Re: [Election-Methods] Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method for public elections?
On Dec 22, 2007, at 6:45 AM, James Gilmour wrote: If you wish to utilise in some way all the information that could be recorded on a preferential ballot, that is a completely different voting system from IRV, with different objectives. The preferences are no longer 'contingency choices', but take on a new function depending on the detail of the voting system. It is almost certain that the voters would mark their ballots in a different way in an election by such a voting system from how they would mark their contingency choices in an election by IRV. Jonathan Lundell Sent: 22 December 2007 19:00 This seems plausible enough (and certainly IRV voters should be instructed along contingency lines). WRT marking ballots differently, setting manipulation aside, and considering only contingency vs preferential ranking, do you have an example or two of how and why a voter might end up with different ballots in the two contexts? That is a very fair question, Jonathan, but I do not have any practical examples to indicate the circumstances in which voters might mark their preferences differently. We do not use IRV for any public elections in the UK and so I have no real example to draw on. And it is very difficult to invent examples based on direct, single-winner elections from other countries without a lot of relevant political information, because there is little agreement about how real voters would respond, as I have seen repeatedly in discussions of such examples as Bush-Nader-Gore. I am not a specialist in voter behaviour and so have no special insights on which to base real predictions. That said, one situation where IRV ballots and Condorcet ballots might be completed similarly would be when there are three strong front-runners. Then IRV voters and Condorcet voters might well complete their preferential ballots similarly. When the everyone's second choice candidate had very weak first preference support, they might well complete the ballots differently: in Condorcet the supporters of the two strong wings might truncate in an attempt to prevent the weak second choice from coming through the middle. But that suggestion is contentious, as I have seen in other discussions and there is no agreement about how voters would really react. Just a word about terminology: IRV ballots, Condorcet ballots and Borda ballots are all 'preferential' ballots. The difference is that in IRV the successive preferences are brought into play only on the stated contingency; Borda tries to sum all the preferences instantly into one value; Condorcet perhaps lies somewhere between these two extremes, depending on the sequence of events in the individual count. James Gilmour No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.5.516 / Virus Database: 269.17.6/1192 - Release Date: 21/12/2007 13:17 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method for public elections?
On Sat, 22 Dec 2007 19:09:49 - James Gilmour wrote: Dave Ketchum Sent: 22 December 2007 18:01 Conceded that some could like IRV, even after understanding what it does. It wasn't my intent to make any point for or against IRV, but it interesting another thread is discussing the reasons for the use of IRV and the non-use of Condorcet in public elections around the world. HOWEVER, what it does is hidden behind its advertising, and its popularity should plummet like a rock if a true description was seen by more. Maybe. The failure of IRV by excluding the candidate who is everyone's second choice is well known, though obviously those promoting IRV don't shout this from the rooftops. I am very sympathetic to the arguments in favour of Condorcet, that it does not automatically exclude such second choice candidates. However, there is a major issue about the political acceptability of the Condorcet winner by the electors when that everyone's second choice candidate was a very weak first choice. The situation vis a vis political acceptability to the electorate would be very different when first choice support is split reasonably equally among three front runners. I have raised this issue of political acceptability before, but I have not yet seen the question answered. As a practical electoral reformer, this is a real issue for me because any reform we promote must be politically acceptable to the electorate, never mind the hostile politicians. Trying with 3 front runners: 34 AS These are committed to A, but see S as best alternative. 32 BS These are normally committed to S, but B has offered something immediately attractive. 32 S Staying with S. 1 C Lemon - will not matter. 1 ? Last vote, yet to count. Condorcet: S wins for better liking than either A or B. IRV depends on last vote: S - which wins after dropping B. B - which loses to A. A or C - depends on resolving tie for: B - A wins. S - S wins. Agreed political acceptability is important, but such as what happens above should dent IRV's access to such. The description does not have to say failure, as I see appropriate - just to note that while IRV usually awards the same winner as Condorcet, when it differs it can shock those who appreciate what Condorcet does by analyzing all that the voter says. But this wording again ignores that fact that an IRV ballot and a Condorcet ballot are two very different things. The Condorcet count is not simply making full use of the information recorded by the voters on the ballot papers. A Condorcet ballot is completely different from an IRV ballot, because when the voters fill in their Condorcet ballot papers they know that the preferences will be used according to the Condorcet counting rules, and so they take that into account. It is not a question of using the SAME information in two different ways (one of which is incomplete and therefore defective), which your original comment and the wording above suggest. Tell me what is so different between these two uses of the same ballot, which usually award the same winner for the same voting. Agreed that I consider the differences in reading to be serious - but that relates to the rare cases in which I object to IRV interpretation - which do not affect how the voter, unable to predict when IRV problems may occur, should vote. James Gilmour -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method for public elections?
Dave Ketchum Sent: 22 December 2007 21:52 Out of all this I see very little possible use for differences: That is the problem. So you will continue to describe the different ballots and voting systems incorrectly. James Gilmour No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.5.516 / Virus Database: 269.17.6/1192 - Release Date: 21/12/2007 13:17 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method for public elections?
On Sat, 22 Dec 2007 22:03:03 - James Gilmour wrote: Dave Ketchum Sent: 22 December 2007 21:52 Out of all this I see very little possible use for differences: That is the problem. So you will continue to describe the different ballots and voting systems incorrectly. Topic of the quoted sentence was ballots and voting. If we need differences there please tell us. There are differences which relate to selecting a voting system and for counting votes but, by the time voting is being done, it is too late to be editing the system. James Gilmour -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method for public elections?
Markus, Thank you for your insight. I certainly agree with you that only the best method should be used, but I would pose to you the question: Why is it that the best method isn't used? You and I (though not some others) would agree that the condorcet criterion is the correct one when determining the outcome of single winner elections, and yet they are not used in any public election anywhere in the world. Though the current best methods (Yours, and Ranked Pairs), are relatively new, Condorcet methods have been around for quite a long time. So the newness of the methodology can't be the reason. The difficulty in changing an electoral system once it has been started certainly plays a part, but IRV seems to be making significant inroads in this area whereas Condorcet methods are not. I think the answer lies in looking at the organizations that have adopted the Schulze method. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method 44 organizations, and almost all of them are technically oriented. The answer seems to me to be clear, complexity. Though beat-path is the best methodology, and the one that I would use in any professional organization that I was a part of, it violates a principle of democracy. For an election method to be of the people the people must be able to understand its implementation. They must be able to understand why one leader was picked, and not another, and further, how their ballot played a part in that decision. This begs that question of whether there is a Condorcet method simple enough for everyone to understand, and yet having the greatest number of desirable properties. Perhaps one answer might be in Borda-elimination methods. They are the only ones to have ever been used in public elections, and have very little added complexity when compared to IRV. IRV has had a great deal of success in being adopted, so we know that voters can handle something as complex as IRV. Borda-elimination also stacks up favorably when compared to anything but ranked pairs and Schulze. The only criteria that it doesn't pass are local IIa, monotonicity and independence of clones. non-monotonicity, while weird, doesn't imply that the candidate chosen is in any way inferior to a candidate chosen under a monotonic rule. I would have thought that the main reason why you would want a monotonic rule is so that people would accept it as valid. This does not appear to be an issue as IRV is non-monotonic, and is well liked. There are some possible issues regarding additional sussepability to strategy, but I'm not sure how serious those would be. Also, like all condorcet methods, Borda-elimination is monotonic if there is a Condorcet winner. local IIa and independence of clones are not passes, and this is an inferiority. but at least it passes them when there is a Condorcet winner. I seriously doubt that clones would be a big problem outside FPP, where vote-splitting is rampant. So guess I'd ask if the minor theoretical deficiencies are not made up for by the additional simplicity in populations that would have difficulty understanding beat-path? Why do you think that no Condorcet method has been adopted by any government? Ian http://thefell.googlepages.com -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of Markus Schulze Sent: Friday, December 21, 2007 1:47 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method for public elections? Dear Ian Fellows, the Nanson method and the Baldwin method violate monotonicity and independence of clones. They also violate the desideratum that candidates, who are not in the Smith set, should not have any impact on the result of the elections. When you try to get a Condorcet method adopted somewhere, you will not only be attacked by the FPP supporters and the IRV supporters. You will also be attacked by the supporters of all kinds of election methods. Therefore, it will not be sufficient that you argue that the proposed method is better than FPP and IRV; you will rather have to argue that the proposed method is the best of all methods. Therefore, it is useful to propose a Condorcet method that satisfies a large number of criteria. Furthermore, I don't think that it makes much sense to try to find a Condorcet method that looks as much as possible like IRV or as much as possible like Borda. The best method according to IRV's underlying heuristic will always be IRV; the best method according to the underlying heuristic of the Borda method will always be the Borda method. It makes more sense to propose a Condorcet method that stands on its own legs. Markus Schulze Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method for public elections?
Ian, I do not understand your argument. Borda elimination is not so simple to comprehend for all voters. If is not possible to use Schulze or MAM in an election, perhaps pairwise sorted plurality would be a easy alternative: If no beats-all candidate exists, eliminate the plurality loser. Like Nanson and Baldwin, this method meets Smith but violates monotonicity and cloneproofness, but opposite to Borda elimination, it meets summability and dominant mutual third. 2007/12/21, Ian Fellows [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Markus, Thank you for your insight. I certainly agree with you that only the best method should be used, but I would pose to you the question: Why is it that the best method isn't used? You and I (though not some others) would agree that the condorcet criterion is the correct one when determining the outcome of single winner elections, and yet they are not used in any public election anywhere in the world. Though the current best methods (Yours, and Ranked Pairs), are relatively new, Condorcet methods have been around for quite a long time. So the newness of the methodology can't be the reason. The difficulty in changing an electoral system once it has been started certainly plays a part, but IRV seems to be making significant inroads in this area whereas Condorcet methods are not. I think the answer lies in looking at the organizations that have adopted the Schulze method. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method 44 organizations, and almost all of them are technically oriented. The answer seems to me to be clear, complexity. Though beat-path is the best methodology, and the one that I would use in any professional organization that I was a part of, it violates a principle of democracy. For an election method to be of the people the people must be able to understand its implementation. They must be able to understand why one leader was picked, and not another, and further, how their ballot played a part in that decision. This begs that question of whether there is a Condorcet method simple enough for everyone to understand, and yet having the greatest number of desirable properties. Perhaps one answer might be in Borda-elimination methods. They are the only ones to have ever been used in public elections, and have very little added complexity when compared to IRV. IRV has had a great deal of success in being adopted, so we know that voters can handle something as complex as IRV. Borda-elimination also stacks up favorably when compared to anything but ranked pairs and Schulze. The only criteria that it doesn't pass are local IIa, monotonicity and independence of clones. non-monotonicity, while weird, doesn't imply that the candidate chosen is in any way inferior to a candidate chosen under a monotonic rule. I would have thought that the main reason why you would want a monotonic rule is so that people would accept it as valid. This does not appear to be an issue as IRV is non-monotonic, and is well liked. There are some possible issues regarding additional sussepability to strategy, but I'm not sure how serious those would be. Also, like all condorcet methods, Borda-elimination is monotonic if there is a Condorcet winner. local IIa and independence of clones are not passes, and this is an inferiority. but at least it passes them when there is a Condorcet winner. I seriously doubt that clones would be a big problem outside FPP, where vote-splitting is rampant. So guess I'd ask if the minor theoretical deficiencies are not made up for by the additional simplicity in populations that would have difficulty understanding beat-path? Why do you think that no Condorcet method has been adopted by any government? Ian http://thefell.googlepages.com -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of Markus Schulze Sent: Friday, December 21, 2007 1:47 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method for public elections? Dear Ian Fellows, the Nanson method and the Baldwin method violate monotonicity and independence of clones. They also violate the desideratum that candidates, who are not in the Smith set, should not have any impact on the result of the elections. When you try to get a Condorcet method adopted somewhere, you will not only be attacked by the FPP supporters and the IRV supporters. You will also be attacked by the supporters of all kinds of election methods. Therefore, it will not be sufficient that you argue that the proposed method is better than FPP and IRV; you will rather have to argue that the proposed method is the best of all methods. Therefore, it is useful to propose a Condorcet method that satisfies a large number of criteria. Furthermore, I don't think that it makes much sense to try to find a Condorcet method that looks as much as possible like IRV or as much as possible like Borda
Re: [Election-Methods] Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method for public elections?
A correction: 2007/12/22, Diego Santos [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Ian, I do not understand your argument. Borda elimination is not so simple to comprehend for all voters. If is not possible to use Schulze or MAM in an election, perhaps pairwise sorted plurality would be a easy alternative: If no beats-all candidate exists, eliminate the plurality loser. Like Nanson and Baldwin, this method meets Smith but violates monotonicity and cloneproofness, but opposite to Borda elimination, it meets summability and dominant mutual third. Where I said dominant mutual third I really would wanted to say third burial resistance. This criterion is not met by Schulze neither MAM. 2007/12/21, Ian Fellows [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Markus, Thank you for your insight. I certainly agree with you that only the best method should be used, but I would pose to you the question: Why is it that the best method isn't used? You and I (though not some others) would agree that the condorcet criterion is the correct one when determining the outcome of single winner elections, and yet they are not used in any public election anywhere in the world. Though the current best methods (Yours, and Ranked Pairs), are relatively new, Condorcet methods have been around for quite a long time. So the newness of the methodology can't be the reason. The difficulty in changing an electoral system once it has been started certainly plays a part, but IRV seems to be making significant inroads in this area whereas Condorcet methods are not. I think the answer lies in looking at the organizations that have adopted the Schulze method. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method 44 organizations, and almost all of them are technically oriented. The answer seems to me to be clear, complexity. Though beat-path is the best methodology, and the one that I would use in any professional organization that I was a part of, it violates a principle of democracy. For an election method to be of the people the people must be able to understand its implementation. They must be able to understand why one leader was picked, and not another, and further, how their ballot played a part in that decision. This begs that question of whether there is a Condorcet method simple enough for everyone to understand, and yet having the greatest number of desirable properties. Perhaps one answer might be in Borda-elimination methods. They are the only ones to have ever been used in public elections, and have very little added complexity when compared to IRV. IRV has had a great deal of success in being adopted, so we know that voters can handle something as complex as IRV. Borda-elimination also stacks up favorably when compared to anything but ranked pairs and Schulze. The only criteria that it doesn't pass are local IIa, monotonicity and independence of clones. non-monotonicity, while weird, doesn't imply that the candidate chosen is in any way inferior to a candidate chosen under a monotonic rule. I would have thought that the main reason why you would want a monotonic rule is so that people would accept it as valid. This does not appear to be an issue as IRV is non-monotonic, and is well liked. There are some possible issues regarding additional sussepability to strategy, but I'm not sure how serious those would be. Also, like all condorcet methods, Borda-elimination is monotonic if there is a Condorcet winner. local IIa and independence of clones are not passes, and this is an inferiority. but at least it passes them when there is a Condorcet winner. I seriously doubt that clones would be a big problem outside FPP, where vote-splitting is rampant. So guess I'd ask if the minor theoretical deficiencies are not made up for by the additional simplicity in populations that would have difficulty understanding beat-path? Why do you think that no Condorcet method has been adopted by any government? Ian http://thefell.googlepages.com -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] ]On Behalf Of Markus Schulze Sent: Friday, December 21, 2007 1:47 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method for public elections? Dear Ian Fellows, the Nanson method and the Baldwin method violate monotonicity and independence of clones. They also violate the desideratum that candidates, who are not in the Smith set, should not have any impact on the result of the elections. When you try to get a Condorcet method adopted somewhere, you will not only be attacked by the FPP supporters and the IRV supporters. You will also be attacked by the supporters of all kinds of election methods. Therefore, it will not be sufficient that you argue that the proposed method is better than FPP and IRV; you
