RE: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy]

Hi everyone, 

 

We met the December 1 deadline of integrating with Symantec systems, and all 
validation and issuance of TLS certificates is currently flowing through 
DigiCert’s  backend. Initial results appear generally positive, with the 
validation staff processing orders and delivering certificates. Symantec 
customers are using their existing Symantec front-end ordering systems. As 
expected with any migration of this scale, we are working directly with 
customers in the instances that require additional customer support.

 

Thought I’d let everyone here know we are live with the operations. I plan to 
post an update with more information about how things went after we have some 
run-rate data. Let me know if you have questions.

 

Jeremy



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Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Peter Kurrasch via dev-security-policy]

  Clearly there has to be a way for key compromises to be remedied. If I've been following this pinning discussion correctly it seems unavoidable that we will have cases requiring certs to be issued on the soon-to-be old Symantec infrastructure...? for the foreseeable future (i.e. post-Dec 1)?Also it's not totally clear to me what will be delivered on Dec 1, 2017 in terms of infrastructure as well as issuance policies.From: Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policySent: Sunday, October 1, 2017 2:55 PM‎Is this a correct summary? There’s four categories of customers that require trust in existing Symantec roots being address:...4.	Those that pinned a specific intermediate’s keys, resulting in a failure unless the issuing CA had the same keys as used by Symantec. ...‎Category 4 is under discussion.  Sounds like Google would prefer not to see a reuse of keys. Pinning times are sufficiently short that customers could migrate to the new infrastructure prior to total distrust of the roots under certain circumstances. If the cert was issued prior to June 2016, and the key expires after March 2018, anyone using the pin could be locked out until the pin expires. If pins last up to a year, customers issuing a cert after June 2016 should have time to migrate prior to root removal. One issue is that these customers won’t be able to get a new cert that functions off the old intermediate post Dec 1, 2017, effectively meaning key compromises cannot be addressed.
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RE: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy]

Is this a correct summary? 

 

There’s four categories of customers that require trust in existing Symantec 
roots being address:

1.  Those that can migrate to a new trusted root because they use the certs 
in a standard TLS-configuration
2.  Those that require a certain Symantec root for various applications but 
can use a DigiCert root for standard browser-based TLS
3.  Those that require a non-trusted intermediate because they have pinned 
a Symantec root in the application and using a trusted DigiCert root, even if 
cross-signed would cause the application to fail.
4.  Those that pinned a specific intermediate’s keys, resulting in a 
failure unless the issuing CA had the same keys as used by Symantec. 

 

Category 1 customers are straight-forward.  They will be migrated to a DigiCert 
root.

 

Category 2 customers are potentially straight forward but could have validation 
issues.  If we cross-sign the DigiCert global root with the required Symantec 
root, then the customer can migrate but might experience issues when the root 
is actually removed.  However, this could cause issues for the 84 certificates 
already using the DigiCert root.

 

Category 3 customers are potentially straight forward but will lose trust in 
Sep 2018 unless the new root is embedded prior to that date. If we create a new 
root, sign it with the Symantec roots, and embed the new roots as necessary, we 
avoid the problems with a previously trusted root.  Wouldn’t this have the same 
validation issues as Category 2? 

 

Category 4 is under discussion.  Sounds like Google would prefer not to see a 
reuse of keys. Pinning times are sufficiently short that customers could 
migrate to the new infrastructure prior to total distrust of the roots under 
certain circumstances. If the cert was issued prior to June 2016, and the key 
expires after March 2018, anyone using the pin could be locked out until the 
pin expires. If pins last up to a year, customers issuing a cert after June 
2016 should have time to migrate prior to root removal. One issue is that these 
customers won’t be able to get a new cert that functions off the old 
intermediate post Dec 1, 2017, effectively meaning key compromises cannot be 
addressed.

 

=

Jeremy

 

 

From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:r...@sleevi.com] 
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2017 8:18 PM
To: Peter Bowen <pzbo...@gmail.com>
Cc: Ryan Sleevi <r...@sleevi.com>; 
mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org; Jeremy Rowley 
<jeremy.row...@digicert.com>
Subject: Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

 

 

 

On Sun, Sep 24, 2017 at 12:40 PM, Peter Bowen <pzbo...@gmail.com 
<mailto:pzbo...@gmail.com> > wrote:

I agree that 3b potentially has a higher risk than 3z, but it has a
higher reward.  3b allows pins to continue to work even if the trust
store removes 3.  It comes down to the level of protection of the root
key.  If it is secure, then this provides continued compatibility
while removing the original root.  The 3z option means that all pins
to the existing root break.

This isn't really a risk for browser-based applications, after all the
browser can implement a "known bad pins" list and not enforce pinning
if all the pins are on that list or can choose to not enforce pins if
older than a certain date.  However in a situation where the
application is distinct from the browser, this does not work.  I
realize this isn't Mozilla (or Chrome's) problem, but it is important
to consider in the broader Internet PKI view.

Thanks,
Peter

 

Peter,

 

Thanks for confirming that this isn’t a concern for browser-based applications. 
While not to suggest they are the only participant that matters in the Web PKI, 
I think it would be fair to say that many of the concessions and workarounds 
have been heretofore focused on the browser-based case.

 

That said, I’m not sure it’s as dire as you suspect. As noted in the previous 
message, an adoption of 3z wouldn’t break applications pinned to 3 unless and 
until a root store took steps to remove. We’ve seen some platforms, such as 
macOS and iOS, take steps for manual whitelisting of pre-existing certs. We’ve 
seen other platforms, such as Windows, take steps based on timestamping or date 
issued. Most importantly, however, the only public discussions regarding 
removal have suggested a timeframe of late-2018. Applications that pinned 
certificates, without the ability to update in a year, are arguably outside of 
the scope of ‘reasonable’ use cases - the ecosystem itself has shown itself to 
change on at least that frequency.

 

As such, hopefully it’s persuasive that the reward for 3b compared to 3z is not 
actually significant, especially for browsers, and the risk is arguably much 
greater. Repeating the pattern of 2z & 3z, for every root with active issuance, 
provides the greatest way to reduce risk for applications that have pinned and 
need additional migration time. Note that the plan would s

Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Patrick Figel via dev-security-policy]

On 28.09.17 19:06, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy wrote:
> On 26/09/17 03:17, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
>> update in a year, are arguably outside of the scope of ‘reasonable’ use
>> cases - the ecosystem itself has shown itself to change on at least that
>> frequency.
> 
> Is "1 year" not a relatively common (for some value of "common") setting
> for HPKP timeouts for sites which think they have now mastered HPKP?

IIRC both Chrome and Firefox cap the max-age value of HPKP at 60 days.
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Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Quirin Scheitle via dev-security-policy]

Hi Gerv,

> On 28. Sep 2017, at 19:06, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy 
>  wrote:
> 
> Is "1 year" not a relatively common (for some value of "common") setting
> for HPKP timeouts for sites which think they have now mastered HPKP?

We did a large-scale scan of about 200M domains for HPKP in April 2017.
We found a max-age median duration of 1 month and about 10% of domains that set 
max-age values to 1 year or more. 
I am attaching the plot. HPKP it missing, as it is very similar to HPKP|HSTS.
The associated paper will be camera-ready tomorrow, happy to share it then. 

> 
> Does anyone have stats on HPKP prevalence and duration distribution?
> Ideally combined with whether the longer time periods are pinning to
> roots, intermediates or EE certs?

We did not look into that, but it should be doable from the data. 

Kind regards
Quirin




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Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy]

On 26/09/17 03:17, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
> update in a year, are arguably outside of the scope of ‘reasonable’ use
> cases - the ecosystem itself has shown itself to change on at least that
> frequency.

Is "1 year" not a relatively common (for some value of "common") setting
for HPKP timeouts for sites which think they have now mastered HPKP?

Does anyone have stats on HPKP prevalence and duration distribution?
Ideally combined with whether the longer time periods are pinning to
roots, intermediates or EE certs?

Gerv

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Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Peter Bowen via dev-security-policy]

On Fri, Sep 22, 2017 at 6:22 AM, Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy
 wrote:
> On Friday, 22 September 2017 05:01:03 UTC+1, Peter Bowen  wrote:
>> I realize this is somewhat more complex than what you, Ryan, or Jeremy
>> proposed, but it the only way I see root pins working across both
>> "old" and "new" trust stores.
>
> I would suggest that a better way to spend the remaining time would be 
> remedial work so that your business isn't dependant on a single third party 
> happening to make choices that are compatible with your existing processes. 
> Trust agility should be built into existing processes and systems, where it 
> doesn't exist today it must be retro-fitted, systems which can't be 
> retrofitted are an ongoing risk to the company's ability to deliver.
>
> Trust agility doesn't have to mean you give up all control, but if you were 
> in a situation where the business trusted roots from Symantec, Comodo and 
> say, GlobalSign then you would have an obvious path forwards in today's 
> scenario without also needing to trust dozens of organisations you've no 
> contact with.
>
> I know the Mozilla organisation has made this mistake itself in the past, and 
> I'm sure Google has too, but I don't want too much sympathy here to get in 
> the way of actually making us safer.

Nick,

I agree with pretty much everything you said :)

However, as you point out, many organisations have run into problems
in this area.  As a community, we saw similar issues come up during
the SHA-1 deprecation phase and seemed surprised.  I want to try to
make sure there is not surprise, especially when it comes to
configurations that are not obvious.

For example, on some mobile platforms it is common to have the app
enforce pinning but the OS handle chain building and validation.  This
can have poor interaction if the OS were to update the trust store as
the returned chain may no longer have the pinned CA.

Consider what Jeremy drew:

GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority -> DigiCert Global G2 -> (new
issuing CA) -> (end entity)

If the platform trusts DigiCert Global G2, then the chain that is
returned to the application will be:

DigiCert Global G2 -> (new issuing CA) -> (end entity)

In this case, any application pinned to GeoTrust will fail.

Even if it was a new Root:

GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority -> DigiCert GeoTrust G2 ->
(new issuing CA) -> (end entity)

The same problem will occur if the OS updates the trust store but the
application does not update.

One notable thing is that the server operator, application vendor, OS
vendor, and CA may be four unrelated parties.  If the application is
expected to work with "new" and "old" OS versions, this will take some
careful work if the keys in the built chain change over time.

Thanks,
Peter
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Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy]

On Friday, 22 September 2017 05:01:03 UTC+1, Peter Bowen  wrote:
> I realize this is somewhat more complex than what you, Ryan, or Jeremy
> proposed, but it the only way I see root pins working across both
> "old" and "new" trust stores.

I would suggest that a better way to spend the remaining time would be remedial 
work so that your business isn't dependant on a single third party happening to 
make choices that are compatible with your existing processes. Trust agility 
should be built into existing processes and systems, where it doesn't exist 
today it must be retro-fitted, systems which can't be retrofitted are an 
ongoing risk to the company's ability to deliver.

Trust agility doesn't have to mean you give up all control, but if you were in 
a situation where the business trusted roots from Symantec, Comodo and say, 
GlobalSign then you would have an obvious path forwards in today's scenario 
without also needing to trust dozens of organisations you've no contact with.

I know the Mozilla organisation has made this mistake itself in the past, and 
I'm sure Google has too, but I don't want too much sympathy here to get in the 
way of actually making us safer.
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Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Peter Bowen via dev-security-policy]

On Thu, Sep 21, 2017 at 7:17 PM, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
 wrote:
> I think we can divide the discussion into two parts, similar to the
> previous mail: How to effectively transition Symantec customers with
> minimum disruption, whether acting as the Managed CA or as the future
> operator of Symantec’s PKI, and how to effectively transition DigiCert’s
> infrastructure. This is a slightly different order than your e-mail
> message, but given the time sensitivity of the Symantec transition, it
> seems more effective to discuss that first.
>
> I think there may have been some confusion on the Managed CA side. It’s
> excellent that DigiCert plans to transition Symantec customers to DigiCert
> roots, as that helps with an expedient reduction in risk, but the plan
> outlined may create some of the compatibility risks that I was trying to
> highlight. In the discussions of the proposed remediations, one of the big
> concerns we heard raised by both Symantec and site operators was related to
> pinning - both in the Web and in mobile applications. We also heard about
> embedded or legacy devices, and their needs for particular chains.
>
> It sounds like this plan may have been based on a concern that I’d tried to
> address in the previous message. That is, the removal of the existing
> Symantec roots defines a policy goal - the elimination in trust in these
> legacy roots, due to the unknown scope of issues. However, that goal could
> be achieved by a number of technical means - for example, ‘whitelisting’ a
> set of Managed CAs (as proposed by Chrome), or replacing the existing
> Symantec roots with these new Managed CA roots in a 1:1 swap. Both of these
> approaches achieve the same policy objective, while reducing the
> compatibility risk.

Ryan,

As an existing Symantec customer, I'm not clear that this really
addresses the challenges we face.

So far we have found several different failure modes.  We hope that
any solution deployed will assure that these don't trigger.

First, we found that some clients have a limited set of roots in their
trust store.   The "VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification
Authority - G5" root with SPKI SHA-256 hash of
25b41b506e4930952823a6eb9f1d31def645ea38a5c6c6a96d71957e384df058 is
the only root trusted by some clients. They do, somewhat
unfortunately, check the certificate issuer, issuer key id, and
signature, so they changing any will break things.  However they don't
update their trust store.  So the (DN, key id, public key) tuple needs
to be in the chain for years to come.

Second, we have found that some applications use the system trust
store but implement additional checks on the built and validated
chain.  The most common case is  checking that at least one public key
in the chain matches a list of keys the application has internally.

As there is an assumption that the current root (DN, public key)
tuples will be replaced relatively soon by some trust store
maintainers, there needs to be a way that that both of these cases can
work.  The only way I can see this working long term on both devices
with updated trust stores as well as devices that have not updated the
trust store is to do a little bit of hackery and create new (DN,
public key) tuples with the existing public key.  This way apps with
pinning will work on systems with old trust stores and one systems
with updated trust stores.

As a specific example, again using the Class 3 G5 root, today a chain
looks like:

1) End-entity info
2) 
spkisha256:f67d22cd39d2445f96e16e094eae756af49791685007c76e4b66f154b7f35ec6,KeyID:5F:60:CF:61:90:55:DF:84:43:14:8A:60:2A:B2:F5:7A:F4:43:18:EF,
DN:CN=Symantec Class 3 Secure Server CA - G4, OU=Symantec Trust
Network, O=Symantec Corporation, C=US,
3) spkisha256:25b41b506e4930952823a6eb9f1d31def645ea38a5c6c6a96d71957e384df058,
KeyID:7F:D3:65:A7:C2:DD:EC:BB:F0:30:09:F3:43:39:FA:02:AF:33:31:33,
DN:CN=VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5,
OU=(c) 2006 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only, OU=VeriSign
Trust Network, O=VeriSign\, Inc., C=US

If there is a desire to (a) remove the Class 3 G5 root and (b) keep
the pin to its key working, the only solution I can see is to create a
new root that uses the same key.  This would result in a chain that
looks something like:

1) End-entity info
2b) spkisha256:,KeyID:, DN:CN=New Server Issuing CA, O=DigiCert, C=US,
3b) spkisha256:25b41b506e4930952823a6eb9f1d31def645ea38a5c6c6a96d71957e384df058,
KeyID:6c:e5:3f:7b:45:1f:66:b4:e6:7c:70:05:86:19:79:4f:a6,
DN:CN=VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5,
OU=DigiCert Compatibility Root, OU=(c) 2006 VeriSign, Inc. - For
authorized use only, OU=VeriSign Trust Network, O=VeriSign\, Inc.,
C=US
3) spkisha256:25b41b506e4930952823a6eb9f1d31def645ea38a5c6c6a96d71957e384df058,
KeyID:7F:D3:65:A7:C2:DD:EC:BB:F0:30:09:F3:43:39:FA:02:AF:33:31:33,
DN:CN=VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5,

Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy]

. Thawte Primary Root CA
> 20. Thawte Primary Root CA – G2
> 21. Thawte Primary Root CA – G3
> 22. Thawte Server CA
> 23. Thawte Timestamping CA
> 24. UTN-Userfirst-Network Applications
> 25. Verisign Class 1 Public PCA
> 26. Verisign Class 3 Public Primary Certificate Authority – G4
> 27. Verisign Class 3 Public Primary Certificate Authority – G5
> 28. Verisign Class 4 Public Primary Certificate Authority – G3
> 29. Verisign Time Stamping CA
> 30. Verisign Universal Root Certificate Authority
> 31. Verisign4
> 32. Verisign Class 1 Public PCA – G3
> 33. Verisign Class 1 Public PCA – G2
> 34. Verisign Class 2 Public PCA – G3
> 35. Verisign Class 2 Public PCA – G2
> 36. Verisign Class 3 Public PCA
> 37. Verisign Class 3 Public PCA – MD2
> 38. Verisign Class 3 Public PCA – G2
> 39. Verisign Class 2 Public Primary Certification Authority – G3
>
>
>
> The current end-state plan for root cross-signing is provided at
> https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1401384. The diagrams there
> show all of the existing sub CAs along with the new Sub CAs and root
> signings planned for post-close. Some of these don’t have names so they are
> lumped in a general “Intermediate” box.
>
>
>
> We reached the same conclusion as you about segmentation by root (that
> compartmentalization by root won’t work), not to mention that
> compartmentalization will be near impossible considering what we’ve
> previously issued and how the roots are trusted in various root programs.
> Instead, we plan on creating sub CAs based on the number of entities using
> the intermediate.  For example, every 2000 or so entities will use another
> Sub CA. This will roughly segment customers based on excepted volumes.  We
> also plan on providing a lot more unique intermediates on a per customer
> basis.  Permitting large companies to have a dedicated intermediate will
> help shield them from being revoked if another Sub CA needs to be revoked
> and allow browsers to selectively whitelist/blacklist entities.  Of course,
> not every company will want this, but it’ll be available for anyone who
> wants it.
>
>
>
> The plan, based on your suggestions, is to cross-sign the DigiCert Global
> G2 root with the four Symantec roots:
>
>
>
> 1.  GeoTrust Global CA
> 2.  GeoTrust Global CA 2
> 3.  Verisign Class 3 Public Primary Certificate Authority – G5
> 4.  Thawte Primary Root CA
>
>
>
> The exact roots cross-signing the DigiCert root is very much in flux.
> Until close, we aren’t reaching out to current Symantec customers for, I
> think, obvious reasons.  However, we do plan on communicating with these
> customers immediately post close to determine which roots are pinned in
> applications and what roots are required for custom applications. We are
> trying to limit the number of primary roots to six (three ECC, three RSA)
> plus one transition root to keep the chains and use manageable.
>
>
>
> The Global G2 root will become the transition root to DigiCert for
> customers who can’t move fully to an operational DigiCert roots prior to
> September 2018. Any customers that require a specific root can use the
> transition root for as long as they want, realizing that path validation
> may be an issue as Symantec roots are removed by platform operators.
> Although we cannot currently move to a single root because of the lack of
> EV support and trust in non-Mozilla platforms, we can move to the existing
> three roots in an orderly fashion.
>
>
>
> If the agreement closes prior to Dec 1, the Managed CA will never exist.
> Instead, all issuance will occur through one of the three primary DigiCert
> roots mentioned above with the exception of customers required to use a
> Symantec root for certain platforms or pinning. The cross-signed Global
> root will be only transitory, meaning we’d hope customers would migrate to
> the DigiCert roots once the systems requiring a specific Symantec roots are
> deprecated or as path validation errors arise.
>
>
>
> Jeremy
>
>
>
>
>
> From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:r...@sleevi.com]
> Sent: Thursday, September 14, 2017 1:28 PM
> To: Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.row...@digicert.com>
> Cc: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
> Subject: Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Aug 2, 2017 at 5:12 PM, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy <
> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org <mailto:dev-security-policy@
> lists.mozilla.org> > wrote:
>
> Hi everyone,
>
>
>
> Today, DigiCert and Symantec announced that DigiCert is acquiring the
> Symantec CA assets, includi

RE: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy]

The original Mozilla plan was to distrust around Sep 2018.  We're still 
planning for that date, but would appreciate it if trust was permitted around a 
single intermediate (say the DigiCert Global Trust G2 root?).  If we need to 
use a separate root with no other certs as the transition, we could create one. 
 I know my team would prefer it as the Global Trust G2 root is our primary SHA2 
root.

-Original Message-
From: Peter Bowen [mailto:pzbo...@gmail.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, September 20, 2017 10:21 AM
To: Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.row...@digicert.com>
Cc: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

On Tue, Sep 19, 2017 at 8:39 PM, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy 
<dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
> The current end-state plan for root cross-signing is provided at 
> https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1401384. The diagrams there show 
> all of the existing sub CAs along with the new Sub CAs and root signings 
> planned for post-close. Some of these don’t have names so they are lumped in 
> a general “Intermediate” box.
>
> The Global G2 root will become the transition root to DigiCert for customers 
> who can’t move fully to an operational DigiCert roots prior to September 
> 2018. Any customers that require a specific root can use the transition root 
> for as long as they want, realizing that path validation may be an issue as 
> Symantec roots are removed by platform operators. Although we cannot 
> currently move to a single root because of the lack of EV support and trust 
> in non-Mozilla platforms, we can move to the existing three roots in an 
> orderly fashion.
>
> If the agreement closes prior to Dec 1, the Managed CA will never exist. 
> Instead, all issuance will occur through one of the three primary DigiCert 
> roots mentioned above with the exception of customers required to use a 
> Symantec root for certain platforms or pinning. The cross-signed Global root 
> will be only transitory, meaning we’d hope customers would migrate to the 
> DigiCert roots once the systems requiring a specific Symantec roots are 
> deprecated or as path validation errors arise.

Jeremy,

Am I correct that a key input into this plan was the Mozilla plan to fully 
remove the Symantec roots from the trust store before then end of 2018?  Google 
seemed to suggest they would keep trusting them for a longer period with a 
restriction on which subordinate CAs are trusted.

Thanks,
Peter


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Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Peter Bowen via dev-security-policy]

On Tue, Sep 19, 2017 at 8:39 PM, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
 wrote:
>
> The current end-state plan for root cross-signing is provided at 
> https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1401384. The diagrams there show 
> all of the existing sub CAs along with the new Sub CAs and root signings 
> planned for post-close. Some of these don’t have names so they are lumped in 
> a general “Intermediate” box.
>
> The Global G2 root will become the transition root to DigiCert for customers 
> who can’t move fully to an operational DigiCert roots prior to September 
> 2018. Any customers that require a specific root can use the transition root 
> for as long as they want, realizing that path validation may be an issue as 
> Symantec roots are removed by platform operators. Although we cannot 
> currently move to a single root because of the lack of EV support and trust 
> in non-Mozilla platforms, we can move to the existing three roots in an 
> orderly fashion.
>
> If the agreement closes prior to Dec 1, the Managed CA will never exist. 
> Instead, all issuance will occur through one of the three primary DigiCert 
> roots mentioned above with the exception of customers required to use a 
> Symantec root for certain platforms or pinning. The cross-signed Global root 
> will be only transitory, meaning we’d hope customers would migrate to the 
> DigiCert roots once the systems requiring a specific Symantec roots are 
> deprecated or as path validation errors arise.

Jeremy,

Am I correct that a key input into this plan was the Mozilla plan to
fully remove the Symantec roots from the trust store before then end
of 2018?  Google seemed to suggest they would keep trusting them for a
longer period with a restriction on which subordinate CAs are trusted.

Thanks,
Peter
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Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[James Burton via dev-security-policy]

Hi Jeremy,

Is DigiCert planning on continuing selling DV certificates after the 
transition? As DigiCert has previously been vocal on the fact that the 
drawbacks of issuing DV certificates outweigh the benefits as stated here: 
https://www.digicert.com/dv-ssl-certificate.htm. If DigiCert is going to issue 
DV certificates which root or roots are you going to dedicated for the 
certificates?

James
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RE: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy]

.  GeoTrust Global CA
2.  GeoTrust Global CA 2
3.  Verisign Class 3 Public Primary Certificate Authority – G5
4.  Thawte Primary Root CA

 

The exact roots cross-signing the DigiCert root is very much in flux. Until 
close, we aren’t reaching out to current Symantec customers for, I think, 
obvious reasons.  However, we do plan on communicating with these customers 
immediately post close to determine which roots are pinned in applications and 
what roots are required for custom applications. We are trying to limit the 
number of primary roots to six (three ECC, three RSA) plus one transition root 
to keep the chains and use manageable.  

 

The Global G2 root will become the transition root to DigiCert for customers 
who can’t move fully to an operational DigiCert roots prior to September 2018. 
Any customers that require a specific root can use the transition root for as 
long as they want, realizing that path validation may be an issue as Symantec 
roots are removed by platform operators. Although we cannot currently move to a 
single root because of the lack of EV support and trust in non-Mozilla 
platforms, we can move to the existing three roots in an orderly fashion. 

 

If the agreement closes prior to Dec 1, the Managed CA will never exist. 
Instead, all issuance will occur through one of the three primary DigiCert 
roots mentioned above with the exception of customers required to use a 
Symantec root for certain platforms or pinning. The cross-signed Global root 
will be only transitory, meaning we’d hope customers would migrate to the 
DigiCert roots once the systems requiring a specific Symantec roots are 
deprecated or as path validation errors arise.

 

Jeremy

 

 

From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:r...@sleevi.com] 
Sent: Thursday, September 14, 2017 1:28 PM
To: Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.row...@digicert.com>
Cc: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

 

 

 

On Wed, Aug 2, 2017 at 5:12 PM, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy 
<dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org 
<mailto:dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> > wrote:

Hi everyone,



Today, DigiCert and Symantec announced that DigiCert is acquiring the
Symantec CA assets, including the infrastructure, personnel, roots, and
platforms.  At the same time, DigiCert signed a Sub CA agreement wherein we
will validate and issue all Symantec certs as of Dec 1, 2017.  We are
committed to meeting the Mozilla and Google plans in transitioning away from
the Symantec infrastructure. The deal is expected to close near the end of
the year, after which we will be solely responsible for operation of the CA.
>From there, we will migrate customers and systems as necessary to
consolidate platforms and operations while continuing to run all issuance
and validation through DigiCert.  We will post updates and plans to the
community as things change and progress.



I wanted to post to the Mozilla dev list to:

1.  Inform the public,
2.  Get community feedback about the transition and concerns, and
3.  Get an update from the browsers on what this means for the plan,
noting that we fully commit to the stated deadlines. We're hoping that any
changes



Two things I can say we plan on doing (following closing) to address
concerns are:

a.  We plan to segregate certs by type on each root. Going forward, we
will issue all SSL certs from a root while client and email come from
different roots. We also plan on limiting the number of organizations on
each issuing CA.  We hope this will help address the "too big to fail" issue
seen with Symantec.  By segregating end entities into roots and sub CAs, the
browsers can add affected Sub CAs to their CRL lists quickly and without
impacting the entire ecosystem.  This plan is very much in flux, and we'd
love to hear additional recommendations.
b.  Another thing we are doing is adding a validation OID to all of our
certificates that identifies which of the BR methods were used to issue the
cert. This way the entire community can readily identify which method was
used when issuing a cert and take action if a method is deemed weak or
insufficient.  We think this is a huge improvement over the existing
landscape, and I'm very excited to see that OID rolled out.



Thanks a ton for any thoughts you offer.



Jeremy

 

eremy,

 

Thanks for sharing details about your rough plans. There’s a lot at play here, 
particularly when trying to fully visualize DigiCert’s existing and proposed 
hierarchy, so I’m wondering if it might be easier to explore what the ‘ideal 
PKI’ may look like, and then try to work backwards to figure out how this 
acquisition can help that.

 

At the core, we can imagine there is a root CA for each major long-term 
cryptographic configuration - which, in today’s world, generally means 
RSA/2048, RSA/4096, ECC/256, and ECC/384. In tomorrow’s world, this may also 
accommodate additional curves Ed2551

RE: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy]

Hey Ryan – Thanks a ton for this post.  I’m working on a reply and should have 
something next week, but I wanted to acknowledge that we saw the post and are 
working on providing the information requested. 

 

Jeremy

 

From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:r...@sleevi.com] 
Sent: Thursday, September 14, 2017 1:28 PM
To: Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.row...@digicert.com>
Cc: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

 

 

 

On Wed, Aug 2, 2017 at 5:12 PM, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy 
<dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org 
<mailto:dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> > wrote:

Hi everyone,



Today, DigiCert and Symantec announced that DigiCert is acquiring the
Symantec CA assets, including the infrastructure, personnel, roots, and
platforms.  At the same time, DigiCert signed a Sub CA agreement wherein we
will validate and issue all Symantec certs as of Dec 1, 2017.  We are
committed to meeting the Mozilla and Google plans in transitioning away from
the Symantec infrastructure. The deal is expected to close near the end of
the year, after which we will be solely responsible for operation of the CA.
>From there, we will migrate customers and systems as necessary to
consolidate platforms and operations while continuing to run all issuance
and validation through DigiCert.  We will post updates and plans to the
community as things change and progress.



I wanted to post to the Mozilla dev list to:

1.  Inform the public,
2.  Get community feedback about the transition and concerns, and
3.  Get an update from the browsers on what this means for the plan,
noting that we fully commit to the stated deadlines. We're hoping that any
changes



Two things I can say we plan on doing (following closing) to address
concerns are:

a.  We plan to segregate certs by type on each root. Going forward, we
will issue all SSL certs from a root while client and email come from
different roots. We also plan on limiting the number of organizations on
each issuing CA.  We hope this will help address the "too big to fail" issue
seen with Symantec.  By segregating end entities into roots and sub CAs, the
browsers can add affected Sub CAs to their CRL lists quickly and without
impacting the entire ecosystem.  This plan is very much in flux, and we'd
love to hear additional recommendations.
b.  Another thing we are doing is adding a validation OID to all of our
certificates that identifies which of the BR methods were used to issue the
cert. This way the entire community can readily identify which method was
used when issuing a cert and take action if a method is deemed weak or
insufficient.  We think this is a huge improvement over the existing
landscape, and I'm very excited to see that OID rolled out.



Thanks a ton for any thoughts you offer.



Jeremy

 

eremy,

 

Thanks for sharing details about your rough plans. There’s a lot at play here, 
particularly when trying to fully visualize DigiCert’s existing and proposed 
hierarchy, so I’m wondering if it might be easier to explore what the ‘ideal 
PKI’ may look like, and then try to work backwards to figure out how this 
acquisition can help that.

 

At the core, we can imagine there is a root CA for each major long-term 
cryptographic configuration - which, in today’s world, generally means 
RSA/2048, RSA/4096, ECC/256, and ECC/384. In tomorrow’s world, this may also 
accommodate additional curves Ed25519 and Ed448, such as via 
https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix . In total, this means the 
ideal PKI only needs four to six root certificates.

 

Within each root, you can build out the appropriate segmentation. For 
performance reasons, it’s likely preferable to have a ‘wide’ PKI (many sub-CAs 
off the root, each constrained in capability and used for a limited amount of 
time) versus a ‘deep’ PKI (hierarchically reducing the capabilities at each 
level in the trust graph- for example, “All TLS” -> “All DV” -> “All first 
party DV” -> “All first party DV in Q12017”), even if a deep PKI can provide 
better compartmentalization for some use cases.

 

It isn’t clear that compartmentalizing on root provides any obvious benefits to 
users, especially as it’s the same infrastructure and audits, but it does seem 
that it increases the management overhead (for root stores), the configuration 
challenges (for site operators), not to mention the management (and, 
occasionally, network & memory) challenges for users to support all of those 
roots.

 

It would be ideal to see DigiCert streamline its PKI to better align with that 
vision, and to understand what challenges might prevent that. For example, is 
there a path to transition all new DigiCert issuance to a single root? If it 
can’t be done for all certs, can it be done for TLS? Understanding if there are 
challenges to that goal can provide invaluable insight into how the Managed CA 
transition can look.

Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy]

On Wed, Aug 2, 2017 at 5:12 PM, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:

> Hi everyone,
>
>
>
> Today, DigiCert and Symantec announced that DigiCert is acquiring the
> Symantec CA assets, including the infrastructure, personnel, roots, and
> platforms.  At the same time, DigiCert signed a Sub CA agreement wherein we
> will validate and issue all Symantec certs as of Dec 1, 2017.  We are
> committed to meeting the Mozilla and Google plans in transitioning away
> from
> the Symantec infrastructure. The deal is expected to close near the end of
> the year, after which we will be solely responsible for operation of the
> CA.
> From there, we will migrate customers and systems as necessary to
> consolidate platforms and operations while continuing to run all issuance
> and validation through DigiCert.  We will post updates and plans to the
> community as things change and progress.
>
>
>
> I wanted to post to the Mozilla dev list to:
>
> 1.  Inform the public,
> 2.  Get community feedback about the transition and concerns, and
> 3.  Get an update from the browsers on what this means for the plan,
> noting that we fully commit to the stated deadlines. We're hoping that any
> changes
>
>
>
> Two things I can say we plan on doing (following closing) to address
> concerns are:
>
> a.  We plan to segregate certs by type on each root. Going forward, we
> will issue all SSL certs from a root while client and email come from
> different roots. We also plan on limiting the number of organizations on
> each issuing CA.  We hope this will help address the "too big to fail"
> issue
> seen with Symantec.  By segregating end entities into roots and sub CAs,
> the
> browsers can add affected Sub CAs to their CRL lists quickly and without
> impacting the entire ecosystem.  This plan is very much in flux, and we'd
> love to hear additional recommendations.
> b.  Another thing we are doing is adding a validation OID to all of our
> certificates that identifies which of the BR methods were used to issue the
> cert. This way the entire community can readily identify which method was
> used when issuing a cert and take action if a method is deemed weak or
> insufficient.  We think this is a huge improvement over the existing
> landscape, and I'm very excited to see that OID rolled out.
>
>
>
> Thanks a ton for any thoughts you offer.
>
>
>
> Jeremy
>

eremy,

Thanks for sharing details about your rough plans. There’s a lot at play
here, particularly when trying to fully visualize DigiCert’s existing and
proposed hierarchy, so I’m wondering if it might be easier to explore what
the ‘ideal PKI’ may look like, and then try to work backwards to figure out
how this acquisition can help that.

At the core, we can imagine there is a root CA for each major long-term
cryptographic configuration - which, in today’s world, generally means
RSA/2048, RSA/4096, ECC/256, and ECC/384. In tomorrow’s world, this may
also accommodate additional curves Ed25519 and Ed448, such as via
https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix . In total, this means the
ideal PKI only needs four to six root certificates.

Within each root, you can build out the appropriate segmentation. For
performance reasons, it’s likely preferable to have a ‘wide’ PKI (many
sub-CAs off the root, each constrained in capability and used for a limited
amount of time) versus a ‘deep’ PKI (hierarchically reducing the
capabilities at each level in the trust graph- for example, “All TLS” ->
“All DV” -> “All first party DV” -> “All first party DV in Q12017”), even
if a deep PKI can provide better compartmentalization for some use cases.

It isn’t clear that compartmentalizing on root provides any obvious
benefits to users, especially as it’s the same infrastructure and audits,
but it does seem that it increases the management overhead (for root
stores), the configuration challenges (for site operators), not to mention
the management (and, occasionally, network & memory) challenges for users
to support all of those roots.

It would be ideal to see DigiCert streamline its PKI to better align with
that vision, and to understand what challenges might prevent that. For
example, is there a path to transition all new DigiCert issuance to a
single root? If it can’t be done for all certs, can it be done for TLS?
Understanding if there are challenges to that goal can provide invaluable
insight into how the Managed CA transition can look.

A significant reason for the Managed CA plan was to provide a temporary
bridge for those TLS servers who had made risky and fragile technical
decisions - such as pinning to a single CA or only supporting a single CA
on a device - while minimizing the risk to the broader TLS ecosystem. As
Symantec, like other organizations wishing to operate a trusted CA, would
be permitted to apply to have new roots (and a new infrastructure)
included, once it had met the minimum required security standards, the

Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Peter Kurrasch via dev-security-policy]

  I think the plan at the root level makes sense and is reasonable, at least as far as I think I understand it. (A diagram would be nice.)‎ At the intermediate level, however, I think more detail is needed. I'm especially interested in learning how resilient the cert hierarchy will be should it become necessary to alter the hierarchy in response to an adversarial act or management mishap or PKI community sanction or perhaps even future standards work.I also wonder about the plan to allocate the "economically critical" customer base across the various intermediates. For example, should soda companies, banks, shipping companies, and media sites all be given the same consideration? What about main web sites vs static content servers (CDNs)? What about sites that are important to the economy but aren't necessarily the most popular?‎My hope is that there will be enough fault tolerance, redundancy, resiliency--call it whatever you like--built in to the system so that we know we have options available should we need them. The extent to which DigiCert can flesh out some of these details will be of benefit to the whole community.From: Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policySent: Monday, August 21, 2017 12:48 AMTo: mozilla-dev-security-policyReply To: Jeremy RowleySubject: RE: DigiCert-Symantec AnnouncementHi everyone, We’re still progressing towards close and transition.  One of the items we are heavily evaluating is the root structure and cross-signings post close.  Although the plan is still being finalized, I wanted to provide a community update on the current proposal.Right now, Mozilla post stated that they plan to deprecate Symantec roots for TLS by the end of 2018.  We continue to work on a plan to transition all customers using the roots for TLS to another root, likely the DigiCert High Assurance root.  We will not cross-sign any Symantec roots, however we will continue using those roots for code signing and client/email certs post close (non-TLS use cases).  We also plan on using Symantec roots to cross-sign some of the DigiCert roots to provide ubiquity in non-Mozilla systems and processes.  However, this sign will only provide one-way trust, with the ultimate chain in Mozilla being EE-> Issuing CA -> DigiCert root in all cases.DigiCert currently has four operational roots in the Mozilla trust store: Baltimore, Global, Assured ID, and High Assurance. The other roots are some permutation of these four roots that were established for future use cases/rollover (ECC vs. RSA).  We already separate operations by Sub CA, with TLS, email, and code signing using different issuing CAs. As mentioned in my previous post, we plan on using multiple Sub CAs chained to the DigiCert roots to further control the population trusted by each Sub CA but have not decided on exact numbers. OV and EV will be limited  by Alexa distribution and/or number of customers.  DV isn’t readily identifiable by customer and will use a common sub CA.Root separation proves a difficult, yet achievable, task as there are only four operational roots: Baltimore, High Assurance, Global, and Assured ID. Global and High Assurance issue mostly OV/EV certs but do include code signing and client certificates. High Assurance is our EV root and used for both EV code signing certificates and TLS certs.   Baltimore is our cross-signed root and used primarily by older Verizon customers. Assured ID is used mostly for code signing and client.  However, Assured ID is also our FBCA root, meaning government-issued TLS certificates chain to it.  Of course, all TLS certs are issued in accordance with the BRs regardless of root. Looking at the current customer base, our current plan is to issue EV (code and TLS) from High Assurance, OV (code and TLS) from Global. Assured ID will continue as our client certificate and government root. We plan to continue using Symantec roots for code signing and client.  We’re still looking into this though. We’d love to separate out the roots more than this, but that’s not likely possible given the current root architecture. If there is a non-cross-signed Symantec root that the browsers are not planning to remove, we’d like to continue using the root to issue high volume DV and device certificates.  If this is not possible and Mozilla is still planning on distrusting all Symantec roots, we’ll likely migrate DV certs to a Sub 

RE: [EXT] Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Steve Medin via dev-security-policy]

We are not making any changes at this time.

> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of
> Adrian R. via dev-security-policy
> Sent: Friday, September 01, 2017 4:09 AM
> To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
> Subject: [EXT] Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement
>
> a small question:
> what's going to happen with [freessl.com]
>
> under Symantec's leadership it was intended for the site to become a free
> alternative to StartCom and LetsEncrypt, but it was not quite opened for
> issuance except for non-profits.
>
> Now with the transition of the CA activities to DigiCert i haven't seen
> anything about it, not even the site blog over there says anything about it.
> https://www.freessl.com/freessl/blog/
>
> Any news about it?
>
> Thanks,
> 
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Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Adrian R. via dev-security-policy]

a small question:
what's going to happen with https://www.freessl.com/ ?

under Symantec's leadership it was intended for the site to become a free 
alternative to StartCom and LetsEncrypt, but it was not quite opened for 
issuance except for non-profits.

Now with the transition of the CA activities to DigiCert i haven't seen 
anything about it, not even the site blog over there says anything about it. 
https://www.freessl.com/freessl/blog/

Any news about it?

Thanks,

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RE: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy]

Hi everyone, 

 

We’re still progressing towards close and transition.  One of the items we are 
heavily evaluating is the root structure and cross-signings post close.  
Although the plan is still being finalized, I wanted to provide a community 
update on the current proposal.

 

Right now, Mozilla post stated that they plan to deprecate Symantec roots for 
TLS by the end of 2018.  We continue to work on a plan to transition all 
customers using the roots for TLS to another root, likely the DigiCert High 
Assurance root.  We will not cross-sign any Symantec roots, however we will 
continue using those roots for code signing and client/email certs post close 
(non-TLS use cases).  We also plan on using Symantec roots to cross-sign some 
of the DigiCert roots to provide ubiquity in non-Mozilla systems and processes. 
 However, this sign will only provide one-way trust, with the ultimate chain in 
Mozilla being EE-> Issuing CA -> DigiCert root in all cases.

 

DigiCert currently has four operational roots in the Mozilla trust store: 
Baltimore, Global, Assured ID, and High Assurance. The other roots are some 
permutation of these four roots that were established for future use 
cases/rollover (ECC vs. RSA).  We already separate operations by Sub CA, with 
TLS, email, and code signing using different issuing CAs. As mentioned in my 
previous post, we plan on using multiple Sub CAs chained to the DigiCert roots 
to further control the population trusted by each Sub CA but have not decided 
on exact numbers. OV and EV will be limited  by Alexa distribution and/or 
number of customers.  DV isn’t readily identifiable by customer and will use a 
common sub CA.

 

Root separation proves a difficult, yet achievable, task as there are only four 
operational roots: Baltimore, High Assurance, Global, and Assured ID. Global 
and High Assurance issue mostly OV/EV certs but do include code signing and 
client certificates. High Assurance is our EV root and used for both EV code 
signing certificates and TLS certs.   Baltimore is our cross-signed root and 
used primarily by older Verizon customers. Assured ID is used mostly for code 
signing and client.  However, Assured ID is also our FBCA root, meaning 
government-issued TLS certificates chain to it.  Of course, all TLS certs are 
issued in accordance with the BRs regardless of root.  

 

Looking at the current customer base, our current plan is to issue EV (code and 
TLS) from High Assurance, OV (code and TLS) from Global. Assured ID will 
continue as our client certificate and government root. We plan to continue 
using Symantec roots for code signing and client.  We’re still looking into 
this though. We’d love to separate out the roots more than this, but that’s not 
likely possible given the current root architecture. If there is a 
non-cross-signed Symantec root that the browsers are not planning to remove, 
we’d like to continue using the root to issue high volume DV and device 
certificates.  If this is not possible and Mozilla is still planning on 
distrusting all Symantec roots, we’ll likely migrate DV certs to a Sub CA 
chained to the Baltimore root.

 

Of course, this is only an initial proposal.  We’ll revise as things progress 
and based on the community feedback.  We appreciate your thoughts.

 

Jeremy

 

 

From: Peter Kurrasch [mailto:fhw...@gmail.com] 
Sent: Thursday, August 3, 2017 11:21 PM
To: Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.row...@digicert.com>; mozilla-dev-security-policy 
<mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org>
Subject: Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

 

I agree with the high-level concepts, although I would probably like to add 
something about "being good stewards of technologies that play a critical role 
in the global economy." (Feel free to use your own words!)

 

Regarding the current Mozilla/Google plans, I don't necessarily have a problem 
with them but I do think we should give ourselves permission to make 
adjustments (if needed) because the circumstances have changed since those 
plans were developed. Consider:

 

* Because the acquisition is now in the picture, legal issues might impede 
progress in certain areas. The most notable example is the fact that DigiCert 
will have limited authority over Symantec until the deal actually closes. For 
example, what will happen in the period between Dec 1 and the closing (assuming 
it's after the first)?

 

* Once the deal does close, personnel and management issues could present 
various challenges in meeting certain deadlines. For example, if subject matter 
experts decide to leave Symantec prior to the closing, how might that hinder 
DigiCert?

 

* A lot of churn is about to be introduced in the global PKI. Times of chaos 
create moments of opportunity for those who wish to do bad things. Should 
something happen, corrections may be necessary which can impact delivery dates, 
and so on.





Let me be clear that these are just hypothetical situatio

Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Peter Kurrasch via dev-security-policy]

  I agree with the high-level concepts, although I would probably like to add something about "being good stewards of technologies that play a critical role in the global economy." (Feel free to use your own words!)Regarding the current Mozilla/Google plans, I don't necessarily have a problem with them but I do think we should give ourselves permission to make adjustments (if needed) because the circumstances have changed since those plans were developed. Consider:* Because the acquisition is now in the picture, legal issues might impede progress in certain areas. The most notable example is the fact that DigiCert will have limited authority over Symantec until the deal actually closes. For example, what will happen in the period between Dec 1 and the closing (assuming it's after the first)?* Once the deal does close, personnel and management issues could present various challenges in meeting certain deadlines. For example, if subject matter experts decide to leave Symantec prior to the closing, how might that hinder DigiCert?* A lot of churn is about to be introduced in the global PKI. Times of chaos create moments of opportunity for those who wish to do bad things. Should something happen, corrections may be necessary which can impact delivery dates, and so on.Let me be clear that these are just hypothetical situations and rhetorical questions. I don't expect answers and my only intention is to get people to start thinking about these matters (if they haven't already begun).Hopefully this better explains where I was coming from in my initial reply.From: Jeremy RowleySent: Thursday, August 3, 2017 8:13 PM‎ Hey Peter,  I think the Mozilla and Google plans both stand as-is, although probably need an updated based on this announcement.  I'm hoping that the high-level concepts remain unchanged:    - Migrate to a new infrastructure    - Audit the migration and performance to ensure compliance    - Improve operational transparency so the community has assurances on what is happening.  Jeremy  This certainly shakes things up! I've had my concerns that Symantec's plan was complicated and risky, but now I'm wondering if this new path will be somewhat simpler--yet even more risky? I'm not suggesting we shouldn't take this path but I am hoping we make smart, well-thought-out decisions along the waysnip...* I think it's appropriate to re-think some of the deadlines, given that we're talking less about a carrots-and-sticks model and more of one based on smart decision-making, good risk management, and sticks.
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RE: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy]

Hey Peter, 



 I think the Mozilla and Google plans both stand as-is, although probably need 
an updated based on this announcement.  I'm hoping that the high-level concepts 
remain unchanged:

- Migrate to a new infrastructure

- Audit the migration and performance to ensure compliance

- Improve operational transparency so the community has assurances on what 
is happening. 



 Jeremy

 

 

From: dev-security-policy 
[mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+jeremy.rowley=digicert@lists.mozilla.org]
 On Behalf Of Peter Kurrasch via dev-security-policy
Sent: Wednesday, August 2, 2017 8:01 PM
To: mozilla-dev-security-policy <mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org>
Subject: Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

 

This certainly shakes things up! I've had my concerns that Symantec's plan was 
complicated and risky, but now I'm wondering if this new path will be somewhat 
simpler--yet even more risky? I'm not suggesting we shouldn't take this path 
but I am hoping we make smart, well-thought-out decisions along the way.

 

Some thoughts:

 

* Will there be other players in Symantec's SubCA plan or is DigiCert the only 
one?

 

* ‎Is DigiCert prepared (yet?) to commit to a "first day of issuance" under the 
SubCA plan? That is, when is the earliest date that members of the general 
public may purchase certs that chain up through the new "DigiCert SubCA" to any 
of the Symantec roots? I hope that, for issues that may arise under the new 
system, there is sufficient time to identify and resolve them prior to the 
2017-12-01 deadline.





* I think the idea of a smart segregation plan for the roots and intermediates 
is a must-have. Such a plan should factor in the clientele who are using the 
different roots and the environments in which they operate. Given how important 
the "ubiquitous roots" are, I would hope to see community involvement and 
"sign-off", if you will.

 

* I think it's appropriate to re-think some of the deadlines, given that we're 
talking less about a carrots-and-sticks model and more of one based on smart 
decision-making, good risk management, and sticks.









Finally, when I went to read the DigiCert blog post, I noticed that John 
Merrill's link for the agreement announcement was a dud. I don't know why but I 
really don't care either. I think it serves as a reminder ‎that mistakes are 
going to be made during this process so it's best to make allowances for that 
in the plans going forward. That, and attention to detail is important.





Thanks.



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RE: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy]

We aren't sure at this point. DigiCert already runs two (almost three) logs.
Symantec runs two logs.  Although CT plans are still under discussion, I
don't think the ecosystem needs four CT logs operated by a single CA.
Regardless, we'll do whatever is best to support CT and the DigiCert and
Symantec customer-base. Likely, we'll compare infrastructure and keep the
best performing logs. We'll definitely run a differential between the logs
and consult with the community before anything is done with existing logs. 
Jeremy

-Original Message-
From: dev-security-policy
[mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+jeremy.rowley=digicert.com@lists.mozilla
.org] On Behalf Of Santhan Raj via dev-security-policy
Sent: Thursday, August 3, 2017 1:36 PM
To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

On Wednesday, August 2, 2017 at 6:44:51 PM UTC-7, Peter Bowen wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 2, 2017 at 2:12 PM, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy 
> <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> > Today, DigiCert and Symantec announced that DigiCert is acquiring 
> > the Symantec CA assets, including the infrastructure, personnel, 
> > roots, and platforms.  At the same time, DigiCert signed a Sub CA 
> > agreement wherein we will validate and issue all Symantec certs as 
> > of Dec 1, 2017.  We are committed to meeting the Mozilla and Google 
> > plans in transitioning away from the Symantec infrastructure. The 
> > deal is expected to close near the end of the year, after which we will
be solely responsible for operation of the CA.
> > From there, we will migrate customers and systems as necessary to 
> > consolidate platforms and operations while continuing to run all 
> > issuance and validation through DigiCert.  We will post updates and 
> > plans to the community as things change and progress.
> >
> > Thanks a ton for any thoughts you offer.
> 
> Jeremy,
> 
> A while ago I put together a list of all the certificates that are or 
> were included in trust stores that were known to be owned by Symantec 
> or companies that Symantec acquired.  The list is in Google Sheets at 
> https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1piCTtgMz1Uf3SHXoNEFYZKAjKGPJdR
> DGFuGehdzcvo8/edit?usp=sharing
> 
> Can you confirm that DigiCert will be "solely responsible for 
> operation" of all of these CAs once the deal closes?
> 
> Thanks,
> Peter

Hi Jeremy,

A similar question regarding Symantec's CT log infrastructure. Are they part
of the deal and do you plan to continue hosting them?

Thanks,
Santhan
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RE: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy]

Hi Doug,

We are confident in our ability to hit the deadlines set by both Mozilla and 
Google. Our understanding is that all new validations will be done by DigiCert 
on Dec 1, 2017. We plan to start re-validating information as soon as 
practical under the Sub CA agreement. Our mutual goal is to avoid Symantec 
validation data reuse, avoiding the shorter validity periods required by 
Google.  Both companies believe this will provide the best customer experience 
and give customers the service they are used to.

Jeremy

> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+doug.beattie=globalsign@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of
> Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
> Sent: Wednesday, August 2, 2017 10:54 PM
> To: Peter Kurrasch <fhw...@gmail.com>; mozilla-dev-security-policy
> <mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org>
> Subject: RE: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement
> * Will there be other players in Symantec's SubCA plan or is DigiCert
> the only one?
>
>
>
> [DC] Only DigiCert.

Jeremy - It's my understanding that as of December 1st every certificate 
issued by Symantec or a Managed CA must have the domains validated by the 
Managed CA (in this case only DigiCert). Is it feasible that DigiCert 
revalidate every domain in use by Symantec Enterprise customs between now and 
then, and to keep up with all reissues/renewals and new Retail and Partner 
orders?  It seems like a huge challenge, especially given that you are not 
able to use Symantec employees or systems for this.  Maybe my assumptions are 
not accurate.



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Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy]

On 02/08/2017 23:12, Jeremy Rowley wrote:

Hi everyone,

  


Today, DigiCert and Symantec announced that DigiCert is acquiring the
Symantec CA assets, including the infrastructure, personnel, roots, and
platforms.  At the same time, DigiCert signed a Sub CA agreement wherein we
will validate and issue all Symantec certs as of Dec 1, 2017.  We are
committed to meeting the Mozilla and Google plans in transitioning away from
the Symantec infrastructure. The deal is expected to close near the end of
the year, after which we will be solely responsible for operation of the CA.

From there, we will migrate customers and systems as necessary to

consolidate platforms and operations while continuing to run all issuance
and validation through DigiCert.  We will post updates and plans to the
community as things change and progress.

  


Wasn't the whole outsourced SubCA plan predicated on the outsourcing
being done to someone else.  But with this, DigiCert (as successor to
Symantec) would be outsourcing to itself?



I wanted to post to the Mozilla dev list to:

1.  Inform the public,
2.  Get community feedback about the transition and concerns, and
3.  Get an update from the browsers on what this means for the plan,
noting that we fully commit to the stated deadlines. We're hoping that any
changes

  


Two things I can say we plan on doing (following closing) to address
concerns are:

a.  We plan to segregate certs by type on each root. Going forward, we
will issue all SSL certs from a root while client and email come from
different roots. We also plan on limiting the number of organizations on
each issuing CA.  We hope this will help address the "too big to fail" issue
seen with Symantec.  By segregating end entities into roots and sub CAs, the
browsers can add affected Sub CAs to their CRL lists quickly and without
impacting the entire ecosystem.  This plan is very much in flux, and we'd
love to hear additional recommendations.
b.  Another thing we are doing is adding a validation OID to all of our
certificates that identifies which of the BR methods were used to issue the
cert. This way the entire community can readily identify which method was
used when issuing a cert and take action if a method is deemed weak or
insufficient.  We think this is a huge improvement over the existing
landscape, and I'm very excited to see that OID rolled out.



If you take over the roots, why continue to keep separate roots for the
former Symantec brands (except as an "old hierarchy used mostly for
their own CRLs and historic relying parties such as certain Microsoft
products")?


Enjoy

Jakob
--
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded
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Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy]

I believe all of the non expired CAs listed are in scope.

> On Aug 2, 2017, at 7:44 PM, Peter Bowen  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Aug 2, 2017 at 2:12 PM, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
>  wrote:
>> Today, DigiCert and Symantec announced that DigiCert is acquiring the
>> Symantec CA assets, including the infrastructure, personnel, roots, and
>> platforms.  At the same time, DigiCert signed a Sub CA agreement wherein we
>> will validate and issue all Symantec certs as of Dec 1, 2017.  We are
>> committed to meeting the Mozilla and Google plans in transitioning away from
>> the Symantec infrastructure. The deal is expected to close near the end of
>> the year, after which we will be solely responsible for operation of the CA.
>> From there, we will migrate customers and systems as necessary to
>> consolidate platforms and operations while continuing to run all issuance
>> and validation through DigiCert.  We will post updates and plans to the
>> community as things change and progress.
>> 
>> Thanks a ton for any thoughts you offer.
> 
> Jeremy,
> 
> A while ago I put together a list of all the certificates that are or
> were included in trust stores that were known to be owned by Symantec
> or companies that Symantec acquired.  The list is in Google Sheets at
> https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1piCTtgMz1Uf3SHXoNEFYZKAjKGPJdRDGFuGehdzcvo8/edit?usp=sharing
> 
> Can you confirm that DigiCert will be "solely responsible for
> operation" of all of these CAs once the deal closes?
> 
> Thanks,
> Peter
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RE: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Doug Beattie via dev-security-policy]

> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+doug.beattie=globalsign@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of
> Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
> Sent: Wednesday, August 2, 2017 10:54 PM
> To: Peter Kurrasch <fhw...@gmail.com>; mozilla-dev-security-policy
> <mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org>
> Subject: RE: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement
> * Will there be other players in Symantec's SubCA plan or is DigiCert the only
> one?
> 
> 
> 
> [DC] Only DigiCert.

Jeremy - It's my understanding that as of December 1st every certificate issued 
by Symantec or a Managed CA must have the domains validated by the Managed CA 
(in this case only DigiCert). Is it feasible that DigiCert revalidate every 
domain in use by Symantec Enterprise customs between now and then, and to keep 
up with all reissues/renewals and new Retail and Partner orders?  It seems like 
a huge challenge, especially given that you are not able to use Symantec 
employees or systems for this.  Maybe my assumptions are not accurate.

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Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Santhan Raj via dev-security-policy]

On Wednesday, August 2, 2017 at 6:44:51 PM UTC-7, Peter Bowen wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 2, 2017 at 2:12 PM, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
>  wrote:
> > Today, DigiCert and Symantec announced that DigiCert is acquiring the
> > Symantec CA assets, including the infrastructure, personnel, roots, and
> > platforms.  At the same time, DigiCert signed a Sub CA agreement wherein we
> > will validate and issue all Symantec certs as of Dec 1, 2017.  We are
> > committed to meeting the Mozilla and Google plans in transitioning away from
> > the Symantec infrastructure. The deal is expected to close near the end of
> > the year, after which we will be solely responsible for operation of the CA.
> > From there, we will migrate customers and systems as necessary to
> > consolidate platforms and operations while continuing to run all issuance
> > and validation through DigiCert.  We will post updates and plans to the
> > community as things change and progress.
> >
> > Thanks a ton for any thoughts you offer.
> 
> Jeremy,
> 
> A while ago I put together a list of all the certificates that are or
> were included in trust stores that were known to be owned by Symantec
> or companies that Symantec acquired.  The list is in Google Sheets at
> https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1piCTtgMz1Uf3SHXoNEFYZKAjKGPJdRDGFuGehdzcvo8/edit?usp=sharing
> 
> Can you confirm that DigiCert will be "solely responsible for
> operation" of all of these CAs once the deal closes?
> 
> Thanks,
> Peter

Hi Jeremy,

A similar question regarding Symantec's CT log infrastructure. Are they part of 
the deal and do you plan to continue hosting them?

Thanks,
Santhan
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Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Alex Gaynor via dev-security-policy]

Hi Jeremy,

Will the certificates being issued for Symantec starting December 1st be
issued under the existing DC roots, or under new roots?

Alex

On Wed, Aug 2, 2017 at 5:12 PM, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:

> Hi everyone,
>
>
>
> Today, DigiCert and Symantec announced that DigiCert is acquiring the
> Symantec CA assets, including the infrastructure, personnel, roots, and
> platforms.  At the same time, DigiCert signed a Sub CA agreement wherein we
> will validate and issue all Symantec certs as of Dec 1, 2017.  We are
> committed to meeting the Mozilla and Google plans in transitioning away
> from
> the Symantec infrastructure. The deal is expected to close near the end of
> the year, after which we will be solely responsible for operation of the
> CA.
> From there, we will migrate customers and systems as necessary to
> consolidate platforms and operations while continuing to run all issuance
> and validation through DigiCert.  We will post updates and plans to the
> community as things change and progress.
>
>
>
> I wanted to post to the Mozilla dev list to:
>
> 1.  Inform the public,
> 2.  Get community feedback about the transition and concerns, and
> 3.  Get an update from the browsers on what this means for the plan,
> noting that we fully commit to the stated deadlines. We're hoping that any
> changes
>
>
>
> Two things I can say we plan on doing (following closing) to address
> concerns are:
>
> a.  We plan to segregate certs by type on each root. Going forward, we
> will issue all SSL certs from a root while client and email come from
> different roots. We also plan on limiting the number of organizations on
> each issuing CA.  We hope this will help address the "too big to fail"
> issue
> seen with Symantec.  By segregating end entities into roots and sub CAs,
> the
> browsers can add affected Sub CAs to their CRL lists quickly and without
> impacting the entire ecosystem.  This plan is very much in flux, and we'd
> love to hear additional recommendations.
> b.  Another thing we are doing is adding a validation OID to all of our
> certificates that identifies which of the BR methods were used to issue the
> cert. This way the entire community can readily identify which method was
> used when issuing a cert and take action if a method is deemed weak or
> insufficient.  We think this is a huge improvement over the existing
> landscape, and I'm very excited to see that OID rolled out.
>
>
>
> Thanks a ton for any thoughts you offer.
>
>
>
> Jeremy
>
>
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>
>
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Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy]

Peter Bowen  writes:

>Gerv's email was clear that sale to DigiCert will not impact the plan,
>saying: "any change of control of some or all of Symantec's roots would not
>be grounds for a renegotiation of these dates."
>
>So the sanctions are still intact.

Ah, I phrased my question a bit unclearly, what I meant was that the existing
certs, which now chain up to to-be-untrusted Symantec roots, can be moved
across to trusted DigiCert roots and continue as before.  I'm assuming that
was the intent of exercise, that it's business as usual, just the name has
changed.

Peter.
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Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Peter Bowen via dev-security-policy]

On Wed, Aug 2, 2017 at 8:10 PM, Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy
 wrote:
> Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy  
> writes:
>
>>Today, DigiCert and Symantec announced that DigiCert is acquiring the
>>Symantec CA assets, including the infrastructure, personnel, roots, and
>>platforms.
>
> I realise this is a bit off-topic for the list but someone has to bring up the
> elephant in the room: How does this affect the Google vs. Symantec situation?
> Is it pure coincidence that Symantec now re-emerges as DigiCert, presumably
> avoiding the sanctions since now things will chain up to DigiCert roots?

Peter,

On topic for this list is Mozilla policy.  Gerv's email was clear that
sale to DigiCert will not impact the plan, saying: "any change of
control of some or all of Symantec's roots
would not be grounds for a renegotiation of these dates."

So the sanctions are still intact.

Thanks,
Peter
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Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy]

Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy  
writes:

>Today, DigiCert and Symantec announced that DigiCert is acquiring the
>Symantec CA assets, including the infrastructure, personnel, roots, and
>platforms.

I realise this is a bit off-topic for the list but someone has to bring up the
elephant in the room: How does this affect the Google vs. Symantec situation?
Is it pure coincidence that Symantec now re-emerges as DigiCert, presumably
avoiding the sanctions since now things will chain up to DigiCert roots?

Just curious here, this seems like a bit too much of a coincidence.

Peter.
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RE: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy]

 

 

* Will there be other players in Symantec's SubCA plan or is DigiCert the only 
one?

 

[DC] Only DigiCert.

 

* ‎Is DigiCert prepared (yet?) to commit to a "first day of issuance" under the 
SubCA plan? That is, when is the earliest date that members of the general 
public may purchase certs that chain up through the new "DigiCert SubCA" to any 
of the Symantec roots? I hope that, for issues that may arise under the new 
system, there is sufficient time to identify and resolve them prior to the 
2017-12-01 deadline.

 

[DC] Not yet. That’s an ongoing discussion.  



* I think the idea of a smart segregation plan for the roots and intermediates 
is a must-have. Such a plan should factor in the clientele who are using the 
different roots and the environments in which they operate. Given how important 
the "ubiquitous roots" are, I would hope to see community involvement and 
"sign-off", if you will.

 

[DC] Okay. We plan to update the community as things solidify.

 

* I think it's appropriate to re-think some of the deadlines, given that we're 
talking less about a carrots-and-sticks model and more of one based on smart 
decision-making, good risk management, and sticks.


[DC] I’ll leave that open to the community discussion, although anything sooner 
than the current deadlines might not have as satisfactory results as the 
current proposal.



Finally, when I went to read the DigiCert blog post, I noticed that John 
Merrill's link for the agreement announcement was a dud. I don't know why but I 
really don't care either. I think it serves as a reminder ‎that mistakes are 
going to be made during this process so it's best to make allowances for that 
in the plans going forward. That, and attention to detail is important.

 

[DC] Egg on my face there. Thanks for finding that.  We’re getting it updated.

 



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Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Peter Kurrasch via dev-security-policy]

  This certainly shakes things up! I've had my concerns that Symantec's plan was complicated and risky, but now I'm wondering if this new path will be somewhat simpler--yet even more risky? I'm not suggesting we shouldn't take this path but I am hoping we make smart, well-thought-out decisions along the way.Some thoughts:* Will there be other players in Symantec's SubCA plan or is DigiCert the only one?* ‎Is DigiCert prepared (yet?) to commit to a "first day of issuance" under the SubCA plan? That is, when is the earliest date that members of the general public may purchase certs that chain up through the new "DigiCert SubCA" to any of the Symantec roots? I hope that, for issues that may arise under the new system, there is sufficient time to identify and resolve them prior to the 2017-12-01 deadline.* I think the idea of a smart segregation plan for the roots and intermediates is a must-have. Such a plan should factor in the clientele who are using the different roots and the environments in which they operate. Given how important the "ubiquitous roots" are, I would hope to see community involvement and "sign-off", if you will.* I think it's appropriate to re-think some of the deadlines, given that we're talking less about a carrots-and-sticks model and more of one based on smart decision-making, good risk management, and sticks.Finally, when I went to read the DigiCert blog post, I noticed that John Merrill's link for the agreement announcement was a dud. I don't know why but I really don't care either. I think it serves as a reminder ‎that mistakes are going to be made during this process so it's best to make allowances for that in the plans going forward. That, and attention to detail is important.Thanks.
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Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Peter Bowen via dev-security-policy]

On Wed, Aug 2, 2017 at 2:12 PM, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
 wrote:
> Today, DigiCert and Symantec announced that DigiCert is acquiring the
> Symantec CA assets, including the infrastructure, personnel, roots, and
> platforms.  At the same time, DigiCert signed a Sub CA agreement wherein we
> will validate and issue all Symantec certs as of Dec 1, 2017.  We are
> committed to meeting the Mozilla and Google plans in transitioning away from
> the Symantec infrastructure. The deal is expected to close near the end of
> the year, after which we will be solely responsible for operation of the CA.
> From there, we will migrate customers and systems as necessary to
> consolidate platforms and operations while continuing to run all issuance
> and validation through DigiCert.  We will post updates and plans to the
> community as things change and progress.
>
> Thanks a ton for any thoughts you offer.

Jeremy,

A while ago I put together a list of all the certificates that are or
were included in trust stores that were known to be owned by Symantec
or companies that Symantec acquired.  The list is in Google Sheets at
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1piCTtgMz1Uf3SHXoNEFYZKAjKGPJdRDGFuGehdzcvo8/edit?usp=sharing

Can you confirm that DigiCert will be "solely responsible for
operation" of all of these CAs once the deal closes?

Thanks,
Peter
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RE: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy]

Hey Nick - I plan to include all relevant OIDs in the cert. I figured that
way relying parties understand the total risk associated with verification
of the certificate, even if they don't know exactly the methods tied to each
listed domain. If a method is eventually deemed less desirable (*cough*
domain authorization letters *cough*), then the entire cert would need to be
replaced anyway to reflect deprecation of that method.

Jeremy 

-Original Message-
From: dev-security-policy
[mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+jeremy.rowley=digicert.com@lists.mozilla
.org] On Behalf Of Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy
Sent: Wednesday, August 2, 2017 4:57 PM
To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

On the use of OIDs to signify the Blessed Method used for validation I
thought it can't hurt to mention the first obstacle for this idea which
occurred to me in respect of Let's Encrypt (and more generally any CA
importing ACME I think)

Suppose an applicant asks for www.example.com, images.example.com and
www.example.org. They demonstrate control over www.example.com using files
in .well-known/ (sorry I'm writing this on my phone in a hotel room, don't
have BR section numbers in front of me) but use DNS to show control over
www.example.org...

Which OID goes in this certificate? Both of them? There are arbitrarily more
complicated examples along these lines, all worth a bit of thought before
setting off I think.
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RE: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy]

Thanks Kathleen. We already offer short-lived certs (anywhere from 8 hours
up), but they are not issued off a dedicated intermediate. It's a great
suggestion, and we'll add it to the DigiCert plan.

Jeremy 

-Original Message-
From: dev-security-policy
[mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+jeremy.rowley=digicert.com@lists.mozilla
.org] On Behalf Of Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy
Sent: Wednesday, August 2, 2017 4:07 PM
To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

On Wednesday, August 2, 2017 at 2:13:40 PM UTC-7, Jeremy Rowley wrote:
> Today, DigiCert and Symantec announced that DigiCert is acquiring the 
> Symantec CA assets, including the infrastructure, personnel, roots, 
> and platforms.  At the same time, DigiCert signed a Sub CA agreement 
> wherein we will validate and issue all Symantec certs as of Dec 1, 2017.


Thanks for posting this information here.

Pointer to DigiCert's blog:

https://www.digicert.com/blog/digicert-to-acquire-symantec-website-security-
business/



> Two things I can say we plan on doing (following closing) to address 
> concerns are:
> 
> a.We plan to segregate certs by type on each root. Going forward, we
> will issue all SSL certs from a root while client and email come from 
> different roots.


I would like to see all CAs move in this direction.


> We also plan on limiting the number of organizations on each issuing 
> CA.  We hope this will help address the "too big to fail" issue seen 
> with Symantec.  By segregating end entities into roots and sub CAs, 
> the browsers can add affected Sub CAs to their CRL lists quickly and 
> without impacting the entire ecosystem.  This plan is very much in 
> flux, and we'd love to hear additional recommendations.


I greatly appreciate your consideration in this area!

Perhaps there can be different subCAs for large organizations versus
smaller/individual site operators (that might be covered as different
brands). Of course, I'm always in favor of technically-constrained subCAs
for the large organizations.

And perhaps one (or more) of the subCAs can be dedicated to short-lived SSL
certs, similar to Let's Encrypt?


> b.Another thing we are doing is adding a validation OID to all of our
> certificates that identifies which of the BR methods were used to 
> issue the cert. This way the entire community can readily identify 
> which method was used when issuing a cert and take action if a method 
> is deemed weak or insufficient.  We think this is a huge improvement 
> over the existing landscape, and I'm very excited to see that OID rolled
out.

I would like to see all CAs move in this direction as well.


Looks like you are going to be very busy! :-)

Thanks, and good luck!

Kathleen
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Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

[Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy]

On Wednesday, August 2, 2017 at 2:13:40 PM UTC-7, Jeremy Rowley wrote:
> Today, DigiCert and Symantec announced that DigiCert is acquiring the
> Symantec CA assets, including the infrastructure, personnel, roots, and
> platforms.  At the same time, DigiCert signed a Sub CA agreement wherein we
> will validate and issue all Symantec certs as of Dec 1, 2017. 


Thanks for posting this information here.

Pointer to DigiCert's blog:

https://www.digicert.com/blog/digicert-to-acquire-symantec-website-security-business/



> Two things I can say we plan on doing (following closing) to address
> concerns are:
> 
> a.We plan to segregate certs by type on each root. Going forward, we
> will issue all SSL certs from a root while client and email come from
> different roots. 


I would like to see all CAs move in this direction.


> We also plan on limiting the number of organizations on
> each issuing CA.  We hope this will help address the "too big to fail" issue
> seen with Symantec.  By segregating end entities into roots and sub CAs, the
> browsers can add affected Sub CAs to their CRL lists quickly and without
> impacting the entire ecosystem.  This plan is very much in flux, and we'd
> love to hear additional recommendations. 


I greatly appreciate your consideration in this area!

Perhaps there can be different subCAs for large organizations versus 
smaller/individual site operators (that might be covered as different brands). 
Of course, I'm always in favor of technically-constrained subCAs for the large 
organizations.

And perhaps one (or more) of the subCAs can be dedicated to short-lived SSL 
certs, similar to Let's Encrypt?


> b.Another thing we are doing is adding a validation OID to all of our
> certificates that identifies which of the BR methods were used to issue the
> cert. This way the entire community can readily identify which method was
> used when issuing a cert and take action if a method is deemed weak or
> insufficient.  We think this is a huge improvement over the existing
> landscape, and I'm very excited to see that OID rolled out.

I would like to see all CAs move in this direction as well.


Looks like you are going to be very busy! :-)

Thanks, and good luck!

Kathleen
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