Re: tautology

1999-10-25 Thread Jacques M. Mallah

On Wed, 20 Oct 1999, Russell Standish wrote:
> The measure of Jack Mallah is irrelevant to this situation. The
> probability of Jack Mallah seeing Joe Schmoe with a large age is
> proportional to Joe Schmoe's measure - because - Joe Schmoe is
> independent of Jack Mallah. However, Jack Mallah is clearly not
> independent of Jack Mallah, and predictions of the probability of Jack
> Mallah seeing a Jack Mallah with large age cannot be made with the
> existing assumptions of ASSA. The claim is that RSSA has the
> additional assumptions required.

That's total BS.
I'll review, although I've said it so many times, how effective
probabilities work in the ASSA.  You can take this as a definition of
ASSA, so you can NOT deny that this is how things would work if the ASSA
is true.  The only thing you could try, is to claim that the ASSA is
false.
The effective probability of an observation with characteristic
'X' is (measure of observations with 'X') / (total measure).
The conditional effective probability that an observation has
characteristic Y, given that it has characteristic X, is
p(Y|X) = (measure of observations with X and with Y) / (measure with X).
OK, these definitions are true in general.  Let's apply them to
the situation in question.
'X' = being Jack Mallah and seeing an age for Joe Shmoe and for
Jack Mallah, and seeing that Joe also sees both ages and sees that Jack
sees both ages.
Suppose that objectively (e.g. to a 3rd party) Jack and Joe have
their ages drawn from the same type of distribution.  (i.e. they are the
same species).
Case 1: 'Y1' = the age seen for Joe is large.
Case 2: 'Y2' = the age seen for Jack is large.
Clearly P(Y1|X) = P(Y2|X).

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/





Re: Turing vs math

1999-10-25 Thread Marchal



Juergen Schmidhuber wrote:

> In absence of
>evidence to the contrary we assume that the presence of your consciousness
>(whatever that may be) is detectable by a computable process, namely, the
>one employed by you, the observer, who decides that he exists, via some
>sort of computation taking place as part of the evolution of his universe.

Sorry but I don't detect the presence of "my consciousness" still less by
a computable process. I'm afraid you confuse 1-person description of 
itself
and 3th-person description of its body, at some level.

... nor do I decide that I exist. What could that mean ?



A recent question by hal, and Juergen reply:
>> Which programs count and which ones don't?  
>
>Those that compute your universe AND NOTHING ELSE.

The problem is that with comp there is no meaning to the
expression "your universe". This follows from PE-omega + Occam razor, or
in a more deep and informative way from PE-omega + Movie-argument.

I am still waiting your reply for the PE-omega post I send you 
months ago :-)

Bruno







Re: Turing vs math

1999-10-25 Thread Marchal

Hal finney wrote:

>There are other ways to formalize computing: stack machines, register
>machines, cellular automata, even idealized billiard balls bouncing
>around in a giant pinball machine.  Each one agrees with the others on
>computational complexity, but again only up to a "scale factor" which
>includes the additive constant.


I'm afraid this is false. Although Quantum Computing does not
violate Church's Thesis. It does violate the complexity-restriction
of it. It is true that all classical computers can emulate each
other in polynomial time, but there are strong evidences that
quantum computer cannot be emulate by classical computer without
an exponential slow-down.
This can be a fundamental point in our search of the measure.
But in my approach I cannot postulate a quantum world, I must derive
it from abstract computability.

... and this happens with the logic Z1* ... 
(chapter 5 of http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal)


Bruno.