Re: [EM] In defense of the Electoral College (was Re: Making a Bad
Jonathan, You got anything to say other than gibberish? How about a real sentence or two on how exactly you want the US government to count over 100 million IRV votes for president? Kathy >> On Sat, Nov 8, 2008 at 7:26 PM, Jonathan Lundell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >> wrote: >> I.e. IRV would necessitate that the federal government be responsible for counting all the nation's ballots if IRV were used to elect the President - so we can expect all IRV/STV proponents to oppose national popular vote for president. >>> >>> You can expect it all you like, but you'd be wrong. >>> >> >> Really? So you support having the federal government count all the >> ballots for all US citizens? Exactly who and how do you imagine that >> could be done? > > Think of it as a ranked choice: IRV > NPV > EC. > > That wasn't so hard, was it? > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] New MN court affidavits etc. (correction)
On Sat, Nov 8, 2008 at 1:34 PM, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to >election-methods@lists.electorama.com > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > > http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com > > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > You can reach the person managing the list at >[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..." > > > Today's Topics: >> From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: Re: [EM] New MN court affidavits etc. (correction) > (1) Brown v. Smallwood outlawed preferential voting, period, in > Minnesota. Part of the current problem is that FairVote made a highly > suspect interpretation that tried to assert BvS as being only about > Bucklin, not about a sequential elimination method like IRV. This was > based on a comment in BvS that was practically dicta. Other parts of > BvS made it very clear that casting multiple votes in a single > election was considered unconstitutional by that court. > Abd ul, >From what I can tell, having read all of the affidavits and responses of the plaintiffs (but not being an attorney), the case against IRV is only in very small part based on BvS, and is based more on the requirements of the US and Minnesota constitutions that IRV/STV violate. It may be very likely that BvS could be overturned, yet IRV/STV still declared unconstitutional on grounds that would *not* apply to most other alternative voting methods. Kathy Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] In defense of the Electoral College (was Re: Making a Bad
On Nov 8, 2008, at 6:49 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote: On Sat, Nov 8, 2008 at 7:26 PM, Jonathan Lundell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: I.e. IRV would necessitate that the federal government be responsible for counting all the nation's ballots if IRV were used to elect the President - so we can expect all IRV/STV proponents to oppose national popular vote for president. You can expect it all you like, but you'd be wrong. Really? So you support having the federal government count all the ballots for all US citizens? Exactly who and how do you imagine that could be done? Think of it as a ranked choice: IRV > NPV > EC. That wasn't so hard, was it? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] In defense of the Electoral College (was Re: Making a Bad
On Sat, Nov 8, 2008 at 7:26 PM, Jonathan Lundell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> I.e. IRV would necessitate that the federal government be responsible >> for counting all the nation's ballots if IRV were used to elect the >> President - so we can expect all IRV/STV proponents to oppose national >> popular vote for president. > > You can expect it all you like, but you'd be wrong. > Really? So you support having the federal government count all the ballots for all US citizens? Exactly who and how do you imagine that could be done? -- Kathy Dopp The material expressed herein is the informed product of the author's fact-finding and investigative efforts. Dopp is a Mathematician, Expert in election audit mathematics and procedures; in exit poll discrepancy analysis; and can be reached at P.O. Box 680192 Park City, UT 84068 phone 435-658-4657 http://utahcountvotes.org http://electionmathematics.org http://electionarchive.org http://kathydopp.com/serendipity/ How to Audit Election Outcome Accuracy http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/VoteCountAuditBillRequest.pdf History of Confidence Election Auditing Development & Overview of Election Auditing Fundamentals http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/History-of-Election-Auditing-Development.pdf Voters Have Reason to Worry http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] In defense of the Electoral College (was Re: Making a Bad
On Nov 8, 2008, at 6:05 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote: IRV proponents must oppose the national popular vote because IRV/STV has to be centrally counted because it is not precinct or state summable. I.e. IRV would necessitate that the federal government be responsible for counting all the nation's ballots if IRV were used to elect the President - so we can expect all IRV/STV proponents to oppose national popular vote for president. You can expect it all you like, but you'd be wrong. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] (no subject)
> Date: Sat, 8 Nov 2008 04:11:45 -0800 (PST) > From: Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: [EM] New MN court affidavits etc. (correction) > > Dave, > Are you really comfortable supporting and supplying ammunition to a group of > avowed FPP supporters in their effort to have IRV declared > unconstitutional? > > Will you have any complaint when in future they are trying to do the same > thing to some Condorcet method you like and IRV supporters help them on > grounds like it fails Later-no-Harm, Later-no-Help, and probably? > mono-add-top? Chris, Your statement oversimplifies and ignores details/differences between IRV and Condorcet. IRV proponents may pretend not to know that Condorcet methods do not exhibit most of the flaws of IRV counting methods. For example, Condorcet, to my knowledge treats all voters ballots equally, considers all choices on all ballots, is precinct, county, and state summable and thus would not be an obstacle to a national popular vote for President, produces fairer results, etc. Clearly to anyone willing to think about the specifics, any argument against Condorcet or range voting methods would not be able to make use of the ample arguments available to anyone who opposes counting methods like IRV, so such fear-mongering is wholly inappropriate. Kathy Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] In defense of the Electoral College (was Re: Making a Bad
> From: Jonathan Lundell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: Re: [EM] In defense of the Electoral College (was Re: Making >a Bad Thing Worse) >> --- En date de : Ven 7.11.08, Markus Schulze > alumni.tu-berlin.de> a ?crit : >> > Second: It makes it possible that the elections >> > are run by the governments of the individual >> > states and don't have to be run by the central >> > government. >> >> I especially agree with this second point, or at least that it has >> been >> a good thing that the elections have not been conducted by a single >> authority. IRV proponents must oppose the national popular vote because IRV/STV has to be centrally counted because it is not precinct or state summable. I.e. IRV would necessitate that the federal government be responsible for counting all the nation's ballots if IRV were used to elect the President - so we can expect all IRV/STV proponents to oppose national popular vote for president. Kathy Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Some chance for consensus (was: Buying Votes)
Dear Forest, you wrote: > This reminds me of your two urn method based on approval ballots: > Initialize with all ballots in the first urn. > While any ballots are left in the first urn ... > find the approval winner X of these remaining ballots > circle candidate X on all of the ballots in the first urn that > approve candidate X, and then transfer them to the second urn. > End While > Elect the circled candidate on a randomly drawn ballot from the > second urn. Yes, it's inspired by that method which was due not to me but to someone else, I think. The important difference is, though, that in the above method there will never be full cooperation since as long as the two largest approval scores are more than 1 point apart, every voter approving but not favouring the approval winner has an incentive to remove her approval for the approval winner. In particular, the equilibria in our 55/45 situation would look like the following, with x+y=56: 55-x: A x: A+C y: B+C 45-x: B So with the above method, C would win only with probability 56%. In the new suggestion, in contrast, the voters can make sure that the "contract" to elect C only becomes effective when all voters cooperate: Knowing that everybody prefers C to the Random Ballot lottery, they can all rate C at 1. > It looks like your newest method is a variation where "Approval" is > interpreted as "positive rating," "partial approval" I would call it. The rating can be interpreted not as a utility value but as a "limit on non-cooperation". Or, the other way around, the value 100 minus the rating can be interpreted as a "cooperation threshold". I got the idea for this when reading the Wikipedia article on the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact which has a very similar provision making sure that signing the contract is "safe" even when it is not known in advance who exactly the other participants will be! > and X is circled only on those > ballots that rate X sufficiently high* relative to the number of ( > remaining) ballots that do not approve X. ...That do not approve X *at least as strongly*. This is important! Otherwise there would alway be an incentive to use only the values 100 (for the favourite only), 1, and 0: Rating an option 1 would then lead to other voters who have a higher rating transfer their probability, without me transferring it, too. Therefore the requirement is that a voter with rating R only transfers her probability if more than 100-R percent of all voters do so, too! This gives me a possibility to specify a "safe" rating without exactly knowing who will be the other cooperating voters. > If 99% of the (remaining) ballots do not approve X, then X is circled > only on those ballots that rate X above 99%. If less than 1% of the ( > remaining) ballots do not approve X, then even a ballot that rates X > at a mere 1% would get a circle around X. Right! > The exact relation between the required rating relative to the lack > of approval (on the remaining ballots) can be played with to get > variations of this method. True, but I guess as long as you use a monotonic transformation for this, the result will be equivalent. Except that the order in which the options are processed would vary. It is charming to be able to simply explain it this way: "If you rate C at R, your vote will not be transferred to C whenever R or more voters rate C less than R". > In this method there is no need to rate any candidate that the voter > cannot conceive of as a compromise. Therefore it seems quite natural > to consider positive rating as some level of approval. Right. With this interpretation, options are considered in order of decreasing "partial approval score". It is important not to use the rating sum instead since then there would be a conflict between the necessity of using a small score to be safe and using a larger score to make sure the compromise is considered before the polar favourite options! > *Some provision must be made for ties and for the case where no > ballot rates the current X high enough to get transfered into the > second urn. When no ballot rates X high enough, then R must be considered to be infinity, hence no ballots get transferred and the next option is considered. As for ties, I usually think of them late. However: Ties are only relevant for the order in which the options get processes here. The natural tiebreaker would be this: If two options have the minimum number of zero ratings, consider the number of 1-ratings next, then (if still equal) the number of 2-ratings and so on. What do you think of the following name for this method: EC6 (Equal Chances Choice with Controlled Cooperation for Consensus or Compromise) Is this silly or smart? Yours, Jobst > Does that capture the idea? > > Forest > > > - Original Message - > From: Jobst Heitzig > Date: Thursday, November 6, 2008 3:37 pm > Subject: Re: [EM] Some chance for
Re: [EM] Some chance for consensus (was: Buying Votes)
Jobst, This reminds me of your two urn method based on approval ballots: Initialize with all ballots in the first urn. While any ballots are left in the first urn ... find the approval winner X of these remaining ballots circle candidate X on all of the ballots in the first urn that approve candidate X, and then transfer them to the second urn. End While Elect the circled candidate on a randomly drawn ballot from the second urn. It looks like your newest method is a variation where "Approval" is interpreted as "positive rating," and X is circled only on those ballots that rate X sufficiently high* relative to the number of (remaining) ballots that do not approve X. If 99% of the (remaining) ballots do not approve X, then X is circled only on those ballots that rate X above 99%. If less than 1% of the (remaining) ballots do not approve X, then even a ballot that rates X at a mere 1% would get a circle around X. The exact relation between the required rating relative to the lack of approval (on the remaining ballots) can be played with to get variations of this method. In this method there is no need to rate any candidate that the voter cannot conceive of as a compromise. Therefore it seems quite natural to consider positive rating as some level of approval. *Some provision must be made for ties and for the case where no ballot rates the current X high enough to get transfered into the second urn. Does that capture the idea? Forest - Original Message - From: Jobst Heitzig Date: Thursday, November 6, 2008 3:37 pm Subject: Re: [EM] Some chance for consensus (was: Buying Votes) To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED], election-methods@lists.electorama.com, Raph Frank , Kristofer Munsterhjelm > Hi again, > > here's another, somewhat more stable method which also achieves > the > following: > > > ... > > provides for strategic equilibria in which C is elected with > 100%, 55%, > > and 100% probability, respectively, in the following situations: > > > > Situation 1: > > 55% A(100)>C(70)>B(0) > > 45% B(100)>C(70)>A(0) > > > > Situation 2: > > 30% A(100)>C(70)>B,D(0) > > 25% B(100)>C(70)>A,D(0) > > 45% D(100)>A,B,C(0) > > > > Situation 3: > > 32% A(100)>C(40)>B,D(0) > > 33% B(100)>C(40)>A,D(0) > > 35% D(100)>C(40)>A,B(0) > > > > (All these being sincere utilities) > > ... > > > The idea is that for each possible compromise option C, a voter > indicates, by a rating on her ballot, how many voters she > requires to > transfer their winning probability to C before she will do so, too. > > > This is the method: > > 1. Each of the N voters rates on her ballot each option between > 0 and 100. > > 2. For each option X, put > s(X) = no. of ballots rating X at zero. > > 3. Put all ballots into a first urn labelled U1, and have > another urn > labelled U2, initially empty. > > 4. For each option X, in order of ascending s(X), do the following: > > 4.1 Find the smallest number R for which f(R) >= 100, where > f(R) = R + 100 * (no. of ballots in U1 rating X above R) / N. > > 4.2 For each ballot in U1 rating X above R: Mark X on that > ballot and > move the ballot from U1 to U2. > > 5. On each of the ballots that remained in U1, mark the option > with the > highest rating on that ballot and also put the ballot into U2. > > 6. Draw one ballot at random. The option marked on that ballot wins. > > > (By "above", we mean strictly above and not equal, of course.) > > If there is only one compromise option C besides some polar > favourite > options A,B,... , the method essentially simplifies to this: > - Find the smallest R such that at least 100-R percent of the > ballots > rate C above R. > - Then draw a ballot at random. If it rates C above R, C wins, > otherwise > the option with the largest rating of that ballot wins. > > > Let's look at the three example situations: > > Situation 1 (sincere utilities): > 55: A(100)>C(70)>B(0) > 45: B(100)>C(70)>A(0) > > Take any pair of numbers x,y such that > > 0 <= x <= 55, > 0 <= y <= 45, > x + y > 55, > x > 3y/7, and > y > 3x/7. > > It is easy to check from the above true ratings that then all > voters > would gain if x of the A-voters and y of the B-voters > transferred their > winning probability to C. The voters can make sure this happens > in the > suggested method by voting this way: > > 55-x: A(100)>C(0)=B(0) > x: A(100)>C(101-x-y)>B(0) > y: B(100)>C(101-x-y)>A(0) > 45-y: B(100)>C(0)=A(0) > > The method would begin with C (receiving the smallest numbers of > 0-rates), find R=100-x-y, and mark C on all the x+y ballots, > resulting > in these winning probabilities: A:55-x, B:45-y, C:x+y. > > No voter has an incentive to reduce her C-rating since that > would > immediately move R to 100 and C's winning probability to 0. > > So, for each such pair (x,y), the above way of voting is a > strategic > equilibrium, the socially best of whose is the one where x=55 > and y=45, >
Re: [EM] In defense of the Electoral College (was Re: Making a Bad Thing Worse)
On Sat, Nov 8, 2008 at 7:12 PM, Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > On Sat, 08 Nov 2008 18:45:38 +0100 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: >> If the small states resist, the large and middle sized states will attain a >> majority, and thus through the compact/agreement overrule the others. At >> that point, it'll be in the interest of the small states to join since their >> share of power by staying outside the system is effectively zero. > > If you wander outside the law you can end up in court - a path available to > the small states if the large states do that - or whoever felt hurt by the > NPV agreement. Is that illegal/unconstitutional? That is open to dispute. States are allowed to decide how to assign their Electors, States representing 51% of the EC votes could make the decision based on what happens outside their State. As a more extreme example, what if States formed a compact and the compact said that they will not accept more members if the EC votes of the compact exceed 50%. This would create an incentive to join and would mean that the compact States would hold all the power. It is reasonable that the SC would rule that this is stripping the non-compact members of their right to vote. They might even rule that State EC vote assignments must be purely based on the views of the voters in that State. However, someone with more SC knowledge could probably comment better. Also, a compact requires Congress' consent (or at least Congress can block compacts). It is likely that Congress wouldn't agree if the terms of the compact were grossly unfair. However, States could create a de facto compact by just establishing a process and making it hard for the State to withdraw. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] New MN court affidavits etc. (correction)
At 07:11 AM 11/8/2008, Chris Benham wrote: Are you really comfortable supporting and supplying ammunition to a group of avowed FPP supporters in their effort to have IRV declared unconstitutional? So many aspects, so little time (1) Brown v. Smallwood outlawed preferential voting, period, in Minnesota. Part of the current problem is that FairVote made a highly suspect interpretation that tried to assert BvS as being only about Bucklin, not about a sequential elimination method like IRV. This was based on a comment in BvS that was practically dicta. Other parts of BvS made it very clear that casting multiple votes in a single election was considered unconstitutional by that court. (2) Brown v. Smallwood was quite a questionable decision, neither following the precedents of other courts, nor, in turn, followed by other courts. So its application remained in Minnesota. (3) As soon as the suit was filed in Minnesota, I recommended to activists favoring other methods that resources be put together to file friend-of-the-court briefs arguing (1) that BvS applied to all forms of preferential voting and, specifically, (2) it did not specially apply to methods that fail LnH, and, in particular, applied to both IRV and to Bucklin. And that (3) the decision itself should be totally overturned. (4) The danger was that BvS would be confirmed based on LnH failure of Bucklin, legitimizing *only* sequential elimination methods. Thus Minnesota would get IRV, which, it turns out, is a very questionable and, at best, shallow reform; but better and simpler reforms would remain impossible. (5) One exception: what might be the most sweeping reform of them all is available with IRV as a base: Asset Voting. It was actually invented by Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) as a tweak on STV. All that one has to do is to assign any exhausted votes to the first preference candidate on the exhausted ballot. However, this does not satisfy LNH, technically, even though it clearly gives the voter maximum power to influence the outcome. (The vote only transfers to the "elector" if the vote would otherwise be wasted. Since it would go to the first preference candidate, it cannot harm that candidate. However, it fails LnH with respect to lower preference candidates, under what would probably be rare contingencies.) Politically, I'd prefer to see IRV outlawed based on a pure confirmation of BvS, than to see the partial overturn based on a specification of BvS as applying only to LNH failing methods. But better than both these outcomes would be a simple overturn of BvS as an abberant decision. And, yes, that would allow Minneapolis to proceed. I've become *very strongly* opposed to IRV, but one of the ways that the general public is going to come to this position is to have examples in front of them. IRV actually behaves badly, compared to top-two runoff, in terms of the opportunities afforded to independent and third-party candidates, who have *much* more chance of being elected under top-two runoff than they do under IRV. IRV will elect an "independent or third party candidate" when this candidate was a frontrunner, and would have won under FPTP (Plurality). Circumstances where other than this happens are limited to spoiler-effect scenarios, where there is a strong third party candidate, and what I might call distorted vote transfers. It turns out that vote transfers generally reflect the opinions of a subpopulation that, much more than theorists have expected, reflect the general opinion. That is, if, say, 60% of all voters prefer A over B and C, and C is eliminated, the C voters will generally favor A over B by roughly the same ratio, i.e. 60% of the transfers will go to A. Yes. This means that the plurality winner of the first round will go on, after transfers, to win the election. From the experience so far in the U.S., it *always* happens. But nearly all these elections, so far, have been nonpartisan elections. In partisan elections, it may shift. Or may not, we don't know. Historically, in Ann Arber, there was a reversal of the first round result, due to the strength of the Human Rights Party and thus vote transfers to the Democratic candidate. We might note that HRP strength was ultimately demolished after the victory but I'm not sure what that means (The HRP became, eventually, the Minnesota Green Party.) With top-two runoff, something quite different happens. About one-third of the time, the runner-up in the first round goes on to win the election. Why? Well, it really should be studied. There are two possible explanations that come to my mind. (1) A dark horse candidate that wasn't considered a possible winner managed to make it to second place; then, once this candidate was taken seriously and examined by the public, a decision regarding true preference was made. (2) Voter preferences didn't change, but voter turnout did. This, by the way,
Re: [EM] In defense of the Electoral College (was Re: Making a Bad Thing Worse)
On Sat, 08 Nov 2008 18:45:38 +0100 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Dave Ketchum wrote: On Fri, 07 Nov 2008 09:58:30 +0100 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: I think an NPV-style gradual change would have a greater chance of succeeding than would a constitutional amendment. The constitutional amendment requires a supermajority, and would thus be blocked by the very same small states that benefit from the current Electoral College. An NPV style change MIGHT have a greater chance than an amendment but: It would be incomplete. Small states could resist for the same reason. If the small states resist, the large and middle sized states will attain a majority, and thus through the compact/agreement overrule the others. At that point, it'll be in the interest of the small states to join since their share of power by staying outside the system is effectively zero. If you wander outside the law you can end up in court - a path available to the small states if the large states do that - or whoever felt hurt by the NPV agreement. Note that small states could retain their advantage with an amendment -- as I proposed. What might all states compromise on? That would depend on the nature of the agreement. Either it would be straight NPV (all states weighted by population) or it would be according to current (EC) weighting. For an amendment, it's possible that small states would oppose the amendment if it's population-normalized, whereas large states would oppose it if it was electoral-college-normalized. Which means, as in many disagreements, a compromise would make sense. As for the system of such a compact, we've discussed that earlier. I think the idea of basing it on a Condorcet matrix would be a good one. That is, states produce their own Condorcet matrices, and then these are weighted and added together to produce a national Condorcet matrix, which is run through an agreed-upon Condorcet method. How do we tolerate either weight or not weight without formal agreement (amendment)? I imagine a clause like: "The maximum power of a state shall be its population, as a fraction of the population of all states within the compact. Call this power p. The state shall be free to pick an x so that the weighting for this state is p * x, 0 <= x <= 1". That's for the closest thing to NPV. For a continuous electoral college, the first sentence would be "The maximum power of a state shall be the sum of its number of representatives and senators, divided by the sum of the number of representatives and senators for all states within the compact". There's no reason to have x < 1 but for future agreements to mutually diminish power (to turn an EC compact into a population-normalized one or vice versa). I'll add that this phrasing would give states the same power no matter the relative turnout. If that's not desired, it could be rephrased differently, but giving states the same power is closer to the current state of things. The continuous electoral college variant does not take into account the 23rd Amendment, either. Ugh. If all states use Plurality, well, the results are as in Plurality. If some use Condorcet, those have an advantage, and if some want to use cardinal weighted pairwise, they can do so. Yet it's technically possible to use any method that produces a social ordering (by submitting, if there are n voters and the social ordering is A>B>C, the Condorcet matrix corresponding to "n: A>B>C"). While imperfect, and possibly worse than Plurality-to-Condorcet or simple Condorcet matrix addition, the option would be there, and would be better than nothing. Actually each state does only the first step of Condorcet - the NxN array: If a state does Condorcet, that is exact. If a state does Plurality, conversion as if voters did bullet voting in Condorcet is exact. If a state does something else, it has to be their responsibility to produce the NxN array. Yes. What I'm saying is that it's theoretically possible to incorporate any voting method into this; however, the results might be suboptimal if you try to aggregate, say, IRV results this way, since you'd get both the disadvantages of IRV and Condorcet (nonmonotonicity for the former and LNH* failure for the latter, for instance). IRV is a distraction since such ballots could and should be counted as Condorcet. Should be a method that at least tries for a result based on comparative strength of candidates. States have differing collections of candidates: In theory, could demand there be a single national list. More practical to permit present nomination process, in case states desire such. Thus states should be required to prepare their NxN arrays in a manner that permits exact merging with other NxN arrays, without having to know what candidates may be in the other arrays. The easiest way to do this is probably to have the candidates sorted (by nam
Re: [EM] In defense of the Electoral College (was Re: Making a Bad Thing Worse)
Hi Chris and Jonathan, >Kevin, >Why does having elections for national office run by a "central authority" >like a federal electoral commission necessarily mean that the "federal >government" (presumably you refer here to partisan office-holders with >a stake in the election outcome) would have the power to "cancel or >postpone or manipulate" the presidential election? It doesn't. It's possible to imagine an electoral commission with enough independence and security to conduct an election that can't be tampered with by the government in power at the time. >Can you please support your point by comparing the US with other >First World countries, perhaps just focussing on the last few decades? I don't see why I would focus on First World countries in the last few decades. America goes back further than that, and the point is theoretical. Jonathan wrote: >>It's possible to imagine a different American history, if the federal >>government had been in a position to cancel or postpone or manipulate >>the presidential election. > >Presumably, under that scenario, 50 states could do that to state >elections. Not necessarily, since there would be some threat of intervention by the federal government, if democracy were to fail too obviously in a state. Sometimes people do claim irregularities with a vote within a certain state. Kevin Venzke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] In defense of the Electoral College (was Re: Making a Bad Thing Worse)
Dave Ketchum wrote: On Fri, 07 Nov 2008 09:58:30 +0100 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: I think an NPV-style gradual change would have a greater chance of succeeding than would a constitutional amendment. The constitutional amendment requires a supermajority, and would thus be blocked by the very same small states that benefit from the current Electoral College. An NPV style change MIGHT have a greater chance than an amendment but: It would be incomplete. Small states could resist for the same reason. If the small states resist, the large and middle sized states will attain a majority, and thus through the compact/agreement overrule the others. At that point, it'll be in the interest of the small states to join since their share of power by staying outside the system is effectively zero. Note that small states could retain their advantage with an amendment -- as I proposed. What might all states compromise on? That would depend on the nature of the agreement. Either it would be straight NPV (all states weighted by population) or it would be according to current (EC) weighting. For an amendment, it's possible that small states would oppose the amendment if it's population-normalized, whereas large states would oppose it if it was electoral-college-normalized. As for the system of such a compact, we've discussed that earlier. I think the idea of basing it on a Condorcet matrix would be a good one. That is, states produce their own Condorcet matrices, and then these are weighted and added together to produce a national Condorcet matrix, which is run through an agreed-upon Condorcet method. How do we tolerate either weight or not weight without formal agreement (amendment)? I imagine a clause like: "The maximum power of a state shall be its population, as a fraction of the population of all states within the compact. Call this power p. The state shall be free to pick an x so that the weighting for this state is p * x, 0 <= x <= 1". That's for the closest thing to NPV. For a continuous electoral college, the first sentence would be "The maximum power of a state shall be the sum of its number of representatives and senators, divided by the sum of the number of representatives and senators for all states within the compact". There's no reason to have x < 1 but for future agreements to mutually diminish power (to turn an EC compact into a population-normalized one or vice versa). I'll add that this phrasing would give states the same power no matter the relative turnout. If that's not desired, it could be rephrased differently, but giving states the same power is closer to the current state of things. The continuous electoral college variant does not take into account the 23rd Amendment, either. If all states use Plurality, well, the results are as in Plurality. If some use Condorcet, those have an advantage, and if some want to use cardinal weighted pairwise, they can do so. Yet it's technically possible to use any method that produces a social ordering (by submitting, if there are n voters and the social ordering is A>B>C, the Condorcet matrix corresponding to "n: A>B>C"). While imperfect, and possibly worse than Plurality-to-Condorcet or simple Condorcet matrix addition, the option would be there, and would be better than nothing. Actually each state does only the first step of Condorcet - the NxN array: If a state does Condorcet, that is exact. If a state does Plurality, conversion as if voters did bullet voting in Condorcet is exact. If a state does something else, it has to be their responsibility to produce the NxN array. Yes. What I'm saying is that it's theoretically possible to incorporate any voting method into this; however, the results might be suboptimal if you try to aggregate, say, IRV results this way, since you'd get both the disadvantages of IRV and Condorcet (nonmonotonicity for the former and LNH* failure for the latter, for instance). States have differing collections of candidates: In theory, could demand there be a single national list. More practical to permit present nomination process, in case states desire such. Thus states should be required to prepare their NxN arrays in a manner that permits exact merging with other NxN arrays, without having to know what candidates may be in the other arrays. The easiest way to do this is probably to have the candidates sorted (by name or some other property, doesn't really matter). When two matrices with different entries are joined, expand the result matrix as appropriate. Since the candidate indices are sorted, there'll be no ambiguity when joining (unless two candidates have the same names, but that's unlikely). Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] New MN court affidavits by those defending non-Monotonic voting methods & IRV/STV
Trivia: B gets at least 9 votes with Plurality, more if voters recognize the method and adjust their voting. Agreed that Plurality and Two-round runoffs should lose against any good system - as should IRV. If the court cannot do better, perhaps they should throw the case out for weakness in arguments - I see either side winning producing nothing but trouble. DWK On Sat, 8 Nov 2008 10:02:15 -0500 Terry Bouricius wrote: But Dave Ketchum's example is about how IRV can fail to elect a Condorcet winner. This candidate gets zero votes under plurality rules and is immediately eliminated under two-round runoff rules as well. Plurality and Two-round runoffs are the two systems the plaintiffs are seeking to preserve, while "constitutionally" prohibiting Condorcet (as well as IRV). Terry Bouricius - Original Message - From: "Dave Ketchum" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Sent: Friday, November 07, 2008 10:09 PM Subject: Re: [EM] New MN court affidavits by those defending non-Monotonic voting methods & IRV/STV Perhaps this could get some useful muscle by adding such as: 9 B>A Now we have 34 voting B>A. Enough that they can expect to win and may have as strong a preference between these two as might happen anywhere. C and D represent issues many feel strongly about - and can want to assert to encourage action by B, the expected winner. If ONE voter had voted B>A rather than D>B>A, IRV would have declared B the winner. Note that Condorcet would have declared B the winner any time the B>A count exceeded the A>B count (unless C or D got many more votes). DWK On Fri, 7 Nov 2008 14:05:03 -0700 Kathy Dopp wrote: Dave, I agree with you -that is important too, but the attorneys and judge(s) have their own criteria for judging importance as compared to existing laws. Your example IMO does show unequal treatment of voters, so perhaps I'll include it as one of many ways to show how IRV unequally treats voters and see if the attorneys use it or not. Thanks. Kathy On Fri, Nov 7, 2008 at 1:35 PM, Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Topic below is monotonicity, which seems discardable as a side issue. Of more importance is IRV's NOT CARING whether more voters indicate preferring A>B or B>A - can even declare A the winner when a majority of voters prefer B of this pair. Example: 20 A>B 15 C>B>A 10 D>B>A Here a majority prefer B>A, but C and D have a special attraction for some some minorities. DWK On Thu, 6 Nov 2008 11:23:39 -0700 Kathy Dopp wrote: FYI, Defendants in the MN Case (who are promoting IRV and STV methods) have just released new affidavits to the court that discuss Arrow's theorem as supporting the case for IRV/STV and dismissing the importance of IRV's nonmonotonicity. I posted three of these most recent affidavits of the defendants of Instant Runoff Voting and STV here: http://electionmathematics.org/em-IRV/DefendantsDocs/ The first two docs listed are by Fair Vote's new expert witness. The third doc is by the Minneapolis, MN City attorney. The defendants characterize Arrow's theorem as proving that "there exists no unequivocally satisfactory, or normatively appealing, voting rule." and claim the "possibility of nonmonotonic results plagues ALL potential democratic voting systems with 3 or more candidates unless a dictatorial voting rule is adopted." I would appreciate it if any of you have time to read some of the above three docs, particularly the third document by the attorney, and give me your responses. FYI, the plaintiff's characterizes Arrow's theorem on p. 3 of this doc: http://electionmathematics.org/em-IRV/DefendantsDocs/11SuplementaryReplyMemoinSupportofMotionforSummaryJudgment.pdf Thank you. Kathy -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] New MN court affidavits by those defending non-Monotonic voting methods & IRV/STV
I have been against IRV's way of 'counting' ballots since the first time I heard of such, long before IRV or EM were born. So, if the ammunition I supplied has an effect I will be delighted, and have nothing against others' similar efforts. DWK On Fri, 7 Nov 2008 21:40:41 -0800 (PST) Chris Benham wrote: Dave, Are you really comfortable supporting and supplying ammunition to a group of avowed FPP supporters in their effort to have IRV declared unconstitutional? Will have any complaint when in future they are trying to do the same thing to some Condorcet method you like and IRV supporters help them on grounds like it fails Later-no-Harm, Later-no-Help, and probably mono-add-top? Chris Benham Dave Ketchum wrote (Fri.Nov.7): Perhaps this could get some useful muscle by adding such as: 9 B>A Now we have 34 voting B>A. Enough that they can expect to win and may have as strong a preference between these two as might happen anywhere. C and D represent issues many feel strongly about - and can want to assert to encourage action by B, the expected winner. If ONE voter had voted B>A rather than D>B>A, IRV would have declared B the winner. Note that Condorcet would have declared B the winner any time the B>A count exceeded the A>B count (unless C or D got many more votes). DWK On Fri, 7 Nov 2008 14:05:03 -0700 Kathy Dopp wrote: > Dave, > > I agree with you -that is important too, but the attorneys and > judge(s) have their own criteria for judging importance as compared to > existing laws. > > Your example IMO does show unequal treatment of voters, so perhaps > I'll include it as one of many ways to show how IRV unequally treats > voters and see if the attorneys use it or not. > > Thanks. > > Kathy -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] New MN court affidavits by those defending non-Monotonic voting methods & IRV/STV
But Dave Ketchum's example is about how IRV can fail to elect a Condorcet winner. This candidate gets zero votes under plurality rules and is immediately eliminated under two-round runoff rules as well. Plurality and Two-round runoffs are the two systems the plaintiffs are seeking to preserve, while "constitutionally" prohibiting Condorcet (as well as IRV). Terry Bouricius - Original Message - From: "Dave Ketchum" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Sent: Friday, November 07, 2008 10:09 PM Subject: Re: [EM] New MN court affidavits by those defending non-Monotonic voting methods & IRV/STV Perhaps this could get some useful muscle by adding such as: 9 B>A Now we have 34 voting B>A. Enough that they can expect to win and may have as strong a preference between these two as might happen anywhere. C and D represent issues many feel strongly about - and can want to assert to encourage action by B, the expected winner. If ONE voter had voted B>A rather than D>B>A, IRV would have declared B the winner. Note that Condorcet would have declared B the winner any time the B>A count exceeded the A>B count (unless C or D got many more votes). DWK On Fri, 7 Nov 2008 14:05:03 -0700 Kathy Dopp wrote: > Dave, > > I agree with you -that is important too, but the attorneys and > judge(s) have their own criteria for judging importance as compared to > existing laws. > > Your example IMO does show unequal treatment of voters, so perhaps > I'll include it as one of many ways to show how IRV unequally treats > voters and see if the attorneys use it or not. > > Thanks. > > Kathy > > On Fri, Nov 7, 2008 at 1:35 PM, Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > wrote: > >>Topic below is monotonicity, which seems discardable as a side issue. >> >>Of more importance is IRV's NOT CARING whether more voters indicate >>preferring A>B or B>A - can even declare A the winner when a majority of >>voters prefer B of this pair. >> >>Example: >>20 A>B >>15 C>B>A >>10 D>B>A >> >>Here a majority prefer B>A, but C and D have a special attraction for >>some >>some minorities. >> >>DWK >> >>On Thu, 6 Nov 2008 11:23:39 -0700 Kathy Dopp wrote: >> >>>FYI, >>> >>>Defendants in the MN Case (who are promoting IRV and STV methods) have >>>just released new affidavits to the court that discuss Arrow's theorem >>>as supporting the case for IRV/STV and dismissing the importance of >>>IRV's nonmonotonicity. >>> >>>I posted three of these most recent affidavits of the defendants of >>>Instant Runoff Voting and STV here: >>> >>>http://electionmathematics.org/em-IRV/DefendantsDocs/ >>> >>>The first two docs listed are by Fair Vote's new expert witness. >>> >>>The third doc is by the Minneapolis, MN City attorney. >>> >>>The defendants characterize Arrow's theorem as proving that "there >>>exists no unequivocally satisfactory, or normatively appealing, voting >>>rule." and claim the "possibility of nonmonotonic results plagues ALL >>>potential democratic voting systems with 3 or more candidates unless a >>>dictatorial voting rule is adopted." >>> >>>I would appreciate it if any of you have time to read some of the >>>above three docs, particularly the third document by the attorney, and >>>give me your responses. >>> >>>FYI, the plaintiff's characterizes Arrow's theorem on p. 3 of this doc: >>> >>> >>>http://electionmathematics.org/em-IRV/DefendantsDocs/11SuplementaryReplyMemoinSupportofMotionforSummaryJudgment.pdf >>> >>>Thank you. >>> >>>Kathy -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] New MN court affidavits etc. (correction)
Below is my recent (Fri.7 Nov.) post with a missing "you" inserted. Dave, Are you really comfortable supporting and supplying ammunition to a group of avowed FPP supporters in their effort to have IRV declared unconstitutional? Will you have any complaint when in future they are trying to do the same thing to some Condorcet method you like and IRV supporters help them on grounds like it fails Later-no-Harm, Later-no-Help, and probably mono-add-top? Chris Benham Find your perfect match today at the new Yahoo!7 Dating. Get Started http://au.dating.yahoo.com/?cid=53151&pid=1012 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
