The difference between Intermediate FBC and Intermediate FBC-2 is about
whether or not it might
be necessary to insincerely uprank some bottom-deserving candidates
from bottom to to 2nd-to-bottom, in order
to maximally help to defeat another one which is left at bottom.
The matter that is relevant to FBC criteria is the the top end
consideration of insincerely downranking one's
favorite from top.So, though Intermediate FBC-2 might distinguish among
some methods,
it doesn't do so in a way that differs importantly from Intermediate FBC.
So I withdraw my suggestion of Intermediate FBC-2 as a possible useful
criterion.
Intermediate FBC is suggested as an awkward attempt to look at difficult
distinctions that were
impliled when FBCs of differing strengths were brought up.
The Weak (ordinary) FBC and Strong FBC are more simply-defined anyway.
Ordinary (Weak) FBC, which
I've been citing for a long time, makes a useful distinction, when it is
shown that most methods, includng
Condorcet, Kemeny, and IRV, fail even that most lenient, easily-passed, FBC.
Approval passes Strong FBC, but I don't claim to know what, if any, other
method(s) pass Strong FBC.
No one has suggested or demonstrated that any method other than Approval
passes Strong FBC.
Cubicle society:
In reply to a posting that just apeared, with its link to a website,, I
suggest that we actually have what amounts very nearly to the
cubicle-society described in that posting's website-reference. People rely
on the mass-media to tell them how other people
feel on issues, and how those other people will vote.
That's why nearly everyone seems to believe it when the media tell us what
the two choices are. Several
authors, including Noam Chomsky, and probably the historian MIchael
Parenti, have pointed out that
each person, believing the media, believes that s/he is alone in her
preferences, positions, beliefs and
social poliicy wishes. Each perfson therefore feels resigned and hopeless.
Plurality's peculiar all-but-one-at-bottom
rule is necessary to protect that misinformation.
Of course open and honest media, reflecting genuine, unfiltered,
unmodified, input from the public, would
tell a very different story.
But when voters are allowed to express approval for more than one
candidate, the election results will show
public preferences very different from those in our big-money-controlled
media. I know, I've already said
that, but it's relevent to the cublcle society described in the website.
But, not only is the information regarding the preferences and wishes of
the other voters distorted by media,
but, additionally, now at least, the count of the actual votes is
unverified, and therefore not legimiate.
Look at the issues of _Harper's_ magazine that appeared soon after the 2004
presidential election. Harpers
described many pieces of evidence that the 2004 election count was
falsified. As you may remember, there
was much similar fraudulent-count evidence described regarding the 2000
election as well.
But here's something that many people seem to miss: Even when it isn't
shown that a count is fraudulent, the
count is still non-legitimate if it isn't vefifiable. A political system's
use of a non-verifiable machine-count
is ridiculous.
Maybe it could be somehow possible for a machine-count to be verifiable.
But, untiil then, a handcount is
necessary. That's another disadvantage of rank-balloting voting
systems--Most of them aren't feasibly
hand-countable.
Mike Ossipoff
.
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