Re: [EM] No geographical districts

2008-09-11 Thread Juho

On Sep 5, 2008, at 2:26 , Raph Frank wrote:


On Thu, Sep 4, 2008 at 10:13 PM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

The simplest (not necessarily optimal) approach to implement multiple
dimensions is one where you simply elect representatives starting  
from the
ones with strongest support (e.g. best candidate of the largest  
party in the
largest district), skip candidates that can not be elected any  
more (e.g.
district already full, party already full), and continue until all  
seats
have been filled. At some point in the chain all requirements of  
all
dimensions are met if they are strong enough (and if there are  
suitable

candidates left).


I would probably elect the weakest of each party's strongest
candidates, e.g. find the strongest candidate from each party and then
assign a seat to that weakest of them.


Why weakest? What is the weakest of each party's strongest candidates?

Juho




Once a party gets its allocation of seats, it can't be assigned any  
more.


This is to allow small parties fill in their seats before large
parties can lock them out.

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Re: [EM] No geographical districts

2008-09-11 Thread Juho

On Sep 5, 2008, at 4:00 , Stéphane Rouillon wrote:


Hello Juho,

using age, gender or other virtual dimension to build virtual  
districts

replaces geographic antagonism by generation antagonism.


Ok, also that may happen. Each society should pick dimensions that  
suit them best. (I'm just listing different options.)


The idea is to get equivalent sample that are not opposed by  
intrinsec construction.


If the intention is not to divide people to groups that defend the  
interests of that group (or just feel like being part of the same  
group), then one could get rid of the districts altogether and use  
only one nation wide district.


Thus we may find neutral decision takers that will minimize the  
overall
bad impacts of a decision, thus maximize to the best of their  
knowledge
the decisions for all the electorate. If you split representative  
into groups who have divergent opinions, the result will not  
optimize common interest, it will only illustrate the rapport de  
force
(maybe translated as power struggle) between the representatives.  
Age representatives would hardly stay neutral while deciding  
retirement fees and pensions for example.


The Irish senate based on profession seems one step toward getting  
neutral decision takers

for deciding the localization of projects for example.
I prefer equivalent samples of the entire electorate (phone numbers  
or hash tables using names could work too, but it has some slight  
discrepancies and problems...)


Yes, if one wants to avoid any groupings (like age groups, regional  
groups, races, political parties) then maybe electing a random set of  
citizens (trying to avoid giving them the opportunity to organize  
themselves) could be the best approach. Some groupings are however  
likely to emerge afterwards even if we would elect the  
representatives by some random selection method.


Juho



From: Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Election Methods Mailing List [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] No geographical districts
Date: Fri, 5 Sep 2008 00:13:34 +0300

Geographical proportionality is one specific dimension. Most  
other  dimensions could be called political dimensions. Also  
groupings that  do not live in any specific compact area could be  
called political  groupings. In principle they could form a party  
and that way get a  proportional number of representatives. (This  
is also in line with  the geographical proportionality related  
target of guaranteeing  representation from all _geographic_ areas.)


Many political systems have chosen geographical districts to be  
fixed  in the sense that people automatically vote for the  
district where  they live in. In the political dimension people  
are typically allowed  to pick the group that they want to  
represent them.


It is possible to have election methods that support multiple   
dimensions, i.e. more than these two. One could e.g. simply have   
multiple orthogonal party structures and then in the vote  
counting  process force the representatives to be elected so that   
proportionality will be respected in all dimensions.


There could be also additional fixed dimensions like automatic   
fixed sex or age based proportionality.


Some of the additional dimensions could also be virtual  
districts  in the sense that each voter would be registered in  
exactly one of  them, and probably also vote only for candidates  
that belong to one's  own virtual district. I understood that  
you would use virtual  districts to replace the current  
geographical districts (and the  geographical proportionality that  
they represent).


The simplest (not necessarily optimal) approach to implement  
multiple  dimensions is one where you simply elect representatives  
starting  from the ones with strongest support (e.g. best  
candidate of the  largest party in the largest district), skip  
candidates that can not  be elected any more (e.g. district  
already full, party already full),  and continue until all seats  
have been filled. At some point in the  chain all requirements  
of all dimensions are met if they are strong  enough (and if there  
are suitable candidates left).


(Some dimensions could be one-directional in the sense that one  
would  aim at guaranteeing  at least a proportional share of the  
seats but  would not limit them to this number. For example one  
could allow all  members of some minority to require proportional  
representation by  marking this in their ballot. Other voters  
would however not be  required to vote either for or against this  
minority. Any candidate  (or any party, of any regions etc.) could  
belong to this group. One  should however not allow these lists to  
overrule party  proportionality or other complete dimensions (to  
avoid riding under  two flags (party and minority) and getting  
also corresponding  double representation).)


Small ad here too. Trees (hierarchical candidate lists) offer   
multiple dimensions in a simplified

Re: [EM] No geographical districts

2008-09-11 Thread Raph Frank
On 9/11/08, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  Why weakest? What is the weakest of each party's strongest candidates?

It means find the candidate in each party with the highest vote.
These are the party's stongest candidates.

You then assign the seat to the weakest of them (but only if the party
is entitled to another seat).

My thinking was that if you assign them in a different order, you
could end up with a situation where a small party cannot be assigned a
seat that they are entitled to as they only ran in a few districts and
those districts have already been filled.

By assigning to the weakest party first, the chances of that are lessened.

A larger party would likely have someone running in all
constituencies, so should have someone to take their seats near the
end.

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Re: [EM] No geographical districts

2008-09-05 Thread Raph Frank
On 9/5/08, Stéphane Rouillon [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/public/get_involved/submission/R/ROUILLON-65
  You are welcome to comment. At least I hope you have fun reading it if you
 find the time.

Your implementation of IRV is non-standard (though I agree with the
none of the above change and it is needed for your 2nd step).

Perhaps, votes would only go to none if the voter actually ranks none.

E.g.

A 1
B
C
None 2

would transfer to none if A is eliminated, but would be exhausted if
the voter didn't vote for None.  However, that would mean that the
voter has no effect on the PR stage, so probably a bad idea.

it might be better to use a divisor method (d'Hondt or Webster's
methods) to share out the seats.  This has some advantages in terms of
resistance to weird effects
(See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alabama_paradox#Alabama_Paradox ).
Your method looks like the largest remainder method.

I also don't agree with independents getting a seat with 0.51 seats
worth of votes, but that is another discussion (see previous PR
thread)

Also, you could include the None votes as a None-party.  This party
could be assigned seats.  They would be left vacant.  My opinion is
that they should be considered to vote against every bill (though with
the crutch option, it probably doesn't matter).  Alternatively, they
could just trigger a by-election.

For example, of all the valid arrangements (each party has the correct
number of seats), find the one where the elected representatives have
the highest total votes.

I am not sure I agree with the 'crutch' but, if you must have it, I
would suggest a modification.

After the election, the new parliament tries to nominate a PM.

First they vote to keep the current PM.  If he fails to get a
majority, he becomes a caretaker-PM and he and the cabinet can't
excersise major powers, without consent of the House.

They can then try to nominate others in the ordinary way.

If after 1 month, no nomination motion has obtained majority support,
they can attempt to use the crutch rule.

Any member of the House may stand as a candidate.

The House holds three sequential votes.

In the first round, an approval ballot is used.  For the last 2, each
member votes for 1 candidate.

The candidate who wins the plurality of the vote is considered
nominated to be PM (with crutch support).

The additional candidates are added, but they only remain members of
the House for as long as the PM remains PM.

Also, they cannot vote in motions which nominate someone else to be PM
(or motions which declare that the PM has gained support of the
majority of the House).  They also cannot vote in motions which call
for a new election to be held.

The term limit is reduced on a pro-rata basis.  If the PM is PM for 1
year and then they manage to get a majority, then under your example,
that would count as 7/4 * 1 year = 1.75 years used.  Thus the term
would have 2.25 years left (of 4).

This system has the advantage that it allows the smaller parties the
option to try to form a coalition.  If the split was 40%, 30%, 30%,
under your rule, the 40% party could declare a minority government
against the wishes of the 60% of the other 2 parties.

It also allows 2 parties which has a larger vote between them access
to the crutch system.  For example, if the split was 40%, 30%, 15%,
9%, 6%.  It would allow a coalition of the 30%+15% parties to form the
minority government as it has more votes than the 40% party.

In addition, it allows a moverment by the House back to a majority
government.  In the above example, if the 40% party finally managed to
get the 9% and 6% parties into a coalition, they could vote to
nominate the leader of 40% party as PM.  The additional members due to
the crutch would not be allowed to vote for this motion, so the new
coalition would win by 55% to 45%.

It might also be worth allowing them to switch crutch-coalition.  For
example, once the 40% party gets support of the 6% party, it now has
the plurality of the vote.

It might also be worth having a rule that within 1 year of the end of
term, the crutch rule cannot be used.

I was thinking that a better way of having Heterogeneous districts
would be to based them on polling stations.  If each district needed
10 polling stations, then you could randomly allocate polling stations
to districts.  This doesn't get perfect blinding, but is much easier
to implement.

This might be better than social security number as the districts
could be completely different each election.  Also, social security
numbers are static (and set by the government), so districts might
have overlap from the previous election.

If you waited until the last possible moment to decide the polling
stations, then a politician wouldn't know where to direct pork and in
any case, it would be hard to direct it at a specific polling station
area.

I don't know if a party 'front-bench' member would actually be willing
to stand against the cabinet.  

Re: [EM] No geographical districts

2008-09-05 Thread Kristofer Munsterhjelm

Raph Frank wrote:

On Fri, Sep 5, 2008 at 2:00 AM, Stéphane Rouillon
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Hello Juho,

using age, gender or other virtual dimension to build virtual districts
replaces geographic antagonism by generation antagonism.
The idea is to get equivalent sample that are not opposed by intrinsec
construction.


A simple option would be to convert the date of birth into a number,
but have the year the the least significant part..

16-04-82 would become 160,482

The public could then be sorted by those numbers.  In effect, you are
splitting people by the day of the month they are born on, if there is
a tie, you use month and only use year at the end.

This would give a mix of ages, genders and any other measure in each district.

It is pretty much equivalent to just randomly distributing the voters
between the districts, but unlike a random system, it is harder to
corrupt.


It could have a similar result to having alphabetic ranked ballots, only 
with birthdays instead of last names. The selection would be biased in 
the direction of those that are born close to January. It may not 
matter, but it would appear unfair.


If you have computers, you could just sort by SHA512(name concatenated 
with birthdate concatenated with the year of the election). That's 
probably overkill (since even if you could break SHA-512, which would be 
a feat by itself, you'd have to convince the favored member to change 
his name to something suitable), but then there'd be a sufficient margin 
of safety. Randomness without randomness.


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Re: [EM] No geographical districts

2008-09-04 Thread Raph Frank
On 9/4/08, Stéphane Rouillon [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Why not self-chosen districts ?
  Because then the last half of voters would be able to pick
  between district already composed of majoritarians ideologies.
  Again the least organized and the smallest group would finish splitted
  between several districts where they would be in minority.

  Do you really believe that if you represent 1% of an ideology,
  others political parties will keep the last of 100 seats for you?
  With an FPTP system they would gang up as much districts
  to 51% and let you be minoritarian in the district(s) you want.

Self chosen districts can work in many ways.  If they are completely
free, you are right.  The optimal for a majority group is to spread
out evenly and win them all.

If you assign by birth date, you get near perfect spreading out by
default.  A majority party will likely end up with a majority in every
district.  It even neutralises any geographic variation in the State.

One option would be to allow the group itself decide who can and who
can't join their district.  For example, it could be based on a
candidate or committee.  They get to vet any potential new members.
Perhaps, any group of at least 11 people could form a committee and
register as a 'seed' district.  Also, the might have the right to kick
members they don't like.

Unless another party managed to infiltrate the group so that a
majority of its members were for the other party, any infiltration
just means that they have less people in their own groups.

For example,

1) 6 months before election day, the N largest district groups are
'locked-in'.

2) For another 3 months people are allowed to register to change from
their district to another one, as long as their district is to large
and the target is to small (or they weren't in a district and want to
join a small one).

3) 3 months before the election, all the districts that are still to
large have random members reduced to make them the right size and
unassigned people are then randomly assigned to the small districts to
make them large enough.

4) Each district then selects a winner using approval voting

The randomness wouldn't necessarily have to be random.  It could use
some fixed method to decide the ordering.  For example, it could be
based on social security number and date of birth.  You could pass
them into a function that re-orders them.

Also, the prcesses weakens the secret ballot as district formation
becomes part of the process and it isn't secret.

  You could argue that a proportional system would solve the representation
  problem, whatever district definition used. But it would not solve
  the ability that politicians have for bribing a geographical district,
  simply by targeting an area that is an undecided district.

It comes down to what you think representation is.  That is
representing their district at the national level.  It isn't bribing
anyone, it is getting them what they want.  What if an area has no
hospital and nobody seems to care because they are concerned about the
national issues?

I think single seat districts aren't a good idea anyway.  Most
modifications are just a hack to a broken system.

  With astrological districts, subventioning an hospital that would treat
 only people
  born between january 11th and january 16th would be:
  1) complex to implement;
  2) easy to be proven;
  3) an obvious case of political bribery attempt.

It might be that people who meet the criteria get some benefit in any
hospital.  Also, if 'everyone' is doing it, then it might be less
frowned upon.

  It would bring regions to discuss between one another instead of confront
 each other,
  having all representatives of the whole country instead of each defending
 its piece of cake.

Party list PR is designed to do this.  Everyone represents the whole country.

It gives lots of power to the party leader though.

My thoughrs on the whole national representation thing is to have
multiple layers of representatives.  In the US, it might work as

A) 30 elected in six districts (districts of ~50 million (10 mill per seat))
B) 100 elected in 20 districts (districts of ~15 million (3 mill per seat))
C)  300 elected in 60 districts (districts of ~5 million (1 mill per seat))

This districts would end up crossing State lines.  One option is that
C is designed so that it doesn't.  Small States would just have
smaller districts.  A State with 2 Representatives would just hold a 2
seat election.

The A) and B) districts would need to cross State lines for sure.
This would require a constitutional amendment.

This creates a mix of national level, regional level and State level
representatives.

If you wanted to get fancy, you might give group A) Representatives 4
votes, group B) 2 votes and group C) 1 votes.  This is to take into
account that an A) representative represents a larger number of
voters.

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Re: [EM] No geographical districts

2008-09-04 Thread James Gilmour
Stéphane Rouillon   Sent: Thursday, September 04, 2008 6:03 AM
 STV-PR suffers from three principal problems that are exacerbated when 
 trying to push the proportionality limit. 

Why would you want to try to push the proportionality limit?  The law of 
diminishing returns applies to representation and
proportionality, as I said in a recent EM post under another topic heading.  
The available evidence from countries with a history of
FPTP elections from single-member districts (UK, USA, Canada) indicates that 
real electors would be very content with much less than
proportionality at the limit  -  indeed, they would demand such a  trade-off in 
return for guaranteed local representation.  In any
event, proportionality at the limit would bring its own political problems and 
so would be undesirable and unwanted for that reason
alone.


 They are all caused  by the large 
 number of candidates:

Why need the numbers of candidates be large?  Of course, to some electors who 
are used to single-member districts contested for
decades by only two parties, any number greater than two might be considered 
large.  In my experience such comments usually come
from those who are completely opposed to any reform of FPTP in single-member 
districts, but I know that group does not include
Stéphane.  Such comments do, however, play into the hands of the anti-reformers.


 1) A pre-selection occurs within each party, in order for the 
 star candidate of each party to get elected, that star often tries to kill 
 concurrency 
 having bad collegues running with him or none at all in order 
 to increase its own election probability;

If the districts are of a size that would give an acceptable balance between 
proportionality and guaranteed local representation,
all the major parties would want to promote teams of candidates because they 
would have realistic chances of winning more than one
seat.  So while the star might well want to behave like a prima donna, any 
party that allowed that to determine its team of
candidates would be heading for electoral disaster.  Also, internal party 
democracy should prevail.


 2) It is hard to make fair debates when the number of candidates is huge and 
 they are not even the same for several parties: in the end the candidates 
 having the most means (money and visibility) have the opportunity of getting 
 heard and the others may simply not;

Why would the numbers of candidates necessarily be huge?  The issues arising 
from the availability of money have nothing to do
with the voting system.  To level the democracy playing field, there clearly 
has to be reform (limitation) of the money that can be
spent by parties and by candidates during any election campaign  -  though I 
can see such limitation being extremely unpopular in
the USA.  However, we could do much to reduce the impact of those differences 
by using a voting system that gave proportional
representation of the voters.


 3) voters complain about the large number of names on the ballot adding 
 several undesirable behaviours like random completion or following a party 
 pre-selection.

Why would there be large numbers of names on the ballot?   I agree that random 
selection might be considered an undesirable
behaviour (though some have suggested random selection would be better than 
selection by election!), but I don't think it is for you
or me to say that a voter who has knowingly followed his or her favoured 
party's selection has engaged in an undesirable behaviour.
Indeed, it could be said to be an extremely rational behviour.


 Equivalent virtual districts have no such problems: they allow comparing all 
 candidates with every party proposing a unique candidacy per district. The 
 result is you can obtain PR results like using only one district for STV-PR, 
 without the previous problems.

Virtual districts may not have the three problems you specified, but they do 
have one real problem:  real electors live (and vote)
in the real world - they do not live in a virtual world.  They want their votes 
to reflect the real world in which they live, by
giving an acceptable balance between proportional representation of differing 
political viewpoints and local representation of the
geographically recognisable communities within which they live.

James Gilmour

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Re: [EM] No geographical districts

2008-09-04 Thread Stéphane Rouillon

Hello James,

(for other readers , please let me state again that, in my humble opinion, 
STV family of electoral systems are the best multi-winner methods on the 
market actually. However, it should not stop us from criticizing aspects we 
think could be enhanced. It is not because you have a radio and a 
photographic apparel that you should not try to invent TV...).


Yes most electors would be very content with much less than proportionality 
at the limit
because they are convinced they have to sacrifice something else to obtain 
it
(local representation for some, government stability, access to a 
representative,...).
No one has ever presented them with an option that conciliate all these 
goals.
Several demand a guaranteed local representation (although this demand is a 
lot stronger in rural areas not urban ones). But we all already have a 
municipal level that is based on geographical management and can facilitate 
access to a local representative.


Thus:
-I want to push the proportionnality limit to obtain a true representation 
of the electorate.
I can cope with the stability problems that could occur using other tools, 
like the crutch option for example.
- I want a large number of candidates because the more option you get as a 
voter, the more ideas you can choose among and the more representative is 
the result of the election.
-I want list built for a party from the electoral result of the voters would 
expressed a preference for that party. Thus, no party oligarchy can impose a 
hierarchy to its supporters and still individual imputability plays a role 
because we would vote for somebody and not for a cause.


STV or STV-PR with one big district would give me these properties, but I 
try to get rid of the

problems it produces. Am I logical enough?

For the purpose of presenting different debates per district, I see very 
well putting each debate onthe web, on a political youtube. Thus speech time 
and not money would have  to be fairly

attributed.

And finally about the real world issue, it seems it all comes to how we see 
the world. I am very proud of having a municipal level which solves most of 
my geographical problems (removing the snow, taking the garbagge, giving 
access to a library, managing street parking,...).  However,
my major concerns go through boundaries most of the time (SRAS, hurricanes, 
acid rain, animals,
epidemia, religions, ideas, money, inflation, planes, violence on tv, bombs, 
terrorists, free trade products, gay weddings, abortion, drug legalisation, 
add as much actuality major issue you like...) . Virtual districts would fit 
better the real world.  I want my vote to reflect the real world in which I 
live, by assessing that major debates are now some that concern the overall 
planet.
Having representatives elected from non-geographical districts does not 
remove their geographical link. We all come from somewhere we know well. It 
just removes their geographical dependance about being elected or not. 
Governing is taking decisions. We want defendors of the options and neutral 
judges to choose between them like in a justice court. How can we expect our 
current system to behave properly when MP's have to do both! Defendors 
should be elected from a ground territory to defend the rights of the people 
they know well.  Judges should have no link to take decisions in the best 
interest for all. Hence, decision takers (country representatives) should be 
elected from non-geographical districts.


The real world now spreads ideas all around the globe in a minute like I am 
doing right now.
Distance is less and less relevant. We should adapt our political structures 
to this reality.


Thanks for taking the time to read,
Stéphane.


From: James Gilmour [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] No geographical districts
Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2008 12:06:10 +0100

Stéphane Rouillon   Sent: Thursday, September 04, 2008 6:03 AM
 STV-PR suffers from three principal problems that are exacerbated when
 trying to push the proportionality limit.

Why would you want to try to push the proportionality limit?  The law of 
diminishing returns applies to representation and
proportionality, as I said in a recent EM post under another topic heading. 
 The available evidence from countries with a history of
FPTP elections from single-member districts (UK, USA, Canada) indicates 
that real electors would be very content with much less than
proportionality at the limit  -  indeed, they would demand such a  
trade-off in return for guaranteed local representation.  In any
event, proportionality at the limit would bring its own political problems 
and so would be undesirable and unwanted for that reason

alone.


 They are all caused  by the large
 number of candidates:

Why need the numbers of candidates be large?  Of course, to some electors 
who are used to single-member districts contested for
decades by only two parties, any number greater

Re: [EM] No geographical districts

2008-09-04 Thread Fred Gohlke

Good Afternoon, Stephane Rouillon

I, for one, find your suggestion original and elegant.

You have described a simple way of dividing the people into districts, 
independent not only of their geographic location but of their 
ideological predispositions, as well.  Candidates who seek to represent 
such 'districts' must attract the support of the entire community.  They 
must be truly representative of the district they seek to represent. 
That is enormously different than the monstrosities we endure because of 
partisan politics.


Thank you very much for a wonderful idea.  It seeks to empower the 
people rather than any group.  I fear it bears little chance of adoption 
because it protects no vested interest.  The only way such a process 
will ever be adopted is if the concept can be made a topic of 
discussion, particularly among students interested in achieving a 
righteous government.


Fred

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Re: [EM] No geographical districts

2008-09-04 Thread Juho
Geographical proportionality is one specific dimension. Most other  
dimensions could be called political dimensions. Also groupings that  
do not live in any specific compact area could be called political  
groupings. In principle they could form a party and that way get a  
proportional number of representatives. (This is also in line with  
the geographical proportionality related target of guaranteeing  
representation from all _geographic_ areas.)


Many political systems have chosen geographical districts to be fixed  
in the sense that people automatically vote for the district where  
they live in. In the political dimension people are typically allowed  
to pick the group that they want to represent them.


It is possible to have election methods that support multiple  
dimensions, i.e. more than these two. One could e.g. simply have  
multiple orthogonal party structures and then in the vote counting  
process force the representatives to be elected so that  
proportionality will be respected in all dimensions.


There could be also additional fixed dimensions like automatic  
fixed sex or age based proportionality.


Some of the additional dimensions could also be virtual districts  
in the sense that each voter would be registered in exactly one of  
them, and probably also vote only for candidates that belong to one's  
own virtual district. I understood that you would use virtual  
districts to replace the current geographical districts (and the  
geographical proportionality that they represent).


The simplest (not necessarily optimal) approach to implement multiple  
dimensions is one where you simply elect representatives starting  
from the ones with strongest support (e.g. best candidate of the  
largest party in the largest district), skip candidates that can not  
be elected any more (e.g. district already full, party already full),  
and continue until all seats have been filled. At some point in the  
chain all requirements of all dimensions are met if they are strong  
enough (and if there are suitable candidates left).


(Some dimensions could be one-directional in the sense that one would  
aim at guaranteeing  at least a proportional share of the seats but  
would not limit them to this number. For example one could allow all  
members of some minority to require proportional representation by  
marking this in their ballot. Other voters would however not be  
required to vote either for or against this minority. Any candidate  
(or any party, of any regions etc.) could belong to this group. One  
should however not allow these lists to overrule party  
proportionality or other complete dimensions (to avoid riding under  
two flags (party and minority) and getting also corresponding  
double representation).)


Small ad here too. Trees (hierarchical candidate lists) offer  
multiple dimensions in a simplified framework, but with priorities  
involved too. One can e.g. be a greenish red or a reddish green.


Juho



On Sep 4, 2008, at 1:01 , Stéphane Rouillon wrote:


Hello electorama fans,

regarding that last comment, I invite those interested in non- 
geographical district
to consider astrological district. The idea is to obtain equivalent  
samples of the electorate
in term of any distribution (age, geography, profession, language,  
religion,...) like
poll survey use. For example, in Quebec with near 4 000 000  
electors, we could
obtain around 73 (73 x 5 = 365 days) of less than 55 000 electors  
each.
Thus electorate results could indicate a better performance from  
some candidates

instead of reflecting the district bias produced by its design.
For example the first district could be formed with all Quebecors  
born between
1st and 5th of january, the 2nd with Quebecors born between 6th and  
10th of january

and so on...

For more details of an electoral system using such districts,  
search for SPPA

(Scrutin Préférentiel, Proportionel et Acirconscriptif in french).
An english version is available on the electoral reform website
of the British-Colombia citizen assembly.

...

However, even something like they should be compact favours some
people.  If you are part of a group that is spread evenly, then  
you do

worse if the districts are compact.  The problem is that philosophy
that districts should be geographically based.

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for  
list info




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Re: [EM] No geographical districts

2008-09-04 Thread Raph Frank
On Thu, Sep 4, 2008 at 10:13 PM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 The simplest (not necessarily optimal) approach to implement multiple
 dimensions is one where you simply elect representatives starting from the
 ones with strongest support (e.g. best candidate of the largest party in the
 largest district), skip candidates that can not be elected any more (e.g.
 district already full, party already full), and continue until all seats
 have been filled. At some point in the chain all requirements of all
 dimensions are met if they are strong enough (and if there are suitable
 candidates left).

I would probably elect the weakest of each party's strongest
candidates, e.g. find the strongest candidate from each party and then
assign a seat to that weakest of them.

Once a party gets its allocation of seats, it can't be assigned any more.

This is to allow small parties fill in their seats before large
parties can lock them out.

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Re: [EM] No geographical districts

2008-09-04 Thread Stéphane Rouillon

Hello Juho,

using age, gender or other virtual dimension to build virtual districts
replaces geographic antagonism by generation antagonism.
The idea is to get equivalent sample that are not opposed by intrinsec 
construction.

Thus we may find neutral decision takers that will minimize the overall
bad impacts of a decision, thus maximize to the best of their knowledge
the decisions for all the electorate. If you split representative into 
groups who have divergent opinions, the result will not optimize common 
interest, it will only illustrate the rapport de force
(maybe translated as power struggle) between the representatives. Age 
representatives would hardly stay neutral while deciding retirement fees and 
pensions for example.


The Irish senate based on profession seems one step toward getting neutral 
decision takers

for deciding the localization of projects for example.
I prefer equivalent samples of the entire electorate (phone numbers or hash 
tables using names could work too, but it has some slight discrepancies and 
problems...)



From: Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Election Methods Mailing List [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] No geographical districts
Date: Fri, 5 Sep 2008 00:13:34 +0300

Geographical proportionality is one specific dimension. Most other  
dimensions could be called political dimensions. Also groupings that  do 
not live in any specific compact area could be called political  groupings. 
In principle they could form a party and that way get a  proportional 
number of representatives. (This is also in line with  the geographical 
proportionality related target of guaranteeing  representation from all 
_geographic_ areas.)


Many political systems have chosen geographical districts to be fixed  in 
the sense that people automatically vote for the district where  they 
live in. In the political dimension people are typically allowed  to pick 
the group that they want to represent them.


It is possible to have election methods that support multiple  dimensions, 
i.e. more than these two. One could e.g. simply have  multiple orthogonal 
party structures and then in the vote counting  process force the 
representatives to be elected so that  proportionality will be respected in 
all dimensions.


There could be also additional fixed dimensions like automatic  fixed sex 
or age based proportionality.


Some of the additional dimensions could also be virtual districts  in the 
sense that each voter would be registered in exactly one of  them, and 
probably also vote only for candidates that belong to one's  own virtual 
district. I understood that you would use virtual  districts to replace 
the current geographical districts (and the  geographical proportionality 
that they represent).


The simplest (not necessarily optimal) approach to implement multiple  
dimensions is one where you simply elect representatives starting  from the 
ones with strongest support (e.g. best candidate of the  largest party in 
the largest district), skip candidates that can not  be elected any more 
(e.g. district already full, party already full),  and continue until all 
seats have been filled. At some point in the  chain all requirements of 
all dimensions are met if they are strong  enough (and if there are 
suitable candidates left).


(Some dimensions could be one-directional in the sense that one would  aim 
at guaranteeing  at least a proportional share of the seats but  would not 
limit them to this number. For example one could allow all  members of some 
minority to require proportional representation by  marking this in their 
ballot. Other voters would however not be  required to vote either for or 
against this minority. Any candidate  (or any party, of any regions etc.) 
could belong to this group. One  should however not allow these lists to 
overrule party  proportionality or other complete dimensions (to avoid 
riding under  two flags (party and minority) and getting also 
corresponding  double representation).)


Small ad here too. Trees (hierarchical candidate lists) offer  multiple 
dimensions in a simplified framework, but with priorities  involved too. 
One can e.g. be a greenish red or a reddish green.


Juho



On Sep 4, 2008, at 1:01 , Stéphane Rouillon wrote:


Hello electorama fans,

regarding that last comment, I invite those interested in non- 
geographical district
to consider astrological district. The idea is to obtain equivalent  
samples of the electorate
in term of any distribution (age, geography, profession, language,  
religion,...) like
poll survey use. For example, in Quebec with near 4 000 000  electors, we 
could

obtain around 73 (73 x 5 = 365 days) of less than 55 000 electors  each.
Thus electorate results could indicate a better performance from  some 
candidates

instead of reflecting the district bias produced by its design.
For example the first district could be formed with all Quebecors  born 
between
1st and 5th of january, the 2nd

Re: [EM] No geographical districts

2008-09-04 Thread Raph Frank
On Fri, Sep 5, 2008 at 2:00 AM, Stéphane Rouillon
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Hello Juho,

 using age, gender or other virtual dimension to build virtual districts
 replaces geographic antagonism by generation antagonism.
 The idea is to get equivalent sample that are not opposed by intrinsec
 construction.

A simple option would be to convert the date of birth into a number,
but have the year the the least significant part..

16-04-82 would become 160,482

The public could then be sorted by those numbers.  In effect, you are
splitting people by the day of the month they are born on, if there is
a tie, you use month and only use year at the end.

This would give a mix of ages, genders and any other measure in each district.

It is pretty much equivalent to just randomly distributing the voters
between the districts, but unlike a random system, it is harder to
corrupt.

 Thus we may find neutral decision takers that will minimize the overall
 bad impacts of a decision, thus maximize to the best of their knowledge
 the decisions for all the electorate.

You make a good point.  It would reduce the pork issue, but it gives
minorities no representation.  A group with a majority will probably
win all the seats.

The probability of a group with 55% of the votes not getting a
majority in all the districts would be tiny due to the law of large
numbers.

If that group is geographically concentrated, you are back where you started.

 The Irish senate based on profession seems one step toward getting neutral
 decision takers
 for deciding the localization of projects for example.

Professionals are also a defined group.

However, I like your idea to use a group that is non-local to decide
localisation issues.

What about having 2 houses.  The geographic house is elected by
PR-STV.  The national one is elected using your method.

The geographic house might decide that a hospital needs to be build,
but the national house would then decide where.

Ofc, if the country was ethnically divided and the majority ethnic
group lived in the East, then the national house would probably direct
most projects in that direction.

Btw, the Irish Senate looks (somewhat) good in theory, but doesn't
actually work that way in practice.  The nominating boards (which
represent different professions) have very little power.  The county
councillors are the ones who actually vote for the Senators.  It is a
secret ballot, but most councillors vote for their party (or as part
of a voting pact).  This means that the Senate elections tend to
follow the distribution of county councillor seats.

The exception is the university seats, they are elected by graduates
of certain universities (but not all ... grrr).

Also, the Taoiseach (PM) gets to appoint a few.  The combination of
the county councillor (the governing coalition should have at least a
strong minority of those seats) and the fact that the Taoiseach gets
to appoint some mean that generally the Government has an easy
majority in the Senate.

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info


Re: [EM] No geographical districts

2008-09-04 Thread Stéphane Rouillon

Dear Raph,

your understanding is perfect.
Of course using still FPTP with virtual districts would typicaly produce an 
assembly with all the
seats of the same party. It was designed to be used with an open list 
system, as much proportional as possible (to the integrality limit). The 
list is filled from individual support gathered from
each candidates, having equivalent sample of the electorate let us suppose 
that the one which have the best results promote the best ideas. SPPA 
provides some other details like the possibility to vote None and an option 
to garantee an almost majoritarian government at most for stability purpose.


http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/public/get_involved/submission/R/ROUILLON-65
You are welcome to comment. At least I hope you have fun reading it if you 
find the time.



From: Raph Frank [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Stéphane Rouillon [EMAIL PROTECTED]
CC: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] No geographical districts
Date: Fri, 5 Sep 2008 02:25:24 +0100

On Fri, Sep 5, 2008 at 2:00 AM, Stéphane Rouillon
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Hello Juho,

 using age, gender or other virtual dimension to build virtual districts
 replaces geographic antagonism by generation antagonism.
 The idea is to get equivalent sample that are not opposed by intrinsec
 construction.

A simple option would be to convert the date of birth into a number,
but have the year the the least significant part..

16-04-82 would become 160,482

The public could then be sorted by those numbers.  In effect, you are
splitting people by the day of the month they are born on, if there is
a tie, you use month and only use year at the end.

This would give a mix of ages, genders and any other measure in each 
district.


It is pretty much equivalent to just randomly distributing the voters
between the districts, but unlike a random system, it is harder to
corrupt.

 Thus we may find neutral decision takers that will minimize the overall
 bad impacts of a decision, thus maximize to the best of their knowledge
 the decisions for all the electorate.

You make a good point.  It would reduce the pork issue, but it gives
minorities no representation.  A group with a majority will probably
win all the seats.

The probability of a group with 55% of the votes not getting a
majority in all the districts would be tiny due to the law of large
numbers.

If that group is geographically concentrated, you are back where you 
started.


 The Irish senate based on profession seems one step toward getting 
neutral

 decision takers
 for deciding the localization of projects for example.

Professionals are also a defined group.

However, I like your idea to use a group that is non-local to decide
localisation issues.

What about having 2 houses.  The geographic house is elected by
PR-STV.  The national one is elected using your method.

The geographic house might decide that a hospital needs to be build,
but the national house would then decide where.

Ofc, if the country was ethnically divided and the majority ethnic
group lived in the East, then the national house would probably direct
most projects in that direction.

Btw, the Irish Senate looks (somewhat) good in theory, but doesn't
actually work that way in practice.  The nominating boards (which
represent different professions) have very little power.  The county
councillors are the ones who actually vote for the Senators.  It is a
secret ballot, but most councillors vote for their party (or as part
of a voting pact).  This means that the Senate elections tend to
follow the distribution of county councillor seats.

The exception is the university seats, they are elected by graduates
of certain universities (but not all ... grrr).

Also, the Taoiseach (PM) gets to appoint a few.  The combination of
the county councillor (the governing coalition should have at least a
strong minority of those seats) and the fact that the Taoiseach gets
to appoint some mean that generally the Government has an easy
majority in the Senate.




Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info


Re: [EM] No geographical districts

2008-09-03 Thread Allen Smith
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED] (on 3 September
2008 22:01:24 +), [EMAIL PROTECTED]
(=?iso-8859-1?B?U3TpcGhhbmUgUm91aWxsb24=?=) wrote:
Hello electorama fans,

regarding that last comment, I invite those interested in non-geographical 
district to consider astrological district.

How about self-chosen districts? One element of current geographical
districts is that people at least theoretically (and in some actual cases -
see Libertarians moving to New Hampshire, Alaska, etc for instance) can
choose to move to be more around people they agree more with; that even this
(frequently impractical) method would be impossible with such a system would
be one objection to it.

...
However, even something like they should be compact favours some
people.  If you are part of a group that is spread evenly, then you do
worse if the districts are compact.  The problem is that philosophy
that districts should be geographically based.

Yes.

-Allen

-- 
Allen Smith, Ph.D.   http://cesario.rutgers.edu/easmith/
There is only one sound argument for democracy, and that is the argument
that it is a crime for any man to hold himself out as better than other men,
and, above all, a most heinous offense for him to prove it. - H. L. Mencken

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info


Re: [EM] No geographical districts

2008-09-03 Thread Stéphane Rouillon

Why not self-chosen districts ?
Because then the last half of voters would be able to pick
between district already composed of majoritarians ideologies.
Again the least organized and the smallest group would finish splitted
between several districts where they would be in minority.

Do you really believe that if you represent 1% of an ideology,
others political parties will keep the last of 100 seats for you?
With an FPTP system they would gang up as much districts
to 51% and let you be minoritarian in the district(s) you want.

You could argue that a proportional system would solve the representation
problem, whatever district definition used. But it would not solve
the ability that politicians have for bribing a geographical district,
simply by targeting an area that is an undecided district. With selfchosen 
district,
anyone can say to teachers, automobile workers, or any other segment of the 
population:
gather in one district, mine, and I'll flood your field with fresh 
investment
With astrological districts, subventioning an hospital that would treat only 
people

born between january 11th and january 16th would be:
1) complex to implement;
2) easy to be proven;
3) an obvious case of political bribery attempt.
It would bring regions to discuss between one another instead of confront 
each other,
having all representatives of the whole country instead of each defending 
its piece of cake.


But I concede: it would not stop a classical influence traffic which consist 
of giving money

to a politician to tell him how to vote... That would still be a police job.


From: Allen Smith [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
CC: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] No geographical districts
Date: Wed, 3 Sep 2008 18:51:28 -0400

In message [EMAIL PROTECTED] (on 3 September
2008 22:01:24 +), [EMAIL PROTECTED]
(=?iso-8859-1?B?U3TpcGhhbmUgUm91aWxsb24=?=) wrote:
Hello electorama fans,

regarding that last comment, I invite those interested in 
non-geographical

district to consider astrological district.

How about self-chosen districts? One element of current geographical
districts is that people at least theoretically (and in some actual cases -
see Libertarians moving to New Hampshire, Alaska, etc for instance) can
choose to move to be more around people they agree more with; that even 
this
(frequently impractical) method would be impossible with such a system 
would

be one objection to it.

...
However, even something like they should be compact favours some
people.  If you are part of a group that is spread evenly, then you do
worse if the districts are compact.  The problem is that philosophy
that districts should be geographically based.

Yes.

-Allen

--
Allen Smith, Ph.D.   http://cesario.rutgers.edu/easmith/
There is only one sound argument for democracy, and that is the argument
that it is a crime for any man to hold himself out as better than other 
men,

and, above all, a most heinous offense for him to prove it. - H. L. Mencken

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info




Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info


Re: [EM] No geographical districts

2008-09-03 Thread Jonathan Lundell

On Sep 3, 2008, at 10:02 PM, Stéphane Rouillon wrote:

STV-PR suffers from three principal problems that are exacerbated  
when trying to push the proportionality limit. They are all caused  
by the large number of candidates:
1) A pre-selection occurs within each party, in order for the star  
candidate
of each party to get elected, that star often tries to kill  
concurrency having bad collegues running with him or none at all in  
order to increase its own election probability;


That assumes a rather high degree of agenda manipulation by the  
parties. Why need we assume that parties would be the exclusive  
gatekeepers to an STV ballot? For that matter, behavior like that  
seems like a good way to guarantee the formation of new parties that  
don't kill their good candidates.




2) It is hard to make fair debates when the number of candidates is  
huge and they are not even the same for several parties: in the end  
the candidates having the most means (money and visibility) have the  
opporunity of getting heard and the others may simply not;


In an STV election, though, candidates need not appeal to the entire  
electorate. Sure, if we insist on running American-style campaigns,  
money will play an undue role, and STV is not a magic bullet to fix  
that problem.




3) voters complain about the large number of names on the ballot  
adding several undesirable behaviours like random completion or  
following a party pre-selection.


It's an issue. On the other hand, I recently voted in a FPTP election  
with 135 gubernatorial candidates.





Equivalent virtual districts have no such problems: they allow  
comparing all candidates with every party proposing a unique  
candidacy per district. The result is you can obtain PR results like  
using only one district for STV-PR, without the previous problems.




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