--- On Wed, 21/1/09, Michael Allan <m...@zelea.com> wrote: > Juho Laatu wrote: > > > I see two valid ways to form opinions. > > - opinion formation based on mass media > > - opinion formation based on mutual discussion > > > > Individuals may use one or both > > approaches when forming their private > > opinion, and also when forming their > > public opinion (public ballot or > > other public expression of their > > opinion). > > That's true, both are valid. But mutual discussion is > in short > supply. The vacuum is filled by mass media, giving them > too much > leverage as instruments of manipulation. So we need to > facilitate > mutual discussion.
Yes, it is good to facilitate mutual discussion better. My aim with this discussion is to study if one can combine that with the good old privacy / secret vote principles. > > > I don't see any big conflict. They are > > free to speak even if the society does > > not provide them with tools to prove > > to others how they voted. (And they > > can still tell others how they voted.) > > But can private voting fit in the public sphere? There are > at least > two practical problems: > > i) Given the protections of free speech, there is no way > to > generally enforce a secret ballot. So a competing > system that > allows for public voting cannot be excluded. Mutatis > mutandis, > that system will win the competition, because at > least some > people will prefer to cast their votes openly. The > most likely > outcome is that individual voters will have a choice > - secret or > open ballot. I see three alternative approaches (for each individual voter) here. 1) The vote is forced secret. The voter can tell how she voted (=freedom of speech). But she can not prove to the coercer or buyer how she voted. 2) The voter can choose if her vote is public or secret. She can also tell what her secret vote was. 3) The vote is public. What I mean is that also enforced secrecy and free speech can be combined. > > ii) Harder to verify the results. Verification based on > full > disclosure of all voter data is easier and more > transparent. Yes, secrecy makes verification more demanding. > > And one theoretical problem: > > iii) The asymettry between private voting and public > discussion is > ugly (seems to me), and may lead to unforseen > problems. We > could switch to private discussions, but that sits > poorly with > the aim of public consensus. I think current systems rely on private voting and public discussion (although different than the proxy based discussion). It may be possible to enrich this with better mutual discussion / delegable voting rights without sacrificing secret votes / privacy. I don't see the need of a representative / proxy to know who her voters exactly are to be crucial. In some aspect it is better that she doesn't know (no vote buying, services to those that voted, no hard feelings against those that this time voted someone else etc.). The (secret) voters on the other hand will get more power when they can let several representatives / proxies understand that they got or may get the vote :-). > > Leaving aside secret/open ballots, the other design > features in > support of mutual discussion are: > > a) Peer-to-peer voting as a stuctural support for large > scale > discussion - keeping it de-centred, so it doesn't > collapse to > inaccessible, mass communication. Yes. Having a rich hierarchical discussion structure is one key benefit of the proxy structure. (Also secret voters may participate. Some of the proxies are low level and nearby in any case.) > > b) Continuous voting to make the issue more concrete, and > to > thematize the discussion. There will always be lots > to talk > about because the results are continuously revealed, > and never > final. Yes, continuous talk may improve the discussion. This topic has however also the other side. One reason behind terms of few years is that this way the representatives will have some time to work in peace. Continuous voting may also make the system more populist (no tax raises ever since all those representatives might be kicked out right away, without the calming period before the next elections). It is possible to have also some hysteresis in the system. This allows for example short protests by the voters and allowing them to still change their mind before the representative will be kicked out. In some systems and at some levels it however may not matter if the representatives / proxies change frequently. Juho > > -- > Michael Allan > > Toronto, 647-436-4521 > http://zelea.com/ > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see > http://electorama.com/em for list info ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info