Re: [Election-Methods] method design challenge + new method AMP
On May 9, 2008, at 10:46 , Jobst Heitzig wrote: Dear Raphfrk you wrote: One issue with random processes is that they don't work well for a legislature. A majority would just keep asking that the vote be repeated until they win it. Saying that a re-vote cannot occur unless the situation changes would require that a definition of a change in the situation be decided. Alternatively, laws could be considered social contracts which have a duration and certain terms of termination which would have to be met by any later decisions to change the law. Also, people have a certain level of distrust for random processes. I don't think people would accept a President who was elected even though he only had a 1% chance of winning. I am not sure what the threshold is before it would be acceptable (some people would object to a 49% candidate winning instead of a 51% candidate). This is probably true. I would not recommend such a method for elections of Presidents or the like but for bodies who frequently make individual decisions on issues. Probabilistic methods are actually proportional methods (at least if they aim at giving n% probability to a candidate with n% support, or some other probabilities that the voters like more). I don't know what the other (non-proportional) methods should be called here since dictatorship of majority is not valid in this particular case. Maybe always elect the best (according to some criterion) is more accurate. Juho Yours, Jobst __ _ EINE FÜR ALLE: die kostenlose WEB.DE-Plattform für Freunde und Deine Homepage mit eigenem Namen. Jetzt starten! http://unddu.de/? [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ The all-new Yahoo! Mail goes wherever you go - free your email address from your Internet provider. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] [english 95%] Re: [english 94%] Re: method design challenge +new method AMP
On May 9, 2008, at 13:39 , Jobst Heitzig wrote: Dear Juho, you wrote: (Roughly the question is if one wants to give Stalin and other unwanted fellows a small probability to become elected or a zero probability.) I don't think this is the point. To the contrary, bringing up such examples is quite misleading, I think, because extreme options are not at all a problem of non-deterministic methods only. Yes, but as I see it the reasons are different. In a typical non- deterministic method like random ballot I think it is the intention to give all candidates with some support also some probability of becoming elected. In the deterministic methods electing some non- popular extremist is typically an unwanted feature and a result of the method somehow failing to elect the best winner. *No* election or decision method should be applied without first checking the feasibility of options with respect to certain basic requirements. This sorting out the constitutional options cannot be subject to a group decision process itself since often the unconstitutional options have broad support (Hitler is only the most extreme example for this). In other words, without such a feasibility check *before* deciding, also majoritarian methods can produce a very bad outcome (think of Rwanda...). Ok, this looks like an intermediate method where one first has one method (phase 1) that selects a set of acceptable candidates and then uses some other method (phase 2) (maybe non-deterministic) to elect the winner from that set. There is need for pure non-deterministic methods like random ballot, and pure deterministic methods, and also combinations of different methods may be useful. Also in the case where the no-good candidates are first eliminated I see the same two different philosophies on how the remaining candidates are handled. Either all remaining candidates (with some support) are given some probability or alternatively one always tries to elect the best winner. The intention was thus not to say non- deterministic methods would not work properly but that there are two philosophies that are quite different and that may be used in different elections depending on the nature of the election. Due to this difference I'm interested in finding both deterministic and non-deterministic solutions for the challenge. Juho Yours, Jobst __ _ EINE FÜR ALLE: die kostenlose WEB.DE-Plattform für Freunde und Deine Homepage mit eigenem Namen. Jetzt starten! http://unddu.de/? [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ Inbox full of spam? Get leading spam protection and 1GB storage with All New Yahoo! Mail. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] method design challenge +new method AMP
Dear Juho, you wrote: Yes, but as I see it the reasons are different. In a typical non- deterministic method like random ballot I think it is the intention to give all candidates with some support also some probability of becoming elected. Not at all! At least in those non-deterministic methods which I design the goal is to make it probable that the voters implement a strategic equilibrium in which a compromise option (instead of the favourite of a mere majority) will be elected with (near) certainty. But for such an equilibrium to exist in the first place, the method cannot be majoritarian, since then the majority would have no incentive at all to cooperate. Instead, all voters must have some power, not only those belonging to the majority, and therefore each voter is given control over an equal amount of winning probability. Still, the goal is not that they assign this amount to their favourite option but that they trade it in some controlled way, in order to elect a compromise which makes all the cooperating voters better off than without the trading! Since at the same time, voting shall be secret, the trading cannot be expected to be performed by open negotiations between the voters, but it must be facilitated by some mechanism which trades winning probabilities automatically depending on the preference information on the voters' ballots. If then in certain situations it happens that not much trading actually takes place, so that the winning probabilities remain with the voters' favourites, then this is only an indication that no sufficiently attractive compromise options existed in that situation. But whenever such an option does exist, the goal of non-deterministic methods like DFC, D2MAC, and AMP is that voters recognize that they are better off with the compromise than with the benchmark Random Ballot solution, and that they can bring about the election of the compromise by safely indicating their willingness to trade their share of the winning probability, without running the risk of being cheated by the other faction(s). D2MAC is quite good at this if only the compromise option is sufficiently attractive, but not in a situation which is as narrow as the one I gave at the beginning of this thread. AMP is better there, but it is not monotonic unfortunately. Yours, Jobst In the deterministic methods electing some non- popular extremist is typically an unwanted feature and a result of the method somehow failing to elect the best winner. *No* election or decision method should be applied without first checking the feasibility of options with respect to certain basic requirements. This sorting out the constitutional options cannot be subject to a group decision process itself since often the unconstitutional options have broad support (Hitler is only the most extreme example for this). In other words, without such a feasibility check *before* deciding, also majoritarian methods can produce a very bad outcome (think of Rwanda...). Ok, this looks like an intermediate method where one first has one method (phase 1) that selects a set of acceptable candidates and then uses some other method (phase 2) (maybe non-deterministic) to elect the winner from that set. There is need for pure non-deterministic methods like random ballot, and pure deterministic methods, and also combinations of different methods may be useful. Also in the case where the no-good candidates are first eliminated I see the same two different philosophies on how the remaining candidates are handled. Either all remaining candidates (with some support) are given some probability or alternatively one always tries to elect the best winner. The intention was thus not to say non- deterministic methods would not work properly but that there are two philosophies that are quite different and that may be used in different elections depending on the nature of the election. Due to this difference I'm interested in finding both deterministic and non-deterministic solutions for the challenge. Juho Yours, Jobst ___ ___ _ EINE FÜR ALLE: die kostenlose WEB.DE-Plattform für Freunde und Deine Homepage mit eigenem Namen. Jetzt starten! http://unddu.de/? [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ Inbox full of spam? Get leading spam protection and 1GB storage with All New Yahoo! Mail. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info pgpUbFPDuaKZJ.pgp Description: PGP signature Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] method design challenge +new method AMP
On May 9, 2008, at 20:27 , Jobst Heitzig wrote: Dear Juho, you wrote: Yes, but as I see it the reasons are different. In a typical non- deterministic method like random ballot I think it is the intention to give all candidates with some support also some probability of becoming elected. Not at all! At least in those non-deterministic methods which I design the goal is to make it probable that the voters implement a strategic equilibrium in which a compromise option (instead of the favourite of a mere majority) will be elected with (near) certainty. Ok, there are also such methods (more complex than basic random ballot). I interpreted the stronger than majoritarianism search of a compromise candidate to be an additional requirement that determines one subclass of (deterministic and nondeterministic) election methods. Juho But for such an equilibrium to exist in the first place, the method cannot be majoritarian, since then the majority would have no incentive at all to cooperate. Instead, all voters must have some power, not only those belonging to the majority, and therefore each voter is given control over an equal amount of winning probability. Still, the goal is not that they assign this amount to their favourite option but that they trade it in some controlled way, in order to elect a compromise which makes all the cooperating voters better off than without the trading! Since at the same time, voting shall be secret, the trading cannot be expected to be performed by open negotiations between the voters, but it must be facilitated by some mechanism which trades winning probabilities automatically depending on the preference information on the voters' ballots. If then in certain situations it happens that not much trading actually takes place, so that the winning probabilities remain with the voters' favourites, then this is only an indication that no sufficiently attractive compromise options existed in that situation. But whenever such an option does exist, the goal of non-deterministic methods like DFC, D2MAC, and AMP is that voters recognize that they are better off with the compromise than with the benchmark Random Ballot solution, and that they can bring about the election of the compromise by safely indicating their willingness to trade their share of the winning probability, without running the risk of being cheated by the other faction(s). D2MAC is quite good at this if only the compromise option is sufficiently attractive, but not in a situation which is as narrow as the one I gave at the beginning of this thread. AMP is better there, but it is not monotonic unfortunately. Yours, Jobst In the deterministic methods electing some non- popular extremist is typically an unwanted feature and a result of the method somehow failing to elect the best winner. *No* election or decision method should be applied without first checking the feasibility of options with respect to certain basic requirements. This sorting out the constitutional options cannot be subject to a group decision process itself since often the unconstitutional options have broad support (Hitler is only the most extreme example for this). In other words, without such a feasibility check *before* deciding, also majoritarian methods can produce a very bad outcome (think of Rwanda...). Ok, this looks like an intermediate method where one first has one method (phase 1) that selects a set of acceptable candidates and then uses some other method (phase 2) (maybe non-deterministic) to elect the winner from that set. There is need for pure non-deterministic methods like random ballot, and pure deterministic methods, and also combinations of different methods may be useful. Also in the case where the no-good candidates are first eliminated I see the same two different philosophies on how the remaining candidates are handled. Either all remaining candidates (with some support) are given some probability or alternatively one always tries to elect the best winner. The intention was thus not to say non- deterministic methods would not work properly but that there are two philosophies that are quite different and that may be used in different elections depending on the nature of the election. Due to this difference I'm interested in finding both deterministic and non-deterministic solutions for the challenge. Juho Yours, Jobst ___ ___ _ EINE FÜR ALLE: die kostenlose WEB.DE-Plattform für Freunde und Deine Homepage mit eigenem Namen. Jetzt starten! http://unddu.de/? [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ Inbox full of spam? Get leading spam protection and 1GB storage with All New Yahoo! Mail. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
