Re: ODP: Free will/consciousness/ineffability

[Marchal]

Zbigniew Motyka wrote:


Marchal wrote:[[[EMAIL PROTECTED]] -Re: Free 
will/consciousness/ineffability, 01-10-01(see below)]:

I don't believe in matter (personal opinion)
Comp is incompatible (in some sense) with existing matter (my thesis).
(...)

I agree and that is why I believe that IF we are machine THEN we are
immaterial machine. We have never leave Plato heaven if you want.
Now I don't believe copy of material universe exists in Platonia.
Appearance of physical universes emerges on the computational histories.
To explain appearnance of lawfulness we need to take into account
*ALL* computational histories.

(...) If there is a physical universe then comp is false.
Equivalently if comp is true there is no physical universe. 


Many people seem to believe in Popper?s Third World - Platonia more then 
in their own personal experience. People believe in many other things as 
well. It doesn?t mean that every ?designum? (designated object) of their 
belief (signum) does really exist somewhere else then in Platonia, where 
any every possible idea would exist. I used conditional to underline that 
in my opinion there is no idea in Third World which was not created first 
in the brain of some conscious being. In such an understanding, Platonia 
would be nothing more than the global memory existing in whole the world. 
In my opinion it is sublimated form of global (social) consciousness 
(culture) and as such is the property of more complicated level of matter 
than single (human) being. 


But what is matter? Even in the physicist books I see only relation
between numbers.  My Platonia is numberland, including the many dreams,
obeying to the laws of dreams (computer/information science), I have no
serious evidence that substancial (aristotelian) matter exists in any
obvious sense. I don't postulate it.


And as consciousness for humans is the property 
of material  brain, 


In which sense? I mean with or without comp? Few people doubt the
brain obeys computational laws at some level (like Schroedinger equation).
Even Hameroff accept it implicitely by postulating the brain is a
(universal) quantum machine. Only Penrose seems aware (for incorrect
reason unfortunately) that the existence of substancial matter 
(not intelligence) is incompatible with comp, so that a materialist
toe need a non computaionalist theory of mind. (Of course I got
the equivalent contraposition: a computationalist toe need an 
immaterialist theory of matter).


 ... the culture is the property of society. 


OK. I mean that comparison has some smell of truth ...


Such a point 
of view is commonly identified with Marxism and too often declined only 
due to that negative connotation - what a pity. In my opinion - as a 
physicist -  materialism is much closer to physical description of the 
world then any form of idealism. 


That is a quite respectable opinion. All what I say is that such
opinion is incompatible with comp (and weak form of Ockham). 
I proved that comp gives us no other choice, for solving the mind body
problem, than deriving the physical laws from a set of self-referential
truth. More generally from logic + arithmetic (I indeed translate a 
simple
argument (the dovetailer universal argument UDA) in arithmetic
by using the Godel trick (perfectionned by Lob, Solovay, Boolos, Visser,
Goldblatt). BTW I use also the formidable work of Grzegorczyk, a great
Polish logician. The arithmetical version of the first person is given
by his modal logical system S4Grz (Grz for Grzegorczyk).
You know Poland has been one of the most productive country in logic!


And physical description is the best 
description humans worked out as the scientific method of 
cognition, so far.


I am quite amazed by physics and physicians. Still I am used to believe
that the mind/body problems is physics' Achile's Heel. It is the place 
where aventurous physicist will meet aventurous psychologist or 
theologians.


There is no reason (even from the Okham?s point of view) to believe in 
Platonia solely and neglect material world. 


Material world appear more solid when we will understand that
its stable laws emerge from machines forever dreaming in Numberland.


Everything you can state from 
such point of view, may be easily translated in terms of properties of 
matter.

You talk like if you have a proof of the existence of matter. Like if it 
was
obvious subtancia are consistent. But you know substancia only appears
in Aristote mind when he misunderstood Plato doctrine on intelligible 
ideas.
(My opinion!). Despite the formidable success of physics, the main
problems are not solved: neither qualitative appearance, nor (the new
problem which appears through the comp hypothesis), the problem of the
qualitative *appearance* of matter and quantities.

You talk like if matter has been defined, or if we know what it is.
I don't think we know that. From material point to probability waves
and superstring in complex space, it seems matter is elusive, even

Re: Predictions duplications

[Russell Standish]

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
 So you NEED something additional to explain the ongoing regularity.
 You need something like the Speed Prior, which greatly favors regular 
 futures over others.
 

I take issue with this statement. In Occam's Razor I show how any
observer will expect to see regularities even with the uniform prior
(comes about because all observers have resource problems,
incidently). The speed prior is not necessary for Occam's Razor. It is
obviously consistent with it though.

The interesting thing is of course whether it is possible to
experimentally distinguish between the speed prior and the uniform
prior, and it is not at all clear to me that it is possible to
distinguish between these cases.

Cheers


Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile)
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax   9385 6965, 0425 253119 ()
Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Room 2075, Red Centrehttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix  +612, Interstate prefix 02

Re: Immortality

[Marchal]

Brent Meeker wrote:

But then why do you say that a duplicate of your brain processes in a
computer would not be conscious.  You seem to be discriminating between
a biological duplicate and a silicon duplicate. 

I have never say that. A duplicate of me (at the right level which exists
with the comp hyp) would be as conscious as me.

What I do have said somewhere (and I guess the misunderstanding comes
from that) is that a computer cannot be conscious, nor can a brain, nor
can any piece of matter (if that exists at all). Only a person, which
by comp is immaterial, can be conscious. I was (in some context) 
preventing
the Searle error consisting in believing that I am a brain, instead
of the more correct I have a brain which follows by comp.
Only latter in the reasoning will substancial matter disappear too, so
that the brain itself will appear somehow immaterial.

I suggest you reread the UDA where I explicitely use the fact that
not only a duplicate of me in a computer would be conscious, but even
the many duplicate of me in arithmetic are conscious. That is why
my next future depend on all computations existing in the arithmetical
plato heaven.

I'm glad you ask question. Don't hesitate, I am aware that some
answer to some post can put doubt on some other answer to other
post (either by lack of pedagogy from my part, or just because
some question are very contextual).

But of course with comp a duplicate of me with silicon, or even
with pebbles and toilet paper or with the people of China or
whatever could make me conscious, and this even if it take
one billion year for each instruction; I cannot be aware of the
delays ...

Bruno

Re: Immortality

[Brent Meeker]

Hello Marchal

On 10-Oct-01, Marchal wrote:
 Brent Meeker wrote:
 
 But then why do you say that a duplicate of your brain processes in a
 computer would not be conscious. You seem to be discriminating
 between a biological duplicate and a silicon duplicate.
 
 I have never say that. A duplicate of me (at the right level which
 exists with the comp hyp) would be as conscious as me.
 
 What I do have said somewhere (and I guess the misunderstanding comes
 from that) is that a computer cannot be conscious, nor can a brain,
 nor can any piece of matter (if that exists at all). Only a person,
 which by comp is immaterial, can be conscious. 

OK, I understand - I think.  But as I understand your ontology,
everything is immaterial - even matter.  So the question is, are there
consciousness' that are not associated with material things.  Can there
be disembodied consciousness as supposed by mystics and people who have
OBE's (out of body experiences)?

I was (in some context)
 preventing
 the Searle error consisting in believing that I am a brain,
 instead of the more correct I have a brain which follows by comp.
 Only latter in the reasoning will substancial matter disappear too,
 so that the brain itself will appear somehow immaterial.
 
 I suggest you reread the UDA where I explicitely use the fact that
 not only a duplicate of me in a computer would be conscious, but even
 the many duplicate of me in arithmetic are conscious. That is why
 my next future depend on all computations existing in the arithmetical
 plato heaven.

I'm not sure I grasp the concept of duplicates in arithmetic. 
Arithmetic is abstract and immaterial.  There can be duplicate
representations of 2+2=4 but I don't see how there can be duplicate
facts in Platonia corresponding to 2+2=4. As an immaterial fact of
logic it can't be duplicated because there can be no distinction
between two instances of it.

Brent Meeker
 The human mind did not evolve in order to create a race of
  philosophers or scientists   
  --- Bainbridge