At 10:33 PM 9/5/2007, Forest W Simmons wrote: >As for the prisoner's dilemma problem, I wonder if the possibility of >"defection" could be eliminated by having trading parties sit down and >sign binding agreements during formal trading.
The concept that I was brought to by this discussion can be expressed in this: The citizens of this community form an FA/DP organization; such organizations encourage universal membership by (1) making membership easy and of minimal burden, (2) not taking any controversial positions as an organization, and (3) facilitating coordination and cooperation between factions that can form over any issue, by utilizing the concentration of representation through chosen proxies, who do not issue binding orders, but only distribute advice to their clients (as well as receiving information about client ideas and preferences). So, in the subject election, there are two factions, which can naturally be represented by two proxies, though more can certainly be at the table. These proxies negotiate a suggested compensation between the factions, and, in theory, it is possible, because this is a positive-sum game (i.e, there is an option which, if the ratings represent commensurable utilities, optimizes the overall gain, though it may not optimize the individual gain of each faction, unless there is some transfer of compensation) which makes the optimal choice a gain for all factions; it is possible but not necessary that this gain be evenly distributed. *However,* the success of this negotiation will be measured by the election. What the negotiation does is to establish three funds, one for each of the outcomes. Thus there is the A fund, the B fund, and the C fund. Citizens contribute to the funds according to what outcome they prefer, they can contribute to more than one fund, should they choose, though it makes no sense to contribute to all of the funds. If the election is won by A, then the A fund is distributed to all citizens who voted. If by B, the B fund it distributed, and if by C, the C fund is distributed. The contributions to the other funds are returned to those who contributed. Now the funds by themselves would be pretty chaotic. However, the key would be that FA/DP negotiation would set suggested contributions for each faction, and the FA structure would likewise monitor performance, and donors to any fund could change their contribution under certain rules, up until a certain deadline, perhaps the day before the election. Come election day, all voters would know what they would receive from each election outcome. There is no legal obligation to contribute to any fund. However, if the negotiation has been successful, all voters will have a motive to vote, probably, for the utility optimizer. Whatever other utilities there exist (non-financial) would, in theory, have been balanced by the compensation, and, if the distribution is even, the overall utility winner will be the one most advantageous to all voters. Rationally, it should be unanimous. Such a system is not going to induce voters to vote for something they consider truly repugnant.... short of that, however, it will compensate them sufficiently, by definition. It's true that they may not get what they would personally deem enough to have induced them to vote for that option, but, remember, the initial conditions supposed uniform ratings within each of the two factions. As I see it, without doing a rigorous analysis -- far from it! --, the contribution to each fund by each voter would rationally be their utility for that fund's candidate winning, should they wish to share the burden of their own caucus. The tragedy of the commons could apply to this. However, if the B voters refuse to contribute to the C fund, they will have only themselves to blame for the victory of A, and this regret would be individual, and they would each know if they had made sufficient effort, on average. The members of the A faction, seeing the poor contribution level to the C fund, will likewise not make contributions to the A and C funds. They will know, from the FA/DP organization, that they are in the majority, and they can get what they want -- if the election rules allow the majority to prevail -- without resorting to compensation. If the election method is majoritarian, then, what would mostly happen is that B voters, understanding their situation, contribute to the C fund -- if the real commensurable utilities are the ones originally given as ratings. They only have to pay if C wins (more accurately, they get their contributions money back if C does not win.) There is no possibility for betrayal in this -- except, of course, that corrupt trustees could abscond with the funds, but ordinary escrow could be used for the funds. The proxies sitting down to negotiate on behalf of their factions would presumably have some idea of what their clients would actually be willing to put up, as well as what they would be willing to accept if their preferred option is not chosen.... ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
