Re: [EM] Election layering effect (or why election-method reform is important)
On 4/27/2012 12:48 PM, Ted Stern wrote: On 27 Apr 2012 12:26:11 -0700, Richard Fobes wrote: ... Winning an election with less than half the votes might seem like a small unfairness, but the effect is huge because of a layering effect. Although each Congressman typically got a ballot mark from about one out of two voters in the general election, he or she got a ballot mark from only about one out of four voters (based on cross-party counting) if the Congressman competed against a strong candidate in the primary election. Another layer occurs because only slightly more than half the members of Congress need to vote in favor of a new law to get it passed, so just those Congressmen got ballot marks from only about one out of eight U.S. voters, which is about 12% of U.S. voters. Yet even more layers are involved because most Congressmen first serve as state-level officials, and the state-level election process similarly filters out the problem-solving leaders that most voters want. Adding in two more layers to account for mainstream-media influence and low voter turnout easily accounts for how each law passed in Congress represents the desires of only 1% of the U.S. population. ... I'm interested in any ideas for how this concept can be explained more clearly, especially if someone can think of an appropriate analogy or metaphor or diagram. Here's an analogy: The task is to approximate the number 0.4445 to the nearest integer. If you start by rounding to the nearest thousandth, you get 0.445. If you then round to the nearest hundredth, you get 0.45. If you then round to the nearest tenth, you then get 0.5. Then if you round to the nearest integer, you get 1. But 0.4445 is closer to zero than one, so you end up being wrong by more than one-half. Ted I like this analogy. It does not amplify enough, yet it prompted me to think of this idea: We tend to think of politics as a pyramid that has our few-in-number leaders at the top, and the numerous voters at the bottom who support the leaders through voting. In contrast, an upside-down pyramid might be more realistic. Each layer in the pyramid corresponds to one of the layers mentioned above. At the bottom are the few voters who marked on their primary-election ballot support for the Congressmen who voted (as part of a majority) to pass a new law. I'm still working out how best to draw it, yet this seems like a useful path to clarify the importance of election-method reform. Thanks! On 4/28/2012 10:52 AM, Stéphane Rouillon wrote: ... With an STV election, 3 seats in a single super-district, let's assume ... ... Typically STV produces a global individual satisfaction rates around twice FPTP rates for the simulations I have made yet... ... This does not covers the layering effect of multiple representative levels, but it emphasizes the mismatch between the will of electors and the results. Stéphane Rouillon Yes, proportional methods reduce the number of wasted votes (which can be defined in various ways). Yet, as you say, this does not address the layering effect. Nevertheless, thank you for your ideas. Richard Fobes Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Election layering effect (or why election-method reform is important)
On 05/03/2012 09:29 AM, Richard Fobes wrote: I like this analogy. It does not amplify enough, yet it prompted me to think of this idea: We tend to think of politics as a pyramid that has our few-in-number leaders at the top, and the numerous voters at the bottom who support the leaders through voting. In contrast, an upside-down pyramid might be more realistic. Each layer in the pyramid corresponds to one of the layers mentioned above. At the bottom are the few voters who marked on their primary-election ballot support for the Congressmen who voted (as part of a majority) to pass a new law. I'm still working out how best to draw it, yet this seems like a useful path to clarify the importance of election-method reform. I first found this pattern when considering forms of council democracy. In these types of democracy, you have local councils that appoint representatives from their number to form regional councils that appoint representatives... and so on up. In the worst case, a bare majority at every level can control the whole system. In a one-level system, a majority suffices (which is much less than 100%); in a two-level system, a majority of a majority; in a three level system, a majority of a majority of a majority and so on. Generally, if the councils are of size n, then a majority m is floor(n/2) + 1. Call the fraction required to get a majority, f. f = m/n, and this approaches 50% as n goes to infinity. Then in the very worst case, f^(num levels) of the total population suffice to control the council democracy. In a primary system, it's worse since only a fraction of the population can vote in any given primary (excepting open/jungle primaries), and not all who can vote are going to. On 4/28/2012 10:52 AM, Stéphane Rouillon wrote: ... With an STV election, 3 seats in a single super-district, let's assume ... ... Typically STV produces a global individual satisfaction rates around twice FPTP rates for the simulations I have made yet... ... This does not covers the layering effect of multiple representative levels, but it emphasizes the mismatch between the will of electors and the results. Stéphane Rouillon Yes, proportional methods reduce the number of wasted votes (which can be defined in various ways). Yet, as you say, this does not address the layering effect. Nevertheless, thank you for your ideas. In the council model, proportional representation does help, so to some extent it does alleviate the layering effect. If a council elects three instead of one to the next level, then in the worst case, the faction has to get all of them for enough councils to get a sufficient supermajority on the next level, and so on. In a primary system, I think the most clear benefit is that it dissolves the problem. If you have proportional representation, there's no need for primaries - at least not for legislative elections. Any group that disagrees with the party can simply leave that party to form a party of its own. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Election layering effect (or why election-method reform is important)
It is not only proportionality, but individual-based support method that make the difference. Using the same STV will of the electorate, and this possible closed lists (B3-B2-B1, R3-R2-R1, Y3-Y2-Y1), we obtain a different Global individual satisfaction measure, despite the fact that we still elect one representative of each political party. Voters will: 10%: B3 B2 Y2 R1 R2 Y1 Y3 R3 B1 30%: R1 R2 R3 B1 B2 B3 Y1 Y2 Y3 51%: B1 Y1 Y2 Y3 R1 R3 R2 B3 B2 9%: Y1 B1 R1 B2 R2 Y3 Y2 R3 B3 They do their best to maximize their results... (Some of the 51% will vote Yellow...) Elected: B3 R3 Y3. Individual satisfaction of the first group of voters: 33,3% (two elected among the 3 first choices) Individual satisfaction of the second group of voters: 33,3% (one elected among the 3 first choices) Individual satisfaction of the third group of voters: 0% (none elected among the 3 first choices) Individual satisfaction of the fourth group of voters: 0% (none elected among the 3 first choices) Global individual satisfaction of all voters: 10% x 33,3% + 30% x 33,3% + 51% x 0% + 9% x 0% = 13,3% A lot worst... Stéphane On 2012-05-03 15:46, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: On 05/03/2012 09:29 AM, Richard Fobes wrote: I like this analogy. It does not amplify enough, yet it prompted me to think of this idea: We tend to think of politics as a pyramid that has our few-in-number leaders at the top, and the numerous voters at the bottom who support the leaders through voting. In contrast, an upside-down pyramid might be more realistic. Each layer in the pyramid corresponds to one of the layers mentioned above. At the bottom are the few voters who marked on their primary-election ballot support for the Congressmen who voted (as part of a majority) to pass a new law. I'm still working out how best to draw it, yet this seems like a useful path to clarify the importance of election-method reform. I first found this pattern when considering forms of council democracy. In these types of democracy, you have local councils that appoint representatives from their number to form regional councils that appoint representatives... and so on up. In the worst case, a bare majority at every level can control the whole system. In a one-level system, a majority suffices (which is much less than 100%); in a two-level system, a majority of a majority; in a three level system, a majority of a majority of a majority and so on. Generally, if the councils are of size n, then a majority m is floor(n/2) + 1. Call the fraction required to get a majority, f. f = m/n, and this approaches 50% as n goes to infinity. Then in the very worst case, f^(num levels) of the total population suffice to control the council democracy. In a primary system, it's worse since only a fraction of the population can vote in any given primary (excepting open/jungle primaries), and not all who can vote are going to. On 4/28/2012 10:52 AM, Stéphane Rouillon wrote: ... With an STV election, 3 seats in a single super-district, let's assume ... ... Typically STV produces a global individual satisfaction rates around twice FPTP rates for the simulations I have made yet... ... This does not covers the layering effect of multiple representative levels, but it emphasizes the mismatch between the will of electors and the results. Stéphane Rouillon Yes, proportional methods reduce the number of wasted votes (which can be defined in various ways). Yet, as you say, this does not address the layering effect. Nevertheless, thank you for your ideas. In the council model, proportional representation does help, so to some extent it does alleviate the layering effect. If a council elects three instead of one to the next level, then in the worst case, the faction has to get all of them for enough councils to get a sufficient supermajority on the next level, and so on. In a primary system, I think the most clear benefit is that it dissolves the problem. If you have proportional representation, there's no need for primaries - at least not for legislative elections. Any group that disagrees with the party can simply leave that party to form a party of its own. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Election layering effect (or why election-method reform is important)
Hi, an other aspect to this is the development of a posteriori to election criteria to measure satisfaction of the electorate from the results. Forget about the electoral method, just focus on the result and the electorate will. Individually taken, it is easy to quantify how much an elector is satisfied with the results from its own participation to an election. Among all the candidates a candidate could have an influence on their election, the ratio of these candidates getting elected represents the satisfaction rate of the elector. How do you get the full will of that elector? Just assume all voters proposed with the same choices than that elector make the same picks. The result represents the 100% satisfaction result. Some examples: With an FPTP election, 3 districts: District 1: Blue* 45% Red 35% Yellow 20% District 2: Blue* 51% Red 30% Yellow 19% District 3: Blue 25% Red 30% Yellow* 45% The 3 elected MP (2 Blue, 1 Yellow) produce an average individual satisfaction rate of 47%. With an STV election, 3 seats in a single super-district, let's assume following ballots and results: 10%: B3 B2 Y2 R1 R2 Y1 Y3 R3 B1 30%: R1 R2 R3 B1 B2 B3 Y1 Y2 Y3 51%: B1 Y1 Y2 Y3 R1 R3 R2 B3 B1 9%: Y1 B1 R1 B2 R2 Y3 Y3 R3 B3 Elected: B1 Y1 R1. Individual satisfaction of the first group of voters: 0% (none elected among the 3 first choices) Individual satisfaction of the second group of voters: 33,3% (one elected among the 3 first choices) Individual satisfaction of the third group of voters: 66,7% (two elected among the 3 first choices) Individual satisfaction of the fourth group of voters: 100% (all elected among the 3 first choices) Global individual satisfaction of all voters: 10% x 0% + 30% x 33,3% + 51% x 66,7% + 9% x 100% = 53% Typically STV produces a global individual satisfaction rates around twice FPTP rates for the simulations I have made yet... Almost all election method can be measured this criteria (it makes no sense for a fully random selection). This does not covers the layering effect of multiple representative levels, but it emphasizes the mismatch between the will of electors and the results. Stéphane Rouillon On 2012-04-27 15:26, Richard Fobes wrote: Recently I realized that in our Declaration, and in our discussions, we have failed to explain and explore the amplification effect that occurs as a result of, for a lack of a better term at the moment, layering. Here is how I explained it in the proposal I referred to earlier: Winning an election with less than half the votes might seem like a small unfairness, but the effect is huge because of a layering effect. Although each Congressman typically got a ballot mark from about one out of two voters in the general election, he or she got a ballot mark from only about one out of four voters (based on cross-party counting) if the Congressman competed against a strong candidate in the primary election. Another layer occurs because only slightly more than half the members of Congress need to vote in favor of a new law to get it passed, so just those Congressmen got ballot marks from only about one out of eight U.S. voters, which is about 12% of U.S. voters. Yet even more layers are involved because most Congressmen first serve as state-level officials, and the state-level election process similarly filters out the problem-solving leaders that most voters want. Adding in two more layers to account for mainstream-media influence and low voter turnout easily accounts for how each law passed in Congress represents the desires of only 1% of the U.S. population. (The full proposal is at: http://www.the99declaration.org/4408/ban_single_mark_ballots_from_congressional_elections?recruiter_id=4408 ) I'm interested in any ideas for how this concept can be explained more clearly, especially if someone can think of an appropriate analogy or metaphor or diagram. Richard Fobes Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Election layering effect (or why election-method reform is important)
Recently I realized that in our Declaration, and in our discussions, we have failed to explain and explore the amplification effect that occurs as a result of, for a lack of a better term at the moment, layering. Here is how I explained it in the proposal I referred to earlier: Winning an election with less than half the votes might seem like a small unfairness, but the effect is huge because of a layering effect. Although each Congressman typically got a ballot mark from about one out of two voters in the general election, he or she got a ballot mark from only about one out of four voters (based on cross-party counting) if the Congressman competed against a strong candidate in the primary election. Another layer occurs because only slightly more than half the members of Congress need to vote in favor of a new law to get it passed, so just those Congressmen got ballot marks from only about one out of eight U.S. voters, which is about 12% of U.S. voters. Yet even more layers are involved because most Congressmen first serve as state-level officials, and the state-level election process similarly filters out the problem-solving leaders that most voters want. Adding in two more layers to account for mainstream-media influence and low voter turnout easily accounts for how each law passed in Congress represents the desires of only 1% of the U.S. population. (The full proposal is at: http://www.the99declaration.org/4408/ban_single_mark_ballots_from_congressional_elections?recruiter_id=4408 ) I'm interested in any ideas for how this concept can be explained more clearly, especially if someone can think of an appropriate analogy or metaphor or diagram. Richard Fobes Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Election layering effect (or why election-method reform is important)
On 27 Apr 2012 12:26:11 -0700, Richard Fobes wrote: Recently I realized that in our Declaration, and in our discussions, we have failed to explain and explore the amplification effect that occurs as a result of, for a lack of a better term at the moment, layering. Here is how I explained it in the proposal I referred to earlier: Winning an election with less than half the votes might seem like a small unfairness, but the effect is huge because of a layering effect. Although each Congressman typically got a ballot mark from about one out of two voters in the general election, he or she got a ballot mark from only about one out of four voters (based on cross-party counting) if the Congressman competed against a strong candidate in the primary election. Another layer occurs because only slightly more than half the members of Congress need to vote in favor of a new law to get it passed, so just those Congressmen got ballot marks from only about one out of eight U.S. voters, which is about 12% of U.S. voters. Yet even more layers are involved because most Congressmen first serve as state-level officials, and the state-level election process similarly filters out the problem-solving leaders that most voters want. Adding in two more layers to account for mainstream-media influence and low voter turnout easily accounts for how each law passed in Congress represents the desires of only 1% of the U.S. population. (The full proposal is at: http://www.the99declaration.org/4408/ban_single_mark_ballots_from_congressional_elections?recruiter_id=4408 ) I'm interested in any ideas for how this concept can be explained more clearly, especially if someone can think of an appropriate analogy or metaphor or diagram. Here's an analogy: The task is to approximate the number 0.4445 to the nearest integer. If you start by rounding to the nearest thousandth, you get 0.445. If you then round to the nearest hundredth, you get 0.45. If you then round to the nearest tenth, you then get 0.5. Then if you round to the nearest integer, you get 1. But 0.4445 is closer to zero than one, so you end up being wrong by more than one-half. Ted Richard Fobes Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info -- araucaria dot araucana at gmail dot com Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
