time of composition what other pkgs are affected. I can see 3 possible solutions: 1) introduce a new pseudo-header “Affects” and/or 2) make the field optional so that it defaults to the bug number being processed and/or 3) add support for a placeholder bug number like “-1” (similar to how the clone command works)
Bug#1018216: xwayland: Impossible to resize column widths in the LibreOffice spreadsheet (localc) by dragging a mouse
Package: xwayland Version: 2:1.20.11-1+deb11u1 Severity: normal X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.xwayl...@sideload.33mail.com In the localc GUI the way to resize a column is to hover the pointer over the divider/boundary line between two columns until “←→” appears, click, and drag left or right. When clicking and holding, dialog shows the current width, but dragging is ineffective. The pointer does not keep a grasp on the divider/boundary line. The only resizing action that works with the mouse is to double click on the divider line, which results in whatever width fits the text. This is not always the ideal size. Workaround: There is a workaround but it’s very cumbersome. You must right click on the column label and choose “column width…” to hand-type a size. If you don’t like the results, you generally have to repeat that trial & error process several times until it’s right. -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.4 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-16-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages xwayland depends on: ii libaudit1 1:3.0-2 ii libbsd0 0.11.3-1 ii libc6 2.31-13+deb11u3 ii libdrm2 2.4.104-1 ii libepoxy0 1.5.5-1 ii libgbm1 20.3.5-1 ii libgcrypt20 1.8.7-6 ii libgl1 1.3.2-1 ii libpixman-1-0 0.40.0-1 ii libselinux1 3.1-3 ii libsystemd0 247.3-7 ii libunwind8 1.3.2-2 ii libwayland-client0 1.18.0-2~exp1.1 ii libxau6 1:1.0.9-1 ii libxdmcp6 1:1.1.2-3 ii libxfont2 1:2.0.4-1 ii libxshmfence1 1.3-1 ii xserver-common 2:1.20.11-1+deb11u1 xwayland recommends no packages. xwayland suggests no packages. -- no debconf information
Bug#1018049: libreoffice-writer: PDF export fails to dump the file where instructed; and in one case writes no file at all
Package: libreoffice-writer Version: 1:7.0.4-4+deb11u1 Severity: normal X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.lowri...@sideload.33mail.com When performing an “export as…”, we are given a couple choices: 1) “export as PDF” 2) “export directly as PDF” It’s unclear what direct means, and what’s implied by the first option (apparently indirect). So that’s consfusing; but whatever. I chose the first option. Then I navigated by manually editing the path in the first field (because it was not obvious how to navigate graphically). When I saved the file, it did not appear in the specified place. Instead it dumped the PDF in the same directory as the original doc. This is bug 1. Since I did not find the file initially, I tried again, this time choosing “export directly as PDF”. I discovered the graphical way of navigating. It’s non-intuitive: a down arrow in the top right of he window. I used that to navigate to the place where I wanted the file written. The default filename was good as-is, so I clicked “export”, and instead of exporting the file in the directory that is showing, the UI simply navigated one level deeper. I could not make it dump the file in the directory that I chose. I had to abandon the operation. This is bug 2. When I repeat the above procedures, sometimes an item on the screen blinks rapidly, such as the “export” button or the field holding the path, and the window is frozen and refuses input. I have to kill lowriter at that point. I’ll call this bug 3, but note that I’m using Sway which is a tiled window manager that’s not too mature, so this 3rd bug could actually be a bug outside of lowriter. -- Package-specific info: -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.4 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-16-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages libreoffice-writer depends on: ii libabw-0.1-1 0.1.3-1 ii libc62.31-13+deb11u3 ii libe-book-0.1-1 0.1.3-2 ii libepubgen-0.1-1 0.1.1-1 ii libetonyek-0.1-1 0.1.9-4 ii libgcc-s110.2.1-6 ii libicu67 67.1-7 ii libmwaw-0.3-30.3.17-1 ii libodfgen-0.1-1 0.1.8-2 ii libreoffice-base-core1:7.0.4-4+deb11u1 ii libreoffice-common 1:7.0.4-4+deb11u1 ii libreoffice-core 1:7.0.4-4+deb11u1 ii librevenge-0.0-0 0.0.4-6+b1 ii libstaroffice-0.0-0 0.0.7-1 ii libstdc++6 10.2.1-6 ii libuno-cppu3 1:7.0.4-4+deb11u1 ii libuno-cppuhelpergcc3-3 1:7.0.4-4+deb11u1 ii libuno-sal3 1:7.0.4-4+deb11u1 ii libuno-salhelpergcc3-3 1:7.0.4-4+deb11u1 ii libwpd-0.10-10 0.10.3-1 ii libwpg-0.3-3 0.3.3-1 ii libwps-0.4-4 0.4.12-1 ii libxml2 2.9.10+dfsg-6.7+deb11u2 ii ucf 3.0043 ii uno-libs-private 1:7.0.4-4+deb11u1 ii zlib1g 1:1.2.11.dfsg-2+deb11u1 Versions of packages libreoffice-writer recommends: ii libreoffice-math 1:7.0.4-4+deb11u1 Versions of packages libreoffice-writer suggests: ii default-jre [java8-runtime] 2:1.11-72 ii fonts-crosextra-caladea 20130214-2.1 ii fonts-crosextra-carlito 20130920-1.1 ii libreoffice-base1:7.0.4-4+deb11u1 ii libreoffice-java-common 1:7.0.4-4+deb11u1 ii openjdk-11-jre [java8-runtime] 11.0.15+10-1~deb11u1 Versions of packages libreoffice-core depends on: ii fontconfig 2.13.1-4.2 ii fonts-opensymbol2:102.11+LibO7.0.4-4+deb11u1 ii libboost-locale1.74.0 1.74.0-9 ii libc6 2.31-13+deb11u3 ii libcairo2 1.16.0-5 ii libclucene-contribs1v5 2.3.3.4+dfsg-1+b1 ii libclucene-core1v5 2.3.3.4+dfsg-1+b1 ii libcmis-0.5-5v5 0.5.2-3 ii libcups22.3.3op2-3+deb11u2 ii libcurl3-gnutls 7.74.0-1.3+deb11u1 ii libdbus-1-3 1.12.20-2 ii libdconf1 0.38.0-2 ii libeot0 0.01-5+b1 ii libepoxy0 1.5.5-1 ii libexpat1 2.2.10-2+deb11u3 ii libexttextcat-2.0-0 3.4.5-1 ii libfontconfig1 2.13.1-4.2 ii libfreetype62.10.4+dfsg-1+deb11u1 ii libgcc-s1 10.2.1-6 ii libglib2.0-02.66.8-1 ii libgpgmepp6 1.14.0-1+b2 ii libgraphite2-3 1.3.14-1 ii libgstreamer-plugins-base1.0-0 1.18.4-2 ii libgstreamer1.0-0 1.18.4-2.1 ii
Bug#1017086: ledger: no longer reads gnucash files (regression → undead bug #740757)
Package: ledger Version: 3.2.1-7+b2 Followup-For: Bug #740757 X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.740...@sideload.33mail.com X-Debbugs-Cc: hel...@subdivi.de Control: unarchive 740757 Control: reopen 740757 Control: found 740757 3.2.1-7+b2 Control: affects 740757 gnucash For the past ~7 or so years I have been using my own manually compiled version of ledger to escape bug# 740757: ===8<-- $ /usr/local/bin/ledger -v Ledger 2.6.2, the command-line accounting tool Copyright (c) 2003-2009, John Wiegley. All rights reserved. This program is made available under the terms of the BSD Public License. See LICENSE file included with the distribution for details and disclaimer. (modules: gmp, pcre, xml) ===8<-- This old version of ledger still works on the current stable version of gnucash (ver.4.4): ===8<-- $ /usr/local/bin/ledger --file "$datafile" --register-format '%D!!%P!!%t\n' --begin 2020/12/31 --end 2022/01/01 --sort date --display 't>0' register exp.\*cycl 2021/03/17!! derailleur + chain pliers!!$27.93 2021/04/04!! trigger shifters!!$24.99 ===8<-- But the current version of ledger (3.2.1-7+b2) does NOT operate on gnucash data: ===8<-- /usr/bin/ledger --file "$datafile" --register-format '%D!!%P!!%t\n' --begin 2020/12/31 --end 2022/01/01 --sort date --display 't>0' register exp.\*cycl While parsing file "$datafile", line 2: Error: Directive '' requires an argument While parsing file "$datafile", line 66: Error: Directive '' requires an argument … ===8<-- I don’t know if this is a regression, or if it was never actually fixed. But the current status is that it’s broken. (BTS issue) This bug is a recurrance of bug# 740757. I tried to unarchive that bug but messages to do so were sent to cont...@bugs.debian.org and they were ignored. It’s unclear why because control messages get no ack. So I was forced to open this new bug report, which is the same bug. -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.4 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-16-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages ledger depends on: ii libboost-filesystem1.74.0 1.74.0-9 ii libboost-iostreams1.74.01.74.0-9 ii libboost-python1.74.0 [libboost-python1.74.0-py39] 1.74.0-9 ii libboost-regex1.74.0 [libboost-regex1.74.0-icu67] 1.74.0-9 ii libc6 2.31-13+deb11u3 ii libgcc-s1 10.2.1-6 ii libgmp102:6.2.1+dfsg-1+deb11u1 ii libicu6767.1-7 ii libmpfr64.1.0-3 ii libpython3.93.9.2-1 ii libstdc++6 10.2.1-6 ledger recommends no packages. Versions of packages ledger suggests: pn elpa-ledger pn python3-ledger -- no debconf information
Bug#1017082: neomutt: (security) The sender’s timezone is exposed in the Date: header
Package: neomutt Version: 20201127+dfsg.1-1.2 Severity: normal Tags: upstream X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.neom...@sideload.33mail.com The “Date:” field is added after the user instructs neomutt to send their message, so there is no opportunity for the user to edit the timestamp of the message. Perhaps rightly so, for RFC-compliance. But the timestamp that mutt generates exposes the timezone of the author. It’s too much information. E.g. this reveals to the recipient and all mail servers enroute that the sender is physically in the central Europe timezone: Date: Fri, 12 Aug 2022 13:21:24 +0200 This exposes the presence of senders in the eastern US timezone: Date: Fri, 12 Aug 2022 13:21:24 -0400 It would be surprising if Google or Microsoft did not exploit that information in some way. For privacy, users need control over the format of that date. The RFC likely dictates the format, but the time should be expressed in UTC. And UTC should in fact be the *default* timezone as well. If a user really wants to reveal the timezone they are in for some reason (i.e. the status quo), perhaps there should be a new config parameter for that case. The parameter could be an enum that enables you to name a timezone, or perhaps it could be a simple boolean like “compose_timezone_local” or “compose_timezone_zulu”. FWIW, it’s perhaps also worth mentioning that it might be useful to be able to dynamically select the timezone of the /recipient/, as a courtesy to them in cases where the recipient’s timezone is known by the sender. Of course that brings in a bit of complexity. But in any case, the current behavior is a security issue because confidentiality is compromized. -- Package-specific info: NeoMutt 20201127 Copyright (C) 1996-2020 Michael R. Elkins and others. NeoMutt comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; for details type 'neomutt -vv'. NeoMutt is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it under certain conditions; type 'neomutt -vv' for details. System: Linux 5.10.0-16-amd64 (x86_64) ncurses: ncurses 6.2.20201114 (compiled with 6.2.20201114) libidn: 1.33 (compiled with 1.33) GPGME: 1.14.0-unknown GnuTLS: 3.7.1 libnotmuch: 5.3.0 storage: tokyocabinet Configure options: --build=x86_64-linux-gnu --prefix=/usr {--includedir=${prefix}/include} {--mandir=${prefix}/share/man} {--infodir=${prefix}/share/info} --sysconfdir=/etc --localstatedir=/var --disable-option-checking --disable-silent-rules {--libdir=${prefix}/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu} {--libexecdir=${prefix}/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu} --disable-maintainer-mode --disable-dependency-tracking --mandir=/usr/share/man --libexecdir=/usr/libexec --with-mailpath=/var/mail --gpgme --lua --notmuch --with-ui --gnutls --gss --idn --mixmaster --sasl --tokyocabinet --sqlite --autocrypt Compilation CFLAGS: -g -O2 -ffile-prefix-map=/build/neomutt-aFsTyZ/neomutt-20201127+dfsg.1=. -fstack-protector-strong -Wformat -Werror=format-security -std=c99 -D_ALL_SOURCE=1 -D_GNU_SOURCE=1 -D__EXTENSIONS__ -I/usr/include -I/usr/include/lua5.4 -DNCURSES_WIDECHAR -isystem /usr/include/mit-krb5 Default options: +attach_headers_color +compose_to_sender +compress +cond_date +debug +encrypt_to_self +forgotten_attachments +forwref +ifdef +imap +index_color +initials +limit_current_thread +multiple_fcc +nested_if +new_mail +nntp +pop +progress +quasi_delete +regcomp +reply_with_xorig +sensible_browser +sidebar +skip_quoted +smtp +status_color +timeout +tls_sni +trash Compile options: +autocrypt +bkgdset +color +curs_set +fcntl -flock -fmemopen +futimens +getaddrinfo +gnutls +gpgme +gss +hcache -homespool +idn +inotify -locales_hack +lua +meta +mixmaster +nls +notmuch -openssl +pgp +regex +sasl +smime +sqlite +start_color +sun_attachment +typeahead MAILPATH="/var/mail" MIXMASTER="mixmaster" PKGDATADIR="/usr/share/neomutt" SENDMAIL="/usr/sbin/sendmail" SYSCONFDIR="/etc" To learn more about NeoMutt, visit: https://neomutt.org If you find a bug in NeoMutt, please raise an issue at: https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt/issues or send an email to: -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.4 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-16-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages neomutt depends on: ii libc6 2.31-13+deb11u3 ii libgnutls30 3.7.1-5+deb11u1 ii libgpg-error0 1.38-2 ii libgpgme111.14.0-1+b2 ii libgssapi-krb5-2 1.18.3-6+deb11u1 ii libidn11 1.33-3 ii liblua5.4-0 5.4.2-2 ii libncursesw6 6.2+20201114-2 ii libnotmuch5 0.31.4-2 ii libsasl2-22.1.27+dfsg-2.1+deb11u1 ii
Bug#1017049: profanity: No acknowledgement when running “/omemo start” in a chat room; also no docs on this
Package: profanity Version: 0.10.0-1 Severity: normal Tags: upstream X-Debbugs-Cc: debbug.profan...@sideload.33mail.com To send encrypted messages to a chat room, the following steps are necessary: 1) OMEMO must be switched on for that room (enter “/omemo start” within that room) 2) the fingerprint of every person in that room must be trusted «OR» 2) enable blind trust (“/help omemo trustmode” in some versions) When step 1 is performed, there is no response from the app in that window. There is also no response in window 1. No error message either. So it appears to the user that their command was ignored. In my case, the command had proper effect (so egress messages thereafter were encrypted). But the user should be told something like: “OMEMO enabled for outbound messages to this channel. To reverse this action, run `\omemo end`” It would perhaps also be useful when entering a chat room that has OMEMO disabled to automatically print a banner saying: “Warning: messages sent to this room will be unencrypted. To enable e2ee run `\omemo start` in this window.” Also, “/help omemo” does not cover this use case. The page gives the proper BNF syntax (“/omemo start []”), but it fails to mention that “” cannot be a /room/, and that the only way to start a session for a room is to do “/omemo start” in that room. So there are three bugs here: 1) lack of command acknowledgement 2) lack of warning banner in unencrypted rooms 3) lack of help docs -- System Information: Debian Release: 11.4 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (990, 'stable-updates'), (990, 'stable-security'), (990, 'testing'), (990, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 5.10.0-16-amd64 (SMP w/2 CPU threads) Kernel taint flags: TAINT_OOT_MODULE, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages profanity depends on: ii libc6 2.31-13+deb11u3 ii libcurl3-gnutls7.74.0-1.3+deb11u1 ii libgcrypt201.8.7-6 ii libglib2.0-0 2.66.8-1 ii libgpgme11 1.14.0-1+b2 ii libgtk-3-0 3.24.24-4+deb11u2 ii libncursesw6 6.2+20201114-2 ii libnotify4 0.7.9-3 ii libotr54.1.1-4 ii libpython3.9 3.9.2-1 ii libreadline8 8.1-1 ii libsignal-protocol-c2.3.2 2.3.3-1 ii libsqlite3-0 3.34.1-3 ii libstrophe00.10.1-1 ii libtinfo6 6.2+20201114-2 ii libx11-6 2:1.7.2-1 ii libxss11:1.2.3-1 profanity recommends no packages. profanity suggests no packages. -- no debconf information
Bug#947143: RFS: wordpress/5.3.2+dfsg1-0.1 [NMU] [RC] -- weblog manager
Hi Markus, Thank you for clarifying the situation. On 2019-12-23 18:24:08, Markus Koschany wrote: Hello Niels, Am 23.12.19 um 15:04 schrieb DebBug: Anyone to chime in? Craig? Markus? There is a bit of confusion here, so I try to explain the situation and how we should proceed. Thank you for filing bug report #947212 to track the security issues in Wordpress. This will help to answer those questions raised by Adam. However there was already #946905 that you could have been used as well. Must have missed that one. You have only recently added me to CC, presumably because I have done IIRC, Craig added you initially, FWIW. some security uploads in the past for Wordpress. I don't know what you have discussed with Craig and if he wants to review your work and sponsor it later. Then you actually don't need to open a sponsorship request on debian-mentors. I yet ignore how the process continues, whether Craig will upload the updated package or someone else. And when. Sponsorship requests are either of severity normal or important. Here it would be ok to use important but the severity is merely an indicator and it doesn't automatically guarantee that a bug is prioritized. Security related bugs like #947212/#946905 are either of severity important or grave. OK. From my perspective, regarding the wordpress issue and being responsible for maintenance of a number of exposed instances, it is *critical* security releases get integrated on short terms' notice. As explained, system and data is at elevated risk in the particular case of wordpress having a considerable share of worldwide CMS instances. This also entails liability in case of data loss and/or successful exploitation of local and/or remote resources. In terms of legal obligation of care of user data, customer data and systems as well as in terms of GDPR. This direct consequence is driving a severity "critical". It is also the reason for my providing an updated debian wordpress package for NMU. I prefer debian packages over upstream packaging and if I'm packaging deb package updates locally I might as well let others profit from it. Version 5.3.2 seems to fix a couple of security vulnerabilities. No CVE has been assigned yet. This version should be uploaded to unstable. My intention. If you want to fix Wordpress in Buster and Stretch as well, then you have to go a different route. The security team is responsible for that. As previously discussed I recommend to base security updates on upstream releases for specific Wordpress branches. https://wordpress.org/download/releases/ Buster should be updated to version 5.0.8 and Stretch to 4.7.16. In both cases you would base your work on the Wordpress packages in Buster and Stretch. The changes to the debian files should be minimal, you would merely rebase existing patches and repack the tarball to make it compliant with the DFSG. Not so much my intention. Basically, not at all, for now. I'm depending on the latest upstream releases so I'm sticking with unstable wordpress packages. In short: Version 5.3.2 -> unstable Did Craig agree with the upload? If there is simply no response because of the holiday season we could do a NMU with a delay of 5 to 10 days. I assume you haven't made any major changes to the package. Well, as detailed above, those delays -- for this particular package -- are inacceptable, at least for me. At that, it's on top of the delay from the point in time upstream released to bug reported. Is there a way to speed up this whole process for future releases? Sure, I locally feed the updated packages to archive mirrors, although I'd prefer not preempting debian package releases. After that: Version 5.0.8 -> buster-security Version 4.7.16 -> stretch-security You can already prepare the packages, then we contact the security team and ask for approval. For the time being, I am time-constraint on provision for unstable. Regards, Markus Thanks again for your explanation and efforts. Have a nice holiday. Cheers Nils signature.asc Description: PGP signature
Bug#947143: RFS: wordpress/5.3.2+dfsg1-0.1 [NMU] [RC] -- weblog manager
Adam, On 2019-12-21 23:32:57, Adam Borowski wrote: Control: tags +moreinfo On Sat, Dec 21, 2019 at 11:08:46PM +0100, deb...@think-future.com wrote: Severity: critical If it's indeed this serious, shouldn't this update go via security channels first? I guess so. Sounds reasonable. But, you tell me. On 2019-12-21 22:29:06, DebBug wrote: > Package: sponsorship-requests > Severity: normal > > Dear mentors, > > I am looking for a sponsor for the package "wordpress" > > * Package name: wordpress > Version : 5.3.2+dfsg1-0.1 > Changes since the last upload: > > * Non-maintainer upload. > * New upstream release So you're trying to upload merely a new release, rather than a fix for a security bug (which would warrant such expedience). There might be bugfix-only upstream releases (for good upstreams) or hopelessly-tied-with- unrelated-features releases (for bad upstreams), but at the very least you'd need to point to specific reasons to hurry. First off, I sense a bit of a tone here. I'm feeling accused. Just explain what you think and I'm fine with it. Now, regarding the matter at hand, it occurs to me not everyone is familiar with wordpress: There was a new release upstream in november, two security updates in december but not a single deb pkg update. For someone conscious about security issues, for a CMS that popular, more than a month down the road, even after security related releases, it's rather a long time without deb updates. So, it seems this would warrant an update for a new (security) release. I am willing to support the packages' maintainers, to contribute for others to profit from it, because that's the spirit of opensource, right? So there's the updated package, the sponsored NMU and its RFS. No cherry-picking fixes for outdated versions' security bugs, as wordpress security fixes are released as is, and I cannot intend on starting to backport bug fixes to outdated versions. You're asking for reasons. The reasons are obvious. There are flaws in a piece of software, being actively exploited (observedly, even before any SA was out), the software being widely deployed putting users' systems and data at unnecessary and avoidable risk. Anyone to chime in? Craig? Markus? But here, you're apparently going with a whole new upstream branch, over the Latest deb pkg version: 5.2.4 upstream, november 12: 5.3 latest upstream security release, december 18 That's the way the wordpress devs handle it, and the previous deb pkg version seems to do the same thing as this NMU. Frankly, I don't get your point here. It seems to me like: [X] not applicable. head of the maintainer, who seems to be active -- and all of that without Woah. Easy. Accusive, again. How do you know, I am "going over the head of the maintainer"? You cannot. Yet, you assume so. even trying to follow the procedure. And again. What procedure are _you_ referring to? I'd like to have a read on this. You know, let's keep this on the factual side, this way it may be beneficial to the Debian project. Handling motivated, interested people like this doesn't seem to me as beneficial to the Debian project as it should be. Sadly, as it is, the Debian project as since suffered from exactly this kind of treatment for other people. Technical expertise and soft skills often seem not to be living under the same tree. We must strive for those virtues to be flatmates. I am adhering to the procedure for debian package upload sponsorship, NMU, new members doc, new maintainers packaging doc and probably a couple more. Cheers Nils signature.asc Description: PGP signature
Bug#947212: wordpress: 5.3.2 new upstream bug-fixing release available.
Package: wordpress Version: 5.2.4 Severity: critical Dear Maintainer, * What led up to the situation? Wordpress 5.3 was released on November 12, 2019 with the latest maintenance/security release on December 18, 2019. Since then the Debian wordpress package has not been updated from 5.2.4 leaving instances at unnecessary and avoidable risk. Please consider updating Debian wordpress packages to upstream versions. To reduce exposure of wordpress instances deploying Debian wordpress packages I am offering updated and packaged versions of the Debian wordpress packages (tested OK) for sponsored [2] NMU [1]. I intend on contributing updates on a regular basis. Severity "critical" is chosen for this issue being security-related on a large scale putting many users' systems and data at risk. @Craig In addition to our past PMs, I'm merely formally reporting this critical bug for public reference on 3rd party advise. -- 1: https://mentors.debian.net/package/wordpress 2: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=3D947143 signature.asc Description: PGP signature
Bug#947143: RFS: wordpress/5.3.2+dfsg1-0.1 [NMU] [RC] -- weblog manager
Severity: critical On 2019-12-21 22:29:06, DebBug wrote: Package: sponsorship-requests Severity: normal Dear mentors, I am looking for a sponsor for the package "wordpress" * Package name: wordpress Version : 5.3.2+dfsg1-0.1 Upstream Author : Hard to find for https://wordpress.org * URL : https://wordpress.org * License : GPL-2+ * Vcs : https://salsa.debian.org/debian/wordpress Section : web It builds those binary packages: wordpress - weblog manager wordpress-l10n - weblog manager - language files wordpress-theme-twentysixteen - weblog manager - twentysixteen theme files wordpress-theme-twentyseventeen - weblog manager - twentyseventeen theme files wordpress-theme-twentynineteen - weblog manager - twentynineteen theme files To access further information about this package, please visit the following URL: https://mentors.debian.net/package/wordpress Alternatively, one can download the package with dget using this command: dget -x https://mentors.debian.net/debian/pool/main/w/wordpress/wordpress_5.3.2+dfsg1-0.1.dsc Changes since the last upload: * Non-maintainer upload. * New upstream release Thank you. Regards, Nils signature.asc Description: PGP signature
Bug#947143: RFS: wordpress/5.3.2+dfsg1-0.1 [NMU] -- weblog manager
Package: sponsorship-requests Severity: normal Dear mentors, I am looking for a sponsor for the package "wordpress" * Package name: wordpress Version : 5.3.2+dfsg1-0.1 Upstream Author : Hard to find for https://wordpress.org * URL : https://wordpress.org * License : GPL-2+ * Vcs : https://salsa.debian.org/debian/wordpress Section : web It builds those binary packages: wordpress - weblog manager wordpress-l10n - weblog manager - language files wordpress-theme-twentysixteen - weblog manager - twentysixteen theme files wordpress-theme-twentyseventeen - weblog manager - twentyseventeen theme files wordpress-theme-twentynineteen - weblog manager - twentynineteen theme files To access further information about this package, please visit the following URL: https://mentors.debian.net/package/wordpress Alternatively, one can download the package with dget using this command: dget -x https://mentors.debian.net/debian/pool/main/w/wordpress/wordpress_5.3.2+dfsg1-0.1.dsc Changes since the last upload: * Non-maintainer upload. * New upstream release Thank you. Regards, Nils
Bug#914370: cups-daemon: AppArmor profile allows cupsd to create setuid binaries under /etc
Package: cups-daemon Version: 2.3~b5-2 Severity: normal Dear Maintainer, The AppArmor profile supplied with cupsd isn't much use against local attackers, as it allows cupsd to create setuid binaries at paths it can write to (e.g. under /etc/cups). Since cupsd is run as root by default, these binaries can be setuid root. In the following example, I replace cupsd with a shell and run it as root to test the confinement. As you can see, AppArmor stops the process writing to an unlisted path in /etc, but does allow it to write and and set permissions under /etc/cups. # mv -i /usr/sbin/cupsd /usr/sbin/cupsd.bak # cp /bin/sh /usr/sbin/cupsd # PS1='confined# ' /usr/sbin/cupsd confined# cp /bin/true /etc cp: cannot create regular file '/etc/true': Permission denied confined# cp /bin/true /etc/cups confined# chmod 4555 /etc/cups/true confined# exit # ls -l /etc/cups/true -r-sr-xr-x 1 root root 35424 Nov 22 14:16 /etc/cups/true (Creating a setuid binary at /etc/printcap also works, as does removing any existing symlink there.) In default installations /etc is not on a nosuid mount, so provided that they have a suitable exploit, local attackers who are unconfined but non-root can use cupsd to create a setuid binary, then run the binary themselves to gain unconfined root privileges. -- System Information: Debian Release: buster/sid APT prefers unstable APT policy: (500, 'unstable'), (1, 'experimental') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Kernel: Linux 4.18.0-2-amd64 (SMP w/4 CPU cores) Locale: LANG=en_GB.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_GB.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE=en_GB:en (charmap=UTF-8) Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system) LSM: AppArmor: enabled Versions of packages cups-daemon depends on: ii adduser 3.118 ii bc1.07.1-2+b1 ii libavahi-client3 0.7-4+b1 ii libavahi-common3 0.7-4+b1 ii libc6 2.27-8 ii libcups2 2.3~b5-2 ii libcupsmime1 2.3~b5-2 ii libdbus-1-3 1.12.10-1 ii libgssapi-krb5-2 1.16.1-1 ii libpam0g 1.1.8-3.8 ii libpaper1 1.1.24+nmu5 ii libsystemd0 239-13 ii lsb-base 9.20170808 ii procps2:3.3.15-2 ii ssl-cert 1.0.39 Versions of packages cups-daemon recommends: ii avahi-daemon 0.7-4+b1 ii colord1.4.3-3+b1 ii cups-browsed 1.21.3-3 Versions of packages cups-daemon suggests: ii cups 2.3~b5-2 ii cups-bsd 2.3~b5-2 ii cups-client2.3~b5-2 ii cups-common2.3~b5-2 ii cups-filters [foomatic-filters]1.21.3-3 pn cups-pdf ii cups-ppdc 2.2.9-2 ii cups-server-common 2.3~b5-2 ii foomatic-db-compressed-ppds [foomatic-db] 20180921-1 ii ghostscript9.26~dfsg-1 pn hplip ii poppler-utils 0.69.0-2 ii printer-driver-gutenprint 5.3.1-2 pn printer-driver-hpcups pn smbclient ii udev 239-13 -- no debconf information
Bug#908553: potential solution (found by smilie)
Please remove --with-intl from the configure line in debian/rules. Regards, Igor2
Bug#887008: Problem solved
It appears that the problem got fixed in the next kernel version (4.9.0-6-amd64) so this bug can be closed. --jtg
Bug#879805: Bug 879805
On Sun, Mar 04, 2018 at 23:40:32 +0200, Apollon Oikonomopoulos wrote: > Good catch, this appears to be the following commit: > https://github.com/dovecot/core/commit/c27f060a08d3bbf89fadd58baf61f5ba97a47e3a > > > Is there a chance that the "mbox,zlib" fix from 2.2.33 could be included in > > a > > later Debian 9.x point release? I'm not keen on running a backports package > > that does not appear to get timely security updates. > > Yes, I could include this in a stable update. Would you be willing to > test the proposed update? > I can try! If an armel(!) binary .deb is available, it should be fairly easy to test here.
Bug#879805: Bug 879805
I was also hit hard by this bug after a recent upgrade from debian 8.x to debian 9.x. Dovecot spams the following lines multiple times per second and my .gz compressed mbox archives do not appear to work properly over imap: Mar 3 18:37:28 hostname dovecot: imap(username): Panic: file istream-zlib.c: line 416 (i_stream_zlib_seek): assertion failed: (ret == -1) Mar 3 18:37:28 hostname dovecot: imap(username): Fatal: master: service(imap): child 2768 killed with signal 6 (core dumps disabled) It would appear that Dovecot 2.2.33 contains a likely fix, based on https://www.dovecot.org/doc/NEWS "mbox, zlib: Fix assert-crash when accessing compressed mbox" Stretch only contains 2.2.27, but there is a 2.2.33.2-1~bpo9+1 in stretch-backports. It looks like the stretch-backports package was last uploaded on 15 Nov 2017, so it probably does not contain the security fixes included in DSA-4130-1 which was published on 02 Mar 2018. Is there a chance that the "mbox,zlib" fix from 2.2.33 could be included in a later Debian 9.x point release? I'm not keen on running a backports package that does not appear to get timely security updates. In the meantime, I have disabled the zlib plugin and decompressed all .gz mboxes server-side. While this bug is a little unfortunate, thanks again for all the work you do on this package.
Bug#883938: linux-image-3.16.0-4-amd64: Kernel panic on boot after upgrading to debian 8.10 kernel 3.16.51
On Sat, Dec 09, 2017 at 18:46:08 +0100, Rene Engelhard wrote: > On Sat, Dec 09, 2017 at 06:23:04PM +0100, debbug wrote: > > Package: src:linux > > Version: 3.16.43-2+deb8u5 > > Severity: grave > > Justification: renders package unusable > > > > (Note: This bug affects version 3.16.51-2, not 3.16.43-2+deb8u5, > > but that's the version that "reportbug" filled in after downgrading > > to get this system back up running) > > Then you should have edited the report accordingly... > I was going to, but I wasn't sure about the proper version number or syntax to put in (3.16.51 or 3.16.51-2 or something else) and I didn't want to risk losing the bug in a void or failing to submit. Thanks for fixing up the version number!
Bug#883938: linux-image-3.16.0-4-amd64: Kernel panic on boot after upgrading to debian 8.10 kernel 3.16.51
Package: src:linux Version: 3.16.43-2+deb8u5 Severity: grave Justification: renders package unusable (Note: This bug affects version 3.16.51-2, not 3.16.43-2+deb8u5, but that's the version that "reportbug" filled in after downgrading to get this system back up running) After upgrading from Debian 8.9 to Debian 8.10, this Dell PowerEdge R430 server immediately and consistently throws a kernel panic on boot. (kernel 3.16.51-2) Booting from debian-8.9.0-amd64-netinst.iso in rescue mode let me drop into a shell for the target installation, where I performed something like: cd /var/cache/apt/archives dpkg -i *3.16.43*deb8u5* reboot which restored the previous kernel (3.16.43-deb8u5). This kernel works fine. I only have a terrible java KVM app available for seeing the console, and from what I can see, it logs with timestamps [0.811] through [0.841] (typing in from an image - excuse any typos, and leaving out long hexadecimal numbers that might not be interesting) general protection fault: [#1] SMP CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 3.16.0-4-amd64 #1 Debian 3.16.51-2 Hardware name: Dell PowerEdge R430/03XKDV, BIOS 1.2.6 06/08/2015 task: 88085fa532d0 ti: 88085fa58000 task.ti: 88085fa58000 RIP: 0010:[] [<8109be3d)> build_sched_domains+0x72d/0cf0 (lots of x86_64 registers) Call trace: sched_init_smp+0x398/0x452 mutex_lock+0xe/0x2a put_online_cpus+... stop_machine+... kernel_init_freeable+... rest_init+... kernel_init+... ret_from_fork+... rest_init+... Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x000b ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x000b I also stopped by #debian on irc.debian.org and other people mentioned getting similar (or same) panics on different types of hardware (HP ProLiant DL380 G7, and a Supermicro server). Downgrading to 3.16.43-deb8u5 seemed to work for them as well. -- Package-specific info: ** Version: Linux version 3.16.0-4-amd64 (debian-ker...@lists.debian.org) (gcc version 4.8.4 (Debian 4.8.4-1) ) #1 SMP Debian 3.16.43-2+deb8u5 (2017-09-19) ** Command line: BOOT_IMAGE=/vmlinuz-3.16.0-4-amd64 root=UUID=89e3af9f-5bf1-4e93-99c0-0eca2f4fd312 ro quiet ** Tainted: O (4096) * Out-of-tree module has been loaded. ** Kernel log: [5.957932] systemd[1]: Starting udev Kernel Device Manager... [5.961475] ipmi message handler version 39.2 [5.961963] ipmi device interface [5.962401] Copyright (C) 2004 MontaVista Software - IPMI Powerdown via sys_reboot. [5.963211] IPMI System Interface driver. [5.963253] ipmi_si: probing via SMBIOS [5.963255] ipmi_si: SMBIOS: io 0xca8 regsize 1 spacing 4 irq 10 [5.963256] ipmi_si: Adding SMBIOS-specified kcs state machine [5.963259] ipmi_si: Trying SMBIOS-specified kcs state machine at i/o address 0xca8, slave address 0x20, irq 10 [5.978757] systemd-udevd[396]: starting version 215 [5.978816] systemd[1]: Started udev Kernel Device Manager. [5.978877] systemd[1]: Starting Copy rules generated while the root was ro... [5.979249] systemd[1]: Starting LSB: Set preliminary keymap... [6.010575] systemd[1]: Started Copy rules generated while the root was ro. [6.031435] systemd[1]: Mounted FUSE Control File System. [6.055061] wmi: Mapper loaded [6.060621] input: Power Button as /devices/LNXSYSTM:00/LNXPWRBN:00/input/input3 [6.060626] ACPI: Power Button [PWRF] [6.082592] ACPI Error: No handler for Region [SYSI] (88107ec271e8) [IPMI] (20140424/evregion-163) [6.082600] ACPI Error: Region IPMI (ID=7) has no handler (20140424/exfldio-297) [6.082605] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\_SB_.PMI0._GHL] (Node 88107ec26310), AE_NOT_EXIST (20140424/psparse-536) [6.082617] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\_SB_.PMI0._PMC] (Node 88107ec262c0), AE_NOT_EXIST (20140424/psparse-536) [6.082628] ACPI Exception: AE_NOT_EXIST, Evaluating _PMC (20140424/power_meter-755) [6.120161] ipmi_si ipmi_si.0: Using irq 10 [6.123175] ipmi_si ipmi_si.0: Couldn't set irq info: cc. [6.123177] ipmi_si ipmi_si.0: Maybe ok, but ipmi might run very slowly. [6.142529] ipmi_si ipmi_si.0: Found new BMC (man_id: 0x0002a2, prod_id: 0x0100, dev_id: 0x20) [6.145569] IPMI poweroff: ATCA Detect mfg 0x2A2 prod 0x100 [6.145571] IPMI poweroff: Found a chassis style poweroff function [6.145613] ipmi_si ipmi_si.0: IPMI kcs interface initialized [6.189769] shpchp: Standard Hot Plug PCI Controller Driver version: 0.4 [6.229237] mei_me :00:16.0: Device doesn't have valid ME Interface [6.237853] IPMI Watchdog: driver initialized [6.288912] systemd[1]: Mounted Debug File System. [6.288984] systemd[1]: Mounted Huge Pages File System. [6.289004] systemd[1]: Mounted POSIX Message Queue File System. [6.289448] systemd[1]: Started Increase datagram queue length. [6.289850]
Bug#859183: (no subject)
Package: cgilib Version: 0.6-1 Severity: important Tags: patch Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="===1572526208==" MIME-Version: 1.0 From: deb...@igor2.repo.hu To: Debian Bug Tracking SystemX-Debug: to=sub...@bugs.debian.org from="mih...@igor2.repo.hu" From: mih...@igor2.repo.hu Subject: cgilib.patch: Typo in array indexing causes segfault on multi-value parameters X-Debbugs-Cc: deb...@igor2.repo.hu This is a multi-part MIME message sent by reportbug. --===1572526208== Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline Package: cgilib0.6-1 Severity: important Tags: patch Dear Maintainer, * What led up to the situation? HTTP post parameter with the same name appears multiple times crashes the lib in cgiInit() because of a typo in the array index of a debug message. * What was the outcome of this action? Segfault. -- System Information: Debian Release: stretch/sid APT prefers testing APT policy: (500, 'testing'), (500, 'stable'), (500, 'oldstable') Architecture: i386 (i686) Kernel: Linux 4.5.1retfie (SMP w/2 CPU cores; PREEMPT) Locale: LANG=C, LC_CTYPE=C (charmap=ANSI_X3.4-1968) Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/bash Init: sysvinit (via /sbin/init) --===1572526208== Content-Type: text/x-diff; charset="us-ascii" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="cgilib.patch" diff -uri cgilib-0.6-orig/cgi.c cgilib-0.6/cgi.c --- cgilib-0.6-orig/cgi.c 2017-03-31 08:49:39.0 +0200 +++ cgilib-0.6/cgi.c2017-03-31 08:54:30.990919349 +0200 @@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ free (result[k]->value); free (value); result[k]->value = sptr; - cgiDebugOutput (1, "%s: %s", result[i]->name, result[i]->value); + cgiDebugOutput (1, "%s: %s", result[k]->name, result[k]->value); } } cp = ++ip; --===1572526208==--
Bug#858590: Similar experience here
I have similar experience here: no core dumps, but after upgrading from 2:4.2.14+dfsg-0+deb8u2 to 2:4.2.14+dfsg-0+deb8u4 I cannot access shares that have shadow_copy2 vfs module enabled. The rest of the shares work OK. Downgrading solves the problem. It may not be a completely isolated issue. --jtg
Bug#843561: certbot: Skip use perl in cron-script, just use shell
Second that using -0 */12 * * * root test -x /usr/bin/certbot -a \! -d /run/systemd/system && perl -e 'sleep int(rand(3600))' && certbot -q renew +0 */12 * * * root test -x /usr/bin/certbot -a \! -d /run/systemd/system && / bin/sh -c "/bin/sleep $((RANDOM%3600))" && certbot -q renew Corb
Bug#843839: RFP: pcb-rnd -- modular, interactive printed circuit board designer, compatible with gEDA/PCB and kicad and various other import/export formats.
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist * Package name: pcb-rnd Version : 1.1.3 Upstream Author : Tibor Palinkas (deb...@igor2.repo.hu) * URL : http://repo.hu/projects/pcb-rnd * License : GPLv2+ Programming Lang: C Description : modular, interactive printed circuit board designer, compatible with gEDA/PCB and kicad and various other import/export formats. pcb-rnd is an interactive printed circuit board editor for the X11 window system. pcb-rnd includes a rats nest feature, design rule checking, and can provide industry standard RS-274-X (Gerber), NC drill, and centroid data (X-Y data) output for use in the board fabrication and assembly process. pcb-rnd is load/save compatible with gEDA/PCB and kicad and offers various auxiliary import/export formats. Originally forked from gEDA/PCB. Why is this package useful/relevant: pcb-rnd is an actively developed alternative to already packaged pcb. It offers a lot more features, including compatibility with kicad. Is it a dependency for another package: no. Do you use it: yes. I am also the lead developer. If there are other packages providing similar functionality: yes; pcb and kicad How does it compare: vs pcb: pcb-rnd is much more modular and offers more features. An almost complete summary of the extra features can be found at: http://repo.hu/projects/pcb-rnd/features . Kicad: pcb-rnd is much smaller with fewer dependencies; more suitable for scripted/automated processing. How do you plan to maintain it: I am currently maintaining a set of home-grown debian packages, part of the upstream repository. Are you looking for co-maintainers/sponsor: yes.
Bug#838881: Actual python module files missing
Package: python-parsedatetime Version: 2.1-1 Severity: critical Upgrade from 1.4-1 to 2.1-1 made certbot fail. Short investigation reveals the package contains only files in /usr/share/doc/python-parsedatetime/* but is missing any file in /usr/lib/. -- System Information: Debian Release: stretch/sid Architecture: i386 (i686)
Bug#795407: libmruby-dev: static library compield without -fPIC on x86_64
Subject: libmruby-dev: static library compield without -fPIC on x86_64 Package: libmruby-dev Version: 1.0.0+20141015+gitb4cc962c-1 Severity: important Tags: newcomer upstream Dear Maintainer, * What led up to the situation? I was trying to compile a dynamic library (.so) that linked against libmruby. libmruby comes as a static library (.a). For a dynamic lib on x86_64, the -fPIC compiler flag needs to be used on all object files. In my case this includes the object files in libmruby.a * What exactly did you do (or not do) that was effective (or ineffective)? gcc -shared -o foo.so foo.o -lmruby -lm * What was the outcome of this action? on x86_64 gcc error message that all objects need to be compiled with -fPIC. On i386 it worked. * What outcome did you expect instead? I'd expect all static libraries installed from -dev packages be compiled with -fPIC on x86_64, since a random user project may want to link them in a dynamic lib. * My local hack to solve the problem apt-get source libmruby-dev edit build_config.rb: uncomment the conf.cc do |cc| line and its end, then add cc.flags = '-fPIC' rebuild the package and install Proposed solution: enable -fPIC on x86_64 only and/or also compile a .so of the mruby lib. * Upstream Downloaded the official release pack for 1.0.0 and 1.0.1, they both compiled without -fPIC by default, so the problem is present in the upstream. -- System Information: Debian Release: 8.0 APT prefers testing APT policy: (500, 'testing') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 3.16.0-4-amd64 (SMP w/4 CPU cores) Locale: LANG=C, LC_CTYPE=C (charmap=ANSI_X3.4-1968) Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/bash Init: sysvinit (via /sbin/init) -- no debconf information Best regards, Tibor Palinkas
Bug#770984: apcaccess does not work on ARM
Control: severity -1 serious I am also seeing this, on armel, in version 3.14.12-1. Would it be appropriate to mark this bug severity as grave or serious? I'm not sure if it is proper etiquette, but I might give it a shot with a control message here (hope this works) It would be nice if the jessie release could avoid shipping a broken apcaccess binary. Thanks. -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-bugs-dist-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org
Bug#781886: qcontrol failure to start on boot sometimes (jessie, systemd?)
On Sat, Apr 04, 2015 at 14:43:23 +0100, Ian Campbell wrote: On Sat, 2015-04-04 at 14:48 +0200, reportbug wrote: [...] Apr 02 12:08:28 hostname qcontrol[617]: qcontrol 0.5.4 daemon starting. Apr 02 12:08:28 hostname qcontrold[480]: Starting qcontrol daemon: qcontrol. Apr 02 12:08:28 hostname qcontrol[617]: evdev: Error opening /dev/input/by-path/platform-gpio-keys-event: No such file or directory Apr 02 12:08:28 hostname qcontrol[617]: register() - Error loading module I think this is probably the root cause, this path doesn't exist for some reason, so qcontrold doesn't start. Do you have that device path now? I suppose you must since a later manual start of qcontrold worked. If not then do you have anything similar (i.e. tr - _ perhaps)? I do, it is a symlink to ../event0: 0 lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 9 2015-04-02 12:08 /dev/input/by-path/platform-gpio-keys-event - ../event0 When I do a stat on this /dev/input/event0 file, it curiously displays a filestamp being one second later than the qcontrol journalctl error entries: % stat /dev/input/event0 File: '/dev/input/event0' Size: 0 Blocks: 0 IO Block: 4096 character special file Device: 5h/5d Inode: 5272Links: 1 Device type: d,40 Access: (0660/crw-rw) Uid: (0/root) Gid: ( 113/ input) Access: 2015-04-02 12:08:29.72800 +0200 Modify: 2015-04-02 12:08:29.72800 +0200 Change: 2015-04-02 12:08:29.72800 +0200 Birth: - -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-bugs-dist-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org
Bug#775575: guile-enabled gdb package
X-Debbugs-CC: zu...@debian.org Hector Oron zu...@debian.org wrote: Sorry, but there are already too many GDB packages, You don't need to add another package, just enable guile support in the existing gdb package. People who want a gdb with minimal dependencies can install gdb-minimal
Bug#775575: guile-enabled gdb package
Package: src:gdb Version: 7.7.1+dfsg-5 Severity: wishlist Since upstream version 7.8, GDB can be compiled with support for Guile as an extension language. It would be nice to have a guile-enabled gdb available in Debian. thanks
Bug#775341: chuck: new upstream version 1.3.5.0 available
Package: chuck Version: 1.2.0.8.dfsg-1.4 There is a new upstream version available: 1.3.5.0 http://chuck.cs.princeton.edu/release/
Bug#750360: jessie nfsroot diskless broken? 180 second delay before root is
mounted? Reply-To: Hello, I recently upgraded a debian unstable system that runs diskless with pxe netboot / nfsroot, and now every boot spends 180 seconds with repeated logging of mount: Device or Resource busy error messages in the initramfs scripts before things kick off and the main boot proceeds. Is this the bug causing that? -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-bugs-dist-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org
Bug#736944: nvidia-legacy-304xx-driver: vdpau driver missing, causes floating point exception
By the way, I tried extracting the *vdpau* files from the nvidia .run installer (using option -x), without any further success (that's why they appear in the file listings in the original report) -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-bugs-dist-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org
Bug#702504: python-gi: none
Package: python-gi Version: 3.2.2-2 Severity: normal Dear Maintainer, The user_data property of the TreeIter is always set to None, when returning it from the do_get_iter function. Here a minimal example: from gi.repository import Gtk, GObject class Model(GObject.Object, Gtk.TreeModel): def do_get_iter(self, path): it = Gtk.TreeIter() it.user_data = 23 return (True, it) def do_get_value(self, it, column): return it.user_data m = Model() it = m.get_iter_first() it.user_data # returns None m.get_value(it, 0) # returns None Bug seems to be known and fixed in newer versions, see also: http://old.nabble.com/Problem-understanding-how-to-port-GenericTreeModel-to-gi-td34846802.html -- System Information: Debian Release: 7.0 APT prefers testing APT policy: (500, 'testing') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Foreign Architectures: i386 Kernel: Linux 3.2.0-4-amd64 (SMP w/4 CPU cores) Locale: LANG=en_GB.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_GB.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8) Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Versions of packages python-gi depends on: ii gir1.2-glib-2.0 1.32.1-1 ii libc6 2.13-38 ii libffi5 3.0.10-3 ii libgirepository-1.0-1 1.32.1-1 ii libglib2.0-0 2.33.12+really2.32.4-5 ii python 2.7.3-4 python-gi recommends no packages. Versions of packages python-gi suggests: ii python-gi-cairo 3.2.2-2 -- no debconf information -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-bugs-dist-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org
Bug#695587: apache2.2-common: apache2ctl fullstatus drops .elinks / .links2 dotfiles in current dir
Package: apache2.2-common Running apache2ctl fullstatus drops a directory .links2 in the current working directory. I assume this happens because apache2ctl runs /etc/apache2/envvars which unsets HOME, which then causes the www-browser to create preference files in the current directory. (On another machine, the same script appears to drop .elinks directories into the current directory; it has probably a different setting for the www-browser alternative) -- Package-specific info: List of /etc/apache2/mods-enabled/*.load: alias auth_basic authn_file authz_default authz_groupfile authz_host authz_user autoindex cgi deflate dir env expires mime negotiation php5 proxy proxy_http reqtimeout rewrite setenvif ssl status vhost_alias List of enabled php5 extensions: curl gd gmp imagick mcrypt mysql mysqli pdo pdo_mysql pdo_sqlite pspell sqlite sqlite3 suhosin tidy -- System Information: Debian Release: 6.0.6 APT prefers stable-updates APT policy: (500, 'stable-updates'), (500, 'stable') Architecture: amd64 (x86_64) Kernel: Linux 2.6.32-5-amd64 (SMP w/4 CPU cores) Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=nb_NO.iso88591 (charmap=ISO-8859-1) Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Versions of packages apache2.2-common depends on: ii apache2-utils 2.2.16-6+squeeze10 utility programs for webservers ii apache2.2-bin 2.2.16-6+squeeze10 Apache HTTP Server common binary f ii libmagic1 5.04-5+squeeze2File type determination library us ii lsb-base 3.2-23.2squeeze1 Linux Standard Base 3.2 init scrip ii mime-support 3.48-1 MIME files 'mime.types' 'mailcap ii perl 5.10.1-17squeeze3 Larry Wall's Practical Extraction ii procps1:3.2.8-9squeeze1 /proc file system utilities Versions of packages apache2.2-common recommends: ii ssl-cert 1.0.28 simple debconf wrapper for OpenSSL Versions of packages apache2.2-common suggests: pn apache2-doc none (no description available) pn apache2-suexec | apa none (no description available) ii elinks [www-browser] 0.12~pre5-2 advanced text-mode WWW browser ii links [www-browser] 2.3~pre1-1+squeeze1 Web browser running in text mode ii w3m [www-browser]0.5.2-9 WWW browsable pager with excellent Versions of packages apache2.2-common is related to: pn apache2-mpm-event none (no description available) pn apache2-mpm-itk none (no description available) ii apache2-mpm-prefork 2.2.16-6+squeeze10 Apache HTTP Server - traditional n pn apache2-mpm-workernone (no description available) -- Configuration Files: /etc/apache2/apache2.conf changed [not included] /etc/apache2/conf.d/security changed [not included] /etc/apache2/ports.conf changed [not included] /etc/apache2/sites-available/default changed [not included] /etc/apache2/sites-available/default-ssl changed [not included] -- no debconf information -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-bugs-dist-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org
Bug#673971: (no subject)
tags 673971 + pending reopen 673971 thanks oops... forget the previous comment, messed up bug id -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-bugs-dist-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org
Bug#673971: serendipity: unowned files after purge (policy 6.8, 10.8): /etc/apache2/conf.d/serendipity.conf
tags 673971 + pending thanks postrm checks if the webserver it is trying to remove the config for is used at all. At that time in your test, apache2 has already been removed, otherwise it would have performed the purge correctly. I don't remember why it performs that check and I have now loosened it. -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-bugs-dist-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org
Bug#655509: update fails in preconfig stage: /etc/cron.d/prey failing to meet update expectation
Package: prey Version: 0.5.3-6 Severity: important Tags: patch Hi, ERROR: - update fails CAUSE: - I temporarily changed /etc/cron.d/prey: deactivated regular exec. See below for the change. PATCH: - only try to update cron config if there's an active entry or skip. --- config.orig 2012-01-11 20:34:09.022612405 +0100 +++ config 2012-01-11 20:35:03.690928954 +0100 @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ done fi -if [ -f /etc/cron.d/prey ] +if [ -f /etc/cron.d/prey -a -n $(grep 'prey.sh' /etc/cron.d/prey | egrep -v '^#|^#$|^\s+#') ] then # Frequency of reports and actions prey suggests no packages. -- Configuration Files: /etc/cron.d/prey changed: # /etc/cron.d/prey: crontab entries for the prey package PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin SHELL=/bin/bash #*/20 * * * * root /usr/lib/prey/prey.sh /var/log/prey.log -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-bugs-dist-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org
Bug#644965: reportbug -Q -N bug-ID, subsequent choice o - stacktrace
Package: reportbug Version: 6.2.1 Severity: serious Description: - Using query mode -Q w/ -N 1234, viewing report, then selecting o in the menu crashes reportbug. Trace: What do you want to do now? [N|x|o|r|b|e|q|?]? ? N - (default) Show next message (followup). x - Provide extra information. o - Show other bug reports (return to bug listing). r - Redisplay this message. b - Launch web browser to read full log. e - Launch e-mail client to read full log. q - I'm bored; quit please. ? - Display this help. What do you want to do now? [N|x|o|r|b|e|q|?]? o Traceback (most recent call last): File /usr/bin/reportbug, line 2186, in module main() File /usr/bin/reportbug, line 1073, in main return iface.user_interface() File /usr/bin/reportbug, line 1354, in user_interface package = exinfo.package or exinfo.source AttributeError: 'NoneType' object has no attribute 'package' -- Package-specific info: ** Environment settings: EDITOR=/usr/bin/vi INTERFACE=text ** /home/user/.reportbugrc: reportbug_version 3.31 mode expert ui text realname debbug email l...@think-future.com paranoid -- System Information: Debian Release: wheezy/sid APT prefers testing APT policy: (990, 'testing'), (500, 'unstable'), (500, 'stable') Architecture: i386 (i686) Kernel: Linux 2.6.39.3 (SMP w/2 CPU cores; PREEMPT) Locale: LANG=it_IT.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=it_IT.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8) Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Versions of packages reportbug depends on: ii apt 0.8.15.8 ii python2.7.2-8 ii python-reportbug 6.2.1 reportbug recommends no packages. Versions of packages reportbug suggests: ii debconf-utils1.5.40 ii debsums 2.0.49 ii dlocate none ii emacs22-bin-common | emacs23-bin-common none ii file 5.08-1 ii gnupg1.4.11-3 ii pgpgpg [pgp] 0.13-9 ii postfix [mail-transport-agent] 2.8.3-1 ii python-gtk2 2.24.0-2 ii python-gtkspell none ii python-urwid 0.9.9.2-1 ii python-vte 1:0.28.1-2 ii xdg-utils1.1.0~rc1-2 -- no debconf information -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-bugs-dist-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org
Bug#644930: bad LANG env crashes gnucash on File-New account
Package: gnucash Version: 1:2.4.7-3+b1 Severity: serious Tags: l10n Problem description: Using export LANG=de_DE; gnucash to start gnucash. gnucash crashes upon Selecting File - New account. Same valid for de_DE@UTF-8 maybe others as well. export LANG=de_DE.UTF-8; gnucash however works as intended. Further problem properties: - exists iirc since 2008 or earlier - gnucash devs at #gnucash hint this might be related to libc or gtk. Stack trace: - gnucash-lang-segfault: http://pastebin.com/4h2Cv0La #0 __strncmp_ssse3 () at ../sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/strcmp-ssse3.S:2064 #1 0xb6c7813e in ?? () from /usr/lib/libgtk-x11-2.0.so.0 #2 0xb6de0fc7 in ?? () from /usr/lib/libgtk-x11-2.0.so.0 #3 0xb6de5677 in ?? () from /usr/lib/libgtk-x11-2.0.so.0 #4 0xb6de59f6 in ?? () from /usr/lib/libgtk-x11-2.0.so.0 #5 0xb6ddf4e0 in ?? () from /usr/lib/libgtk-x11-2.0.so.0 #6 0xb6de079b in gtk_tree_model_foreach () from /usr/lib/libgtk-x11-2.0.so.0 #7 0xb6de4f8c in gtk_tree_model_filter_refilter () from /usr/lib/libgtk-x11-2.0.so.0 #8 0xb6c79566 in gtk_entry_completion_complete () from /usr/lib/libgtk-x11-2.0.so.0 #9 0xb6c65d9c in ?? () from /usr/lib/libgtk-x11-2.0.so.0 #10 0xb678af1c in ?? () from /usr/lib/libgobject-2.0.so.0 #11 0xb676d9f2 in g_closure_invoke () from /usr/lib/libgobject-2.0.so.0 #12 0xb678afb7 in ?? () from /usr/lib/libgobject-2.0.so.0 #13 0xb66b2a41 in ?? () from /lib/libglib-2.0.so.0 #14 0xb66b7252 in g_main_context_dispatch () from /lib/libglib-2.0.so.0 #15 0xb66b7a30 in ?? () from /lib/libglib-2.0.so.0 #16 0xb66b80f3 in g_main_loop_run () from /lib/libglib-2.0.so.0 #17 0xb6ceabd9 in gtk_main () from /usr/lib/libgtk-x11-2.0.so.0 #18 0xb7695974 in gnc_ui_start_event_loop () at gnc-gnome-utils.c:668 #19 0x0804d4d4 in inner_main (closure=0x0, argc=1, argv=0xbfa77ae4) at gnucash-bin.c:735 #20 0xb73a4416 in ?? () from /usr/lib/libguile.so.17 #21 0xb7376022 in ?? () from /usr/lib/libguile.so.17 #22 0xb73eb518 in scm_c_catch () from /usr/lib/libguile.so.17 #23 0xb7376657 in scm_i_with_continuation_barrier () from /usr/lib/libguile.so.17 #24 0xb7376733 in scm_c_with_continuation_barrier () from /usr/lib/libguile.so.17 #25 0xb73e9d99 in scm_i_with_guile_and_parent () from /usr/lib/libguile.so.17 #26 0xb73e9dee in scm_with_guile () from /usr/lib/libguile.so.17 #27 0xb73a44ff in scm_boot_guile () from /usr/lib/libguile.so.17 #28 0x0804d8b1 in main (argc=1, argv=0xbfa77ae4) at gnucash-bin.c:879 -- System Information: Debian Release: wheezy/sid APT prefers testing APT policy: (990, 'testing'), (500, 'unstable'), (500, 'stable') Architecture: i386 (i686) Kernel: Linux 2.6.39.3 (SMP w/2 CPU cores; PREEMPT) Locale: LANG=it_IT.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=it_IT.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8) Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Versions of packages gnucash depends on: ii gnucash-common 1:2.4.7-3 ii guile-1.8 1.8.8+1-6 ii guile-1.8-libs 1.8.8+1-6 ii libaqbanking33 5.0.16-1 ii libart-2.0-2 2.3.21-1 ii libatk1.0-02.2.0-1 ii libbonobo2-0 2.24.3-1 ii libbonoboui2-0 2.24.3-1 ii libc6 2.13-21 ii libcairo2 1.10.2-6.1 ii libcrypt-ssleay-perl 0.57-2+b2 ii libdate-manip-perl 6.25-1 ii libdbi10.8.4-5.1 ii libfinance-quote-perl 1.17+git20110918-1 ii libfontconfig1 2.8.0-3 ii libfreetype6 2.4.6-2 ii libgconf2-42.32.4-1 ii libgdk-pixbuf2.0-0 2.24.0-1 ii libglade2-01:2.6.4-1 ii libglib2.0-0 2.28.6-1 ii libgmp10 2:5.0.2+dfsg-1 ii libgnome-keyring0 3.2.0-2 ii libgnome2-02.32.1-1 ii libgnomecanvas2-0 2.30.3-1 ii libgnomeui-0 2.24.5-2 ii libgnomevfs2-0 1:2.24.4-1 ii libgoffice-0.8-8 0.8.17-1 ii libgtk2.0-02.24.4-3 ii libgwengui-gtk2-0 4.3.0-1 ii libgwenhywfar604.3.0-1 ii libhtml-tableextract-perl 2.11-1 ii libhtml-tree-perl 4.2-1 ii libice62:1.0.7-2 ii libktoblzcheck1c2a 1.35-1 ii libltdl7 2.4-4 ii libofx41:0.9.4-2 ii liborbit2 1:2.14.18-0.2 ii libpango1.0-0 1.28.4-3 ii libpopt0 1.16-1 ii libsm6 2:1.2.0-2 ii libsoup2.4-1 2.34.3-1 ii libwebkitgtk-1.0-0 1.4.2-2 ii libwww-perl6.02-1 ii libx11-6 2:1.4.4-2 ii libxml22.7.8.dfsg-4 ii perl 5.12.4-4 ii slib 3b1-3.1 ii zlib1g 1:1.2.3.4.dfsg-3 Versions of packages gnucash recommends: ii gnucash-docs 2.2.0-3 Versions of packages gnucash suggests: pn libdbd-mysqlnone pn libdbd-pgsqlnone pn libdbd-sqlite3 none -- no debconf information -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email
Bug#608232: flpsed does not save text on certain input documents
Package: flpsed Version: 0.5.2-1 Severity: grave Tags: lenny, squeeze flpsed does not save text on postscript produced by xsane in squeeze. The saved document only has /PSEditWidgetPageCount 1 def % PSEditWidget added in line 12 compared to the original. Re-opening the saved document in flpsed another time, adding text and saving again as postscript yields a document with no changes. PDF export has the same result (i.e. the added text is not saved). Running ps2ps or eps2eps on the postscript document yields a several times bigger postscript document that is handled correctly by flpsed. I stripped the image out of a small sample postscript file generated by xsane and attached the result below and as an attachment. Cheers, Karsten === sample postscript === %!PS-Adobe-3.0 %%Creator: XSane version 0.997 (sane 1.0) - by Oliver Rauch %%DocumentData: Clean7Bit %%LanguageLevel: 3 %%BoundingBox: 0 0 69 23 %%Pages: 1 %%EndComments %%BeginDocument: xsane.ps 20 dict begin %%Page: 1 1 %%PageBoundingBox: 0 0 70 24 /DeviceGray setcolorspace 0 rotate 0 0 translate 69.120003 23.76 scale /ImageType 1 /Width 96 /Height 33 /BitsPerComponent 8 /Decode [0 1] /ImageMatrix [96 0 0 -33 0 33] /DataSource currentfile /ASCII85Decode filter /FlateDecode filter showpage %%PageTrailer end %%EOF %%EndDocument === sample postscript -- System Information: Debian Release: squeeze/sid APT prefers testing APT policy: (990, 'testing'), (500, 'unstable') Architecture: i386 (i686) Kernel: Linux 2.6.32-5-686-bigmem (SMP w/4 CPU cores) Locale: LANG=C, LC_CTYPE=C (charmap=ANSI_X3.4-1968) Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Versions of packages flpsed depends on: ii ghostscript-x 8.71~dfsg2-6 The GPL Ghostscript PostScript/PDF ii libc6 2.11.2-7 Embedded GNU C Library: Shared lib ii libfltk1.1 1.1.10-2+b1 Fast Light Toolkit - shared librar ii libgcc1 1:4.4.5-8GCC support library ii libstdc++6 4.4.5-8 The GNU Standard C++ Library v3 ii libx11-62:1.3.3-4X11 client-side library Versions of packages flpsed recommends: ii poppler-utils [xpdf-utils]0.12.4-1.2 PDF utilitites (based on libpopple flpsed suggests no packages. -- no debconf information example.ps Description: PostScript document
Bug#604028: signing-party: Missing dependency ) for siggraph
Package: signing-party Version: 1.1.3-1 Severity: normal Can't locate GD.pm in @INC (@INC contains: /etc/perl /usr/local/lib/perl/5.10.1 /usr/local/share/perl/5.10.1 /usr/lib/perl5 /usr/share/perl5 /usr/lib/perl/5.10 /usr/share/perl/5.10 /usr/local/lib/site_perl .) at /usr/bin/springgraph line 187. GD.pm is in libgd-gd2-noxpm-perl: /usr/lib/perl5/GD.pm libgd-gd2-perl: /usr/lib/perl5/GD.pm ... it is also found in a couple of other packages, which I think are all unrelated here: libgd-securityimage-perl: /usr/share/perl5/GD/SecurityImage/GD.pm libpdf-api2-perl: /usr/share/perl5/PDF/API2/Resource/XObject/Image/GD.pm libtemplate-plugin-gd-perl: /usr/share/perl5/Template/Plugin/GD.pm pdl: /usr/lib/perl5/PDL/IO/GD.pm wml: /usr/lib/wml/perl/lib/i486-linux-gnu-thread-multi/WML/GD.pm As a sidenote (I can fill a separate wishlist bug on this if you like) - I think it would be better to have springgraph in a separate springgraph package, on which signing-party depends. The man-page of apt-rdepends explicitely mentions springgraph: -d, --dotty dotty takes a list of packages on the command line and gener- ates output suitable for use by springgraph. ...and there is no reason why one would want to install signing-party for apt-rdepends. Cheers, Karsten -- System Information: Debian Release: squeeze/sid APT prefers testing APT policy: (990, 'testing'), (500, 'unstable') Architecture: i386 (i686) Kernel: Linux 2.6.32-5-686-bigmem (SMP w/4 CPU cores) Locale: LANG=C, LC_CTYPE=C (charmap=ANSI_X3.4-1968) Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash Versions of packages signing-party depends on: ii gnupg 1.4.10-4 GNU privacy guard - a free PGP rep ii libc6 2.11.2-7 Embedded GNU C Library: Shared lib ii libclass-methodmaker-perl 2.15-2 Perl module for creating generic m ii libgnupg-interface-perl 0.42-3 Perl interface to GnuPG ii libmailtools-perl 2.06-1 Manipulate email in perl programs ii libmime-tools-perl 5.428-1 Perl5 modules for MIME-compliant m ii libterm-readkey-perl2.30-4 A perl module for simple terminal ii libtext-template-perl 1.45-1 Text::Template perl module ii perl5.10.1-16Larry Wall's Practical Extraction ii qprint 1.0.dfsg.2-2 encoder and decoder for quoted-pri Versions of packages signing-party recommends: pn exim4 | mail-transport-agent none (no description available) pn libgd-gd2-noxpm-perl | libgd- none (no description available) pn libpaper-utilsnone (no description available) ii libtext-iconv-perl1.7-2 converts between character sets in ii whiptail 0.52.11-1 Displays user-friendly dialog boxe Versions of packages signing-party suggests: ii imagemagick8:6.6.0.4-2.2 image manipulation programs pn mutt none(no description available) pn texlive-latex-recommended none(no description available) pn wipe none(no description available) -- no debconf information -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-bugs-dist-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org
Bug#564926:
[ Please address all mail to 564...@bugs.debian.org too. ] An update from phpbb2 is not supported anyhow, as the documentation clearly says. Greetings, JM On 6/2/2010 9:44 PM, Nigel Horne wrote: Would that lose my phpbb2 database? -Nigel -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-bugs-dist-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org
Bug#564926: (no subject)
Since the original install already seems to have been faulty I would recommend purging the package completely and installing from scratch. Greetings JM -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-bugs-dist-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org
Bug#573524: (no subject)
Wouldn't this rather be a bug in dbconfig-common? Maybe also the priority of debconf messages to be shown is set too high on your system? -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-bugs-dist-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org
Bug#574976: (no subject)
tags 574976 wontfix thanks AFAIK: - upstream is AWOL - this package would contain ONE actual file - it is not used anywhere else in Debian that we could find out Therefore we have agreed to just keep this one file in the serendipity package directly. JM -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-bugs-dist-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org
Bug#579144: (no subject)
forwarded 579144 http://sourceforge.net/tracker/?func=detailaid=2992079group_id=75065atid=542822 thanks FWIW, I have made a few recommendations on how to make our lifes easier in the upstream issue tracker. -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-bugs-dist-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org
Bug#547456: (no subject)
If this is really the case, wouldn't it rather be a bug in aptitude or dpkg or such? -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-bugs-dist-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org
Bug#565738: (no subject)
Yeah, probably debconf should be used to ask which webservers should be configured (or not). However, this doesn't strike me as being that important since Drupal has a quite good multisite behavior, i.e. it won't show anything under a domain for which it hasn't been configured. -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-bugs-dist-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org
Bug#499765: (no subject)
tags 499765 +moreinfo owner 499765 ! thanks I believe your first problem might be a duplicate of #519713. As far as your second problem is concerned, what action did you exactly carry out to trigger it? -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-bugs-dist-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org
Bug#519713: (no subject)
tags 519713 +pending thanks Actually, it does not only happen for the users, but also for groups etc. ;-) This is due to the corresponding postgres sequences/serial datatypes not being updated after prepopulating the DB. The next version will have the fix. Why this doesn't trigger any key violations in the DB at runtime, I do not know. I guess it actually does but there must be something inside serendipity that handles this exception silently. -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-bugs-dist-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org