Brent Meeker wrote:
>But then why do you say that a duplicate of your brain processes in a
>computer would not be conscious. You seem to be discriminating between
>a biological duplicate and a silicon duplicate.
I have never say that. A duplicate of me (at the right level which exists
with the comp hyp) would be as conscious as me.
What I do have said somewhere (and I guess the misunderstanding comes
from that) is that a computer cannot be conscious, nor can a brain, nor
can any piece of matter (if that exists at all). Only a person, which
by comp is immaterial, can be conscious. I was (in some context)
the "Searle error" consisting in believing that "I am a brain", instead
of the more correct "I have a brain" which follows by comp.
Only latter in the reasoning will substancial matter "disappear" too, so
that the brain itself will appear somehow immaterial.
I suggest you reread the UDA where I explicitely use the fact that
not only a duplicate of me in a computer would be conscious, but even
the many duplicate of me in arithmetic are conscious. That is why
my next future depend on all computations existing in the arithmetical
I'm glad you ask question. Don't hesitate, I am aware that some
answer to some post can put doubt on some other answer to other
post (either by lack of pedagogy from my part, or just because
some question are very contextual).
But of course with comp a duplicate of me with silicon, or even
with pebbles and toilet paper or with the people of China or
whatever could make me conscious, and this even if it take
one billion year for each instruction; I cannot be aware of the