[Dnsmasq-discuss] Tag from interface name?

2017-07-03 Thread Brian Rak
I'd like to be able to classify DHCP requests based on the interface 
they come in on.  I'd like to have a tag based on the interface name 
(so, if the request came in over br0, I'd have a br0 tag to match on).


Is there any way of accomplishing this with dnsmasq currently?  My 
interfaces don't actually have an IP address assigned, so I can't match 
by IP.


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Re: [Dnsmasq-discuss] Estimation of TFTP Server Load Capabilities

2014-07-31 Thread Brian Rak
One option here is to use iPXE ( http://www.ipxe.org/ ) to grab the 
netboot files via HTTP (or some other protocol) instead of relying on 
TFTP.  There's some extra configuration work here, but serving up the 
365KB iPXE image to clients via TFTP is a lot less work then serving up 
the entire kernel/initrd package.


On 7/23/2014 11:13 PM, Linux Luser wrote:


I have a project where I use dnsmasq for netboot installs. Currently, 
there can be an unlimited number of installs happened at once. At what 
point (number of TFTP transfers happening in parallel) should I be 
concerned that I'm overtaxing dnsmasq's TFTP capabilities? Does 
dnsmasq use threads or multiprocessing for TFTP transfers?


Thanks.



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[Dnsmasq-discuss] Debugging

2014-02-11 Thread Brian Rak
Is there any way to get additonal debugging information out of dnsmasq?  
I'm running into an issue where I'm seeing 'DHCPDISCOVER(eth0) X Y no 
address available', but it's not particularly clear to me why this is 
happening.  Is there a way to log the contents of the DISCOVER packet?  
I know I can use tcpdump, but that doesn't show me what dnsmasq actually 
thinks is in the packet.


In my case, I should be seeing a subscriber-id in the packets.  I see it 
in tcpdump, but I'm not clear if dnsmasq is actually parsing it.


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Re: [Dnsmasq-discuss] Debugging

2014-02-11 Thread Brian Rak

Sorry, should have mentioned that I already have that enabled.

That gives me some extra info:

Feb 11 11:14:07 x dnsmasq-dhcp[2278]: 3227716451 DHCPDISCOVER(eth0) 
00:25:90:d6:ac:25 no address available
Feb 11 11:14:08 x dnsmasq-dhcp[2278]: 467005255 available DHCP range: 
10.x.10 -- 10.x.250
Feb 11 11:14:08 x dnsmasq-dhcp[2278]: 467005255 available DHCP range: 
10.y.10 -- 10.y.250
Feb 11 11:14:08 x dnsmasq-dhcp[2278]: 467005255 available DHCP range: 
10.z.10 -- 10.z.250

Feb 11 11:14:08 x dnsmasq-dhcp[2278]: 467005255 vendor class: udhcp 1.12.0

but doesn't appear to log the subscriber ID.  I can't tell if its 
supposed to be logged in that case either.


On 2/11/2014 10:50 AM, Simon Kelley wrote:

On 11/02/14 15:12, Brian Rak wrote:

Is there any way to get additonal debugging information out of dnsmasq?
  I'm running into an issue where I'm seeing 'DHCPDISCOVER(eth0) X Y no
address available', but it's not particularly clear to me why this is
happening. Is there a way to log the contents of the DISCOVER packet? I
know I can use tcpdump, but that doesn't show me what dnsmasq actually
thinks is in the packet.

In my case, I should be seeing a subscriber-id in the packets. I see it
in tcpdump, but I'm not clear if dnsmasq is actually parsing it.




log-dhcp


will help.


Cheers,

Simon.



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Re: [Dnsmasq-discuss] Limit DNS queries to the local subnet clients

2013-11-29 Thread Brian Rak
That's how you end up with an open DNS resolver, and unwittingly DDOS 
other machines.


On 11/28/2013 10:52 PM, Don Muller wrote:

Wouldn't it be better to not define dnsmasq as the DNS resolver for the subnets 
you don't want handle.

Sent from my iPad

Don Muller


On Nov 28, 2013, at 12:26 PM, Édouard Thuleau thul...@gmail.com wrote:

Hi,

I'm new with dnsmasq and I like to know if we can limit it to answer
DNS queries only to clients of the subnet served by dnsmasq or to a
defined subnet ?

Regards,
Édouard.

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Re: [Dnsmasq-discuss] Limit DNS queries to the local subnet clients

2013-11-29 Thread Brian Rak
Your initial answer seems to assume that if you don't tell anyone about 
your DNS server, no one will discover it.  That's pretty much wrong.  
Every public IP on the internet is going to be probed looking for open 
DNS servers to abuse multiple times a day.


Also, assuming that everyone is in a trusted, internal lan is not a 
valid assumption.  With various virtualization platforms using dnsmasq 
for DNS/DHCP, I'd say it's increasingly being used in places where it's 
directly exposed to the internet.


On 11/29/2013 10:34 AM, Don Muller wrote:

Yes if dmsmasq was open to internet but that would not prevent the request from 
coming in, just from it being answered. The question was how limit dnsmasq to 
answer DNS queries only to clients of the subnet served by dnsmasq or to a 
defined subnet. So assuming it is in a controlled environment (internal lan) if 
you don't setup the other subnets to send requests to dnamasq then it would 
only receive requests on the subnets you do want to service. Besides why would 
you want to set up the dns resolver on subnets you were not going to answer? I 
think the answer to this is better network set up on the client subnets and 
also at the routers and firewalls.

Don


-Original Message-
From: Brian Rak [mailto:b...@gameservers.com]
Sent: Friday, November 29, 2013 9:45 AM
To: Don Muller; dnsmasq-discuss@lists.thekelleys.org.uk
Subject: Re: [Dnsmasq-discuss] Limit DNS queries to the local subnet
clients

That's how you end up with an open DNS resolver, and unwittingly DDOS
other machines.

On 11/28/2013 10:52 PM, Don Muller wrote:

Wouldn't it be better to not define dnsmasq as the DNS resolver for

the subnets you don't want handle.

Sent from my iPad

Don Muller


On Nov 28, 2013, at 12:26 PM, Édouard Thuleau thul...@gmail.com

wrote:

Hi,

I'm new with dnsmasq and I like to know if we can limit it to answer
DNS queries only to clients of the subnet served by dnsmasq or to a
defined subnet ?

Regards,
Édouard.

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Re: [Dnsmasq-discuss] Limit DNS queries to the local subnet clients

2013-11-29 Thread Brian Rak
You seem to be a bit confused about how the attack works. It's not directed at 
the dnsmasq server.  The attacker uses Spode's traffic to trick dnsmasq into 
attacking a remote server. DNS replies proceed amplification and anonymity to 
the attacks. Dropping outgoing DNS replies will prevent the server from being 
abused.

On a daily basis I deal with mis configured servers that are attacking my 
machines. While perimiter defenses are great in theory defense in depth is what 
you want for real networks

Don Muller d...@djmuller.com wrote:
I agree with what you are saying but I think you are missing the point
of the question. The poster only wanted dnsmasq to respond to certain
subnets. The place to do that is not in dnsmasq but at the perimeter.
Setting up dnsmasq to not respond does not stop the traffic from coming
in, it just stops it from responding. The place to stop any type of
attack is at the perimeter and not someplace inside the network. For
internal networks don't set up dnsmasq as your DNS resolver and you
don't have to tell dnsmasq to not respond.

Sent from my iPad

Don Muller

 On Nov 29, 2013, at 2:03 PM, Brian Rak b...@gameservers.com wrote:
 
 Your initial answer seems to assume that if you don't tell anyone
about your DNS server, no one will discover it.  That's pretty much
wrong.  Every public IP on the internet is going to be probed looking
for open DNS servers to abuse multiple times a day.
 
 Also, assuming that everyone is in a trusted, internal lan is not a
valid assumption.  With various virtualization platforms using dnsmasq
for DNS/DHCP, I'd say it's increasingly being used in places where it's
directly exposed to the internet.
 
 On 11/29/2013 10:34 AM, Don Muller wrote:
 Yes if dmsmasq was open to internet but that would not prevent the
request from coming in, just from it being answered. The question was
how limit dnsmasq to answer DNS queries only to clients of the subnet
served by dnsmasq or to a defined subnet. So assuming it is in a
controlled environment (internal lan) if you don't setup the other
subnets to send requests to dnamasq then it would only receive requests
on the subnets you do want to service. Besides why would you want to
set up the dns resolver on subnets you were not going to answer? I
think the answer to this is better network set up on the client subnets
and also at the routers and firewalls.
 
 Don
 
 -Original Message-
 From: Brian Rak [mailto:b...@gameservers.com]
 Sent: Friday, November 29, 2013 9:45 AM
 To: Don Muller; dnsmasq-discuss@lists.thekelleys.org.uk
 Subject: Re: [Dnsmasq-discuss] Limit DNS queries to the local
subnet
 clients
 
 That's how you end up with an open DNS resolver, and unwittingly
DDOS
 other machines.
 
 On 11/28/2013 10:52 PM, Don Muller wrote:
 Wouldn't it be better to not define dnsmasq as the DNS resolver
for
 the subnets you don't want handle.
 Sent from my iPad
 
 Don Muller
 
 On Nov 28, 2013, at 12:26 PM, Édouard Thuleau thul...@gmail.com
 wrote:
 Hi,
 
 I'm new with dnsmasq and I like to know if we can limit it to
answer
 DNS queries only to clients of the subnet served by dnsmasq or to
a
 defined subnet ?
 
 Regards,
 Édouard.
 
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 ___
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 Dnsmasq-discuss@lists.thekelleys.org.uk
 http://lists.thekelleys.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/dnsmasq-discuss
 
 
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 Dnsmasq-discuss@lists.thekelleys.org.uk
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Re: [Dnsmasq-discuss] timing of dhcp-script for tftp downloads

2013-11-16 Thread Brian Rak


On 11/16/2013 10:01 AM, Simon Kelley wrote:



Also, is there any way to know when a tftp download starts vs.ends?


No, I don't think so.


You could always chainload iPXE, and use HTTP instead of TFTP. You'd be 
able to use any server side language to do actions when a download 
starts/ends.


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[Dnsmasq-discuss] DNSMasq and DNS reflection attacks

2013-10-24 Thread Brian Rak
We've recently undertaken a project to clean up our network, and lock 
down all the open DNS resolvers.  As you may know, these are very 
frequently used for DDOS attacks: http://openresolverproject.org/ , 
http://www.team-cymru.org/Services/Resolvers/ .


I haven't been able to find any sort of configuration option that would 
prevent DNSMasq from being abused like this, and I've had to resort to 
iptables rules instead.  Is there a configuration option that that would 
disable responding to DNS queries from certain interfaces?  The other 
option that seems handy would be one to only reply to DNS queries from 
hosts that have a configured DHCP lease.


Are there any features of DNSMasq that would prevent it from being 
abused to conduct attacks?


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Re: [Dnsmasq-discuss] DNSMasq and DNS reflection attacks

2013-10-24 Thread Brian Rak


On 10/24/2013 12:28 PM, Simon Kelley wrote:

On 24/10/13 17:03, Brian Rak wrote:

We've recently undertaken a project to clean up our network, and lock
down all the open DNS resolvers. As you may know, these are very
frequently used for DDOS attacks: http://openresolverproject.org/ ,
http://www.team-cymru.org/Services/Resolvers/ .

I haven't been able to find any sort of configuration option that would
prevent DNSMasq from being abused like this, and I've had to resort to
iptables rules instead. Is there a configuration option that that would
disable responding to DNS queries from certain interfaces? The other
option that seems handy would be one to only reply to DNS queries from
hosts that have a configured DHCP lease.

Are there any features of DNSMasq that would prevent it from being
abused to conduct attacks?




This is an important topic, and quite difficult to understand, so I'm 
going to take this opportunity to try and put a definitive statement 
on the record.


First the simple stuff.

Dnsmasq has --interface --except-interface and --listen-address 
configuration options that disable response to DNS queries from 
certain interfaces. The first thing that has to be done is to use 
these. Mostly it's the only thing that needs to done.



Now, the complicated stuff.

Under certain circumstances, --interface=interface degrades to mean 
the same as --listen-address=address on interface. For instance if 
eth0 has address 192.168.0.1 and dnsmasq is configured with 
--interface=eth0, then dnsmasq will reply to any query which is sent 
to 192.168.0.1, no matter what interface it actually arrives at. The 
circumstance under which happens is when the --bind-interfaces flag is 
used.


Now, in the above example, this isn't a problem, since a botnet can't 
direct traffic to an RFC-1918 address. If, on the other hand, the 
address of an internal interface (ie one configured to accept DNS 
queries) is globally routable, then queries which arrive via another 
interface (ie one linked to the internet) with the destination address 
of the internal interface _will_ be replied to, and a DNS reflection 
attack is possible.


This has mainly been seen in libvirt and OpenStack installations which 
use dnsmasq, since sometimes they are provisioned with real 
addresses. I'd expect to see problems in the future with IPv6, since 
far more people will be using globally routable addresses with IPv6.


The reason that this happens is that --bind-interfaces uses the 
bare-minimum BSD sockets API only. Detecting which interface a packet 
arrived on, rather than the address to which it was sent, needs 
non-portable API, and is impossible on some platforms (openBSD, for 
instance) --bind-interfaces is a works everywhere least common 
denominator. It's also useful when you're running multiple instances 
of dnsmasq on one host, which is why most people use it.


The fix is to use either the default listening mode, or if running 
multiple instances, the new --bind-dynamic mode. --bind-dynamic is 
only available on Linux, and --bind-interfaces is the only mode 
available on openBSD, so BSD users have rather more problems here.


Summary. There's a problem is you want to accept queries in an 
internal interface with a globally routable address and use 
--bind-interfaces. The fix is to remove --bind-interfaces and, if 
necessary, replace it with --bind-dynamic. This fix is not applicable 
on all platforms,


The Real Soon Now 2.67 release logs a very prominent warning if the 
dangerous combination is configured.


Cheers,

Simon.


Thanks for the detailed explanation! It seems that for some of my 
servers I can resolve the issue by using --interface and --except-interface.


I do however have some DNSMasq instances that are providing public, 
globally routable IP addresses via DHCP.  In order to do this, DNSMasq 
must be listening on an interface with a public IP, so it ends up 
providing DNS on that IP as well.  I'm not sure if this is a common use 
case or not.   For this setup, would there be any other option aside 
from iptables rules?




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Re: [Dnsmasq-discuss] DNSMasq and DNS reflection attacks

2013-10-24 Thread Brian Rak


On 10/24/2013 1:00 PM, Simon Kelley wrote:

On 24/10/13 17:46, Brian Rak wrote:


On 10/24/2013 12:28 PM, Simon Kelley wrote:

On 24/10/13 17:03, Brian Rak wrote:

We've recently undertaken a project to clean up our network, and lock
down all the open DNS resolvers. As you may know, these are very
frequently used for DDOS attacks: http://openresolverproject.org/ ,
http://www.team-cymru.org/Services/Resolvers/ .

I haven't been able to find any sort of configuration option that 
would

prevent DNSMasq from being abused like this, and I've had to resort to
iptables rules instead. Is there a configuration option that that 
would

disable responding to DNS queries from certain interfaces? The other
option that seems handy would be one to only reply to DNS queries from
hosts that have a configured DHCP lease.

Are there any features of DNSMasq that would prevent it from being
abused to conduct attacks?




This is an important topic, and quite difficult to understand, so I'm
going to take this opportunity to try and put a definitive statement
on the record.

First the simple stuff.

Dnsmasq has --interface --except-interface and --listen-address
configuration options that disable response to DNS queries from
certain interfaces. The first thing that has to be done is to use
these. Mostly it's the only thing that needs to done.


Now, the complicated stuff.

Under certain circumstances, --interface=interface degrades to mean
the same as --listen-address=address on interface. For instance if
eth0 has address 192.168.0.1 and dnsmasq is configured with
--interface=eth0, then dnsmasq will reply to any query which is sent
to 192.168.0.1, no matter what interface it actually arrives at. The
circumstance under which happens is when the --bind-interfaces flag is
used.

Now, in the above example, this isn't a problem, since a botnet can't
direct traffic to an RFC-1918 address. If, on the other hand, the
address of an internal interface (ie one configured to accept DNS
queries) is globally routable, then queries which arrive via another
interface (ie one linked to the internet) with the destination address
of the internal interface _will_ be replied to, and a DNS reflection
attack is possible.

This has mainly been seen in libvirt and OpenStack installations which
use dnsmasq, since sometimes they are provisioned with real
addresses. I'd expect to see problems in the future with IPv6, since
far more people will be using globally routable addresses with IPv6.

The reason that this happens is that --bind-interfaces uses the
bare-minimum BSD sockets API only. Detecting which interface a packet
arrived on, rather than the address to which it was sent, needs
non-portable API, and is impossible on some platforms (openBSD, for
instance) --bind-interfaces is a works everywhere least common
denominator. It's also useful when you're running multiple instances
of dnsmasq on one host, which is why most people use it.

The fix is to use either the default listening mode, or if running
multiple instances, the new --bind-dynamic mode. --bind-dynamic is
only available on Linux, and --bind-interfaces is the only mode
available on openBSD, so BSD users have rather more problems here.

Summary. There's a problem is you want to accept queries in an
internal interface with a globally routable address and use
--bind-interfaces. The fix is to remove --bind-interfaces and, if
necessary, replace it with --bind-dynamic. This fix is not applicable
on all platforms,

The Real Soon Now 2.67 release logs a very prominent warning if the
dangerous combination is configured.

Cheers,

Simon.


Thanks for the detailed explanation! It seems that for some of my
servers I can resolve the issue by using --interface and
--except-interface.

I do however have some DNSMasq instances that are providing public,
globally routable IP addresses via DHCP. In order to do this, DNSMasq
must be listening on an interface with a public IP, so it ends up
providing DNS on that IP as well. I'm not sure if this is a common use
case or not. For this setup, would there be any other option aside from
iptables rules?


Yes, use --interface to enable that interface for DNS and DHCP, and 
DON'T use --bind-interfaces. As long as you're not using bind 
interfaces, DNS requests which arrive via other interfaces won't be 
answered, even if they have destination addresses for the enabled 
interface.


An example:

You have a router with two interfaces, internal and external. Internal 
is where you're doing DHCP and DNS: it's connected to an ethernet with 
a load of hosts. Internal has a globally routable address (and so, 
presumably do the hosts on the ethernet). External also has a globally 
routeable address and is connected to internet. Attack packets 
therefore arrive on external. Setting --interface=internal means that 
attack packets which arrive via external will NOT be answered, ever. 
The exception to this if they are addressed to the IP address of 
internal AND --bind

Re: [Dnsmasq-discuss] DNSMasq and DNS reflection attacks

2013-10-24 Thread Brian Rak

On 10/24/2013 4:40 PM, richardvo...@gmail.com wrote:
Sorry, I should mention only drop packets in state NEW, you don't 
want to drop replies to your own queries.



On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 3:39 PM, richardvo...@gmail.com 
mailto:richardvo...@gmail.com richardvo...@gmail.com 
mailto:richardvo...@gmail.com wrote:


Your case should be easy to stop with a firewall rule.  Just block
all packets matching the dns listen port (53 usually) in the INPUT
chain, where the source address is outside your block.

Optionally (this prevents reflection attacks against your own
network which you said is not required), configure your router to
drop packets arriving on its external interface where the source
IP is within your internal network.  This is called a reverse
route check.


On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 12:11 PM, Brian Rak b...@gameservers.com
mailto:b...@gameservers.com wrote:


On 10/24/2013 1:00 PM, Simon Kelley wrote:

On 24/10/13 17:46, Brian Rak wrote:


On 10/24/2013 12:28 PM, Simon Kelley wrote:

On 24/10/13 17:03, Brian Rak wrote:

We've recently undertaken a project to clean
up our network, and lock
down all the open DNS resolvers. As you may
know, these are very
frequently used for DDOS attacks:
http://openresolverproject.org/ ,
http://www.team-cymru.org/Services/Resolvers/ .

I haven't been able to find any sort of
configuration option that would
prevent DNSMasq from being abused like this,
and I've had to resort to
iptables rules instead. Is there a
configuration option that that would
disable responding to DNS queries from certain
interfaces? The other
option that seems handy would be one to only
reply to DNS queries from
hosts that have a configured DHCP lease.

Are there any features of DNSMasq that would
prevent it from being
abused to conduct attacks?



This is an important topic, and quite difficult to
understand, so I'm
going to take this opportunity to try and put a
definitive statement
on the record.

First the simple stuff.

Dnsmasq has --interface --except-interface and
--listen-address
configuration options that disable response to DNS
queries from
certain interfaces. The first thing that has to be
done is to use
these. Mostly it's the only thing that needs to done.


Now, the complicated stuff.

Under certain circumstances,
--interface=interface degrades to mean
the same as --listen-address=address on
interface. For instance if
eth0 has address 192.168.0.1 and dnsmasq is
configured with
--interface=eth0, then dnsmasq will reply to any
query which is sent
to 192.168.0.1, no matter what interface it
actually arrives at. The
circumstance under which happens is when the
--bind-interfaces flag is
used.

Now, in the above example, this isn't a problem,
since a botnet can't
direct traffic to an RFC-1918 address. If, on the
other hand, the
address of an internal interface (ie one
configured to accept DNS
queries) is globally routable, then queries which
arrive via another
interface (ie one linked to the internet) with the
destination address
of the internal interface _will_ be replied to,
and a DNS reflection
attack is possible.

This has mainly been seen in libvirt and OpenStack
installations which
use dnsmasq, since sometimes they are provisioned
with real
addresses. I'd expect to see problems in the
future with IPv6, since
far more people will be using globally routable
addresses with IPv6.

The reason that this happens

[Dnsmasq-discuss] Multiple subnets without IP aliases

2013-08-21 Thread Brian Rak
I have a layer 2 vlan (all hosts in the same broadcast domain), that has 
multiple subnets active on it.  For example:


interface ve 906
 ip address 10.0.5.113 255.255.255.248
 ip address 10.0.6.105 255.255.255.248


I have a machine with this configuration:

br0  inet addr:10.0.6.110  Bcast:10.0.6.111 Mask:255.255.255.248

I'd like to serve addresses from both subnets from this machine

I've found that I can do this if the machine running DNSMasq has an IP 
address in both subnets, but this is somewhat of a waste of IP 
addresses.  Is it possible to serve DHCP to both subnets without having 
an IP address on the machine in both subnets?


Before I added the IP alias, I was seeing this:

dnsmasq-dhcp[5848]: 3598047279 available DHCP subnet: 
10.0.6.104/255.255.255.248


DNSMasq wasn't even seeing the other subnet as being available.

Once I added the alias, it did work properly:

dnsmasq-dhcp[5952]: 1867860253 available DHCP subnet: 
10.0.5.112/255.255.255.248
dnsmasq-dhcp[5952]: 1867860253 available DHCP subnet: 
10.0.6.104/255.255.255.248



Renumbering the network isn't an option.

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[Dnsmasq-discuss] Pulling DHCP leases from an external script?

2012-10-03 Thread Brian Rak
I'm trying to set up a DHCP server so that on any request for a new 
lease I can execute a script and have the script return an IP address 
(and other information).


Is this something that is currently possible with dnsmasq?  From reading 
the man page, I can't tell if I will get this behaviour with 
--dhcp-script --leasefile-ro.


Basically, it would be impossible for me to specify all the possible 
DHCP leases at startup, but when a lease request is received I would be 
able to determine what IP to assign.


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Re: [Dnsmasq-discuss] Pulling DHCP leases from an external script?

2012-10-03 Thread Brian Rak
I'm trying to assign addresses via DHCP for a number of different 
networks (using ip-helper and option 82 on the switches).  It's going to 
be tough for me to come up with a predefined list of what leases belong 
to what port, but it's definitely something I should be able to figure 
out when the lease is coming in.  There's also the fact that the config 
file would end up being quite large if I pregenerate it for every 
possible combination.



On 10/3/2012 3:47 PM, Jay Imerman wrote:
I'm not 100% certain, but the way I read the man page, the script is 
triggered after the dnsmasq event occurs, so you can pass some custom 
behavior to a script after dnsmasq has managed the lease.  However, it 
sounds like you want to customize dnsmasq behavior and insert your own 
algorithm for allocating IP addresses?  Just out of curiosity, why?  
You can specify quite a complex set of allocation rules using tags and 
more, why would you need to have anything other than that?

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On Wed, Oct 3, 2012 at 3:14 PM, Brian Rak b...@gameservers.com 
mailto:b...@gameservers.com wrote:


I'm trying to set up a DHCP server so that on any request for a
new lease I can execute a script and have the script return an IP
address (and other information).

Is this something that is currently possible with dnsmasq?  From
reading the man page, I can't tell if I will get this behaviour
with --dhcp-script --leasefile-ro.

Basically, it would be impossible for me to specify all the
possible DHCP leases at startup, but when a lease request is
received I would be able to determine what IP to assign.

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