[EM] Concerns of KM RF. Approval, Condorcet ICT strategy. Reform schedule.
Kristofer: You expressed concern about uncertainty about how to vote in Approval. Let me re-word what I was trying to say about that: First, for simplicity let's say that you belong to a faction that all prefer and vote as you do. What you object to is that, in Approval, you don't know the way of voting by which your faction can get the best result possible. But what you _do_ know (if you like and choose strategic voting) is the way of voting that will maximize your expectation, based on what your expectation already is. (I've already said much about the better-than-expectation strategy of Approval) That's good enough. You can't expect to know exactly what ballot marks will give the best outcome for you. I emphasize that, in Condorcet, you don't know either of those things, _even if it's a u/a election_. Especially if it's a u/a election. And do you really think that our elections don't have unacceptable candidates who could win? .or two sets of candidates such that the merit differences within the sets are negligible compared to the merit difference between the sets? In contrast, Approval's u/a strategy (as is its non-u/a strategy) is not only known, but is the simplest there is: Approve (only) all the acceptables. Yes, Condorcet has the consolation or compensation that, if the election isn't u/a, and if you don't much care about the results, then you can rank the candidates at as many rank positions as you want to. But sincere ranking would be a big mistake in a u/a election. And often in a non-u/a election too, if the result matters. Condorcet's supposed strategy-free-ness is only a sometimes, maybe, thing. And when it isn't that sometime, then you _really_ don't know what to do. Approval voting is incomparably easier and simpler. Richard expressed the concern that, if Approval were enacted, then maybe people wouldn't be willing to later change to something else, and those who would like to go to something better wouldn't have the opportunity. In other words, if you don't enact Condorcet instead of Approval, before Approval, then you'll never get an opportunity to enact Condorcet. A valid concern. Valid to ask about, but not valid to be concerned about. Forgive me for repeating this: If Approval were enacted, there would be changes in government and society, such that the media would be incomparably more free and open. Campaign laws and ballot-access laws would be more fair. Political debates would be more inclusive. These things would result from a government that is more what the voters want. Also, for one thing, after the results of the first Approval election, it would no longer be as easy to exclude non-Republocrats from ballots, debates, editorial letters, articles, news coverage, airtime, etc. And it would be well-established that voting system improvement is possible, because it would be an observed fact. People would be open to it. People would know the subject of voting systems better than they do now. The environment would be _much_ more favorable to rank-balloting than it now is. Now, make no mistake: Condorcet, or rank-methods in general won't be easy, any time. But if they're ever do-able at all, then it will be when Approval has started the improvement and shown that there is such a thing as good voting system reform. .and shown the numerical importance of non-Republocrat candidates, voters and parties. So no, getting a fancier method won't be harder after Approval. That's when it will be possible, if it ever will. Any improvement would be a step. That's the spirit of the Declaration. That's why none of us should oppose eachother's proposals in any publication or forum other than here at EM. Fighting eachother and opposing eachother's proposals in public would be counterproductive, a ruinous hindrance to reform. Does it sound self-serving when I say that Approval should be the first step, the first proposal? I've told many times why Approval is so much more proposable, acceptable, enactable. Approval is literally the minimal change from Plurality that will get rid of Plurality's big fault. Approval is nothing more than the repeal of Plurality's ridiculous rule, the rule that makes Plurality a blatantly, bizarrely undemocratic points rating system. The desirability of that change is so obvious, as is the fact that it's an improvement and nothing other than an improvement, that Approval might even be enacted (Plurality's funny rule repealed) via a voting rights court ruling. Even if you think that Condorcet is enactable, you must agree that Approval's expected enactment time is much less than that of Condorcet. Do you really think that there's a reason to do without reform for a longer time? You want something more than Approval. So do I. I've been saying that all along. I want defection-resistance. It can be had in ICT, and probably in Kristofer's CC/ABE method proposals (but of course they don't meet
Re: [EM] To Condorcetists:
On 17.5.2012, at 0.41, Michael Ossipoff wrote: I liked Finland's elegant open list system when I read about it. But didn't I read that you use d'Hondt? That under-represents small parties. Sainte-Lague is more perfectly proportional and more fair. Yes, Finland uses D'Hondt (and D'Hondt favours large parties when allocating the last fractional seats). Finland also allocates seats independently in each district. That actually favours large parties more than D'Hondt does. As you know having district size of 1 is quite radical from this point of view. In Finland district sizes are from 6 to 34, but still they they favour large parties. There was a reform proposal that would have counted the proportions at national level, but current government decided not to drive that proposal (that was already once approved earlier) forward. As you said small districts are ok if there's a mixed-member system in which national proportional results are used to top-up the parties' district seat totals. You can do that also without a mixed-member system. The Finnish reform proposal first counted the proportions at national level and then forced all the districts to make their seat allocations so that the end result was in line with the agreed proportions. And anyway, as I said, I don't want parties that aren't good enough to win in single-winner elections to have Congressional seats. Ok. But note that this approach allows minor parties whose supporters live in few hot spots to get seats, while parties of the same size but with even distribution of voters will not get any seats. How could using Approval instead of Plurality in our single-member districts be bad? I've talked about how Approval's results would differ from those of Plurality. Proportional representation and two-party systems are two well known approaches. Approval with single winner districts is a new kind of a system, and that may bring surpises (I wrote about them before the referenced line). Also Approval method itself is not free of problems (my key concern is its strategic problems when there are more than two potential winners). You say that hasn't been discussed enough? Ok, shall we discuss the properties of the political system that would result from choosing what people actually like, when voters are free to indicate all the candidates that they like? How would it differ from now? If you're suggesting that there would be some drawback, disadvantage or bad result that could happen because we elect candidates and parties that are more liked than what Plurality elects, then please let's hear them. I have now understood that your ideal (or actually best reachable) target system is a system that elects from few large parties, where few 2. Technically multi-winner elections would use single-winner districts and Approval. Also the president could be elected with Approval. At some point I thought that you might aim at electing good individuals without strong party affiliations, but maybe you are more party oriented that that. I assume that you expect most candidates to have a strong party affiliation. One topic that may need further discussion is the dynamic behaviour of the proposed method. You seemd to assume that the method would converge towards electing candidates from few well known major parties. Could be but I'm not sure. People could also bullet vote (especially the old party supporters), and the old parties could still dominate (although less than before). There would be no alternating power balance anymore, which could mean that people could feel that they can not change the policy however they vote. Would the governments be minority governments or coalition governments? I mean that there could be need for further reforms. The problems of Approval with three or more potential winners might irritate people and change their voting behaviour. I'm not sure what would happen, but I expect this system to be at least in the beginning less predictable than the old well tested approaches. I'm not saying that this system should not be tried. I'm just saying that you might get surprises too, and that the reform process might continue (or return back as in Burlington). you haven't talked with American favorite-buriers, and observed their voting, as I have. I didn't observe any strong burial tendency in Burlington when I analyzed those votes. Normal voters do not know what FBC means, so I'd expect some burying to be present in Burlington if people have strong tendency to do so. My guess is that ranked votes of Condorcet elections would no be radically different. Maybe some activists would mention the theoretical strategic opportunities, but still I believe most voters would just rank as they would rank in IRV. Bullet voting is probably a more common deviation from sincere ranking than burial is. the C/D examples that I've given--my versions of the Approval bad-example (ABE). Could
Re: [EM] Kristofer, April 3, '12, Approval vs Condorcet
On 17.5.2012, at 4.39, Dave Ketchum wrote: Oops - took so long stripping Mike O's zillion words that I forgot to respond. On May 16, 2012, at 10:05 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote: On May 15, 2012, at 2:55 PM, Juho Laatu wrote: On 15.5.2012, at 11.11, Michael Ossipoff wrote: Juho and Kristofer: Just a few preliminary words before I continue my reply to Kristofer that I interrupted a few hours ago: We all agree that Approval would be much easier to propose and enact than would Condorcet. Therefore, we must also agree that, given the same level of effort, the expected time needed to enact Approval is quite a bit less than the expected time needed to enact Condorcet. Now, given that, there are two reasons why you could say that we should try for Condorcet instead of Approval: I'm still not quite certain what elections this proposal refers to. If it refers to use of different single-winner methods in single-winner districts of a multi-winner election to elect members to some representative body, then I'm not ready to recommend elther of those changes before I understand what the goals are. On another subject: But if you want to suggest that others shouldn't propose Approval, then you need to give a good reason. Approval may be an easy and acceptaböe first step. My opinion is that you should plan also next steps, in case someone wants to cancel the reform, drive it further, or if the strategic vulnerabilities of Approval pop up in some election (like the Condorcet criterion problem popped up in Burlington, althogh that was maybe not even noticed by all). I know of no useful reason for rejecting Approval's replacement of Plurality - it's permission to approve of more than one as equally desired while rejecting less than Plurality and the increasing in complexity is trivial. Use of Approval could be a good move although Approval itself is not problem free. And the political system might get some hickups. But there may well be more benefits than problems. And this is a practical place to start the reform. But stepping from Plurality or Approval to Condorcet is also doable and worthy. Condorcet methods are good single-winner methods. Using them to elect representative bodies from single-member districs is an integersting non-classical approach. Approval and Condorcet are in the same category in the sense that they favour centrists and they move away from the alternating two-party power. Use of Condorcet avoids some of the problems of Approval. Juho This is a bigger change because it allows voting for unequally desired candidates with unequal ranks, thus directing those preferred to be given preference in winning. This preference allows voters to include less-liked candidates while directing counters to consider better-liked candidates as preferred. Note: Burlington, as displaying IRV's weakness, is not truly Condorcet, for it has restrictions on ranking and its counters must make decisions without considering all the content of the votes. DWK Juho Now, to resume my Kristofer reply: Mike Ossipoff Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Clarification and correction about u/a strategy
Of course, if there are 2 sets of candidates such that the merit difference
within the two sets are negligible compared to the merit difference between
the sets, then it's clear that defeating the worse set is more important
than choosing among the better set.
So I mis-spoke when I said that, in ICT, if there's a C/D problem, you
should automatically vote E in 2nd place. All of {A,B,C,D,E} belong in 1st
place.
It's just that, in the special situations where in Approval, you'd not
approve E, _that's_ when you'd move E down to 2nd place in ICT.
The various C/D solutions in Approval can, in some circumstances, call for
not approving E. Those would also call for demoting E to 2nd place in ICT.
It's the same strategy response, in both methods, though it's different in
the 2 methods. Obviously, that response is considerably milder and less
costly in lCT. That's ICT's advantage over Approval.
Of course, in a u/a election, certain conditions would have to be met before
you'd let the C/D solutions make you (in Approval) not approve E, or (in
ICT) move E down to 2nd place.
For instance, maybe E is only barely or marginally acceptable. /or maybe,
perhaps due to things said by E supporters and organization, there's doubt
about whether E really would implement hir good platform policies or
campaign promises. In a u/a election, to justify the non-approval or the 2nd
place demotion of E, A,B,C, or D should have a (good?) chance of winning.
If E is clearly the big favorite among {A,B,C,D,E}, and the only one
winnable, then you don't want to do the non-approval or demotion. I'm
assuming that E is at least marginally acceptable in a u/a election.
Even if E supporters attack or continually bad-talk A,B,C and D, that isn't
a practical reason to not approve E or to demote E to 2nd, if E's platform
would bring some genuine improvement, and is on the acceptable side.
And if E's lesser improvements would result at least in a more open system,
with more open and honest media, better media and ballot access, etc., that
would be a start toward better improvement, no matter how much E's
supporters are criticizing A, B, C, and D.
Later, with E elected, if things aren't good, then of course E is unlikely
to get your full support next time, and the various C/D solutions would come
into play if E remains marginally acceptable. Or maybe E has by then become
unacceptable and wouldn't be considered for approval or top ranking.
Mike Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Concerns of KM RF. Approval, Condorcet ICT strategy. Reform schedule.
On May 17, 2012, at 2:09 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote: Kristofer: You expressed concern about uncertainty about how to vote in Approval. Let me re-word what I was trying to say about that: First, for simplicity let’s say that you belong to a faction that all prefer and vote as you do. What you object to is that, in Approval, you don’t know the way of voting by which your faction can get the best result possible. But what you _do_ know (if you like and choose strategic voting) is the way of voting that will maximize your expectation, based on what your expectation already is. (I’ve already said much about the better- than-expectation strategy of Approval) That’s good enough. You can’t expect to know exactly what ballot marks will give the best outcome for you. But the voting method will affect your proper thinking: If Approval you are expressing equal liking for all that you vote for - thus should not vote for those liked too little. If Condorcet you are expressing amount of liking via ranking and can include voting for all wanted if all liked better are not elected. I emphasize that, in Condorcet, you don’t know either of those things, _even if it’s a u/a election_. Especially if it’s a u/a election. And do you really think that our elections don’t have unacceptable candidates who could win? …or two sets of candidates such that the merit differences within the sets are negligible compared to the merit difference between the sets? In contrast, Approval’s u/a strategy (as is its non-u/a strategy) is not only known, but is the simplest there is: Approve (only) all the acceptables. That sounds simple - until I try to apply it to actual voting as to a candidate who I see as on the edge between acceptable and non- . Wrong if non- but would have deserved winning. . Wrong if voted for and wins without deserving. Yes, Condorcet has the consolation or compensation that, if the election isn’t u/a, and if you don’t much care about the results, then you can rank the candidates at as many rank positions as you want to. But sincere ranking would be a big mistake in a u/a election. And often in a non-u/a election too, if the result matters. Condorcet’s supposed strategy-free-ness is only a sometimes, maybe, thing. And when it isn’t that “sometime”, then you _really_ don’t know what to do. Approval voting is incomparably easier and simpler. And this is simpler, for I can rank less-liked below all I like better. Richard expressed the concern that, if Approval were enacted, then maybe people wouldn’t be willing to later change to something else, and those who would like to go to something better wouldn’t have the opportunity. In other words, if you don’t enact Condorcet instead of Approval, before Approval, then you’ll never get an opportunity to enact Condorcet. A valid concern. Valid to ask about, but not valid to be concerned about. Forgive me for repeating this: If Approval were enacted, there would be changes in government and society, such that the media would be incomparably more free and open. Campaign laws and ballot-access laws would be more fair. Political debates would be more inclusive. These things would result from a government that is more what the voters want. Also, for one thing, after the results of the first Approval election, it would no longer be as easy to exclude non- Republocrats from ballots, debates, editorial letters, articles, news coverage, airtime, etc. Enacting Approval or Condorcet, or most any other true improvement, would help as described above. Would also include freer selection among candidates: . As always, vote against the worst of such as Republocrats. . Can also vote for the most desirable candidates. And it would be well-established that voting system improvement is possible, because it would be an observed fact. People would be open to it. People would know the subject of voting systems better than they do now. The environment would be _much_ more favorable to rank-balloting than it now is. Now, make no mistake: Condorcet, or rank-methods in general won’t be easy, any time. But if they’re ever do-able at all, then it will be when Approval has started the improvement and shown that there is such a thing as good voting system reform. …and shown the numerical importance of non-Republocrat candidates, voters and parties. So no, getting a fancier method won’t be harder after Approval. That’s when it will be possible, if it ever will. Any improvement would be a step. That’s the spirit of the Declaration. That’s why none of us should oppose eachother’s proposals in any publication or forum other than here at EM. Fighting eachother and opposing eachother’s proposals in public would be counterproductive, a ruinous hindrance to reform. Does it sound self-serving when I say that Approval should be the first step, the
