Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
I agree with Kevin that the existing SODA page on the wiki is _not_ for novices. I created a simplified page: http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval_(simplified) Feel free to edit, but let's add to it as little as possible, or even take some away if we can. Andy On Fri, Jul 8, 2011 at 4:27 PM, Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr wrote: --- En date de : Ven 8.7.11, Toby Pereira tdp2...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit : The thing about SODA is that it's harder to get than Approval Voting. I haven't exactly read through all the posts on it here thoroughly but I've looked at the page - http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/ Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval - and I do find myself thinking What? [end quote] Well hmm. I'm kind of looking at this article as a collection of things that have been said by SODA people. As a neutral intro to the method for people who don't know whether the inventors have any idea what they are talking about, it's kind of terrible. In particular that intro paragraph... I didn't want to go on. I'm going to abandon the neutral voice and talk as myself. Ahaha. Maybe the article should be forked. Have one concise, neutral version (like neutral neutral), and then the exciting one. Kevin Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
I like the overall structure, but the syntax could certainly be edited for clarity. Shorter sentences with a few concrete examples will feel simpler, even if it ends up longer. I'll make an attempt later. Also, I think that the two pages should be merged, with your page as the introductory section of mine. JQ 2011/7/12 Andy Jennings electi...@jenningsstory.com I agree with Kevin that the existing SODA page on the wiki is _not_ for novices. I created a simplified page: http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval_(simplified) Feel free to edit, but let's add to it as little as possible, or even take some away if we can. Andy On Fri, Jul 8, 2011 at 4:27 PM, Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr wrote: --- En date de : Ven 8.7.11, Toby Pereira tdp2...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit : The thing about SODA is that it's harder to get than Approval Voting. I haven't exactly read through all the posts on it here thoroughly but I've looked at the page - http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/ Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval - and I do find myself thinking What? [end quote] Well hmm. I'm kind of looking at this article as a collection of things that have been said by SODA people. As a neutral intro to the method for people who don't know whether the inventors have any idea what they are talking about, it's kind of terrible. In particular that intro paragraph... I didn't want to go on. I'm going to abandon the neutral voice and talk as myself. Ahaha. Maybe the article should be forked. Have one concise, neutral version (like neutral neutral), and then the exciting one. Kevin Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
I made an attempt to revise and merge, and also to reduce the use of the first person on the main page. Check out http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval#Opinionated_sales_pitches_.28hard_sell.29 to see the results. 2011/7/12 Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com I like the overall structure, but the syntax could certainly be edited for clarity. Shorter sentences with a few concrete examples will feel simpler, even if it ends up longer. I'll make an attempt later. Also, I think that the two pages should be merged, with your page as the introductory section of mine. JQ 2011/7/12 Andy Jennings electi...@jenningsstory.com I agree with Kevin that the existing SODA page on the wiki is _not_ for novices. I created a simplified page: http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval_(simplified) Feel free to edit, but let's add to it as little as possible, or even take some away if we can. Andy On Fri, Jul 8, 2011 at 4:27 PM, Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr wrote: --- En date de : Ven 8.7.11, Toby Pereira tdp2...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit : The thing about SODA is that it's harder to get than Approval Voting. I haven't exactly read through all the posts on it here thoroughly but I've looked at the page - http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/ Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval - and I do find myself thinking What? [end quote] Well hmm. I'm kind of looking at this article as a collection of things that have been said by SODA people. As a neutral intro to the method for people who don't know whether the inventors have any idea what they are talking about, it's kind of terrible. In particular that intro paragraph... I didn't want to go on. I'm going to abandon the neutral voice and talk as myself. Ahaha. Maybe the article should be forked. Have one concise, neutral version (like neutral neutral), and then the exciting one. Kevin Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
On 8.7.2011, at 8.55, Russ Paielli wrote: On Thu, Jul 7, 2011 at 3:32 PM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote: What didi people think before the nowadays generally agreed idea that all countries should be democratic. Maybe some idealists discussed the possibility that one day ordinary people might rule the country. I'm sure many others laughed at them and told them that such changes are dangerous and will never work, particularly since they are not in the interest of the current rulers, nor any other rulers that might overthrow the current rulers. So reforms are just a joke and idealistic dreams like democracy will never work. There would quickly be some new rulers that would kick the poor commoners out and probably even kill them. I'll probably get a bit off topic here, but I think it is important to understand that democracy itself is almost worthless without Constitutionally guaranteed individual rights (as distinct from bogus group rights). That's what the American revolution was all about. The founders certainly did not want a pure democracy. They know very well where that majority rule would lead a tyranny of the majority. That's why they gave us the Bill of Rights. I think we are on our way from laws of jungle to something more civilized. We can invent better and more fine tuned models on how we should operate in order to achieve whatever we want to achieve. This is not completely off topic since decision making methods are one essential component and tool in making our societies work well. The main problem with our political system today is that far too few people understand what freedom and individual rights mean. The Bill of Rights is just the start of it. Property rights are essential to any real notion of freedom, and they are also essential to prosperity. When half the population thinks the gov't should take from those who have too much and give to others who don't have enough, we are in trouble. Yet that's exactly where we are. The greatest election methods in the world cannot save us from those kind of voters. Yes, not too much of that, although most societies of course expect those that are well off to take care of those that would otherwise be in trouble. Are some CEOs overpaid? Yes, I think some are. I happen to believe that some CEOs and boards are ripping off their own shareholders, and I would like to see the gov't do something to give shareholders more say in the matter. But the solution is not to just arbitrarily raise taxes on the rich, as so many want to do. People who don't understant the distinction are dangerous, because they fundamentally believe that the gov't really owns everything and let's us keep some of it out of sheer benevolence. If the gov't really owns everything, it owns you too. One interesting question is if government is considered to be us or them or it. I tend to think that the government and rest of the society (like companies) should serve the people, not the other way around. In a well working democracy we can decide how those structures serve us in the best possible way (allowing e.g. freedom and wealth to all). Today many of us live in democracies and people can make changes if they so want. Actually that was the case already before the age of democracy. Changes were more difficult to achieve then. Now making such improvements should be comparably easy. And despite of having democracy the world is not perfect yet. Improvements are still possible. The key problem is actually, as you say, to agree on the targets, and make a model that majority of the rulers (voters) agree with, and that looks plausible enough so that people can start to believe in that change. The fundamental problem now is that too many of us actually want to go back to a state in which gov't is our master rather than our servant. If gov't can arbitrarily take from you when it thinks you have too much, it is the master, and we are the servants. Why is that so hard for some to understand? I think this is a chicken and egg problem. If government is us, then all the money it takes is because we have agreed to proceed that way. In practice things are more complicated, and governments easily become money hungry beasts that take and spend all the money they can grab. If we go back to the EM topics, good methods need good and simple and credible models and philosophies to allow regular people (voters) to make sensible decisions on which routes to take. One does not work well without the other. Juho --Russ P. -- http://RussP.us Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
Russ Paielli wrote: Let me just elaborate on my concerns about complexity. Most of you probably know most of this already, but let me just try to summ it up and put things in perspective. Some of the participants on this list are advanced mathematicians, and they have been discussing these matters for years. As you all know, the topic of election methods and voting systems can get very complicated. As far as I know, there is still no consensus even on this list on what is the best system. If there is no consensus here, how can you expect to get a consensus among the general public? *Because* some of the participants on this list are advanced mathematicians. We (list participants, since I'm not an advanced mathematician, at least not formally :-) might discuss whether or not Ranked Pairs is better than Schulze, but were it to come to a referendum or a common suggestion, I would support either without a thought. (What happened to that idea of finding a compromise method that everybody on EM could support? Did the idea get sidetracked by SODA?) I would support Schulze and Ranked Pairs, and the uncovered versions thereof. I would have to think a bit longer, but I would probably also support Minmax (a bit concerned about clones though) and even Nanson/Baldwin (since it's not so different from IRV, and has actually been used) and BTR-IRV (for those areas where IRV has buried its claws, if the choice is between BTR-IRV and IRV or Plurality). I would have to think further yet, but I would probably also support Approval (depends on what the alternatives were), and Range (reluctantly), or top-two (because it works in France). I wouldn't support IRV, as I don't think it'll make a significant difference (consider Australia, for instance). But let's suppose a consensus is reached here on the EM list. What happens next? You need to generate public awareness, which is a major task. As far as the general public is concerned, there is no problem with the voting system per se. Voters vote, and the votes are counted. The candidate with the most votes wins. What else do you need? Andrew has given a strategy here: let the people become used to ranked balloting (primarily) and to Condorcet resolution (secondarily). Schulze is also getting some use in different organizations, and it may be possible to spread it further to other organizations in that way. If the members there get used to counting ballots in the Schulze manner, they may start wondering why that isn't done in their local election. It may be a slow strategy, but you can't wave a magic wand and alter the Presidential election system out of the blue, I think. So let's say we somehow manage to get widespread public awareness of the deficiencies of the current plurality system. Then what? Eventually, and actual change has to go through Congress. Try to imagine Senator Blowhard grilling the experts on the proposed rules of their favorite system. It would certainly be good for one thing: fodder for Jon Stewart and Steven Colbert! By then, hopefully there will be local elections being counted by that system, and then one can use that as precedent. Something to the effect of: the people in XYZ vote by method W and like the results. It's more complex than Plurality, but XYZ has many independents and smaller parties, which is a rarity elsewhere, and the people like it. For that matter, if what I know about US lawmakers is correct, the Senators (and Representatives) usually don't know or read the more involved bills themselves anyway. They don't have the time or knowledge. Also, consider the fierce opposition that would develop from any group that thinks they would suffer. And who might that be? How about the two major parties! Do you think they would have the power to stop it? For starters, they would probably claim that any complicated vote transfer algorithm cannot be used because it is not in the Constitution. Yup, that's a problem. It's a general problem for any kind of change: if you have an unfair system and wish to correct it, then if those who currently benefit from the unfair distribution of power are also the gatekeepers, then they will, and can, oppose your change. It's their power on the line. There are no quick fixes to this. The only way to handle it would be through the democratic process, which means one should organize and try to convince the people themselves to support the change. It might be useful to look at the history of the Proportional Representation League in this respect. Their push for PR did manage to get it passed in certain areas (New York, Cincinnati), but then the machines caught on and, well, those areas no longer use PR. It's going to be tough, no doubt about that, and I hope someone around here is good enough at organizing, or that someone who *is* would appear if the methods get initial momentum (in local elections, organizations, etc). However,
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
On Fri, Jul 8, 2011 at 12:32 AM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote: On 8.7.2011, at 8.55, Russ Paielli wrote: On Thu, Jul 7, 2011 at 3:32 PM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote: What didi people think before the nowadays generally agreed idea that all countries should be democratic. Maybe some idealists discussed the possibility that one day ordinary people might rule the country. I'm sure many others laughed at them and told them that such changes are dangerous and will never work, particularly since they are not in the interest of the current rulers, nor any other rulers that might overthrow the current rulers. So reforms are just a joke and idealistic dreams like democracy will never work. There would quickly be some new rulers that would kick the poor commoners out and probably even kill them. I'll probably get a bit off topic here, but I think it is important to understand that democracy itself is almost worthless without Constitutionally guaranteed individual rights (as distinct from bogus group rights). That's what the American revolution was all about. The founders certainly did not want a pure democracy. They know very well where that majority rule would lead a tyranny of the majority. That's why they gave us the Bill of Rights. Let me just correct that sentence: They know very well that majority rule would lead to a tyranny of the majority. I think we are on our way from laws of jungle to something more civilized. We can invent better and more fine tuned models on how we should operate in order to achieve whatever we want to achieve. This is not completely off topic since decision making methods are one essential component and tool in making our societies work well. The main problem with our political system today is that far too few people understand what freedom and individual rights mean. The Bill of Rights is just the start of it. Property rights are essential to any real notion of freedom, and they are also essential to prosperity. When half the population thinks the gov't should take from those who have too much and give to others who don't have enough, we are in trouble. Yet that's exactly where we are. The greatest election methods in the world cannot save us from those kind of voters. Yes, not too much of that, although most societies of course expect those that are well off to take care of those that would otherwise be in trouble. Yes, I agree. But the well off should *voluntarily* take of the less fortunate. They should not be forced. I find it ironic that secular Leftists are constantly trying to impose Christian morality on us. Well, not all of Christian morality. They have no use for the sexual morality part of it, but they are gung-ho for what they consider to be the economic morality of Christianity. But they get that completely wrong, of course. Jesus preached voluntary charity -- not gov't redistribution of wealth! The two are very different. There are also solid practical reasons for not forcing the rich to be charitable. For one, they can usually do more for the general good by running successful businesses that employ people. When you think about it, a rich person who has the lion's share of his wealth invested wisely is actually doing great things for society. If his investment wasn't providing jobs and things that people want or need, then the investment would not be successful. So long as they live reasonably modestly, they aren't taking any more from society than most other people. I could go on about how the recipients of public charity consider it their right, hence have little incentive to get off of it, but I'll leave it at that. I need to get to bed. Good night. --Russ P. Are some CEOs overpaid? Yes, I think some are. I happen to believe that some CEOs and boards are ripping off their own shareholders, and I would like to see the gov't do something to give shareholders more say in the matter. But the solution is not to just arbitrarily raise taxes on the rich, as so many want to do. People who don't understant the distinction are dangerous, because they fundamentally believe that the gov't really owns everything and let's us keep some of it out of sheer benevolence. If the gov't really owns everything, it owns you too. One interesting question is if government is considered to be us or them or it. I tend to think that the government and rest of the society (like companies) should serve the people, not the other way around. In a well working democracy we can decide how those structures serve us in the best possible way (allowing e.g. freedom and wealth to all). Today many of us live in democracies and people can make changes if they so want. Actually that was the case already before the age of democracy. Changes were more difficult to achieve then. Now making such improvements should be comparably easy. And despite of having democracy the world is not perfect yet. Improvements are
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
What I see: .. Condorcet - without mixing in Approval. . SODA - for trying, but seems too complex. . Reject Approval - too weak to compete. Dave Ketchum On Jul 8, 2011, at 6:56 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: First, I'd ask people on this list to please stop discussing tax policy here. It's not the place for it. (What happened to that idea of finding a compromise method that everybody on EM could support? Did the idea get sidetracked by SODA?) More or less. My impression was that we had agreed that a statement should explain and support no more than two simple methods, and mention as good a broad range - as many as could get broad acceptance. For the simple methods, it seemed that people were leaning towards (Condorcet//Approval or Minimax/WV) plus (Approval or SODA). For the generally agreed as improvements, I think we could get consensus that the aforementioned ones plus MJ, Range, and a catch-all condorcet methods (since in practice they are unlikely to differ), would all be improvements over plurality. So, I guess the question is: is there anyone who would support Approval but not SODA? Respond in text. Also, I made a poll on betterpolls - go vote. http://betterpolls.com/v/1425 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
I'm sorry, but aarrhh. I think that people on this list are smart, but this is pathetic. I don't mean to be hard on Dave in particular. But why is it impossible to get any two of us to agree on anything? I want to make a list of systems which are 1. Commonly agreed to be better than approval. 2. Commonly agreed to be simple for an average voter to feel that they understand what's going on. I am not asking each person who responds to choose the best or simplest system according to them. I'm asking everyone to vote in the pollhttp://betterpolls.com/do/1425 and approve (rate higher than 0) all systems which meet those two very low bars. Hopefully, the result will be a consensus. It will almost certainly not be the two best, simplest systems by any individual's personal reckoning. As to the specific comments: 2011/7/8 Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com What I see: . Condorcet - without mixing in Approval. You need some cycle-breaker. Implicit approval is the only order-N tiebreaker I know; fundamentally simpler than any order-N² tiebreaker like minimax. You don't have to call it approval if you don't like the name. . SODA - for trying, but seems too complex. I disagree, but I'm biased. I feel that approve any number of candidates or let your favorite candidate do it for you; most approvals wins is easy to understand. But I can understand if people disagree, so I'm not criticizing this logic. . Reject Approval - too weak to compete. Worse than plurality JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
Russ Paielli wrote: On Thu, Jul 7, 2011 at 3:32 PM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk mailto:juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote: What didi people think before the nowadays generally agreed idea that all countries should be democratic. Maybe some idealists discussed the possibility that one day ordinary people might rule the country. I'm sure many others laughed at them and told them that such changes are dangerous and will never work, particularly since they are not in the interest of the current rulers, nor any other rulers that might overthrow the current rulers. So reforms are just a joke and idealistic dreams like democracy will never work. There would quickly be some new rulers that would kick the poor commoners out and probably even kill them. I'll probably get a bit off topic here, but I think it is important to understand that democracy itself is almost worthless without Constitutionally guaranteed individual rights (as distinct from bogus group rights). That's what the American revolution was all about. The founders certainly did not want a pure democracy. They know very well where that majority rule would lead a tyranny of the majority. That's why they gave us the Bill of Rights. The UK doesn't have a written constitution nor a Bill of Rights, yet it seems to manage. If anything, it is the European country closest to the United States in policy matters. The main problem with our political system today is that far too few people understand what freedom and individual rights mean. The Bill of Rights is just the start of it. Property rights are essential to any real notion of freedom, and they are also essential to prosperity. When half the population thinks the gov't should take from those who have too much and give to others who don't have enough, we are in trouble. Yet that's exactly where we are. The greatest election methods in the world cannot save us from those kind of voters. The greatest election methods in the world could even increase redistribution. According to Warren Smith's page on proportional representation (http://rangevoting.org/PropRep.html, What does economics say?), countries with increasing amounts of PR also have bigger governments and less economic inequality (which is usually accomplished through redistribution, such as by progressive taxes). To some extent, it appears that the people want this. See, for instance, the ideal income distributions, as given by the public, mentioned in http://www.people.hbs.edu/mnorton/norton%20ariely.pdf . If people want redistribution, then giving them more democracy will lead to more redistribution. If that is a problem with the people, then it is a problem with democracy, and as such, a more accurate democracy would have a greater problem with it. Even if it's an effect of proportional representation, the method, rather than an increasingly accurate reflection of the wishes of the people, that would still mean proportional representation would lead to more redistribution. The fundamental problem now is that too many of us actually want to go back to a state in which gov't is our master rather than our servant. If gov't can arbitrarily take from you when it thinks you have too much, it is the master, and we are the servants. Why is that so hard for some to understand? Another reason for the link between PR and government size might be that when the people are more accurately represented, they feel that the government is less them and more us. To the extent that happens, the concept of dominance is weakened: if the government is us then us mastering ourselves is no dangerous relation. I have no proof of that, though; to get it, I would have to ask people in PR democracies and non-PR democracies to what degree they think the government is of, by, and for the people. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
Jameson Quinn wrote: First, I'd ask people on this list to please stop discussing tax policy here. It's not the place for it. (What happened to that idea of finding a compromise method that everybody on EM could support? Did the idea get sidetracked by SODA?) More or less. My impression was that we had agreed that a statement should explain and support no more than two simple methods, and mention as good a broad range - as many as could get broad acceptance. For the simple methods, it seemed that people were leaning towards (Condorcet//Approval or Minimax/WV) plus (Approval or SODA). For the generally agreed as improvements, I think we could get consensus that the aforementioned ones plus MJ, Range, and a catch-all condorcet methods (since in practice they are unlikely to differ), would all be improvements over plurality. So, I guess the question is: is there anyone who would support Approval but not SODA? Respond in text. Also, I made a poll on betterpolls - go vote. http://betterpolls.com/v/1425 After a fashion. SODA may be a good method in a vacuum, but it's also very new and has no precedent at all (apart from its components). Thus, mentioning it in a practical proposal could run the risk of making it seem left-field and thus the rest of our suggestions appear less serious. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
There are many reasons why it is difficult to find a statement that numerous people on this list would be willing to sign. As you know there are probably as many different opinions on different methods as there are people on this list. There have been some related (inconclusive) discussions also earlier on this list. I'll write few comments below to outline some possible problems. 1. Commonly agreed to be better than approval. First I'd like to understand what is the target environment for the method. In the absence of any explanation I assume that we are looking for a general purpose method that could be used for many typical single-winner elections and other decision making in potentially competitive environments. Numerous people on this list may think that Condorcet methods are better. People may find also numerous other methods better than approval, but it may be more difficult to find many people with firm and similar opinions on them. 2. Commonly agreed to be simple for an average voter to feel that they understand what's going on. Different societies may have very different expectations here, depending on what they are used to. Maybe Condorcet voting (ranking) is considered simple enough. Maybe the voters need to understand only how to vote, not how to count the results. Some more reasons why people may have problems with signing the statement. - there is no statement yet - they don't understand or agree that these two targets would be the key targets (why just better than approval, what do the voters need to understand, what is simple) - they may think that there should be more targets or less targets - it might be easier to find an agreement on even smaller statements, one at a time - this proposal would not meet the needs of their own default target environment (maybe some specific society) (maybe their current method is already better) - they are afraid of making public statements that they might regret later - they don't want to take part in web campaigns in general (e.g. because their primary focus is in their academic or other career) - they are simply too uncertain and therefore stay silent - there might be one sentence in the statement that they don't like (or one method) - this initiative was not their own initiative - they have a personal agenda and this initiative does not directly support it (maybe some favourite method, or some particular campaign, maybe this initiative competes with their agenda) - technical arguments I hope you will find some agreements. But I'm not very hopeful if the target is to find an agreement of numerous persons on numerous questions. Maybe if the statement would be very simple. One approach would be to make a complete personal statement and then try to get some support to it (maybe with comments). Juho On 8.7.2011, at 19.47, Jameson Quinn wrote: I'm sorry, but aarrhh. I think that people on this list are smart, but this is pathetic. I don't mean to be hard on Dave in particular. But why is it impossible to get any two of us to agree on anything? I want to make a list of systems which are 1. Commonly agreed to be better than approval. 2. Commonly agreed to be simple for an average voter to feel that they understand what's going on. I am not asking each person who responds to choose the best or simplest system according to them. I'm asking everyone to vote in the poll and approve (rate higher than 0) all systems which meet those two very low bars. Hopefully, the result will be a consensus. It will almost certainly not be the two best, simplest systems by any individual's personal reckoning. As to the specific comments: 2011/7/8 Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com What I see: . Condorcet - without mixing in Approval. You need some cycle-breaker. Implicit approval is the only order-N tiebreaker I know; fundamentally simpler than any order-N² tiebreaker like minimax. You don't have to call it approval if you don't like the name. . SODA - for trying, but seems too complex. I disagree, but I'm biased. I feel that approve any number of candidates or let your favorite candidate do it for you; most approvals wins is easy to understand. But I can understand if people disagree, so I'm not criticizing this logic. . Reject Approval - too weak to compete. Worse than plurality JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
On Fri, Jul 8, 2011 at 9:47 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote: I'm sorry, but aarrhh. I think that people on this list are smart, but this is pathetic. I don't mean to be hard on Dave in particular. But why is it impossible to get any two of us to agree on anything? I want to make a list of systems which are 1. Commonly agreed to be better than approval. 2. Commonly agreed to be simple for an average voter to feel that they understand what's going on. I am not asking each person who responds to choose the best or simplest system according to them. I'm asking everyone to vote in the pollhttp://betterpolls.com/do/1425 and approve (rate higher than 0) all systems which meet those two very low bars. Hopefully, the result will be a consensus. It will almost certainly not be the two best, simplest systems by any individual's personal reckoning. Jameson, I think the answer depends on what you mean by better. (You may have defined that specifically in an earlier post, but if you did, I forgot it. Sorry!) I think we can break the evaluation of election methods down into three major categories: 1. Technical criteria 2. Complexity 3. Equipment requirements Technical criteria includes all those theoretical criteria that have been defined and discussed here for many years, such as Condorcet Criterion, monotonicity, etc. Complexity relates to the vote counting and/or transfer rules. As I wrote a couple days ago, I strongly suspect that any vote counting rules beyond simple addition will be extremely difficult to sell on a large scale. IRV may be a counterexample, but I suspect that (1) it has only been adopted in very liberal cities, and (2) it will never gain traction for major public elections. The more I think about it, the more I am starting to think that Range Voting is the answer. I'm sure Warren will be glad to hear that! One great advantage of Range is its ultra-simple counting rules. Its only real disadvantage is the equipment requirements, but those are not insurmountable. An open issue about Range is, of course, how many rating levels should be used. A natural choice is 10, but anything from about 5 to 10 or so seems reasonable to me. As I said before, I am very concerned about the large number of candidates in the Republican presidential primary. I would love to see Range Voting used there. That won't happen, of course, but if Republicans end up largely unhappy with their candidate (as they were with McCain), the silver lining to that could will be an opportunity to promote Range Voting to Republicans. --Russ P. -- http://RussP.us Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
just a quick comment on a minor point: IRV may be a counterexample, but I suspect that (1) it has only been adopted in very liberal cities, I don't think that's because they're liberal, per se, but rather because they were burned by the 2000 election. We'll see how it works after a conservative Nader throws a national election to the Democrats. (Of course, right now, Republicans go out of their way to at least apear to kow-tow to the conservative base, while Obama goes out of his way to at least appear to distinguish himself from the liberal base, so Republicans have far less need for a third-party candidate. But that can change.) JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
I agree that there are plenty of reasons, good and bad, for not signing on to any given statement. My plea is simply that people consider the reasons for signing it too. No joint statement will ever say exactly what each inidividual signator would have said, but I for one am still willing to make the effort. As for the specific concerns - which systems, how many, etc - several of those questions are touched on by the poll http://betterpolls.com/do/1425. 2011/7/8 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk There are many reasons why it is difficult to find a statement that numerous people on this list would be willing to sign. As you know there are probably as many different opinions on different methods as there are people on this list. There have been some related (inconclusive) discussions also earlier on this list. I'll write few comments below to outline some possible problems. 1. Commonly agreed to be better than approval. First I'd like to understand what is the target environment for the method. In the absence of any explanation I assume that we are looking for a general purpose method that could be used for many typical single-winner elections and other decision making in potentially competitive environments. Numerous people on this list may think that Condorcet methods are better. People may find also numerous other methods better than approval, but it may be more difficult to find many people with firm and similar opinions on them. 2. Commonly agreed to be simple for an average voter to feel that they understand what's going on. Different societies may have very different expectations here, depending on what they are used to. Maybe Condorcet voting (ranking) is considered simple enough. Maybe the voters need to understand only how to vote, not how to count the results. Some more reasons why people may have problems with signing the statement. - there is no statement yet - they don't understand or agree that these two targets would be the key targets (why just better than approval, what do the voters need to understand, what is simple) - they may think that there should be more targets or less targets - it might be easier to find an agreement on even smaller statements, one at a time - this proposal would not meet the needs of their own default target environment (maybe some specific society) (maybe their current method is already better) - they are afraid of making public statements that they might regret later - they don't want to take part in web campaigns in general (e.g. because their primary focus is in their academic or other career) - they are simply too uncertain and therefore stay silent - there might be one sentence in the statement that they don't like (or one method) - this initiative was not their own initiative - they have a personal agenda and this initiative does not directly support it (maybe some favourite method, or some particular campaign, maybe this initiative competes with their agenda) - technical arguments I hope you will find some agreements. But I'm not very hopeful if the target is to find an agreement of numerous persons on numerous questions. Maybe if the statement would be very simple. One approach would be to make a complete personal statement and then try to get some support to it (maybe with comments). Juho On 8.7.2011, at 19.47, Jameson Quinn wrote: I'm sorry, but aarrhh. I think that people on this list are smart, but this is pathetic. I don't mean to be hard on Dave in particular. But why is it impossible to get any two of us to agree on anything? I want to make a list of systems which are 1. Commonly agreed to be better than approval. 2. Commonly agreed to be simple for an average voter to feel that they understand what's going on. I am not asking each person who responds to choose the best or simplest system according to them. I'm asking everyone to vote in the pollhttp://betterpolls.com/do/1425 and approve (rate higher than 0) all systems which meet those two very low bars. Hopefully, the result will be a consensus. It will almost certainly not be the two best, simplest systems by any individual's personal reckoning. As to the specific comments: 2011/7/8 Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com What I see: . Condorcet - without mixing in Approval. You need some cycle-breaker. Implicit approval is the only order-N tiebreaker I know; fundamentally simpler than any order-N² tiebreaker like minimax. You don't have to call it approval if you don't like the name. . SODA - for trying, but seems too complex. I disagree, but I'm biased. I feel that approve any number of candidates or let your favorite candidate do it for you; most approvals wins is easy to understand. But I can understand if people disagree, so I'm not criticizing this logic. . Reject Approval - too weak to compete. Worse than plurality JQ
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Russ Paielli wrote: As I wrote a couple days ago, I strongly suspect that any vote counting rules beyond simple addition will be extremely difficult to sell on a large scale. IRV may be a counterexample, but I suspect that (1) it has only been adopted in very liberal cities, and (2) it will never gain traction for major public elections. The more I think about it, the more I am starting to think that Range Voting is the answer. I'm sure Warren will be glad to hear that! One great advantage of Range is its ultra-simple counting rules. Its only real disadvantage is the equipment requirements, but those are not insurmountable. An open issue about Range is, of course, how many rating levels should be used. A natural choice is 10, but anything from about 5 to 10 or so seems reasonable to me. As I said before, I am very concerned about the large number of candidates in the Republican presidential primary. I would love to see Range Voting used there. That won't happen, of course, but if Republicans end up largely unhappy with their candidate (as they were with McCain), the silver lining to that could will be an opportunity to promote Range Voting to Republicans. To me, Range remains a non-starter for political settings, though I can see some valid uses. I have implicitly argued that the real barrier to adoption of other voting method is simply the complexity of constructing one's ballot. Range voting is more complex than producing an ordering on candidates. For me the problem of determining my own utility for various candidates is quite perplexing; I can't imagine the ordinary voter finding it more pleasant. Range also exposes the possibility of strategic voting very explicitly to the voters. Only a chump casts a vote other than 0 or 10 on a 10-point scale. Range creates an incentive for dishonesty. So if the lazy voters are voting approval style because they don't want to sort out their utilities, and the motivated voters are voting approval style because that's the right strategy, who's left? It seems to me that we might as well have Approval and keep the ballots simple rather than use Range. -- Andrew attachment: andru.vcf Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
On Fri, Jul 8, 2011 at 3:56 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote: So, I guess the question is: is there anyone who would support Approval but not SODA? Respond in text. Also, I made a poll on betterpolls - go vote. http://betterpolls.com/v/1425 Wow, that results page is hard to read when the poll is about voting systems and the results are analyzed with lots of different voting methods. Very meta. In any case, I went and voted. I was pretty hard on SODA. Even though I like where it's going, I, like Kristofer, don't think it's been analyzed enough to become our endorsed system at this point. Let's keep working on it... Andy Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
The thing about SODA is that it's harder to get than Approval Voting. I haven't exactly read through all the posts on it here thoroughly but I've looked at the page - http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval - and I do find myself thinking What? All of its advantages over other systems may be within the posts on this board, but they are not that clear to me from reading the article. The method is explained and also the criteria it satisfies but I'm not happy that I've been convinced why it works. Why are the votes only delegable if you bullet vote (or is that obvious)? Also it seems like a lot of work for just the people who bullet vote (and also allow delegation). Do we know in practice what proportion of people do bullet vote in Approval Voting? Might SODA reduce this number anyway? From the page: If any candidate has an absolute majority at this point, or cannot possibly be beaten by any other candidate using the delegable votes and candidate rankings available, then they win immediately. Does absolute majority just mean over 50%? But with Approval 50% isn't a particular threshold. You can get over 50% and still be beaten. Maybe I'm just unclear on absolute majority, but it's been put as distinct from cannot possibly be beaten by any other candidate using the delegable votes and candidate rankings available. And it still seems strange to me that candidates pre-declare their delegation order but then still get to negotiate. Yes, there's an explanation, but I'm not really sure I get it. The system as it stands allows them to see, after the votes are counted, which of them deserves to win. That one will not delegate their votes, and the other one (of necessity) will. Couldn't there be a way in the system to decide who deserves to win (e.g. based on who would get more votes after the delegation or who had more to start with)? Also, just out of interest, is there a multi-winner version? From: Andy Jennings electi...@jenningsstory.com Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com Sent: Fri, 8 July, 2011 20:57:52 Subject: Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered? On Fri, Jul 8, 2011 at 3:56 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com wrote: So, I guess the question is: is there anyone who would support Approval but not SODA? Respond in text. Also, I made a poll on betterpolls - go vote. http://betterpolls.com/v/1425 Wow, that results page is hard to read when the poll is about voting systems and the results are analyzed with lots of different voting methods. Very meta. In any case, I went and voted. I was pretty hard on SODA. Even though I like where it's going, I, like Kristofer, don't think it's been analyzed enough to become our endorsed system at this point. Let's keep working on it... Andy Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
I can see the point about strategic range just being approval, but strategic First-Past-The-Post is just ignoring everyone except the top two candidates, and you wouldn't just cut out all other candidates in an election to make it simpler. (I think I nicked that point from Warren Smith). If range voting does still produce some honest voters then it might still give a better winner than approval. I suppose the main worry is that under First-Past-The-Post, people know that if they are voting for someone who's unlikely to win then they are wasting their vote, whereas under range voting, the best strategy isn't necessarily as obvious so people lose voting power by not understanding the ins and outs of tactical voting. To me, that's probably the biggest point against range voting. Having said that, if it's as simple as always give 0 or 10 (if it's out of 10), then I imagine it should catch on pretty quickly, although who to give the 0s and 10s to might not always be as obvious. But anyway, I would use range voting for multi-winner elections. For me the biggest problem is not which particular system we use to elect a single winner, but that there is a single winner that takes everything. When we had the referendum for Alternative Vote (Instant Run-off) in the UK, I think most people that preferred it to First-Past-The-Post agreed that it was just scratching the surface and that although it seemed nicer in principle it wouldn't really make much of a material difference (and generally for single-winner systems). And I think most people who voted for Alternative Vote really wanted a proportional system. Anyway, the point I was going to make is that I wonder what strategies people would adopt under a proportional range system - would it always be 0 or 10? From: Andrew Myers an...@cs.cornell.edu To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com Sent: Fri, 8 July, 2011 19:41:27 Subject: Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered? To me, Range remains a non-starter for political settings, though I can see some valid uses. I have implicitly argued that the real barrier to adoption of other voting method is simply the complexity of constructing one's ballot. Range voting is more complex than producing an ordering on candidates. For me the problem of determining my own utility for various candidates is quite perplexing; I can't imagine the ordinary voter finding it more pleasant. Range also exposes the possibility of strategic voting very explicitly to the voters. Only a chump casts a vote other than 0 or 10 on a 10-point scale. Range creates an incentive for dishonesty. So if the lazy voters are voting approval style because they don't want to sort out their utilities, and the motivated voters are voting approval style because that's the right strategy, who's left? It seems to me that we might as well have Approval and keep the ballots simple rather than use Range. -- Andrew Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
2011/7/8 Toby Pereira tdp2...@yahoo.co.uk The thing about SODA is that it's harder to get than Approval Voting. I haven't exactly read through all the posts on it here thoroughly but I've looked at the page - http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval - and I do find myself thinking What? All of its advantages over other systems may be within the posts on this board, but they are not that clear to me from reading the article. The method is explained and also the criteria it satisfies but I'm not happy that I've been convinced why it works. Why are the votes only delegable if you bullet vote (or is that obvious)? Because if you vote for several, which one would get to assign the delegated votes? Also it seems like a lot of work for just the people who bullet vote (and also allow delegation). Do we know in practice what proportion of people do bullet vote in Approval Voting? Bullet voting in Bucklin is strategically equivalent to bullet voting in Approval. In fact, approval would have if anything more bullet voting than Bucklin, because Approval gives no way except bullet voting to express a unique first preference. A quick search finds two results for bullet voting in Bucklin: In Alabama, for example, in the 16 primary election races that used Bucklin Voting between 1916 and 1930, on average only 13% of voters opted to indicate a second choice. and in a Spokane mayoral election 568 of the total of 1799 voters did not add second rank votes. That's a broad range, but certainly enough to see that it's significant. Might SODA reduce this number anyway? SODA takes away most of the strategic motivations NOT to bullet vote, so if anything it would lead to more bullet voting. From the page: If any candidate has an absolute majority at this point, or cannot possibly be beaten by any other candidate using the delegable votes and candidate rankings available, then they win immediately. Does absolute majority just mean over 50%? Yes. But with Approval 50% isn't a particular threshold. That's right. However, if most votes are bullet votes, then it is. Also, it is important when selling a system to just be able to say majority wins and not have to qualify it. Sure, there are people who are willing to listen to your explanation of why not, but there are a lot of people who aren't. You can get over 50% and still be beaten. Maybe I'm just unclear on absolute majority, but it's been put as distinct from cannot possibly be beaten by any other candidate using the delegable votes and candidate rankings available. That's right, these are two separate possibilities, but the rule is deliberately stated in a manner so that a reader who wasn't as aware as you would just read this as one case, so they don't feel that there are too many special cases. And it still seems strange to me that candidates pre-declare their delegation order but then still get to negotiate. Yes, there's an explanation, but I'm not really sure I get it. The system as it stands allows them to see, after the votes are counted, which of them deserves to win. That one will not delegate their votes, and the other one (of necessity) will. Couldn't there be a way in the system to decide who deserves to win (e.g. based on who would get more votes after the delegation or who had more to start with)? In real-world elections, with no more than a half-dozen viable candidates with the rest getting tiny handfuls of votes, it would be quite feasible to work out the unique rational strategy and have the system do it for them. This is not done for two reasons: 1. To allow a foregone kingmaker scenario. A non-winning candidate with a large pile of votes deserves to be a focus of media attention for a few days, and has earned the right to make minor and reasonable demands (on the order of a cabinet seat or two for their party, to serve at the pleasure of the executive). Remember, because the delegation order is pre-declared, the eventual result is almost fore-ordained; minor candidates do not have the power to get too greedy in their demands. And if they take the radical step of NOT sharing their delegated votes in the rationally-correct fashion, their voters would justly want to know why - and their party would suffer if they didn't have a good explanation. 2. As a check on the possibility of strategic declared rankings. In a 1-dimensional 3-candidate scenario, imagine one wing buried the center candidate and managed to be the apparent rational winner thereby. If the other candidates realize this, they can keep this trick from working, but only if their rational strategy is not automatic. Also, just out of interest, is there a multi-winner version? SODA outputs approval ballots (which can also be considered as 3-rank Bucklin ballots). Any proportional method with approval ballots as an input can then be used. With the number of dimensions on which such systems can vary, I could easily list two
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
--- En date de : Ven 8.7.11, Toby Pereira tdp2...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit : The thing about SODA is that it's harder to get than Approval Voting. I haven't exactly read through all the posts on it here thoroughly but I've looked at the page - http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/ Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval - and I do find myself thinking What? [end quote] Well hmm. I'm kind of looking at this article as a collection of things that have been said by SODA people. As a neutral intro to the method for people who don't know whether the inventors have any idea what they are talking about, it's kind of terrible. In particular that intro paragraph... I didn't want to go on. I'm going to abandon the neutral voice and talk as myself. Ahaha. Maybe the article should be forked. Have one concise, neutral version (like neutral neutral), and then the exciting one. Kevin Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
On Jul 8, 2011, at 12:47 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: I'm sorry, but aarrhh. I think that people on this list are smart, but this is pathetic. I don't mean to be hard on Dave in particular. But why is it impossible to get any two of us to agree on anything? I want to make a list of systems which are 1. Commonly agreed to be better than approval. We pretty much agree that approval is a step up from plurality - but most of us agree that we want a bigger step - but have trouble agreeing how to do that. 2. Commonly agreed to be simple for an average voter to feel that they understand what's going on. Voters should understand, but not necessarily be ready to do for themselves - leave that to whoever gets assigned to build the system. I am not asking each person who responds to choose the best or simplest system according to them. I'm asking everyone to vote in the poll and approve (rate higher than 0) all systems which meet those two very low bars. Hopefully, the result will be a consensus. It will almost certainly not be the two best, simplest systems by any individual's personal reckoning. As to the specific comments: 2011/7/8 Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com What I see: . Condorcet - without mixing in Approval. You need some cycle-breaker. Implicit approval is the only order-N tiebreaker I know; fundamentally simpler than any order-N² tiebreaker like minimax. You don't have to call it approval if you don't like the name. When you look close: . If approval thinking could get involved when there is a cycle, we must consider whether this will affect voters' thinking. . Will not the approval thinking affect what is extracted from the ballots. While there are many methods for resolving cycles, might we agree on: . Each cycle member would be CW if the other cycle members were set aside - why not demand that the x*x matrix that decided there was a cycle be THE source for deciding on which cycle member should be winner. . Remember that, when we are electing such as a senator or governor, retrieving new information from the ballots is a complication. . SODA - for trying, but seems too complex. I disagree, but I'm biased. I feel that approve any number of candidates or let your favorite candidate do it for you; most approvals wins is easy to understand. But I can understand if people disagree, so I'm not criticizing this logic. Your favorite candidate for, hopefully, getting elected is not necessarily one you would trust toward getting a good substitute elected. . Reject Approval - too weak to compete. Worse than plurality No - but we should be trying for something better. JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
2011/7/8 Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com On Jul 8, 2011, at 12:47 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: I'm sorry, but aarrhh. I think that people on this list are smart, but this is pathetic. I don't mean to be hard on Dave in particular. But why is it impossible to get any two of us to agree on anything? I want to make a list of systems which are 1. Commonly agreed to be better than approval. Oops, I meant plurality. We pretty much agree that approval is a step up from plurality - but most of us agree that we want a bigger step - but have trouble agreeing how to do that. It's not an irrevocable choice, it's just an endorsement. It would be great news if ANY good system were tried in a real, high-stakes single-winner election. . SODA - for trying, but seems too complex. I disagree, but I'm biased. I feel that approve any number of candidates or let your favorite candidate do it for you; most approvals wins is easy to understand. But I can understand if people disagree, so I'm not criticizing this logic. Your favorite candidate for, hopefully, getting elected is not necessarily one you would trust toward getting a good substitute elected. Agreed, although they would be worth trusting more often than not. But the point of SODA is that it's optional; if you don't trust them, don't delegate to them. . Reject Approval - too weak to compete. Worse than plurality No - but we should be trying for something better. Sure, try for the best. But support everything better than what we have. Because no system will ever be a consensus best, but many systems are consensus better. JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
On Fri, Jul 8, 2011 at 11:41 AM, Andrew Myers an...@cs.cornell.edu wrote: On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Russ Paielli wrote: As I wrote a couple days ago, I strongly suspect that any vote counting rules beyond simple addition will be extremely difficult to sell on a large scale. IRV may be a counterexample, but I suspect that (1) it has only been adopted in very liberal cities, and (2) it will never gain traction for major public elections. The more I think about it, the more I am starting to think that Range Voting is the answer. I'm sure Warren will be glad to hear that! One great advantage of Range is its ultra-simple counting rules. Its only real disadvantage is the equipment requirements, but those are not insurmountable. An open issue about Range is, of course, how many rating levels should be used. A natural choice is 10, but anything from about 5 to 10 or so seems reasonable to me. As I said before, I am very concerned about the large number of candidates in the Republican presidential primary. I would love to see Range Voting used there. That won't happen, of course, but if Republicans end up largely unhappy with their candidate (as they were with McCain), the silver lining to that could will be an opportunity to promote Range Voting to Republicans. To me, Range remains a non-starter for political settings, though I can see some valid uses. I have implicitly argued that the real barrier to adoption of other voting method is simply the complexity of constructing one's ballot. Range voting is more complex than producing an ordering on candidates. For me the problem of determining my own utility for various candidates is quite perplexing; I can't imagine the ordinary voter finding it more pleasant. Range also exposes the possibility of strategic voting very explicitly to the voters. Only a chump casts a vote other than 0 or 10 on a 10-point scale. Range creates an incentive for dishonesty. So if the lazy voters are voting approval style because they don't want to sort out their utilities, and the motivated voters are voting approval style because that's the right strategy, who's left? It seems to me that we might as well have Approval and keep the ballots simple rather than use Range. You raise an interesting point, Andrew. I vaguely recall discussing this very point years ago. From a strict mathematical/probabilistic perspective, you may be correct. But from a psychological perspective, maybe there's more to it. The most common complaint about Approval is that the voter is forced to rate his approved candidates all equally. Range obviously gets around that objection. I would consider rating some candidates off the limits. Does that make me a chump? Maybe. I'd probably rate my approved candidates from 8-10 and my disapproved candidates from 0-2, or something like that -- so at least I would not be a hard-core chump! --Russ P. -- http://RussP.us Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
Let me just elaborate on my concerns about complexity. Most of you probably know most of this already, but let me just try to summ it up and put things in perspective. Some of the participants on this list are advanced mathematicians, and they have been discussing these matters for years. As you all know, the topic of election methods and voting systems can get very complicated. As far as I know, there is still no consensus even on this list on what is the best system. If there is no consensus here, how can you expect to get a consensus among the general public? But let's suppose a consensus is reached here on the EM list. What happens next? You need to generate public awareness, which is a major task. As far as the general public is concerned, there is no problem with the voting system per se. Voters vote, and the votes are counted. The candidate with the most votes wins. What else do you need? So let's say we somehow manage to get widespread public awareness of the deficiencies of the current plurality system. Then what? Eventually, and actual change has to go through Congress. Try to imagine Senator Blowhard grilling the experts on the proposed rules of their favorite system. It would certainly be good for one thing: fodder for Jon Stewart and Steven Colbert! Also, consider the fierce opposition that would develop from any group that thinks they would suffer. And who might that be? How about the two major parties! Do you think they would have the power to stop it? For starters, they would probably claim that any complicated vote transfer algorithm cannot be used because it is not in the Constitution. I realize that IRV has garnered considerable support and success. I suppose that's a tribute to the open-mindedness of ultra-leftist enclaves such as SF and Berkeley. On the other hand, it just goes to show that a fundamentally flawed system can be sold in such enclaves. Sorry if I'm coming across as negative. I'm just trying to be realistic. I am a Republican, and I got interested again in the whole EM thing because of what I see happening in the Republican primary, with so many candidates to split the vote and so many potential voters seemingly oblivious to the problem. I wish there were a good, viable solution, but I just don't see it happening in the foreseeable future. --Russ P. On Thu, Jul 7, 2011 at 12:11 PM, Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.comwrote: Russ and Andrew each offer important thoughts. Russ is right that overly complex methods will likely get rejected - and I agree they deserve such, though Approval is not near to a reasonable limit. And Andrew is right that voters can accept something beyond Approval. Reviewing the steps as voters might think of them: . Approval is simply being able to voye for more than one, as if equals - easy to vote and easy to implement, but makes you wish for more. . Condorcet adds ranking, so you can vote for unequals such as Good that you truly like and Soso as second choice for being better than Bad, that you would happily forget. . Reasonable part of the ranking is ranking two or more as equally ranked. So I looked for what Andrew was referring to as CIVS - seems like it deserves more bragging than I have heard. Voters can easily get invited and vote via Internet in the flexibility doable that way. Read more at http://www.cs.cornell.edu/**andru/civs.htmlhttp://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/civs.html Seems like CIVS would be good to use as is in many places where voting via Internet makes sense - and shows using Condorcet - something adaptable to the way we normally do elections. Dave Ketchum On Jul 6, 2011, at 1:48 PM, Andrew Myers wrote: On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Russ Paielli wrote: ...I eventually realized I was kidding myself to think that those schemes will ever see the light of day in major public elections. What is the limit of complexity that the general public will accept on a large scale? I don't know, but I have my doubts that anything beyond simple Approval will ever pass muster -- and even that will be a hard sell. My experience with CIVS suggests that ranking choices is perfectly comprehensible to ordinary people. There have been more than 3,000 elections run using CIVS, and more than 60,000 votes cast. These are not technically savvy voters for the most part. To pick a few groups rather arbitrarily, CIVS is being used daily by plant fanciers, sports teams, book clubs, music lovers, prom organizers, beer drinkers, fraternities, church groups, PBeM gamers, and families naming pets and (!) children. If anything, to me ranking choices seems easier than Approval, because the voter doesn't have to think about where to draw the approve/disapprove cutoff, which I fear also encourages voters to think strategically. -- Andrew Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info -- http://RussP.us Election-Methods mailing list - see
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
On Jul 7, 2011, at 3:54 PM, Russ Paielli wrote: Let me just elaborate on my concerns about complexity. Most of you probably know most of this already, but let me just try to summ it up and put things in perspective. Some of the participants on this list are advanced mathematicians, and they have been discussing these matters for years. As you all know, the topic of election methods and voting systems can get very complicated. As far as I know, there is still no consensus even on this list on what is the best system. If there is no consensus here, how can you expect to get a consensus among the general public? Because we, hopefully, honor the different rules that make sense when we are voting for the public, rather than what you properly complain about. But let's suppose a consensus is reached here on the EM list. What happens next? You need to generate public awareness, which is a major task. As far as the general public is concerned, there is no problem with the voting system per se. Voters vote, and the votes are counted. The candidate with the most votes wins. What else do you need? Need to start, before listening to your words, with how to let the voters express their desires - something some of them realize need of already. So let's say we somehow manage to get widespread public awareness of the deficiencies of the current plurality system. Then what? Eventually, and actual change has to go through Congress. Try to imagine Senator Blowhard grilling the experts on the proposed rules of their favorite system. It would certainly be good for one thing: fodder for Jon Stewart and Steven Colbert! Congress is important for later - need to start with more lolcal targets. Also, consider the fierce opposition that would develop from any group that thinks they would suffer. And who might that be? How about the two major parties! Do you think they would have the power to stop it? For starters, they would probably claim that any complicated vote transfer algorithm cannot be used because it is not in the Constitution. Constitution? Anyway, need to have a plan to have some idea about who might agree/oppose. I realize that IRV has garnered considerable support and success. I suppose that's a tribute to the open-mindedness of ultra-leftist enclaves such as SF and Berkeley. On the other hand, it just goes to show that a fundamentally flawed system can be sold in such enclaves. Above you said selling would be undoable; here you say what should never get bought has demonstrated possibility of selling such? Dave Ketchum Sorry if I'm coming across as negative. I'm just trying to be realistic. I am a Republican, and I got interested again in the whole EM thing because of what I see happening in the Republican primary, with so many candidates to split the vote and so many potential voters seemingly oblivious to the problem. I wish there were a good, viable solution, but I just don't see it happening in the foreseeable future. --Russ P. On Thu, Jul 7, 2011 at 12:11 PM, Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com wrote: Russ and Andrew each offer important thoughts. Russ is right that overly complex methods will likely get rejected - and I agree they deserve such, though Approval is not near to a reasonable limit. And Andrew is right that voters can accept something beyond Approval. Reviewing the steps as voters might think of them: . Approval is simply being able to voye for more than one, as if equals - easy to vote and easy to implement, but makes you wish for more. . Condorcet adds ranking, so you can vote for unequals such as Good that you truly like and Soso as second choice for being better than Bad, that you would happily forget. . Reasonable part of the ranking is ranking two or more as equally ranked. So I looked for what Andrew was referring to as CIVS - seems like it deserves more bragging than I have heard. Voters can easily get invited and vote via Internet in the flexibility doable that way. Read more at http://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/civs.html Seems like CIVS would be good to use as is in many places where voting via Internet makes sense - and shows using Condorcet - something adaptable to the way we normally do elections. Dave Ketchum On Jul 6, 2011, at 1:48 PM, Andrew Myers wrote: On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Russ Paielli wrote: ...I eventually realized I was kidding myself to think that those schemes will ever see the light of day in major public elections. What is the limit of complexity that the general public will accept on a large scale? I don't know, but I have my doubts that anything beyond simple Approval will ever pass muster -- and even that will be a hard sell. My experience with CIVS suggests that ranking choices is perfectly comprehensible to ordinary people. There have been more than 3,000 elections run using CIVS, and more than
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
On 7/7/11 3:54 PM, Russ Paielli wrote: Let me just elaborate on my concerns about complexity. Most of you probably know most of this already, but let me just try to summ it up and put things in perspective. Some of the participants on this list are advanced mathematicians, and they have been discussing these matters for years. As you all know, the topic of election methods and voting systems can get very complicated. As far as I know, there is still no consensus even on this list on what is the best system. If there is no consensus here, how can you expect to get a consensus among the general public? ... So let's say we somehow manage to get widespread public awareness of the deficiencies of the current plurality system. Then what? Eventually, and actual change has to go through Congress. Try to imagine Senator Blowhard grilling the experts on the proposed rules of their favorite system. It would certainly be good for one thing: fodder for Jon Stewart and Steven Colbert! ... I wish there were a good, viable solution, but I just don't see it happening in the foreseeable future. --Russ P. Russ, I think you might be too focused on US presidential elections. Changing that will take a long time and it is not the place to start. There are lots of other kinds of elections that are also important and where it will be easier to make a change -- will not require a constitutional amendment, for starters. Party primaries seem like one possibility. I think that the way to make the change at the top level is first to get voters aware of and used to ranked-choice voting. That is why I implemented CIVS, for use by organizations at all scales. The specific details of what Condorcet completion method is used are not that important, I think. Many voters don't know or care how the electoral college works, despite 200+ years of its use. And the reasonable Condorcet variations are not more broken than the electoral college! Voters just need time to become comfortable with ranking choices instead of picking one. If you want to try CIVS out, by the way, I happen to be looking for feedback on a good book to use for a college freshman reading project, at: http://www.cs.cornell.edu/w8/~andru/cgi-perl/civs/vote.pl?id=E_6d3db58589520629akey=77b16251195da930 Cheers, -- Andrew attachment: andru.vcf Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
On 7.7.2011, at 22.54, Russ Paielli wrote: Also, consider the fierce opposition that would develop from any group that thinks they would suffer. And who might that be? How about the two major parties! Do you think they would have the power to stop it? If we assume that one of the main targets of political parties is to get lots of votes and lots of power, then any new election method that makes it possible that also other parties might win some seats in some elections are something that they clearly should oppose. From this point of view all attempts to make a two-party system less two-party oriented are doomed. Actually all administrational systems and organizations resist change for some very similar reasons. From individual representative point of view any changes in the election method are extremely risky since they themselves got elected with the old method. Changing that to something new might not elect them again. And the old method will, with good probability. IRV is interesting since it looks like a quite radical reform, but it clearly favours large parties. Fears of some small party winning a seat are much smaller in IRV than e.g. in Condorcet. That may be one reason why IRV has made some progress while Condorcet has not. What didi people think before the nowadays generally agreed idea that all countries should be democratic. Maybe some idealists discussed the possibility that one day ordinary people might rule the country. I'm sure many others laughed at them and told them that such changes are dangerous and will never work, particularly since they are not in the interest of the current rulers, nor any other rulers that might overthrow the current rulers. So reforms are just a joke and idealistic dreams like democracy will never work. There would quickly be some new rulers that would kick the poor commoners out and probably even kill them. Today many of us live in democracies and people can make changes if they so want. Actually that was the case already before the age of democracy. Changes were more difficult to achieve then. Now making such improvements should be comparably easy. And despite of having democracy the world is not perfect yet. Improvements are still possible. The key problem is actually, as you say, to agree on the targets, and make a model that majority of the rulers (voters) agree with, and that looks plausible enough so that people can start to believe in that change. I wish there were a good, viable solution, but I just don't see it happening in the foreseeable future. We will see. Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
On Thu, Jul 7, 2011 at 3:32 PM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote: What didi people think before the nowadays generally agreed idea that all countries should be democratic. Maybe some idealists discussed the possibility that one day ordinary people might rule the country. I'm sure many others laughed at them and told them that such changes are dangerous and will never work, particularly since they are not in the interest of the current rulers, nor any other rulers that might overthrow the current rulers. So reforms are just a joke and idealistic dreams like democracy will never work. There would quickly be some new rulers that would kick the poor commoners out and probably even kill them. I'll probably get a bit off topic here, but I think it is important to understand that democracy itself is almost worthless without Constitutionally guaranteed individual rights (as distinct from bogus group rights). That's what the American revolution was all about. The founders certainly did not want a pure democracy. They know very well where that majority rule would lead a tyranny of the majority. That's why they gave us the Bill of Rights. The main problem with our political system today is that far too few people understand what freedom and individual rights mean. The Bill of Rights is just the start of it. Property rights are essential to any real notion of freedom, and they are also essential to prosperity. When half the population thinks the gov't should take from those who have too much and give to others who don't have enough, we are in trouble. Yet that's exactly where we are. The greatest election methods in the world cannot save us from those kind of voters. Are some CEOs overpaid? Yes, I think some are. I happen to believe that some CEOs and boards are ripping off their own shareholders, and I would like to see the gov't do something to give shareholders more say in the matter. But the solution is not to just arbitrarily raise taxes on the rich, as so many want to do. People who don't understant the distinction are dangerous, because they fundamentally believe that the gov't really owns everything and let's us keep some of it out of sheer benevolence. If the gov't really owns everything, it owns you too. Today many of us live in democracies and people can make changes if they so want. Actually that was the case already before the age of democracy. Changes were more difficult to achieve then. Now making such improvements should be comparably easy. And despite of having democracy the world is not perfect yet. Improvements are still possible. The key problem is actually, as you say, to agree on the targets, and make a model that majority of the rulers (voters) agree with, and that looks plausible enough so that people can start to believe in that change. The fundamental problem now is that too many of us actually want to go back to a state in which gov't is our master rather than our servant. If gov't can arbitrarily take from you when it thinks you have too much, it is the master, and we are the servants. Why is that so hard for some to understand? --Russ P. -- http://RussP.us Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
On 6.7.2011, at 6.42, Russ Paielli wrote:
On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 2:14 AM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
On 5.7.2011, at 11.19, Russ Paielli wrote:
If one wants to simplify the inheritance rules even more then we might end
up using a tree method (I seem to mention it in every mail I send:). In that
approach there is no risk of having loops in the candidate transfer order.
Votes would be counted right away for each branch, and the candidate of the
largest brach of the largest branch of the ... would win.
That sounds interesting, but I'm not sure I understand what you mean. Can
you give an example?
Here's one example.
Tree of candidates + number of personal votes + sum of votes of candidates of
each branch:
Branch1 (13)
Branch1.1 (7)
A (4)
B (3)
Branch1.2 (6)
C (6)
Branch2 (18)
Branch2.1 (12)
D (5)
E (7)
Branch2.2 (5)
F (3)
G (2)
Branch2.3 (1)
H (1)
- Branch2 has more votes than Branch1 = Branch2 wins
- Branch2.1 has more votes than Branch2.2 and Branch2.3 = Branch2.1 wins
- candidate E has more votes than candidate D = candidate E wins
The tree approach thus forces the order of transfer to be non-cyclic. The
transfer order of candidate E is E D {F, G, H}.
The tree format can be printed on paper and it is easy to grasp. The ballot
sheet may also follow the same tree format. Branches may have names (e.g.
party names) or be unnamed. Left wing parties could join forces under one
branch. Candidates of one party could be divided in smaller groups. Or maybe
the branches have no party names and party affiliations, maybe just
descriptive names, maybe no branch names at all.
Thanks for the example, but I don't understand. Who decides what the branches
are, and based on what? Why is E transferring votes if E has the most votes?
And what are the counts after each transfer? Sorry if those are dumb
questions.
Maybe the method is simpler than you expected. It could be as well described as
a list based method where the parties can be internally split in smaller
groupings (or they can join also together in larger groups). My references to
vote transfers are just to explain how this method relates to methods that use
transfers in the vote counting process. The votes that E transfers are
actually not taken away from him but counted both for him and all the branches
that contain him (sorry about using such confusing terms). In this method one
can in a way transfer all the votes right away to the groups that some
candidate is part of. We thus just count the votes of each party / grouping
(i.e. sum up the votes to the candidates of that party). Votes are not
transferred (or summed up) to other candidates but to the branches of the
tree (= parties, groups) that represent all the candidates within them. The
formal vote counting rules will probably not use term transfer at all (maybe
sum instead).
The numbers in the example show the final counts, where the votes (that were
all given to the candidates) have been summed up. The vote counting rule starts
simply the biggest party gets the only seat. In this example Branch2 (=
party2 or wing2) is bigger than Branch1, and therefore the only available seat
goes to that party. (Note that the tree method could be used as well in
multi-member elections.) Then that single seat will be allocated within Branch1
to the biggest of the party internal branches, i.e. Branch2.1, and then to E
that has more votes than D.
The branches will be decided by the parties or whatever associations or
groupings the candidates and their supporters will form. Let's say that
Branch1.1 and Branch 1.2 are two left wing parties that nominated their
candidates ( {A, B} and {C} ) themselves and then decided to joins forces and
form a joint branch (Branch1) to beat the right wing candidates (that was not
enough though since the right wing parties did the same thing and got more
votes). Or in a two-party country like the U.S. this example would of course be
Branch1=Democrats, Branch2=Republicans, and then the candidates of these
parties would form some groups within that party. Branch2.1. could contain two
similar minded candidates from California. They joined together since they
understood that if they would both run alone, they would probably be spoilers
to each others and they could not win. Party internal groupings could thus be
arranged by the party itself or by the individual candidates that form the
sub-branch. It would depend on the election rules who is will formally nominate
such groups (party vs. already nominated candidates vs. whatever group of
candidates).
From strategic point of view it makes sense to form sub-brances (all the way to
a binary tree). Within Branch2 sub-branches Branch2.2 and Branch2.3 could have
also joined forces together (and add one extra level of hierarchy in the tree)
in
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Russ Paielli wrote: ...I eventually realized I was kidding myself to think that those schemes will ever see the light of day in major public elections. What is the limit of complexity that the general public will accept on a large scale? I don't know, but I have my doubts that anything beyond simple Approval will ever pass muster -- and even that will be a hard sell. My experience with CIVS suggests that ranking choices is perfectly comprehensible to ordinary people. There have been more than 3,000 elections run using CIVS, and more than 60,000 votes cast. These are not technically savvy voters for the most part. To pick a few groups rather arbitrarily, CIVS is being used daily by plant fanciers, sports teams, book clubs, music lovers, prom organizers, beer drinkers, fraternities, church groups, PBeM gamers, and families naming pets and (!) children. If anything, to me ranking choices seems easier than Approval, because the voter doesn't have to think about where to draw the approve/disapprove cutoff, which I fear also encourages voters to think strategically. -- Andrew attachment: andru.vcf Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
On 5.7.2011, at 11.19, Russ Paielli wrote:
If one wants to simplify the inheritance rules even more then we might end up
using a tree method (I seem to mention it in every mail I send:). In that
approach there is no risk of having loops in the candidate transfer order.
Votes would be counted right away for each branch, and the candidate of the
largest brach of the largest branch of the ... would win.
That sounds interesting, but I'm not sure I understand what you mean. Can you
give an example?
Here's one example.
Tree of candidates + number of personal votes + sum of votes of candidates of
each branch:
Branch1 (13)
Branch1.1 (7)
A (4)
B (3)
Branch1.2 (6)
C (6)
Branch2 (18)
Branch2.1 (12)
D (5)
E (7)
Branch2.2 (5)
F (3)
G (2)
Branch2.3 (1)
H (1)
- Branch2 has more votes than Branch1 = Branch2 wins
- Branch2.1 has more votes than Branch2.2 and Branch2.3 = Branch2.1 wins
- candidate E has more votes than candidate D = candidate E wins
The tree approach thus forces the order of transfer to be non-cyclic. The
transfer order of candidate E is E D {F, G, H}.
The tree format can be printed on paper and it is easy to grasp. The ballot
sheet may also follow the same tree format. Branches may have names (e.g. party
names) or be unnamed. Left wing parties could join forces under one branch.
Candidates of one party could be divided in smaller groups. Or maybe the
branches have no party names and party affiliations, maybe just descriptive
names, maybe no branch names at all.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
2011/7/4 Russ Paielli russ.paie...@gmail.com Thanks for the feedback, Jameson. After thinking about it a bit, I realized that the method I proposed probably suffers from strategy problems similar to IRV. But at least it avoids the summability problem of IRV, which I consider a major defect. OK, here's another proposal. Same thing I proposed at the top of this thread, except that voters can vote for more than one candidate, as in Approval Voting. How does that stack up? By the way, I took a look at SODA, and I must tell you that I don't consider it a practical reform proposal. It's way too complicated to ever be adopted for major public elections. The method I just proposed is already pushing the limit for complexity, and it is much simpler than SODA. The method you just proposed *is* SODA. That is, you've given the one-sentence summary, and SODA works out the details. Voters are used to the fact that laws typically have both a pithy name/goal and an actual content which is paragraphs of legalese. Even approval voting or plurality take paragraphs to define rigorously. JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
Russ, you said that SODA was too complicated. In my prior message, I responded by saying that it was actually pretty simple. But thanks for your feedback; I realize that the SODA page was not conveying that simplicity well. I've changed the procedure there from 8 individual steps to 4 steps - simple one-sentence overviews - with the details in sub-steps. Of these 4 steps, only step 1 is not in your proposal. And the whole of step 4 is just three words. The procedure is exactly the same, but I hope that this versionhttp://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval#Proceduredoes a better job of communicating the purpose and underlying simplicity of the system. Thanks, Jameson Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Has this idea been considered?
Hello, I was somewhat active on this mailing list for a short time several years ago. How is everyone doing? I have an idea for a single-winner election method, and it seems like a good one to me. I'd like to know if it has been considered before and, if so, what the problems are with it, if any. Here's how it works: The mechanics of casting a ballot are identical to what we do now (in the US anyway). Each voter simply votes for one candidate. After the votes are counted, the last-place candidate transfers his or her votes to the candidate of his or her choice. Then the next-to-last candidate does the same thing, and so on, until one candidate has a majority. The transfer of votes at the close of polling could be automated as follows. Weeks before the election, each candidate constructs a ranked list of his or her preferences for the other candidates. The resulting preference matrix could (should?) be published for the voters to see in advance. The bottom candidate at each round of transfers would then have his or her votes automatically transferred to the top remaining candidate in his or her preference list. The transfer of votes from the bottom finisher in each round resembles IRV, but note that this method is summable -- a major advantage over IRV, eliminating the need to maintain a record of each and every vote cast. I think it may also have other major strategy-deterring advantages over IRV. What do you think? Thanks. Russ P. -- http://RussP.us Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
A system based purely on candidates freely transferring their votes until a majority (or Droop quota) is reached is called Asset voting. I believe that Asset voting is a good system, though there are certainly those who'd disagree. It is also possible - and I'd say desirable - to combine aspects of Asset with other systems productively. One such proposal, SODAhttp://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/SODA, is currently my favorite practical reform proposal, something I have real hopes for. So I'd certainly say you have (reinvented) some good ideas here. With that said, I can see a couple of problems with this system right off. First off, bottom-up elimination is probably the worst feature of IRV, because there is a fairly broad range of situations where it leads inevitably to eliminating a centrist and electing an extremist, in a way that can clearly be criticized as spoiled (the centrist would have won pairwise) and nonmonotonic (votes shifting to the winner can cause them to lose). Secondly, a voter has no power to ensure that their vote is not transferred in a way they do not approve of. This second disadvantage compounds with the first, because a minority bloc will be eliminated early, and their votes transferred more than once before the final result. Cheers, Jameson 2011/7/4 Russ Paielli russ.paie...@gmail.com Hello, I was somewhat active on this mailing list for a short time several years ago. How is everyone doing? I have an idea for a single-winner election method, and it seems like a good one to me. I'd like to know if it has been considered before and, if so, what the problems are with it, if any. Here's how it works: The mechanics of casting a ballot are identical to what we do now (in the US anyway). Each voter simply votes for one candidate. After the votes are counted, the last-place candidate transfers his or her votes to the candidate of his or her choice. Then the next-to-last candidate does the same thing, and so on, until one candidate has a majority. The transfer of votes at the close of polling could be automated as follows. Weeks before the election, each candidate constructs a ranked list of his or her preferences for the other candidates. The resulting preference matrix could (should?) be published for the voters to see in advance. The bottom candidate at each round of transfers would then have his or her votes automatically transferred to the top remaining candidate in his or her preference list. The transfer of votes from the bottom finisher in each round resembles IRV, but note that this method is summable -- a major advantage over IRV, eliminating the need to maintain a record of each and every vote cast. I think it may also have other major strategy-deterring advantages over IRV. What do you think? Thanks. Russ P. -- http://RussP.us Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
Jameson Quinn wrote: With that said, I can see a couple of problems with this system right off. First off, bottom-up elimination is probably the worst feature of IRV, because there is a fairly broad range of situations where it leads inevitably to eliminating a centrist and electing an extremist, in a way that can clearly be criticized as spoiled (the centrist would have won pairwise) and nonmonotonic (votes shifting to the winner can cause them to lose). Secondly, a voter has no power to ensure that their vote is not transferred in a way they do not approve of. This second disadvantage compounds with the first, because a minority bloc will be eliminated early, and their votes transferred more than once before the final result. I wonder if it would be possible to mitigate the order-of-elimination problem by devising a constraint program of some sort. Something like: A candidate has links to it from other candidates according to the voters who voted the other candidate above him. A candidate has links away from it to other candidates according to the voters who voted him above the other candidates. Each candidate can hold a Droop quota's worth of voting power. Any excess is distributed to the candidates that candidate links to, proportional for each candidate to the strength of each link. Start by giving the candidates power equal to how many people voted them in first place. Then: evolve the system until some candidate gets a Droop quota through the mutual distribution. Perhaps this isn't always possible. I'm being a bit quick around the edges here. The general idea is to consider equilibria of some vote-distribution system so that the order in which the actual transfers are done matters less. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
Thanks for the feedback, Jameson. After thinking about it a bit, I realized that the method I proposed probably suffers from strategy problems similar to IRV. But at least it avoids the summability problem of IRV, which I consider a major defect. OK, here's another proposal. Same thing I proposed at the top of this thread, except that voters can vote for more than one candidate, as in Approval Voting. How does that stack up? By the way, I took a look at SODA, and I must tell you that I don't consider it a practical reform proposal. It's way too complicated to ever be adopted for major public elections. The method I just proposed is already pushing the limit for complexity, and it is much simpler than SODA. Regards, Russ P. On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 1:10 PM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote: A system based purely on candidates freely transferring their votes until a majority (or Droop quota) is reached is called Asset voting. I believe that Asset voting is a good system, though there are certainly those who'd disagree. It is also possible - and I'd say desirable - to combine aspects of Asset with other systems productively. One such proposal, SODAhttp://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/SODA, is currently my favorite practical reform proposal, something I have real hopes for. So I'd certainly say you have (reinvented) some good ideas here. With that said, I can see a couple of problems with this system right off. First off, bottom-up elimination is probably the worst feature of IRV, because there is a fairly broad range of situations where it leads inevitably to eliminating a centrist and electing an extremist, in a way that can clearly be criticized as spoiled (the centrist would have won pairwise) and nonmonotonic (votes shifting to the winner can cause them to lose). Secondly, a voter has no power to ensure that their vote is not transferred in a way they do not approve of. This second disadvantage compounds with the first, because a minority bloc will be eliminated early, and their votes transferred more than once before the final result. Cheers, Jameson 2011/7/4 Russ Paielli russ.paie...@gmail.com Hello, I was somewhat active on this mailing list for a short time several years ago. How is everyone doing? I have an idea for a single-winner election method, and it seems like a good one to me. I'd like to know if it has been considered before and, if so, what the problems are with it, if any. Here's how it works: The mechanics of casting a ballot are identical to what we do now (in the US anyway). Each voter simply votes for one candidate. After the votes are counted, the last-place candidate transfers his or her votes to the candidate of his or her choice. Then the next-to-last candidate does the same thing, and so on, until one candidate has a majority. The transfer of votes at the close of polling could be automated as follows. Weeks before the election, each candidate constructs a ranked list of his or her preferences for the other candidates. The resulting preference matrix could (should?) be published for the voters to see in advance. The bottom candidate at each round of transfers would then have his or her votes automatically transferred to the top remaining candidate in his or her preference list. The transfer of votes from the bottom finisher in each round resembles IRV, but note that this method is summable -- a major advantage over IRV, eliminating the need to maintain a record of each and every vote cast. I think it may also have other major strategy-deterring advantages over IRV. What do you think? Thanks. Russ P. -- http://RussP.us Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info -- http://RussP.us Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?
On 5.7.2011, at 3.09, Russ Paielli wrote: Thanks for the feedback, Jameson. After thinking about it a bit, I realized that the method I proposed probably suffers from strategy problems similar to IRV. But at least it avoids the summability problem of IRV, which I consider a major defect. I agree that if IRV is interesting then also this method is. Some IRV related problems remain but you will get summability, clear declarations of candidate preferences, very simple voting and ability to handle easily large number of candidates. You could say that this method is also an improvement of TTR (similar voting, but has ability to pick the winner in one round only, maybe smaller spoiler problem). If people don't like the preference list given by their favourite candidate, one could nominate additional fake candidates to offer additional preference lists. If the preference list of candidate A is ABC, then thee could be an additional (weaker) candidate A1 whose preference order would be A1ACB. One possible extension would be to allow candidates that are afraid that they would be spoilers (that reduce the votes of a stronger favourite candidate too much so that he will be eliminated too early) to transfer their votes right away. The preference list could have a cutoff. Preference list ABCDE (of candidate A) would be interpreted so that votes to A would be added right away also to the score of B and C (but not D and E). If A gets transferred votes from some other candidates, they will be transferred further (to candidates not mentioned above cutoff in the original transfer list) only after A has been eliminated. (One could use this trick also in regular IRV.) If one wants to simplify the inheritance rules even more then we might end up using a tree method (I seem to mention it in every mail I send:). In that approach there is no risk of having loops in the candidate transfer order. Votes would be counted right away for each branch, and the candidate of the largest brach of the largest branch of the ... would win. OK, here's another proposal. Same thing I proposed at the top of this thread, except that voters can vote for more than one candidate, as in Approval Voting. How does that stack up? You should define that method a bit more in detail. I started wondering if it would allow candidate X to win if he asked also 100 of his friends to take part in the election and transfer their votes to him. Juho By the way, I took a look at SODA, and I must tell you that I don't consider it a practical reform proposal. It's way too complicated to ever be adopted for major public elections. The method I just proposed is already pushing the limit for complexity, and it is much simpler than SODA. Regards, Russ P. On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 1:10 PM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com wrote: A system based purely on candidates freely transferring their votes until a majority (or Droop quota) is reached is called Asset voting. I believe that Asset voting is a good system, though there are certainly those who'd disagree. It is also possible - and I'd say desirable - to combine aspects of Asset with other systems productively. One such proposal, SODA, is currently my favorite practical reform proposal, something I have real hopes for. So I'd certainly say you have (reinvented) some good ideas here. With that said, I can see a couple of problems with this system right off. First off, bottom-up elimination is probably the worst feature of IRV, because there is a fairly broad range of situations where it leads inevitably to eliminating a centrist and electing an extremist, in a way that can clearly be criticized as spoiled (the centrist would have won pairwise) and nonmonotonic (votes shifting to the winner can cause them to lose). Secondly, a voter has no power to ensure that their vote is not transferred in a way they do not approve of. This second disadvantage compounds with the first, because a minority bloc will be eliminated early, and their votes transferred more than once before the final result. Cheers, Jameson 2011/7/4 Russ Paielli russ.paie...@gmail.com Hello, I was somewhat active on this mailing list for a short time several years ago. How is everyone doing? I have an idea for a single-winner election method, and it seems like a good one to me. I'd like to know if it has been considered before and, if so, what the problems are with it, if any. Here's how it works: The mechanics of casting a ballot are identical to what we do now (in the US anyway). Each voter simply votes for one candidate. After the votes are counted, the last-place candidate transfers his or her votes to the candidate of his or her choice. Then the next-to-last candidate does the same thing, and so on, until one candidate has a majority. The transfer of votes at the close of polling could be automated as follows. Weeks before
