Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
--- On Wed, 21/1/09, Juho Laatu wrote: > > c) open ballot > > What was the reason why you consider > open vote to be a requirement? (or a > "counter-feature") I need to clarify my own question. In the top layers open votes are the default way of doing things. So the question is why should also the votes at the very bottom level be open. Already at the next level above the bottom level there is an interest to know how one's own or potential future proxy voted, but at the bottom level there is no such reason. (Also making the votes of a proxy that has not volunteered for the job public is problematic (maybe doesn't even know herself that she is a proxy).) Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
--- On Wed, 21/1/09, Michael Allan wrote: > Juho Laatu wrote: > > > I don't see any big conflict. They are > > free to speak even if the society does > > not provide them with tools to prove > > to others how they voted. (And they > > can still tell others how they voted.) > > The problem was to design a democracy in which people: > > * are free to engage with political issues; > > * know this, and are continually reminded of it; > > * yet fail to do so. > > The design solution was: > > a) a single vote, every 4 years or so > > b) mass voting for a few pre-selected candidates Could be also numerous. > > c) secret ballot > > d) no voting on laws, only on the law makers Yes, there are not many direct democracies. (One justification is that this work requires expertise. I don't fully buy this though. Proxies and modern means of communication also help.) > > Now the problem is to design a substansive democracy, in > which > political engagement is a fact. Probably you can not force it, but you can make participation easier and nicer. > Oddly, the preceding > design need not > be altered. It remains essential. All we need is to add a > separate, > primary voting system, I didn't yet quite understand what parts of the old system are kept and what will be replaced with the new system. > with these counter-features: > > a) continuous results, with shifting votes Maybe mostly positive, but also something negative. > > b) peer-to-peer voting, with no pre-selected candidates You may need also some approval from the citizens to become candidates. (Or alternatively you could allow them to indicate if they will not accept the role of a proxy.) > > c) open ballot What was the reason why you consider open vote to be a requirement? (or a "counter-feature") > > d) voting on laws, too I read this as allowing individual voters to vote directly too, without any proxies between them and the decisions (on laws and on anything). Quite OK but I have some concerns on what will happen in the tax raise questions. It is possible that the society would spend more than save. One could set some limits on the number of levels. One could e.g. allow only proxies with n votes to vote in certain questions. Use of hysteresis could help making the role of proxies of different levels clear (last minute decisions or alternative direct and proxy votes would be more complex). The proxy systems may allow (also for other reasons) different proxies or direct voting to be used for different questions. Juho > > -- > Michael Allan > > Toronto, 647-436-4521 > http://zelea.com/ > > > Election-Methods mailing list - see > http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
--- On Wed, 21/1/09, Michael Allan wrote: > Juho Laatu wrote: > > > I see two valid ways to form opinions. > > - opinion formation based on mass media > > - opinion formation based on mutual discussion > > > > Individuals may use one or both > > approaches when forming their private > > opinion, and also when forming their > > public opinion (public ballot or > > other public expression of their > > opinion). > > That's true, both are valid. But mutual discussion is > in short > supply. The vacuum is filled by mass media, giving them > too much > leverage as instruments of manipulation. So we need to > facilitate > mutual discussion. Yes, it is good to facilitate mutual discussion better. My aim with this discussion is to study if one can combine that with the good old privacy / secret vote principles. > > > I don't see any big conflict. They are > > free to speak even if the society does > > not provide them with tools to prove > > to others how they voted. (And they > > can still tell others how they voted.) > > But can private voting fit in the public sphere? There are > at least > two practical problems: > >i) Given the protections of free speech, there is no way > to > generally enforce a secret ballot. So a competing > system that > allows for public voting cannot be excluded. Mutatis > mutandis, > that system will win the competition, because at > least some > people will prefer to cast their votes openly. The > most likely > outcome is that individual voters will have a choice > - secret or > open ballot. I see three alternative approaches (for each individual voter) here. 1) The vote is forced secret. The voter can tell how she voted (=freedom of speech). But she can not prove to the coercer or buyer how she voted. 2) The voter can choose if her vote is public or secret. She can also tell what her secret vote was. 3) The vote is public. What I mean is that also enforced secrecy and free speech can be combined. > > ii) Harder to verify the results. Verification based on > full > disclosure of all voter data is easier and more > transparent. Yes, secrecy makes verification more demanding. > > And one theoretical problem: > > iii) The asymettry between private voting and public > discussion is > ugly (seems to me), and may lead to unforseen > problems. We > could switch to private discussions, but that sits > poorly with > the aim of public consensus. I think current systems rely on private voting and public discussion (although different than the proxy based discussion). It may be possible to enrich this with better mutual discussion / delegable voting rights without sacrificing secret votes / privacy. I don't see the need of a representative / proxy to know who her voters exactly are to be crucial. In some aspect it is better that she doesn't know (no vote buying, services to those that voted, no hard feelings against those that this time voted someone else etc.). The (secret) voters on the other hand will get more power when they can let several representatives / proxies understand that they got or may get the vote :-). > > Leaving aside secret/open ballots, the other design > features in > support of mutual discussion are: > > a) Peer-to-peer voting as a stuctural support for large > scale > discussion - keeping it de-centred, so it doesn't > collapse to > inaccessible, mass communication. Yes. Having a rich hierarchical discussion structure is one key benefit of the proxy structure. (Also secret voters may participate. Some of the proxies are low level and nearby in any case.) > > b) Continuous voting to make the issue more concrete, and > to > thematize the discussion. There will always be lots > to talk > about because the results are continuously revealed, > and never > final. Yes, continuous talk may improve the discussion. This topic has however also the other side. One reason behind terms of few years is that this way the representatives will have some time to work in peace. Continuous voting may also make the system more populist (no tax raises ever since all those representatives might be kicked out right away, without the calming period before the next elections). It is possible to have also some hysteresis in the system. This allows for example short protests by the voters and allowing them to still change their mind before the representative will be kicked out. In some systems and at some levels it however may not matter if the representatives / proxies change frequently. Juho > > -- > Michael Allan > > Toronto, 647-436-4521 > http://zelea.com/ > > > Election-Methods mailing list - see > http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Why the concept of "sincere" votes in Range is flawed.
OK. I interpret this to mean that "sincerity" referred to the sincere opinion that might not even exist. And that this makes it a difficult term to define (for all methods). Or maybe it in this case would be just a difficult term to use (not necessarily to define). For a voter that doesn't have a sincere opinion it is also difficult to vote in any way (not just sincerely). Maybe casting a random ballot is the only option. (Uncertain temporary opinion could still be classified as a sincere although often changing opinion.) (I used terms "my preferences" and "sincere opinion" almost interchangeably but I don't know if that was your approach too.) Juho --- On Wed, 21/1/09, Jobst Heitzig wrote: > From: Jobst Heitzig > Hi Juho! > > > What is the problem with > > sincerity in Plurality? > > Well, that's simple: Any voter who does not have a > unique favourite option (whether that is because of > indifference or uncertainty or because of cyclic > preferences) cannot vote "sincerely" in Plurality! > > Yours, Jobst and the older mail ... --- On Fri, 16/1/09, Jobst Heitzig wrote: > To determine how I should vote, is that quite complicated > or does it depend on what I think how others will vote? > > Or is my optimal way of voting both sufficiently easy to > determine from my preferences and independent of the other > voters? > > If the latter is the case, the method deserves to be called > "strategy-free". The whole thing has nothing to do > with "sincerity". Refering to > "sincerity", that concept in itself being > difficult to define even for methods as simple as Plurality, > complicates the strategy discussion unnecessarily. Are you looking for the English language meaning of sincerity or some technical definition of it (e.g. some voting related criterion)? What is the problem with sincerity in Plurality? Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
Juho Laatu wrote: > I don't see any big conflict. They are > free to speak even if the society does > not provide them with tools to prove > to others how they voted. (And they > can still tell others how they voted.) The problem was to design a democracy in which people: * are free to engage with political issues; * know this, and are continually reminded of it; * yet fail to do so. The design solution was: a) a single vote, every 4 years or so b) mass voting for a few pre-selected candidates c) secret ballot d) no voting on laws, only on the law makers Now the problem is to design a substansive democracy, in which political engagement is a fact. Oddly, the preceding design need not be altered. It remains essential. All we need is to add a separate, primary voting system, with these counter-features: a) continuous results, with shifting votes b) peer-to-peer voting, with no pre-selected candidates c) open ballot d) voting on laws, too -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
Juho Laatu wrote: > I see two valid ways to form opinions. > - opinion formation based on mass media > - opinion formation based on mutual discussion > > Individuals may use one or both > approaches when forming their private > opinion, and also when forming their > public opinion (public ballot or > other public expression of their > opinion). That's true, both are valid. But mutual discussion is in short supply. The vacuum is filled by mass media, giving them too much leverage as instruments of manipulation. So we need to facilitate mutual discussion. > I don't see any big conflict. They are > free to speak even if the society does > not provide them with tools to prove > to others how they voted. (And they > can still tell others how they voted.) But can private voting fit in the public sphere? There are at least two practical problems: i) Given the protections of free speech, there is no way to generally enforce a secret ballot. So a competing system that allows for public voting cannot be excluded. Mutatis mutandis, that system will win the competition, because at least some people will prefer to cast their votes openly. The most likely outcome is that individual voters will have a choice - secret or open ballot. ii) Harder to verify the results. Verification based on full disclosure of all voter data is easier and more transparent. And one theoretical problem: iii) The asymettry between private voting and public discussion is ugly (seems to me), and may lead to unforseen problems. We could switch to private discussions, but that sits poorly with the aim of public consensus. Leaving aside secret/open ballots, the other design features in support of mutual discussion are: a) Peer-to-peer voting as a stuctural support for large scale discussion - keeping it de-centred, so it doesn't collapse to inaccessible, mass communication. b) Continuous voting to make the issue more concrete, and to thematize the discussion. There will always be lots to talk about because the results are continuously revealed, and never final. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Simple illustration of center-squeeze effect in runoff voting
Dave Ketchum wrote: Here it is noted that IRV has a black mark for failing to correctly award W as deserving winner. They seem not to notice that IRV's failure is also describable as incorrectly discarding W as an undeserving loser. As to escaping two party domination, think on: Plurality: If I prefer one of their candidates over the other, I must vote my preference between them, and wait til next time to think of voting for a minor party candidate. Approval: Here I can vote for both a major and a minor, but must vote as if equally desiring the barely tolerable major over the much better minor. IRV: See above. Condorcet: Can use IRV ballots and voting, but Condorcet promises to read all that I vote on them. Further, its N*N array is a useful record as to relative strength of candidates/parties. And "center-squeeze effect" or "Center-pull"? Makes sense if there is only one issue of interest for an election. Makes less sense when, as usually happens, there are multiple important issues with each major party doing better at satisfying each voter on part of the issues. My usual argument against Approval (in favor of something more complex) is this: Say there are three viable parties (if there will be only two, why have Approval in the first place?). You support A > B > C. If A is in the lead, you can approve of A alone. If A's a minor party, then you should approve of both A and B. But if the parties are close, then it may not be clear who you should approve - if A's slightly too low (and the important contest is A vs C), then voting only A will split the vote and may cause C to be elected instead of B. If A's not that low (and the important contest is A vs B), then voting both A and B will cancel your vote for A with your vote for B. It becomes more difficult the closer the parties are in support, and polling errors could cause further problems. Voters shouldn't have to do this. Since we know Plurality is bad, and IRV is bad as well (in one sense, it has to be, so it elects the "right" first candidate in a multiwinner election), that leaves Condorcet - or something exotic like MDDA. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
