Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election
Dear Juho! You wrote: I could imagine a voting system that might address this issue for larger groups, but it isn't Range. One could have elections that take into account e.g. proportionality in time (that could be called one kind of reciprocity) (favour a republican after a democrat, favour other pizzas after pepperoni). Try D2MAC! It does precisely that in the long run :-) Yours, Jobst _ Der WEB.DE SmartSurfer hilft bis zu 70% Ihrer Onlinekosten zu sparen! http://smartsurfer.web.de/?mc=100071distributionid=0066 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election
On Sat, 22 Dec 2007 22:46:17 -0800 rob brown wrote: On Dec 22, 2007 8:04 PM, Jan Kok [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: ... Yes, some people might vote weak preferences in their first Range Voting election, then learn their lesson when their preference lost and they would vote strongly thereafter. But I sort of wonder about the intelligence of people who would cast a *weak* vote for some choice X, and then get upset when X lost. What were they thinking when they voted?!? Well, I once again mention the 2000 election. Someone who likes Nader best, Gore second best, and Bush the least would probably say Oh cool! Before, I couldn?t say that I liked Nader best because it would take my vote away from Gore who really needs it. Now with this newfangled Range voting system I can express that. I?ll give 100 to Nader, 80 to Gore, and 0 to Bush. Woo hoo! And then Gore loses, just like he did with Plurality. But what other voters do also matters. What exactly have you guys solved again? The thing is, even more so that plurality, Range ASKS people to vote honestly. I didn?t feel dishonest at all when I voted for Gore (even though I liked Nader better. I just felt like I was giving a vote to the candidate that could best use it. (some, of course, people feel otherwise, and interpret a plurality to mean I like this candidate best) Range, however, has a strong implication that you are SUPPOSED to express more rich preferences than, say, approval. After all, why else would they go to the expense of offering the more complex ballot? I know that?s an opinion, and is psychological speculationbut I *am * a UI designer, and psychological speculation is what I do. :) By the way, I?m not about to go on a crusade to implement Range Voting for two-choice elections. I don?t think the benefit of perhaps slightly better outcomes would be worth the effort and cost. I?m just responding to Rob?s question: Yes, I think there could be _some_ benefit, sometimes, to using RV in binary-choice elections. Well, if range is implemented, I?d assume it would apply to two candidate elections as well, wouldn?t it? Sure - we start with two candidates and Plurality. Then we get into trouble when there are, sometimes, more than two candidates. So we look for a method suitable for two, or more, candidates, such as: Approval - cannot rank 3 candidates as best, worst, and soso (matters when voter wants to indicate best is better than soso AND soso is better than worst). Condorcet - allows any number of ranks plus equal ranking such as Approval offers. IRV - like Condorcet, excluding equal ranking and occasionally awarding disappointing choices as to winner. Range - like Condorcet but uses ratings instead of ranks. Ratings give finer control than ranks, but demand that voters learn to assign them effectively. My point, however, is that on two candidate elections, where you don?t have the potential for cycles and all these other problems you have with multicandidate elections, it makes more clear the absurdity (in my opinion) of asking people to weaken their vote. The ability of the methods above to handle more than two candidates does not demand any weakening of votes when there are only two candidates. People already have the ability to not vote. I skip candidates and propositions I don?t know much about or care much about. Here in san francisco, I even get to rank candidates, and will rank candidates equally if that?s how I feel. But if I actually have a preference, I will express it as strongly as I can. This puzzles. I understand that San Francisco has ranking via IRV - but assume that it does not permit equal ranking, which IRV has trouble implementing. I think people already feel like their vote doesn?t count for much. Expecting them to reduce it further is nuts, in my opinion. With 3-or-more choice elections, I think the benefits of Range Voting would be HUGE. Understood. Disagree. Range and Condorcet give benefits whenever there are more than two seriously contending candidates. -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election
On Dec 23, 2007 11:43 AM, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: And then Gore loses, just like he did with Plurality. But what other voters do also matters. Surely you understood that I had considered that others might do the same thing. The point is, the issue of vote splitting with plurality is there with range as well. People already have the ability to not vote. I skip candidates and propositions I don?t know much about or care much about. Here in san francisco, I even get to rank candidates, and will rank candidates equally if that?s how I feel. But if I actually have a preference, I will express it as strongly as I can. This puzzles. I understand that San Francisco has ranking via IRV - but assume that it does not permit equal ranking, which IRV has trouble implementing. I allows you to express a first choice but treat second and third as equal. If I had my way, it would be condorcet, and would allow equal rankings at any position. I will, however, say I much prefer IRV to plurality, and think it is a step in the right direction. First we had runoff elections (which people seemed to understand), then we have an automated version of the same that involves ranking candidates, and hopefully in the future we will have a better way of tabulating it that also uses ranked candidates. As much as I understand the imperfections of IRV, it still thrills me to get to rank candidates. With 3-or-more choice elections, I think the benefits of Range Voting would be HUGE. Understood. Disagree. I think people already feel like their vote doesn?t count for much. Range and Condorcet give benefits whenever there are more than two seriously contending candidates. I am well aware that with 3 candidates there are problems that are not there in two candidate elections. ( http://karmatics.com/voting/movienite.htmlsums up my view on this) To be clear, I think Condorcet (and related things like DSV) addresses them (if imperfectly), while Range doesn't come close. Approval is somewhere in the middle. My point in talking about two candidate elections is that the main differentiating effect Range has (allowing people to voluntarily express their opinion with less than maximum weight) could equally apply to two candidate elections as well. By looking at it where the complexities of 3-candidate elections are absent, its absurdity might be more apparent. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election
On Dec 23, 2007 10:49 AM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Now bak to the question. Majority vote may often not yield the optimum outcome (from some chosen high level theoretical viewpoint) but majority vote may well be considered to be the best practical method for competitive two candidate elections. Yeah, well that is pretty much my opinion. With the exception that the high level theoretical viewpoint that supports Range (whether in 2 candidate elections or ones with 3 or more), by ignoring the competitive nature of elections, makes it a pretty non-useful theory for elections held among human beings, who have a history of being rather competitive by nature ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War ). It works pretty good for predicting how non-competive eusocial animals such as bees might want to hold elections, however. ( http://rangevoting.org/ApisMellifera.html , http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eusociality ) Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election
On Dec 23, 2007, at 22:52 , rob brown wrote: On Dec 23, 2007 10:49 AM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Now bak to the question. Majority vote may often not yield the optimum outcome (from some chosen high level theoretical viewpoint) but majority vote may well be considered to be the best practical method for competitive two candidate elections. Yeah, well that is pretty much my opinion. With the exception that the high level theoretical viewpoint that supports Range (whether in 2 candidate elections or ones with 3 or more), by ignoring the competitive nature of elections, makes it a pretty non-useful theory for elections held among human beings, who have a history of being rather competitive by nature ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ War ). It works pretty good for predicting how non-competive eusocial animals such as bees might want to hold elections, however. ( http://rangevoting.org/ApisMellifera.html , http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eusociality ) Works with humans too. Three friends living in different places might agree to meet at a place that has equal distance to all three homes. Or they might select a place that minimizes the sum of the distances (maybe they will share the travelling costs). Parents could agree to watch a Disney movie with their child although they might like a war movie more themselves. In that case they are maybe seeking a solution that maximizes the worst of the three personal utilities. There are many functions that can be used in determining the optimum outcome. But in politics / competitive situations rules of course tend to be different. And the election methods should be chosen accordingly. Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election
On Dec 23, 2007 2:00 PM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Works with humans too. Three friends living in different places might agree to meet at a place that has equal distance to all three homes. Or they might select a place that minimizes the sum of the distances (maybe they will share the travelling costs). What you are describing is very different from what happens with eusocial animals. A situation where a small number of people can work things out, and where reciprocity plays into it (i.e. you got your way last time, etc) is completely, totally different from the type of situation where voting is needed, such as a large scale election where most of the voters don't know one another. What you describe isn't eusociality, which is the complete lack of self interest found in animals that don't reproduce directly. A 100% rational, self-interested person may wish to allow someone else to get their way when preference strengths differ, with the expectation that it will be reciprocated when the preference strengths are reversed. But a large election has no mechanism for reciprocity. I could imagine a voting system that might address this issue for larger groups, but it isn't Range. Parents could agree to watch a Disney movie with their child although they might like a war movie more themselves. Parents and children are, from a Darwinian perspective pretty much the same as eusocial animals, motivation-wise. The children's interests are almost completely aligned with the interests of the parents, since the children are the vector for the parents getting their genes into future generations. In my view, all motivation can be traced back to the attempt to get genes into future generations. But in politics / competitive situations rules of course tend to be different. And the election methods should be chosen accordingly. I'm with you there. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election
Just a quick followup to Abd, since I think my message may have gotten lost in a long post of interspersed replies. I still want to ask a very, very simple question, and I don't think you answered it. But this time I will go to some extra effort to make sure it is interpreted for the simple question it was intended to be. Everyone seems to want to turn it into something more complex than it is. Maybe I'm wrong, but all appearances are that some people are trying to avoid the question or obscure the issue. Say you've got an election for two candidates. They may be people running for office, or it may be an issue that is being voted for (for instance, maybe citizens of a territory are voting on whether they would like to be annexed as a state). But the point is, there are only two options, and there is no possibility of there being more options. There were never primaries to narrow down candidates, or anything of the type. If you are tempted to come up with some scenario where there might be more options or have been more options, or to otherwise bring other complexities into the picture, please resist it. It is a two candidate election. Let's further assume that there are a large enough number of voters that we can assume that most don't know one another. This isn't a pizza party or a local club, but a large scale vote. Also assume that while some people are somewhat on the fence, a lot of others have very strong feelings about it on one side or the other. And assume anyone is welcome to abstain from voting. So once again, the question is this: In this case, do you consider a majority vote optimum? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election
At 01:32 AM 12/22/2007, rob brown wrote: Your example is for more than two candidates. Well, it might seem that way. But there are really only two choices that make any sense. The third pizza type was in there simply to make the normalization scores make sense. If it's not there, there is a problem, and we will get to that. I am not questioning that when there are more than two candidates, it is a different situation. But there are plenty of possibilities for there to be an election where there really are only two candidates, and that is what my question was about. Actually, that situation is rare in true democratic process. When it happens, it is artificial, and typically represents a loss of democracy, a compromise, which has been made in the name of efficiency. While I appreciate that most electionsat least political electionsmay have more than two potential candidates, I was trying to restrict it to a simpler case. But there is always a third potential option, which is None of the above. In true democratic process, at face-to-face meetings, unless special rules have been implemented (which Robert's Rules advises rather strongly against), there is *never* a two-candidate election where there is no third option, which is *no* result. The exception: the two candidates are Yes or No. And even there a majority can create any number of other options. Say your pizza voters are going to watch a DVD, and the only choices are the two movies from Netflix that are in the mailbox. It's really just two candidates sometimes. But couldn't they decide not to watch a DVD at all? Maybe talk. But, sure, if there are only two possibilities you then have a *real* problem with what is called normalization error in the theory of Range Voting. Of course in a small group there are much different dynamics. Reciprocity comes into play. People tend to be a lot more altrusitic towards their friends or people they are close to. I think these issues are quite a bit different in larger elections. Rob is coming to a major point: the difference between elections in a small group and in a large group. However, remember, above, he wants to simplify the question. Now, it seems, there may be some desire to complicate it. Yes, it gets more complicated in large groups. My own work, in fact, is to treat this disease, the isolation and separation of people that is the cause of this lack of altruism. I don't, myself, call it altruism: we all benefit from living in a society where people care about each other. However, if we are studying election methods, I would think that the study would start with methods that work when people vote sincerely, with concern for the public welfare. If a method does not work well with people being honest and open and caring, how would we expect it to work when under *difficult* conditions? Obviously, the conditions are not the same, and thus, when applied in difficult environments, special considerations may be needed. But, remember the basic question here: simple two-candidate election. What is the best outcome? Can the best outcome be found with a simple majority vote on two candidates only? It's quite clear that the *general* answer is no. Many examples can be shown where the majority first preference, if we assume this is how the majority votes in this case, is not the best outcome. But this, then can raise the question Rob raised, of fairness. I gave the pizza example because fairness, in fact, *requires* that we set aside the majority preference. It is not claimed that this would *always* be true, but merely that the situations exist and are even reasonably common where this is the case. Generally, most people will agree to give up a small benefit in favor of a large benefit to others. And life can get pretty ugly, pretty fast, when people don't. I have the right of way, driving down a street, with some level of traffic. I see a car coming out of a driveway, seeking to enter the street. I could drive on, assuming that *someone* later would let this car in, or maybe I don't care at all. Or I could stop and let the car in. Small loss to me (and small loss to those behind me, maybe -- maybe not, depends -- larger gain to the car needing to enter. Now, democratic process is necessarily deliberative. Otherwise we get, in fact, the tyranny of the majority, without the majority ever realizing what it is doing. If it's three people and that pizza, they will surely talk about it, and they won't even vote, they will find consensus informally. But what if it is three thousand people, with one thousand people feeling just like each of the original three? Does the best outcome change? Whether or not there is a practical way to find that outcome is another story. Range Voting is not an ultimate solution, full-on consensus process is it. That, allegedly, suffers from serious efficiency problems, but ... I look at that
Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election
On Dec 22, 2007 8:04 PM, Jan Kok [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: And then they'd probably stop by his house on the way home and burn it to the ground. :-) A good illustration of people having a strong preference, eh? :-) G - [Z] voters wouldn't care as much, and would tend to concentrate on other issues on the candidates' platforms. ... vs. having a weak preference... Yes. Strong and weak preferences (for issues) are definitely expressed in representative democracy (well, not so much in the burning his house down sense, but still). Not very efficiently, but it does work overall. Anyway... it seems we can tune these examples to appeal to more or less selfish voters. For example, what if I substituted cancer for MS in my earlier MS-vs.-cold cure example? Then I think most people would prefer to cure cancer. What if it was breast cancer? Then maybe some misogynist men would prefer to cure colds. Yes, I wasn't trying to miss your point there, I just thought you could use a better example. I think if someone actually found a complete cure for the common cold, that person would be celebrated more than someone who cured MS. But I know what you are getting atsomething that would affect a lot of people a little, vs. something that would affect a few people a lot. I think voting directly on such things just doesn't work right under any sort of democracy (at least as long as each issue is voted on separately). And I think that the idea that range voting would magically fix that problem is a nice fantasy, but nothing more. Sure, they might well do so in the first few elections. Until their candidate loses, and they realize that some on the other side had more voting power because they voted with max values. They would feel suckered. Then they'll say screw this being nice crap and from then on be strategic voters. Yes, some people might vote weak preferences in their first Range Voting election, then learn their lesson when their preference lost and they would vote strongly thereafter. But I sort of wonder about the intelligence of people who would cast a *weak* vote for some choice X, and then get upset when X lost. What were they thinking when they voted?!? Well, I once again mention the 2000 election. Someone who likes Nader best, Gore second best, and Bush the least would probably say Oh cool! Before, I couldn't say that I liked Nader best because it would take my vote away from Gore who really needs it. Now with this newfangled Range voting system I can express that. I'll give 100 to Nader, 80 to Gore, and 0 to Bush. Woo hoo! And then Gore loses, just like he did with Plurality. What exactly have you guys solved again? The thing is, even more so that plurality, Range ASKS people to vote honestly. I didn't feel dishonest at all when I voted for Gore (even though I liked Nader better. I just felt like I was giving a vote to the candidate that could best use it. (some, of course, people feel otherwise, and interpret a plurality to mean I like this candidate best) Range, however, has a strong implication that you are SUPPOSED to express more rich preferences than, say, approval. After all, why else would they go to the expense of offering the more complex ballot? I know that's an opinion, and is psychological speculationbut I *am * a UI designer, and psychological speculation is what I do. :) By the way, I'm not about to go on a crusade to implement Range Voting for two-choice elections. I don't think the benefit of perhaps slightly better outcomes would be worth the effort and cost. I'm just responding to Rob's question: Yes, I think there could be _some_ benefit, sometimes, to using RV in binary-choice elections. Well, if range is implemented, I'd assume it would apply to two candidate elections as well, wouldn't it? My point, however, is that on two candidate elections, where you don't have the potential for cycles and all these other problems you have with multicandidate elections, it makes more clear the absurdity (in my opinion) of asking people to weaken their vote. People already have the ability to not vote. I skip candidates and propositions I don't know much about or care much about. Here in san francisco, I even get to rank candidates, and will rank candidates equally if that's how I feel. But if I actually have a preference, I will express it as strongly as I can. I think people already feel like their vote doesn't count for much. Expecting them to reduce it further is nuts, in my opinion. With 3-or-more choice elections, I think the benefits of Range Voting would be HUGE. Understood. Disagree. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election
On Dec 21, 2007, at 7:41 AM, Jan Kok wrote: I personally have voted on bylaws or platform issues at political conventions, where I wanted to cast a weak vote rather than a strong yes or no vote. The reason was that I had only a weak opinion, and would have preferred to let those with strong opinions have their way - but if nearly everyone had only weak opinions, then I might as well register my opinion and participate in the decision. Then there's Yeats's counter-argument. The best lack all conviction, while the worst Are full of passionate intensity. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
