Brent Meeker wrote: >But then why do you say that a duplicate of your brain processes in a >computer would not be conscious. You seem to be discriminating between >a biological duplicate and a silicon duplicate.
I have never say that. A duplicate of me (at the right level which exists with the comp hyp) would be as conscious as me. What I do have said somewhere (and I guess the misunderstanding comes from that) is that a computer cannot be conscious, nor can a brain, nor can any piece of matter (if that exists at all). Only a person, which by comp is immaterial, can be conscious. I was (in some context) preventing the "Searle error" consisting in believing that "I am a brain", instead of the more correct "I have a brain" which follows by comp. Only latter in the reasoning will substancial matter "disappear" too, so that the brain itself will appear somehow immaterial. I suggest you reread the UDA where I explicitely use the fact that not only a duplicate of me in a computer would be conscious, but even the many duplicate of me in arithmetic are conscious. That is why my next future depend on all computations existing in the arithmetical plato heaven. I'm glad you ask question. Don't hesitate, I am aware that some answer to some post can put doubt on some other answer to other post (either by lack of pedagogy from my part, or just because some question are very contextual). But of course with comp a duplicate of me with silicon, or even with pebbles and toilet paper or with the people of China or whatever could make me conscious, and this even if it take one billion year for each instruction; I cannot be aware of the delays ... Bruno
