Re: [Election-Methods] elect the compromise
From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] As I see it, without doing a rigorous analysis -- far from it! -- the contribution to each fund by each voter would rationally be their utility for that fund's candidate winning, should they wish to share the burden of their own caucus. The tragedy of the commons could apply to this. More specifically, their max contribution would be equal to the difference in utility between the option in question and the expected outcome of the election. There is however still a negotiation step: A: 100, B: 80, C: 20 These people need the per voter payout to exceed $20 for them to shift from A to B A: 0, B: 80, C: 20 Each of these people would be willing to contribute $80 to shift the winner to B from A (Actually, since they get their share of the payout, they will actually be willing to pay $145 each.? If B wins, they lose $145 but then get a payout share of $65 meaning that a B win costs them $80.? I will ignore this effect as it makes it more complex.? It is also a free rider inducing effect though). Assuming 100 voters, there is 80*45 = $3600 available for bids to shift the result to B. The total effective payout to the first faction needs to be $20*55 = $1100. At what point should the first faction switch?? The second faction won't pay more than $80 each but that represents more than 3 times as much as the minimum the first faction will accept. This is where negotiation may be necessary.? Also, for negotiation, accurate knowledge of the potential outcomes are necessary.? Where there are more than 3 options, it may not be clear which options have a chance of winning and also how much they are valued by the other factions. There is no possibility for betrayal in this -- except, of course, that corrupt trustees could abscond with the funds, but ordinary escrow could be used for the funds. There are some free rider issues with the proposal.? It is in the interests of each of the members of the first group not to bid and hope that enough others bid.? The question is if the fa system could handle that.? On each level of the chain, people would be known and it may be hard to pull out.? At the leaf levels, your proxy might ring you up to remind you to bid (and point out that if he doesn't get 80% of his clients to bid, he will make his proxy look bad).? Also, both sides suffer from free rider problems.? There will be members of the first faction who switch at $20 and members of the second faction who won't bid enough.? Perhaps, ?the 2 effects would cancel. Tabarrok proposed what he called dominant insurance contracts.? This may have applications here.? A betting market also achieves the above more directly.? Even without using the market itself to select the winner, trading on the market should make every voter indifferent to the outcome. Raphfrk Interesting site what if anyone could modify the laws www.wikocracy.com Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- Unlimited storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] elect the compromise
Dear Forest! Binding agreements will not solve the problem completely I think. Assume the situation is this, with 4 candidates A,B,C,D of which 3 (A,B,D) have each received 1/3 of the vote, and with the following preferences over lotteries: A: A 100, C 80, BD 0 B: B 100, C 80, AB 0 D: D 100, C 80, AB 0 (The number 80 in the first row means A prefers getting C for certain to getting A with 80% and B or D with 20% probability.) Now if one of the three bluffs by claiming not to consider C a good compromise, the other two still gain by signing an agreement to transfer their probability share to C. Hence each of the three has an incentive to bluff if she can hope the other two will probably sign the agreement anyway. The only solution seems to be that at least one of them announces that she won't sign an agreement with only one other but only with both others. But such an announcement would only be credible if that candidate would at the same time represent her rating for the compromise as something between 34 and 49 instead of 80. In any case, it seems that also with binding agreements it depends on what information the candidates have about the other's preferences... Yours, Jobst Forest W Simmons schrieb: Jobst, I'm not sure how to define rational in this context, either. As for the prisoner's dilemma problem, I wonder if the possibility of defection could be eliminated by having trading parties sit down and sign binding agreements during formal trading. My Best, Forest Jobst Heitzig wrote: Dear Forest, Perhaps candidates should be required to publish their range ballots before the election, and their trading of assets should be required to be rational relative to these announced ratings? I had this idea, too. But upon closer inspection, it is not quite easy to define what in this case rational means, since in this form of trading there easily arise situations similar to the prisoner's dilemma and situations in which bluffing could work... Yours, Jobst Or perhaps, a randomly chose jury of candidate X supporters should have some say in the candidate X proxy decisions? Forest Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] elect the compromise
At 10:33 PM 9/5/2007, Forest W Simmons wrote: As for the prisoner's dilemma problem, I wonder if the possibility of defection could be eliminated by having trading parties sit down and sign binding agreements during formal trading. The concept that I was brought to by this discussion can be expressed in this: The citizens of this community form an FA/DP organization; such organizations encourage universal membership by (1) making membership easy and of minimal burden, (2) not taking any controversial positions as an organization, and (3) facilitating coordination and cooperation between factions that can form over any issue, by utilizing the concentration of representation through chosen proxies, who do not issue binding orders, but only distribute advice to their clients (as well as receiving information about client ideas and preferences). So, in the subject election, there are two factions, which can naturally be represented by two proxies, though more can certainly be at the table. These proxies negotiate a suggested compensation between the factions, and, in theory, it is possible, because this is a positive-sum game (i.e, there is an option which, if the ratings represent commensurable utilities, optimizes the overall gain, though it may not optimize the individual gain of each faction, unless there is some transfer of compensation) which makes the optimal choice a gain for all factions; it is possible but not necessary that this gain be evenly distributed. *However,* the success of this negotiation will be measured by the election. What the negotiation does is to establish three funds, one for each of the outcomes. Thus there is the A fund, the B fund, and the C fund. Citizens contribute to the funds according to what outcome they prefer, they can contribute to more than one fund, should they choose, though it makes no sense to contribute to all of the funds. If the election is won by A, then the A fund is distributed to all citizens who voted. If by B, the B fund it distributed, and if by C, the C fund is distributed. The contributions to the other funds are returned to those who contributed. Now the funds by themselves would be pretty chaotic. However, the key would be that FA/DP negotiation would set suggested contributions for each faction, and the FA structure would likewise monitor performance, and donors to any fund could change their contribution under certain rules, up until a certain deadline, perhaps the day before the election. Come election day, all voters would know what they would receive from each election outcome. There is no legal obligation to contribute to any fund. However, if the negotiation has been successful, all voters will have a motive to vote, probably, for the utility optimizer. Whatever other utilities there exist (non-financial) would, in theory, have been balanced by the compensation, and, if the distribution is even, the overall utility winner will be the one most advantageous to all voters. Rationally, it should be unanimous. Such a system is not going to induce voters to vote for something they consider truly repugnant short of that, however, it will compensate them sufficiently, by definition. It's true that they may not get what they would personally deem enough to have induced them to vote for that option, but, remember, the initial conditions supposed uniform ratings within each of the two factions. As I see it, without doing a rigorous analysis -- far from it! --, the contribution to each fund by each voter would rationally be their utility for that fund's candidate winning, should they wish to share the burden of their own caucus. The tragedy of the commons could apply to this. However, if the B voters refuse to contribute to the C fund, they will have only themselves to blame for the victory of A, and this regret would be individual, and they would each know if they had made sufficient effort, on average. The members of the A faction, seeing the poor contribution level to the C fund, will likewise not make contributions to the A and C funds. They will know, from the FA/DP organization, that they are in the majority, and they can get what they want -- if the election rules allow the majority to prevail -- without resorting to compensation. If the election method is majoritarian, then, what would mostly happen is that B voters, understanding their situation, contribute to the C fund -- if the real commensurable utilities are the ones originally given as ratings. They only have to pay if C wins (more accurately, they get their contributions money back if C does not win.) There is no possibility for betrayal in this -- except, of course, that corrupt trustees could abscond with the funds, but ordinary escrow could be used for the funds. The proxies sitting down to negotiate on behalf of their factions would presumably have some idea of what their clients would actually be willing to
Re: [Election-Methods] elect the compromise
Dear Forest, Perhaps candidates should be required to publish their range ballots before the election, and their trading of assets should be required to be rational relative to these announced ratings? I had this idea, too. But upon closer inspection, it is not quite easy to define what in this case rational means, since in this form of trading there easily arise situations similar to the prisoner's dilemma and situations in which bluffing could work... Yours, Jobst Or perhaps, a randomly chose jury of candidate X supporters should have some say in the candidate X proxy decisions? Forest Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise (correction)
There are deterministic method related tracks that have not been discussed so far. It is possible to use the uncertainty involved in the polls. The votes need not be exactly 55% and 45% but there can be some uncertainty on which one of the two groups is bigger. The A supporters may vote ACB instead of ACB to increase the probability of electing C in the case that the A group will not have majority. (The method could use e.g. approval cutoff, different preference strengths, ratings.) I think this works also with the near perfect information assumption. Probabilities depend on the level of nearness. Juho P.S. I assume the challenge is now to elect only good compromise candidates On Aug 30, 2007, at 16:37 , Howard Swerdfeger wrote: Forest W Simmons wrote: Below where I said unlike Borda I should have said unlike D2MAC. Neither the Borda solution nor the reverse plurality solution requires anything other than the ordinal preferences. So the deterministic solutions that do not depend on some form of vote trading are insensitive to whether or not the voters are inclined to approve C. Perhaps we could refine the challenge to ask for methods that elect C with near certainty when the two factions are 55 A 100 C 80 B 0 45 B 100 C 80 B 0 but almost surely do not elect C with when the two factions are 55 A 100 C 20 B 0 45 B 100 C 20 B 0 assuming throughout optimal strategical voting under near perfect information. It seems to me that vote trading and/or randomness are needed to solve this challenge. I am inclined to agree with you. however, I am not willing to give up hope on a third type of method yet. I would say that on a lower level you need A method that makes it optimal for an individual voter to vote with true preference. the 3 methods I have noticed identified so far are vote trading, randomized ballots, and hiding information from the voter. your assumption of near perfect information obviously eliminates the last one. Both of the methods that are left reduce to giving the voters good reason to vote the truth. I think it is a good idea to keep that in mind when devising future systems. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info ___ Try the all-new Yahoo! Mail. The New Version is radically easier to use The Wall Street Journal http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise
Dear Abd ul-Rahman, the ratings that Jobst fed us as a distraction. You're doing it again -- please stop it. That was not an insult. It made the challenge more interesting. I'm sorry that you thought it critical. I don't think it was insulting. You just repeatedly attribute opinions or intentions to me which are not mine. I explained several times how the ratings are meant to have more meaning than just rankings. I also don't think you were critical here, but I certainly invite you to be it! The only thing I wish is that you try to be post shorter messages, since I really have trouble to read that much! Yours, Jobst Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise
At 04:23 AM 8/30/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote: The only thing I wish is that you try to be post shorter messages, since I really have trouble to read that much! Sorry, don't have time! Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise (correction)
Below where I said unlike Borda I should have said unlike D2MAC. Neither the Borda solution nor the reverse plurality solution requires anything other than the ordinal preferences. So the deterministic solutions that do not depend on some form of vote trading are insensitive to whether or not the voters are inclined to approve C. Perhaps we could refine the challenge to ask for methods that elect C with near certainty when the two factions are 55 A 100 C 80 B 0 45 B 100 C 80 B 0 but almost surely do not elect C with when the two factions are 55 A 100 C 20 B 0 45 B 100 C 20 B 0 assuming throughout optimal strategical voting under near perfect information. It seems to me that vote trading and/or randomness are needed to solve this challenge. Forest W Simmons wrote: I was thinking of vote against one, which could be called Reverse Plurality, the base method for each step of the Coombs sequential elimination method. Equivalently, it could be described as, vote for exactly two candidates. This method would elect C because the 45 in favor of B would have no reason to vote against B or C, so they would all vote against A. If the other 55 voted more against C than B, then B would win, so they will vote more against B than C, which allows C to win. Unlike Borda, this solution works even if the ratings for C are low: 55 ACB 45 BCA I'm not advocating Reverse Plurality, but it is perhaps the simplest deterministic solution to the challenge. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise
At 07:37 PM 8/29/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote: the ratings that Jobst fed us as a distraction. You're doing it again -- please stop it. That was not an insult. It made the challenge more interesting. I'm sorry that you thought it critical. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise
At 01:07 AM 8/27/2007, rob brown wrote: On 8/26/07, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED][EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: At 02:59 AM 8/26/2007, rob brown wrote: Vote trading generally means the ballots can't be secret, so elections would be inherently corruptible by anyone with money. This is commonly assumed. But it probably is not true. First of all, the ballots don't have to be personally identified, all that is necessary is that the winner be known. Ok, so here you seem to be saying that, it is not necessary to keep ballots secret to prevent buying an election No, that's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that one can buy an election with secret ballots, in fact. It can be done now, there are legal ways to do it. But what you can't do is to buy it *in a corrupt manner* with secret ballots. You have to do it openly. The vote trading mentioned would involve a payment or performance of whatever is agreed upon based on the *result* of the election, not on any specific vote. And, of course, this makes it fair. If expensive. However, given the conditions we were working on, *this kind of fair vote trading or buying would be affordable. *By definition.* The value is there, there are large numbers of voters who presumably see that value -- that's what the ratings must mean if they are other than word salad -- and so it is merely a matter of organizing them to make the offer, and of letting the other side know. And of course, it would be best to *negotiate* the deal, so that you aren't just wasting your time. This is why I'm so interested in Free Associations with Delegable Proxy. They could pull off this kind of trick. It could radically transform politics. And the kicker is that it would work with Plurality. You don't need Range do do it. But you would get Range results, or even better (i.e., the compensatory payments or agreements would more evenly distribute the benefit of social utility maximization). If I'm agreeing to pay $X if A wins, I'm paying for a result, not for a vote. Who do I pay it to? That's a good question, isn't it? Well, the answer is simple...you don't. It doesn't work. You've just shown why, counter to what you suggested above, buying large elections is near impossible when the ballots are secret. No, it's not only not impossible, it is done all the time! But we don't think of it as vote buying. We think of it as convincing the public that something good will happen if they vote a certain way. Shall the Town approve the big shopping center? The developers not only promise jobs and the like, they also offer to fund certain town projects. It moves the voters to approve the project, perhaps. If the measure doesn't pass, they don't fund the project. Simple. Obviously, in a non-secret ballot election, you would pay individuals to vote for your candidate, not pay all of the voters for the final result. *This* only works if your payments are secret. If they are public, it can quite easily backfire, and you end up paying out what you promised -- or defaulting -- and getting nothing. Private payments are graft and corruption. The kind of payments I'm suggesting could be looked at -- and which are legal *now* without changes in law -- would be public, or at least not secret or hidden, nor would they be payments for a vote, as such, but for a result. (And I use payments as a convenient term, here, to cover any kind of compensation.) Private payments in close elections can shift the result toward something desired by the payer, often utilizing the votes of people who would not even bother voting without the payment. The vast majority of voters get nothing. But in this case, if we suppose the initial conditions described, the A voters could, for example, agree to accept a payment from the B voters, collectively. The B voters can afford it! (Unless they are collectively impoverished and not merely somewhat so, seriously so. They receive four times the benefit of the choice of C as do the A voters. There's a lot of room for disparity in ability to pay there. And, indeed, next time it might be other voters paying *them*. Generally, we would be talking about such large numbers of voters that single individuals with great wealth could make a dent, but not dominate. As the old saying goes, God must love the poor because he made so many of them. The poor, collectively, are not all that poor. Consider some of the most impoverished third-world countries in the world, with corrupt leaders extracting great wealth from them. They have to have it for him to extract it! If they could pool their resources, if that were practical, they could outspend him. But they don't have the tools, so they are isolated and thus effectively powerless, except for unintelligent mass movements that are more like riots.) It is up to you to calculate whether or not your payments to individuals would be likely enough to get your candidate elected
Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise
On 8/25/07, Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: So there are two main devices for solving the challenge: vote trading and randomness. There is a third one! One of the oldest voting methods that have been studied can also solve it at least in part. I wonder who will first see what I mean :-) I tend to be in agreement with Forest that vote trading and randomness are the only solutions. I have no clue what you are thinking of, but I suspect when I hear it I'm going to think its in the range of what I'd consider cheating. :) Randomness is a weird oneit is great that it can get people to vote honestly, but then it can just pick the wrong one. Vote trading generally means the ballots can't be secret, so elections would be inherently corruptible by anyone with money. Not good. And I wouldn't think it would be ok given your problem description, which is for a single election. ButI suppose if we were able to talk about mulitple elections, where a voter can earn credit for compromising which can be spent in later elections, you could build that into the system in a way that doesn't require losing the secretness, and would solve this problem nicely. Obviously range voting would solve this problem perfectly, if only humans were eusocial animals -- most of us being sterile worker-people, whose only Darwinian interest was the good of the collective. Sadly, we're not, so range voting is (in my opinion) best left to bees and the like. ( http://rangevoting.org/ApisMellifera.html) Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise
At 02:59 AM 8/26/2007, rob brown wrote: Vote trading generally means the ballots can't be secret, so elections would be inherently corruptible by anyone with money. This is commonly assumed. But it probably is not true. First of all, the ballots don't have to be personally identified, all that is necessary is that the winner be known. If I'm agreeing to pay $X if A wins, I'm paying for a result, not for a vote. Who do I pay it to? Well, remember, I only have to pay if I get what I want. Do I really care? But how much moneh would it take to pay off all the voters who, perhaps, register for the payment prior to the election. (To collect, they would have to be on the list of those who actually voted.) Normally, a lot of money. What is offensive about vote-buying is the secrecy of it, and that only some people get paid when all suffer the outcome. In the situations where these payments make sense, though, it would not be a large amount of money *per voter*. In any case, I'll leave it to someone else to work out the details. Suffice it to say that it is *not* plutocracy. Too much money is involved! Not good. And I wouldn't think it would be ok given your problem description, which is for a single election. It's okay if the voters accept it! And if they don't, they don't get paid! (Even if they accept the offer and the candidate doesn't win that someone was willing to compensate for, there is no payment. But probably no loss, either.) Essentially, the given situation was one where all voters would agree that C was a good compromise. (I argued that we could not exactly tell this from the ratings, but, with certain assumptions, this would be the case.) The B voters gain very substantial value from the election of C, whereas the A voters lose only a little. Thus it makes sense for the B voters to compensate the A voters, the majority, for giving up their majority rights, to accept a choice of lesser value to them. And it would make sense for the A voters to accept the compensation that shifted the *net* utility to them such that C becomes their optimum choice. There are other forms of utility shift that could be employed. C could make certain promises, could agree to include, as an example, A in his government. A, as the representative of the A faction, could agree on their behalf to accept some compromise which not only improves overall social utility -- which ultimately benefits everyone if maximization is general policy -- but also at least preserves utility for the majority. (Asset Voting could have this kind of result). ButI suppose if we were able to talk about mulitple elections, where a voter can earn credit for compromising which can be spent in later elections, you could build that into the system in a way that doesn't require losing the secretness, and would solve this problem nicely. Perhaps. It could get very complicated very quickly, and it results in the past binding the present, a problem we already have in many ways. If the voter has credit, by the way, how do we know to apply the credit? Talk about complicated! Obviously range voting would solve this problem perfectly, if only humans were eusocial animals -- most of us being sterile worker-people, whose only Darwinian interest was the good of the collective. We are far more that than seems to be realized. Not sterile, to be sure. But very much social animals. Most of us, most of the time. Sadly, we're not, so range voting is (in my opinion) best left to bees and the like. ( http://rangevoting.org/ApisMellifera.htmlhttp://rangevoting.org/ApisMellifera.html) The argument here is that, because Range Voting is a perfect solution if people vote sincerely, which is conveniently left undefined, it is therefore a bad solution if they vote selfishly. There is no basis for this claim. Simulations don't confirm it. It's ironic, really. Range Voting *to some degree, not completely,* collapses to Approval Voting, under certain conditions with allegedly selfish voters. This is a feature, not a bug! Approval Voting is quite a good method! And it is quite easy to improve Range in ways that should encourage more use of intermediate votes, which does, quite likely, improve performance. But even without these little touches, and with strategic voting, which in Range only means what I call truncating the ratings, not preference reversal, Range still does very well. By the only real performance measures we have, so far: the simulations. (Election Criteria are generally *not* performance measures, they don't generate measures, rather each one is either satisfied or not. And evaluating methods by looking at a list of criteria and seeing how many are satisfied is obviously quite defective, for some criteria are, I think we would agree, more important than others. How do we know which ones are most important? It's quite subjective. However, there is a criterion that could
Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise
Dear Forest, The main thing I overlooked was vote trading. So there are two main devices for solving the challenge: vote trading and randomness. There is a third one! One of the oldest voting methods that have been studied can also solve it at least in part. I wonder who will first see what I mean :-) Jobst suggested a way of combining them: asset voting with random ballot as the base method, so that probabilities are traded. Right. That could solve the problem: With Random Ballot, A and B will win with 55% and 45% probability, respectively. If Candidates A and B agree to trade their power by transferring their complete share of the probability to C, both factions will gain. There is only one problem left: If candidates are allowed to trade also parts of their power, C will not be elected with certainty since then A and B will only offer to transfer a part of their probability large enough so that the other faction will still gain somewhat (details to come). We could also combine them into a DYN version of D2MAC. The basic ballots are DYN ballots. Voters decide Yes/No for each candidate that they feel sure about, and then Delegate the remaining Y/N votes to one of the candidates, presumably their favorite. After all of the Y/N votes have been completed by the proxies, two ballots are drawn at random. If there is a candidate that was (either directly or by proxy) voted Yes on both ballots, then the common Yes candidate with the greatest number of Y's (from the other voters or their proxies) is elected. Otherwise the favorite (i.e. proxy candidate) of the first drawn ballot chooses the winner. That's just an idea meant to stimulate exploration of further possibilities. A very nice idea in my view! One could even let the candidates know what the direct votes are and communicate with each other and let them sign contracts what candidates they will approve of. This would give them also some means of asset trading... Yours, Jobst _ Der WEB.DE SmartSurfer hilft bis zu 70% Ihrer Onlinekosten zu sparen! http://smartsurfer.web.de/?mc=100071distributionid=0066 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise
Dear Kevin, Hi, It seems to me there might be a use for something like the method that was proposed awhile ago that had to do with offering voters incentives to give sincere ratings. For example, the majority would give the sincere score to their compromise in exchange for their vote having greater effect in reducing the win odds of their least favorite candidate. If they rate their compromise too high, the loss of win odds from favorite to compromise outweighs the value of the corresponding lessened odds of the worst candidate. And vice versa for rating the compromise too low. Hmm, I don't think I understand how this works, either. It would have to be a non-majoritarian method in order to solve the problem, of course. Yours, Jobst ___ Jetzt neu! Schützen Sie Ihren PC mit McAfee und WEB.DE. 3 Monate kostenlos testen. http://www.pc-sicherheit.web.de/startseite/?mc=00 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
