Re: new install on Centos 7
On 12/08/17 00:50, voy...@sbt.net.au wrote: > I've followed GhettoForge's Postfix page, so far so good > > but, I'm not that sure of getting dovecot22... > > do I need to do a 'yum shell --enablerepo=gf-plus', followed by install, > run, quit; like for Postfix..? Yes, I haven't done a dovecot page yet, but the instructions are essentially the same as for postfix. Peter
Re: is a self signed certificate always invalid the first time?
Am 11. August 2017 12:46:46 MESZ schrieb Ruben Safir: >On 08/10/2017 04:41 PM, Frank-Ulrich Sommer wrote: >> I can't see any security advantages of a self signed cert. I > >then you fail to understand the history, like when Microsoft's certs >were undermined because the third party authentication agency gave the >keys to 2 guys that knocked on the door and asked for them... > > > >-- >So many immigrant groups have swept through our town >that Brooklyn, like Atlantis, reaches mythological >proportions in the mind of the world - RI Safir 1998 >http://www.mrbrklyn.com > >DRM is THEFT - We are the STAKEHOLDERS - RI Safir 2002 >http://www.nylxs.com - Leadership Development in Free Software >http://www2.mrbrklyn.com/resources - Unpublished Archive >http://www.coinhangout.com - coins! >http://www.brooklyn-living.com > >Being so tracked is for FARM ANIMALS and and extermination camps, >but incompatible with living as a free human being. -RI Safir 2013 Of course I know about this risk. But the only way to reduce it is to remove all preinstalled root CAs from all devices you use. It's more important whoom your client trusts than who signed your cert. Using a self signed cert alone and still using a client with a huge list of preinstalled root CAs will be exactly as vulnerable as using a regular cert with this client. The client will accept a spoofed cert that was fraudulently obtained from one of those root CAs in both cases. If you configure your client such that it only accepts certs that you manually added you could (theoretically and from a security standpoint) still use certs signed by an external CA that you add manually without compromising security. It's only important that you don't let someone else (e.g. the CA because it's easier...) generate your key pair but that you generate it yourself and only submit a certificate signing request.
Re: new install on Centos 7
On Thu, August 10, 2017 6:35 pm, Peter wrote: > GhettoForge has dovecot22 packages as well which provide the latest > stable version of Dovecot for CentOS 6 and 7. Peter, thanks. I've followed GhettoForge's Postfix page, so far so good but, I'm not that sure of getting dovecot22... do I need to do a 'yum shell --enablerepo=gf-plus', followed by install, run, quit; like for Postfix..? or rpm -i http://mirror.ghettoforge.org/distributions/gf/el/7Server/plus/x86_64/dovecot22... ? On Fri, August 11, 2017 5:46 am, Joseph Tam wrote: > Or consider compiling it yourself from source. It may be more work, but > you get complete control over your versioning, your package dependencies, Joseph, thanks whilst I can see the benefits, I'm better stay withing my limits... (as you can see from my Q above) V
Re: is a self signed certificate always invalid the first time?
On 11.08.2017 11:36, Michael Felt wrote: > This is what Ralph means when he says "have been running a CA for > 15+ years" - not that he is (though he could!) sell certificates > commercially - rather, he is using an initial certificate to sign > later certificates with. Actually, I do sell certificates to my customers. :-) In small numbers, and only for servers to which I have administrative access. I created a root CA and two intermediate CAs (one each for client and server certs, respectively). It would be great to have my CAs added to Mozilla's NSS root certificate store, but alas, the effort to get there is massive. Where possible, I will add my CA certs to the customers' keystores. I also made my CA certs available for public download, so tech-savvy users can import the CA certs manually. > Again, technically, there is no difference in a self-signed 2048-bit RSA > key, and one signed by a "major" CA. However, in the "ease of use" there > may be major differences. In 2015 I rolled out an updated CA which I have used ever since, with 4096 bit keys for root and intermediary CA certs. I also only generate 4096 bit keys for servers these days, so my cert chain is "stronger" than those of some commercial CAs. Also, it is good to know that these certs have never been touched by anybody but myself. I even install my own CA cert chain on my iOS devices. > And, Ralph, I salute you. I have never been able to be disciplined > enough to be my own CA. I encourage you to look into the subject again. With the advent of Let's Encrypt, free certs for the masses have become a thing, but if you need more than 3 months validity, want to create certs for Intranet-devices (routers, local servers), or just want maximum control over all certs, setting up your own CA is rewarding. While you're at it, no gentleman should not be without DNSSEC, DKIM and DANE these days. ;-) -Ralph
Re: is a self signed certificate always invalid the first time?
On 08/10/2017 04:41 PM, Frank-Ulrich Sommer wrote: > add security exceptions this rings all alarm bells. no, but software vendors will have you believe that. Sorry, I don't leave my house keys with strangers -- So many immigrant groups have swept through our town that Brooklyn, like Atlantis, reaches mythological proportions in the mind of the world - RI Safir 1998 http://www.mrbrklyn.com DRM is THEFT - We are the STAKEHOLDERS - RI Safir 2002 http://www.nylxs.com - Leadership Development in Free Software http://www2.mrbrklyn.com/resources - Unpublished Archive http://www.coinhangout.com - coins! http://www.brooklyn-living.com Being so tracked is for FARM ANIMALS and and extermination camps, but incompatible with living as a free human being. -RI Safir 2013
Re: is a self signed certificate always invalid the first time?
On 08/10/2017 04:41 PM, Frank-Ulrich Sommer wrote: > I can't see any security advantages of a self signed cert. I then you fail to understand the history, like when Microsoft's certs were undermined because the third party authentication agency gave the keys to 2 guys that knocked on the door and asked for them... -- So many immigrant groups have swept through our town that Brooklyn, like Atlantis, reaches mythological proportions in the mind of the world - RI Safir 1998 http://www.mrbrklyn.com DRM is THEFT - We are the STAKEHOLDERS - RI Safir 2002 http://www.nylxs.com - Leadership Development in Free Software http://www2.mrbrklyn.com/resources - Unpublished Archive http://www.coinhangout.com - coins! http://www.brooklyn-living.com Being so tracked is for FARM ANIMALS and and extermination camps, but incompatible with living as a free human being. -RI Safir 2013
Re: is a self signed certificate always invalid the first time?
On 2017-08-11 11:36, Michael Felt wrote: I have looked at let's encrypt. Key issue for me is having to add a lot python stuff that would otherwise not be on any server. I use acme.sh for all of my LetsEncrypt certs (web & mail), it is written in pure shell script, so no python dependencies. https://github.com/Neilpang/acme.sh
Re: is a self signed certificate always invalid the first time?
I have looked at let's encrypt. Key issue for me is having to add a lot python stuff that would otherwise not be on any server. Again, All CA's like "Let's Encrypt" - and others that are accepted by the "majors", e.g., Windows, Mozilla make it much easier for the "random" user to use anything you protect with SSL (better TLS) without them having to grant "trust" manually. That "trust" is indicated because the CA that signed your certificate is recognized by a CA, that is recognized by CA, that is recognized by a CA in the "root-trust" list that the "majors" make available (e.g., the mozilla list available via the curl site (https://curl.haxx.se/docs/caextract.html)). Now - back to Ralph's comment: On 8/10/2017 1:42 PM, Ralph Seichter wrote: I have been running a CA for 15+ years, generating certificates only for servers I personally maintain. Since my business is too small to be able to afford all the steps required to have my CA trusted by Mozilla, Apple etc., this approach leaves me with the same problem self-signed certs have: How can I make third party applications like web browsers or MUAs trust the certs I created? Rather than make the mistake I did years ago by make "unique" self-signed certificates for different servers - start out with a self-signed certificate that you use as a signing certificate. This is what Ralph means when he says "have been running a CA for 15+ years" - not that he is (though he could!) sell certificates commercially - rather, he is using an initial certificate to sign later certificates with. So, his "users" only need to add the public side of his signing certificate - and any certificate he has signed meets the "chain of trust". So, if your users are "random", i.e., can come from anywhere - you may want a "major accepted/recognized" certificate authority so that you do not have to distribute your signing key. However, if your user pool is "select", or otherwise known - requiring them to use your "self-signed" CA may be a positive, rather than a negative. Again, technically, there is no difference in a self-signed 2048-bit RSA key, and one signed by a "major" CA. However, in the "ease of use" there may be major differences. And, Ralph, I salute you. I have never been able to be disciplined enough to be my own CA. :)
pre-installed CA (was: is a self signed certificate always invalid the first time?)
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Just my humble opinion: We had ran a self-signed CA several years. I would claim, that in theory this is more secure than using pre-installed third party CAs. Using a self-signed cert per server might do for small numers as well. However, when it comes to user divergence (or users coming from a wide range of knowledge and a wide range of devices come into play), roll your own is nightmare of support. As stated by others, some clients (Web browser, systems, mail clients, ...) make it hard to install own certs, Android even claims that the network (all of it from the interpretation of users) becomes insecure, once you install your own root cert. It looks like that more and more clients warns *each* time you access a server with a self-signed cert. In the end, the gain of security (identify servers) was torpedoed by support and lack of understanding *and* will, even including poeple one might think they understand the need of extra steps in favour of security. IMHO, the cert hierarchie today exclude eavesdropping by normal attackers, but is not suitable to identify servers or clients, because you (aka I) cannot trust the pre-installed trusted CAs. If your set of users and devices is small enough, you can prepare all devices or offer an installation packet (for home users with a fixed set of clients), roll your own CA is easy and I would go this way. Alas, clients *should* mark personally trusted CAs differently than vendor-trusted ones. So users can see, if they speak with the correct server or if the server just looks alike, e.g. example.com vs. exampel.com . - -- Steffen Kaiser -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEVAwUBWY1RBHz1H7kL/d9rAQJQdAf/WgD+230Fon0rlXHeTsaQ2fZnn55yA+Eb 6K8RxEJ3y1EK6kgVAlAICxU92ft8smjQZGUU4vhWv/fLnXUErSaptOnXu3Nk7io2 5LqEwv+jmcLWthqxkSY2NJw3kzaNTYLcuQ8cXAVHuzwQlJO4x0MAq1WR4kVQtQh6 cP/EinFxhWjyqQElSJ7ph3EYR/UJVTx1HVFS6bBiA+vY9s07EH64SRomOSwVC3ng ryQZrwc2+5u+9hFfOnuGnBqj76szjhqPpa2PV7fQx8cFuJpJrctVxT+zbLf2sJpF 2XDzygpEiEbQuMe1st6ugOey9N+pdRWstsouVBbUAZ3L5PckmUYYVQ== =X902 -END PGP SIGNATURE-