Re: Results for Voting secrecy

[Kurt Roeckx]

On Tue, Mar 29, 2022 at 03:54:28PM -0700, Russ Allbery wrote:
> 
> My understanding of the implications of this process (and Kurt is
> authoritative here, of course) is that if you rank NOTA equally with an
> option, that vote is not part of V(A,D) or V(D,A) since neither option is
> preferred over the other, and therefore has no effect either way on
> whether an option is discarded because it doesn't meet majority.

That is also my understanding. Ranking an option equal to NOTA means
that it will have no effect on the majority requirements, only other
people's votes will have an effect on the majority requirements for that
option.

In the vote results you'll see that the majority calculation uses
185/61 for option 2. That means 185 people voted option 2 above NOTA,
61 below NOTA. Since there were 258 people who voted it means
258-185-61=12 voted option 2 equal to NOTA.


Kurt

Re: Results for Voting secrecy

[Philip Hands]

Russ Allbery  writes:

> Philip Hands  writes:
>
>> The blurb that's sent out with the votes says:
>
>>   To vote "no, no matter what", rank "None of the above" as more
>>   desirable than the unacceptable choices, or you may rank the "None of
>>   the above" choice and leave choices you consider unacceptable blank.
>
>> which to me suggests that if one ranks something as equal to NotA then
>> one is not marking it as unacceptable, so presumably it is counted as
>> acceptable -- is that how such votes are calculated?
>
> The relevant provision of the constitution is:
>
> A.5.3. Any (non-default) option which does not defeat the default
> option by its required majority ratio is dropped from consideration. 
>
>   1. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters who
>  prefer option A over option B.
>   2. An option A defeats the default option D by a majority ratio N,
>  if V(A,D) is greater or equal to N * V(D,A) and V(A,D) is
>  strictly greater than V(D,A).
>   3. If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority ratio
>  is S; otherwise, its majority ratio is 1.
>
> My understanding of the implications of this process (and Kurt is
> authoritative here, of course) is that if you rank NOTA equally with an
> option, that vote is not part of V(A,D) or V(D,A) since neither option is
> preferred over the other, and therefore has no effect either way on
> whether an option is discarded because it doesn't meet majority.

Ah, right -- it seems that I had a typo in the grep pattern I was
pointing at the tally file, which was confusing me. Having fixed that,
I can now see that it is exactly as you describe.  Thanks :-)

In that case, a vote of '--1-' does make sense, if one doesn't actually
want to block a sufficiently large vote for options 1 or 2. In fact it's
probably what I should have voted rather than '--12' in order to reflect
my actual view.

Cheers, Phil.
-- 
|)|  Philip Hands  [+44 (0)20 8530 9560]  HANDS.COM Ltd.
|-|  http://www.hands.com/http://ftp.uk.debian.org/
|(|  Hugo-Klemm-Strasse 34,   21075 Hamburg,GERMANY


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Re: Results for Voting secrecy

[Russ Allbery]

Philip Hands  writes:

> The blurb that's sent out with the votes says:

>   To vote "no, no matter what", rank "None of the above" as more
>   desirable than the unacceptable choices, or you may rank the "None of
>   the above" choice and leave choices you consider unacceptable blank.

> which to me suggests that if one ranks something as equal to NotA then
> one is not marking it as unacceptable, so presumably it is counted as
> acceptable -- is that how such votes are calculated?

The relevant provision of the constitution is:

A.5.3. Any (non-default) option which does not defeat the default
option by its required majority ratio is dropped from consideration. 

  1. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters who
 prefer option A over option B.
  2. An option A defeats the default option D by a majority ratio N,
 if V(A,D) is greater or equal to N * V(D,A) and V(A,D) is
 strictly greater than V(D,A).
  3. If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority ratio
 is S; otherwise, its majority ratio is 1.

My understanding of the implications of this process (and Kurt is
authoritative here, of course) is that if you rank NOTA equally with an
option, that vote is not part of V(A,D) or V(D,A) since neither option is
preferred over the other, and therefore has no effect either way on
whether an option is discarded because it doesn't meet majority.

-- 
Russ Allbery (r...@debian.org)  

Re: Results for Voting secrecy

[Philip Hands]

Kurt Roeckx  writes:

> On Mon, Mar 28, 2022 at 12:26:51PM -0600, Sam Hartman wrote:
>> > "Kurt" == Kurt Roeckx  writes:
>> 
>> 
>> >> It inadvertently weakened the constitutional protection against
>> >> changes to the constitution.
>> 
>> Kurt> I currently fail to see how it does.
>> 
>> I think Felix's point is that if we had choice 1, 2 and Nota,
>> 
>> People who preferred option 3 would vote N>2=1 or some such.
>> 
>> Because choice 3 was on the ballot, people had options that reflected
>> their preferences and so some of those people voted 3>2>N.
>
> So the only thing I see is that they now had the option to express there
> preferences, while they were limited in how to express their preference
> without option 3.
>
> One way of interpreting the NOTA option is to look say what you think is
> acceptable or not. Without option 3 on the ballot, you can not say you
> think option 1 and 2 are acceptable but prefer option 3. You need to say
> option 1 and 2 are not acceptable, while you actually think they are
> acceptable. With option 3 on the ballot you can really talk about it
> being acceptable or not.
>
> Without option 3, it's probably beter to talk about preference rather
> than being acceptable. If you prefer no change, you just mark it below
> the NOTA option, even when you think option 1 or 2 is acceptable.
>
> Option 3 being on the ballot can make it more likely for option 1 and
> 2 to pass, but that's because people can actually express their opinion.
>
> Our voting system works best when all option are on the ballot. Adding
> more options is not a problem, it has clone independence.
>
>> Felix's point is that the voters who preferred option 3 actually had the
>> power to make it win, provided they were willing to say that they found
>> option 2 unacceptable.
>> Felix's assumption is that if they realized they had that power, they
>> would have exercised it.
>
> But option 2 won, so even if there were people who voted strategically,
> it's not a problem in this vote.

I don't actually mind the outcome (despite my '--12' vote, which was
tactical in the way described above I'm afraid -- probably as a result
of growing up under the UK's first-past-the-post system, which
pretty-much forces people to vote tactically, so I tend to do it out of
habit).

However, I'm failing to understand how the votes are calculated and/or
what certain votes were expected to achieve by the people casting them.

The blurb that's sent out with the votes says:

  To vote "no, no matter what", rank "None of the above" as more
  desirable than the unacceptable choices, or you may rank the "None of
  the above" choice and leave choices you consider unacceptable blank.

which to me suggests that if one ranks something as equal to NotA then
one is not marking it as unacceptable, so presumably it is counted as
acceptable -- is that how such votes are calculated?

It seems 8 people voted '--1-' and 3 voted '1---'.

Did those all contribute to option 2 getting its 3:1 majority?

If so, do we think that someone casting either of those votes was
expecting their vote to be interpreted thus?

Cheers, Phil.
-- 
|)|  Philip Hands  [+44 (0)20 8530 9560]  HANDS.COM Ltd.
|-|  http://www.hands.com/http://ftp.uk.debian.org/
|(|  Hugo-Klemm-Strasse 34,   21075 Hamburg,GERMANY


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Re: Results for Voting secrecy

[Pierre-Elliott Bécue]

Felix Lechner  wrote on 27/03/2022 at 22:30:53+0200:

> Hi Kurt,
>
> On Sun, Mar 27, 2022 at 11:03 AM Kurt Roeckx  wrote:
>>
>> Clearly people don't think it's identical, otherwise it would not have
>> been an option, or people would have voted it equally.
>
> People were confused.
>
> Given the stated intent of Option 3 that "early 2022 is not the time
> for rushed changes like this", the Secretary should not have admitted
> that option to the ballot. It inadvertently weakened the
> constitutional protection against changes to the constitution.
>
> The constitution is the project's foundational document.
>
> Neither the option's proponents nor the voters understood the
> deleterious effect. (Nor did I.) At a minimum, the public was entitled
> to a warning from the Project Secretary.
>
> The vote was procedurally defective.
>
>> Option 3 has no effect on the majority results. The options are compared
>> to the NOTA option.
>
> Folks opposing "secret votes" should never have placed Option 2 ahead
> of NOTA, and would not have done so if Option 3 had been absent.
>
> I do not believe it is possible to reconstruct the electorate's intent
> solely from the beat matrix. A better approximation, however, would be
> to also consider the 107 votes who placed Option 3 ahead of Option 2
> in the latter's majority test. That would yield 185 / (61 + 107) = 1.1
> which is less than the factor of 3 mandated by section 4.1.2 of the
> constitution.
>
> As far as I can see, the result is unconstitutional and thus invalid.
>
>> I currently don't see anything wrong with this vote, so I see no reason
>> to redo it.
>
> Please reconsider. Otherwise the project's sole alternative may be to
> replace the Project Secretary.

So… you state the vote is unconstitutional based on an interpretation
you are making of the potential misleading state some ballot option
would have had. And your solution to "fix" this is to *demand* an
_unconstitutional_ decision from the Project Secretary who is
responsible for making sure things stay constitutional, otherwise you
threaten him to get replaced for doing exactly what the project expects
him to do?

I know these times are rough. I know some people in some countries are
trying to show one can look like a democrat while not being one at all.
But seeing this, there and now is kind of painful. I see it as quite
violent and inappropriate.

As far as I'm concerned, I'd be quite worried to have you as a DPL.

FWIW, Kurt, I'd like to express to you my full sympathy and support.

-- 
PEB


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Re: Results for Voting secrecy

[Thomas Goirand]

On 3/28/22 01:30, Felix Lechner wrote:

Meanwhile, the uncertainty you and I both suffer would be resolved by
a simple redo of the vote with a ballot that carries the appropriate
warning. That is all I asked for.


IMO we shouldn't have voted for this in the first place (for many 
reasons, like not knowing the implementation details, and the fact we 
voted only on one property of the vote).


Please do not make it even more painful asking for another vote (because 
you do not like the outcome).


Cheers,

Thomas Goirand (zigo)

Re: Results for Voting secrecy

[Kurt Roeckx]

On Mon, Mar 28, 2022 at 12:26:51PM -0600, Sam Hartman wrote:
> > "Kurt" == Kurt Roeckx  writes:
> 
> 
> >> It inadvertently weakened the constitutional protection against
> >> changes to the constitution.
> 
> Kurt> I currently fail to see how it does.
> 
> I think Felix's point is that if we had choice 1, 2 and Nota,
> 
> People who preferred option 3 would vote N>2=1 or some such.
> 
> Because choice 3 was on the ballot, people had options that reflected
> their preferences and so some of those people voted 3>2>N.

So the only thing I see is that they now had the option to express there
preferences, while they were limited in how to express their preference
without option 3.

One way of interpreting the NOTA option is to look say what you think is
acceptable or not. Without option 3 on the ballot, you can not say you
think option 1 and 2 are acceptable but prefer option 3. You need to say
option 1 and 2 are not acceptable, while you actually think they are
acceptable. With option 3 on the ballot you can really talk about it
being acceptable or not.

Without option 3, it's probably beter to talk about preference rather
than being acceptable. If you prefer no change, you just mark it below
the NOTA option, even when you think option 1 or 2 is acceptable.

Option 3 being on the ballot can make it more likely for option 1 and
2 to pass, but that's because people can actually express their opinion.

Our voting system works best when all option are on the ballot. Adding
more options is not a problem, it has clone independence.

> Felix's point is that the voters who preferred option 3 actually had the
> power to make it win, provided they were willing to say that they found
> option 2 unacceptable.
> Felix's assumption is that if they realized they had that power, they
> would have exercised it.

But option 2 won, so even if there were people who voted strategically,
it's not a problem in this vote.

On a ballot with mixed majority requirements the option with the lowest
majority requirement clearly has an advantage. It might be possible to
fix that by requiring all option to have the highest majority
requirement, but I'm not really sure it's better or not.


Kurt

Re: Results for Voting secrecy

[Sam Hartman]

> "Kurt" == Kurt Roeckx  writes:


>> It inadvertently weakened the constitutional protection against
>> changes to the constitution.

Kurt> I currently fail to see how it does.

I think Felix's point is that if we had choice 1, 2 and Nota,

People who preferred option 3 would vote N>2=1 or some such.

Because choice 3 was on the ballot, people had options that reflected
their preferences and so some of those people voted 3>2>N.

I.E. voters tend to  shy away from ranking options below NOTA.

In super-majority races, we effectively ask voters two questions:

1) Do you think the option is acceptable--that is, do you  rank it above
NOTA.

2) Which option do you prefer.

Felix's point is that the voters who preferred option 3 actually had the
power to make it win, provided they were willing to say that they found
option 2 unacceptable.
Felix's assumption is that if they realized they had that power, they
would have exercised it.

That's doubtless true for some voters: our voting system is complicated.

However, I've generally found that Debian members are fairly good about
distinguishing what they consider acceptable and what they consider
their prference.
My suspicion is that a good chunk of voters did vote correctly according
to their desires.

My suspicion is that many of the people who would prefer to reaffirm our
old voting system also found  the change acceptable.

Re: Results for Voting secrecy

[Kurt Roeckx]

On Sun, Mar 27, 2022 at 01:30:53PM -0700, Felix Lechner wrote:
> Hi Kurt,
> 
> On Sun, Mar 27, 2022 at 11:03 AM Kurt Roeckx  wrote:
> >
> > Clearly people don't think it's identical, otherwise it would not have
> > been an option, or people would have voted it equally.
> 
> People were confused.
> 
> Given the stated intent of Option 3 that "early 2022 is not the time
> for rushed changes like this", the Secretary should not have admitted
> that option to the ballot.

The Secretary does not have the power to reject ballot options.

> It inadvertently weakened the
> constitutional protection against changes to the constitution.

I currently fail to see how it does.

> Neither the option's proponents nor the voters understood the
> deleterious effect. (Nor did I.) At a minimum, the public was entitled
> to a warning from the Project Secretary.

I still fail to understand your point.

> > Option 3 has no effect on the majority results. The options are compared
> > to the NOTA option.
> 
> Folks opposing "secret votes" should never have placed Option 2 ahead
> of NOTA, and would not have done so if Option 3 had been absent.

I fail to see why they did not properly express their vote. If you think
the text that is part of every ballot is not clear enough, please
suggest changes to it.

The whole point of the NOTA option is to be able to mark options as
acceptable or not. Either an option is acceptable, and you rank it
above the NOTA option, or it's not and you rank it bellow the NOTA
option, or you don't care and rank it equal. The NOTA option's only
purpose is mark options as acceptable or not, which is then used to
see if the majority finds this option acceptable or not.

Option 3 does not have any effect on how you should vote for the
other 2 options, you either still find them acceptable or not.
It allows you to express that you prefer the current system
while also finding the other options acceptable, or that you prefer the
secret vote and find the current system acceptable. It also allows
expressing that you find the current system not acceptable, but
I'm not sure that has a real effect on the result.

Option 3 did have an advantage over the other otions because it does
not modify the constitution, and so it did not require a 3:1 super
majority.

Option 2 barely made the 3:1 super majority requirements:
185/61 = 3.03. One person voting the other way, 184/62 = 2.97 would
have dropped that option, and option 3 would have been the only option
passing the majority requirements despite option 2 being more popular
and acceptable than option 3.


Kurt

Re: Results for Voting secrecy

[Holger Levsen]

On Mon, Mar 28, 2022 at 07:54:25AM +0200, Christian Kastner wrote:
> The latter explicitly reaffirms the status quo, the former does not. I
> guess this is why Holger proposed Choice 3.

yes.
 

-- 
cheers,
Holger

 ⢀⣴⠾⠻⢶⣦⠀
 ⣾⠁⢠⠒⠀⣿⡁  holger@(debian|reproducible-builds|layer-acht).org
 ⢿⡄⠘⠷⠚⠋⠀  OpenPGP: B8BF54137B09D35CF026FE9D 091AB856069AAA1C
 ⠈⠳⣄

The devel is in the details.


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Re: Results for Voting secrecy

[Timo Röhling]

* Christian Kastner  [2022-03-28 07:54]:

The latter explicitly reaffirms the status quo, the former does
not. I guess this is why Holger proposed Choice 3.


Yes, and this is exactly how I used Option 3 to express my
preference.


Cheers
Timo

--
⢀⣴⠾⠻⢶⣦⠀   ╭╮
⣾⠁⢠⠒⠀⣿⡁   │ Timo Röhling   │
⢿⡄⠘⠷⠚⠋⠀   │ 9B03 EBB9 8300 DF97 C2B1  23BF CC8C 6BDD 1403 F4CA │
⠈⠳⣄   ╰╯


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Re: Results for Voting secrecy

[Christian Kastner]

On 2022-03-28 01:22, Christian Kastner wrote:
> 
> On 2022-03-27 19:31, felix.lech...@lease-up.com wrote:
>> Would you please explain why Option 2 defeated NOTA by 124 votes but at
>> the same time defeated Option 3, which was identical to NOTA, by only 35
>> votes?
> 
> This seems to be inline with what the proposer intended, though. From
> the text of Choice 3:
> 
>> [...] which is also why I explicitly want to see "keep the status
>> quo" on the ballot, and not only as "NOTA", but as a real option.

Having thought about this some more, I think the suggestion that the
options are identical is quite simply incorrect.

Somebody inclined towards voting secrecy but unhappy with either of the
two proposed solutions of this particular GR might have voted 4123,
leaving room future GRs with alternative voting secrecy proposals.

Somebody unconditionally opposed towards voting secrecy would have
reaffirmed the status quo with 3412, indicating that any future voting
secrecy proposals would also be rejected.

The latter explicitly reaffirms the status quo, the former does not. I
guess this is why Holger proposed Choice 3.

Re: Results for Voting secrecy

[Russ Allbery]

Felix Lechner  writes:

> I suppose you and Kurt are saying that the denominator in the majority
> calculation is so exactly described that there is no room to read any
> protective spirit into the language of the constitution.

This is what I'm saying.  Obviously I can't speak for Kurt.

Debian is a project that is run according to a set of rules that we have
collectively agreed to follow.  Those rules, when it comes to determining
the outcome of a vote, are straightforward and unambiguous (if not exactly
simple).  They do not include provisions for the Project Secretary, the
DPL, or anyone else to disregard the plain language of the constitution.
If someone wants to change those rules, they can do so with a GR.

-- 
Russ Allbery (r...@debian.org)  

Re: Results for Voting secrecy

[Christian Kastner]

On 2022-03-27 19:31, felix.lech...@lease-up.com wrote:
> Would you please explain why Option 2 defeated NOTA by 124 votes but at
> the same time defeated Option 3, which was identical to NOTA, by only 35
> votes?

This seems to be inline with what the proposer intended, though. From
the text of Choice 3:

> [...] which is also why I explicitly want to see "keep the status
> quo" on the ballot, and not only as "NOTA", but as a real option.
Best,
Christian

Re: Results for Voting secrecy

[Felix Lechner]

Hi Russ,

On Sun, Mar 27, 2022 at 2:29 PM Russ Allbery  wrote:
>
> I do not believe you have enough information to make this assertion with
> complete confidence.

That is correct, and I will at this point wait until affected parties,
if any, speak up.

Meanwhile, the uncertainty you and I both suffer would be resolved by
a simple redo of the vote with a ballot that carries the appropriate
warning. That is all I asked for.

> Regardless, it doesn't matter procedurally.  The remedy that you're asking
> for doesn't exist in the constitution.

I suppose you and Kurt are saying that the denominator in the majority
calculation is so exactly described that there is no room to read any
protective spirit into the language of the constitution.

> This is an absurd escalation when you have no procedural basis for what
> you're demanding, and it's quite concerning coming from someone who is
> currently standing for DPL.  It's also pointless; anyone else who replaces
> the Project Secretary will have to do the same thing.  The discretion
> you're asking for simply does not exist in the constitution.

Well, I see it the other way around. As the only elected office in
Debian, the project leader is the sole respondent to the public.
Everyone else is appointed (and not elected). No other office is so
deeply vested with making sure that the people feel truly represented.

As for my qualification for office, I perceive it as the project
leader's duty to serve everyone, including any people with whom I
disagree. That's all I am doing here. As noted, I am personally in
favor of the constitutional change the Secretary is about to certify.

And as far as I am concerned, I did not escalate. I really do not
believe the project has other appropriate remedies. In any event, I
didn't mean to come across as threatening—especially not to Kurt.

In the US, procedural objections are always short and direct (because
they have to be timely). Compared to the cultural norms in Europe or
Asia, I probably should have exercised greater restraint. Sorry, Kurt.

In summary, I am fine with the proceedings here as long as no folks
opposing secret votes felt cheated today. Let's stop arguing and see
if anyone speaks up.

Thank you for the valuable background on your interpretation of the
constitution!

Kind regards,
Felix Lechner

Re: Results for Voting secrecy

[Russ Allbery]

Felix Lechner  writes:

> Given the stated intent of Option 3 that "early 2022 is not the time for
> rushed changes like this", the Secretary should not have admitted that
> option to the ballot. It inadvertently weakened the constitutional
> protection against changes to the constitution.

The Project Secretary does not have discretion over which options are
admitted to the ballot.

> The vote was procedurally defective.

I don't see any basis in the constitution for this assertion, nor have you
cited any.

> Folks opposing "secret votes" should never have placed Option 2 ahead of
> NOTA, and would not have done so if Option 3 had been absent.

I do not believe you have enough information to make this assertion with
complete confidence.  For example, a vote of option 3 ahead of option 2
and option 2 ahead of NOTA is the correct and proper way of recording the
opinion that they would prefer not to have secret votes but don't believe
that secret votes should be blocked solely due to a supermajority
requirement if they are otherwise the preference of the project's
majority.

I have no idea how many people hold that position.  I doubt it's all of
the people voting that order, but it's not an irrational position to hold.

Regardless, it doesn't matter procedurally.  The remedy that you're asking
for doesn't exist in the constitution.  The remedy available to you if you
believe the outcome of this vote doesn't align with the true voter
preferences is to propose a GR to reverse it or to make changes to the
constitution allowing its reversal via other means.

I agree with you that the interaction between options requiring a
supermajority and options not requiring a supermajority is unintuitive.
We've had multiple discussions about that over the years, including
various hypothetical examples where the results could violate various
desireable voting properties, particularly independence of irrelevant
alternatives (which I think is what you're raising here).  So far, the
project has chosen not to make any changes on this basis, mostly because I
don't think anyone has been able to come up with a fix that still
preserves the property of resolving a GR with a single vote.

For what it's worth, issues like this are why I dislike the common Debian
practice of putting options on the ballot that have the procedural effect
of NOTA plus an additional statement and generally vote them below NOTA
(as I did here).  However, I have been unable to convince people to stop
doing this in the past and have therefore stopped trying.  (And I suppose
I should note that if people followed my advice, there would be no way of
voting the position that they prefer not to have secret votes but don't
think it should be blocked by supermajority requirements, so I guess
that's an argument for such ballot options.)

> Please reconsider. Otherwise the project's sole alternative may be to
> replace the Project Secretary.

This is an absurd escalation when you have no procedural basis for what
you're demanding, and it's quite concerning coming from someone who is
currently standing for DPL.  It's also pointless; anyone else who replaces
the Project Secretary will have to do the same thing.  The discretion
you're asking for simply does not exist in the constitution.

-- 
Russ Allbery (r...@debian.org)  

Re: Results for Voting secrecy

[Paul Tagliamonte]

> Please reconsider. Otherwise the project's sole alternative may be to
> replace the Project Secretary.
>

Let me get this straight --

You (a seconder of the winning option) now believe that we need to stop and
re-open
discussion on a closed matter  that the whole project voted on (which I
believe you've
been a staunch advocate for in the past - GRs are good, democracy, etc,
right?),
single-handedly overturning the results, because you now have changed your
views
on your own amendment that won, and you now believe the constitution is
weakened
such that you're now threatening to remove the Secretary because you
disagree with
their reading of the rules (who's executed the role of reading those rules
since 2009
without prior issue) that is their role in the project to read?

Just checking. Do I have that right?

  Paul



-- 
:wq

Re: Results for Voting secrecy

[Felix Lechner]

Hi Kurt,

On Sun, Mar 27, 2022 at 11:03 AM Kurt Roeckx  wrote:
>
> Clearly people don't think it's identical, otherwise it would not have
> been an option, or people would have voted it equally.

People were confused.

Given the stated intent of Option 3 that "early 2022 is not the time
for rushed changes like this", the Secretary should not have admitted
that option to the ballot. It inadvertently weakened the
constitutional protection against changes to the constitution.

The constitution is the project's foundational document.

Neither the option's proponents nor the voters understood the
deleterious effect. (Nor did I.) At a minimum, the public was entitled
to a warning from the Project Secretary.

The vote was procedurally defective.

> Option 3 has no effect on the majority results. The options are compared
> to the NOTA option.

Folks opposing "secret votes" should never have placed Option 2 ahead
of NOTA, and would not have done so if Option 3 had been absent.

I do not believe it is possible to reconstruct the electorate's intent
solely from the beat matrix. A better approximation, however, would be
to also consider the 107 votes who placed Option 3 ahead of Option 2
in the latter's majority test. That would yield 185 / (61 + 107) = 1.1
which is less than the factor of 3 mandated by section 4.1.2 of the
constitution.

As far as I can see, the result is unconstitutional and thus invalid.

> I currently don't see anything wrong with this vote, so I see no reason
> to redo it.

Please reconsider. Otherwise the project's sole alternative may be to
replace the Project Secretary.

Thank you!

Kind regards,
Felix Lechner

Re: Results for Voting secrecy

[Andrey Rahmatullin]

On Sun, Mar 27, 2022 at 08:03:35PM +0200, Kurt Roeckx wrote:
> > Would you please explain why Option 2 defeated NOTA by 124 votes but at
> > the same time defeated Option 3, which was identical to NOTA, by only 35
> > votes?
> 
> Clearly people don't think it's identical, otherwise it would not have
> been an option, or people would have voted it equally.
(as far as I can see, 90% of voters preferred one of these options to the
other one)

-- 
WBR, wRAR


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Re: Results for Voting secrecy

[Russ Allbery]

felix.lech...@lease-up.com writes:

> I believe the vote should be redone.

> A repeat without Option 3 is needed so that your certified results can
> properly reflect the electorate's position with respect to the question
> posed on the ballot while also honoring our constitutional majority
> requirement.

Speaking solely to procedure rather than merits, I don't see any
constitutional path for this to be done.  Assuming the votes are correctly
recorded (and I don't see any reason to doubt that they are), I believe
this would go beyond the powers of the Project Secretary.  We do not have
a constitutional mechanism to re-run a vote because someone believes the
range of options and their interaction with supermajority requirements was
potentially confusing to voters.

The constitution is quite explicit that supermajority requirements are
only counted against the default option, not against other ballot options.
(See A.5.3.)

You could, of course, propose a remedy or forward-looking fix, such as
prohibiting mixing options with different supermajority requirements on a
single ballot (which would fix this potential problem and several other
problems that have been noted over the years at the cost of requiring
multiple rounds of voting to resolve some GRs).  But that would require a
constitutional change and thus another GR with a 3:1 majority.

-- 
Russ Allbery (r...@debian.org)  

Re: Results for Voting secrecy

[Kurt Roeckx]

On Sun, Mar 27, 2022 at 10:31:44AM -0700, felix.lech...@lease-up.com wrote:
> Dear Mr. Secretary,
> 
> As a Second for the winning Option 2, I was personally happy with last
> night's vote, but I nonetheless object to your certification of these
> tentative results:
> 
> >  Option 2 defeats Option 3 by ( 142 -  107) =   35 votes.
> >  Option 2 defeats Option 4 by ( 185 -   61) =  124 votes.
> 
> Would you please explain why Option 2 defeated NOTA by 124 votes but at
> the same time defeated Option 3, which was identical to NOTA, by only 35
> votes?

Clearly people don't think it's identical, otherwise it would not have
been an option, or people would have voted it equally.

> If so, did Option 2 pass the majority test only because Option 3 was
> available separately?

Option 3 has no effect on the majority results. The options are compared
to the NOTA option.

> I believe the vote should be redone.

I currently don't see anything wrong with this vote, so I see no reason
to redo it.


Kurt

Re: Results for Voting secrecy

[felix . lechner]

Dear Mr. Secretary,

As a Second for the winning Option 2, I was personally happy with last
night's vote, but I nonetheless object to your certification of these
tentative results:

>  Option 2 defeats Option 3 by ( 142 -  107) =   35 votes.
>  Option 2 defeats Option 4 by ( 185 -   61) =  124 votes.

Would you please explain why Option 2 defeated NOTA by 124 votes but at
the same time defeated Option 3, which was identical to NOTA, by only 35
votes?

Did 89 folks vote 3-2-NOTA (or a variation thereof involving Option 1)?

If so, did Option 2 pass the majority test only because Option 3 was
available separately?

I believe the vote should be redone.

A repeat without Option 3 is needed so that your certified results can
properly reflect the electorate's position with respect to the question
posed on the ballot while also honoring our constitutional majority
requirement.

Thank you!

Respectfully,
Felix Lechner


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