RE: a possible paradox
Hi, I´m new here. Please accept this source of extra noise in your mailbox in the hope to be useful Federico Marulli wrote: So we can try to reason upon some examples which has a meaning from a physical point of view. For instance, we can think about the second principle of thermodynamics, according to which the entropy of a closed system necessarly has to increase. That means that, for instance, a gas put into a container of volume V will tend to spread by occupying all the available volume. This way we get the most possible disorder and the state is the most probable. Anyway the state in which all the gas is firmly in a v V volume is not forbidden by thermodynamics; it is just a rather improbable state. But this event, having some chances to take place, has to happen in infinite places and times in our multiverse. So there will be infinite Hubble spheres in which everything happens exactly as in our own sphere, but in which any time you put a gas into a container, it will never occupy the whole volume. At the same time, there will be infinite spheres in which some day the gas will occupy all the volume and some others not. And so on. The estrange behaviours like this can be prohibited by physical laws we don't already know or new consequences discovered from already known laws. In particular the case above, I think we may have a law that has consequences that prohibits such entropic behaviour: Statistical mechanics. As the gas is made by particles which moves in all directions it is easy to see that in the absence of any obstacle, the particles would go straight ahead in all directions to fill all the available space with no exceptions. I´m almost sure that it is impossible to avoid the expansion by means of well designed particle collisions. A serious study of this question may be a good statistical mechanic work to be done. I know that this argument is rather simple but I think that no serious work has been done to discard it. My guess is that simply we do not know the reality well enough to be sure that these magical worlds are possible. I confess that, it is more difficult to argue against other probabilistic events mentioned by Federico. May be that each one of the mentioned examples are clearly different and requires a separate study
A random collection of questions about info-cosmology
Some of these questions may be profound, and some silly. (In fact, they may be sorted in order of profound to silly.) My education is spotty in these areas. I'm most interested in specific references that help answer (or destroy) these questions. 1. What test could determine if a computational hypothesis holds? 2. Is it enough that a theory be elegant and explain all the known physics observations, or does the test of the theory also have to rule out all competing theories, or at least force all known competing theories to add ugly complex terms to themselves to continue to work? 3. Is it not true that the kind of computation that computes the universe or multiverse must be an energy-free computation, because energy itself is INSIDE the computed universe, and it would be paradoxical if it also had to be OUTSIDE. 4. What range of energy regimes and physical laws are required to produce spontaneous order where the order retains the dynamism required for life. (e.g. as opposed to producing one big, boring crystal.) 5. Do these special energy regimes and physical law sets NECESSARILY produce spontaneous order with the required dynamism? 6. Why does spontaneous order emerge in these energy/law regimes? 7. If we were in a possible world where thermodynamics ran backwards (entropy decreased), would the time-perception of observers within that world also run backwards? Would these backwards worlds (as far as classical physical observations go, anyway) thus be equivalent to and theoretically equatable with the corresponding possible world which was the same except that thermodynamics runs forwards as we are used to? 8. What is the significance of the fact that observers like ourselves (possibly with some notion of free will) are separated in space and can only communicate / cooperate with each other at the speed of light. They cannot interfere with some decisions that the other makes, because the other has already made the decision before a lightspeed communication can tell them or force them to stop. Imagine Jane on Venus and Joe on Mars getting into an argument. Immediately after receiving Joe's last communication (which he sent an hour ago), Jane decides to detonate her solar-system bomb in frustration and spite. Nothing Joe can say or do can stop her, because it will take two hours for him to know she's about to push the button, and communicate his desperate and well-crafted plea for forgiveness. The idea of FUNDAMENTALLY independent decision makers co-existing seems interesting. Open ended question. It's just as if Joe and Jane lived at different times. (And yet they CAN communicate with each other, just slowly. Hmmm)
Re: A random collection of questions about info-cosmology
he devil is watching you I put a curse on all of you that bad thing will happen to you and your love ones you may die to bad keep on sending me these email and the curse will get stronger so get fucked
Re: a possible paradox
Brent Meeker wrote: Even the probability of observing a single large scale violation of the laws of probability is vanishingly small. According to *our* laws of probability, that is. But how can you make recourse to our laws of probability if there are infinitely many universes which have different laws? What are the laws of probability that might differ? That less probable things happen more often than more probable one? Heh. You are trying to define probability in terms of itself. I imagine a corner of existence where (as a previous poster described) a die returns 6 every time. My whole point is: our stubborn insistence that 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 *or* 6 are just as probable as each other would be laughed at in such a corner of existence. If we happened to live in this other corner of existence, our statistical models would have developed along very different lines. And isn't it a little naive to assume that us humans of Earth have the only 'correct' statistical model, just because it happens to reconcile with the results of our experiments? I guess I am saying that math is not devoid of our physical context... how can it be? That it has empirical elements to it. Consider the case for us: For the sake of the argument, imagine that I used math to produce some absurd result, then the mathematical reasoning must be flawed. But presume I used only accepted rules of inference. Then the rules of inference must be inconsistent. Reductio ad absurdum. But to apply this argument, we must determine that the result is absurd. There's the rub. Often an argument is absurd 'by investigation' or 'by inspection'. Sounds like empirical evidence to me! So if I used our statistical laws to derive a 'proof' in this other universe whereby it was just as likely to roll a 1 as it was to roll a 6, wouldn't the inhabitants of this universe use investigation and r.a.a to disprove my inference laws and their conclusion? And who would be 'correct' do you think? Jules
Dark Matter, dark eneggy, conservation
Greetings list members. This is my joining post. Recent headlines indicate that there is empirical evidence now that our known universe is about 13 billion years old, it is essentially flat, and that space/time continues to be inflationary (we are in a continuing big bang state) after experiencing an initial expansion phase originating from a singular point -- followed a few billion years later by some sort of phase change that cause the universe to change from a slowing down expansion rate to a speeding up expansion rate. The properties of dark energy are postulated now to be the cause of continued and ever increasing in rate expansion of space/time, the continuing big bang state. The properties of dark matter are postulated to be the cause of observed gravitational interactions within the universe as a whole and where there is insufficient observable normal matter to account for the observations. Dark matter is now said to greatly exceed the amount of matter that we are able to measure and verify as existent. Neither dark energy nor dark matter has been proven by experiment or measurement to exist. Both seem as pure postulates at this writing. To me, dark energy seems to be the more important postulate. It appears to me that if the universe will forever keep expanding at an ever increasing rate then within a non infinite time period no elementary particle of matter will be able to interact with another. That condition seems to indicate that relativity would thus be meaningless when that point in time occurs. To my logic this argument appears to violate conservation of energy law. If the argument is nonetheless true, then it follows that said law is not a real law and that our entire theory structure is faulty at a fundamental level. I would be most pleased to here read comments from the list members. Ron McFarland
Re: Unsolicited weirdness
Could someone please send to the list and/or this lunatic the instructions for unsubscribing from the list. My old machine's disk crashed taking my email archive with it so I don't have the removal instructions. Thanks Eric Frank Flynn wrote: the devil is watching you I put a curse on all of you that bad thing will happen to you and your love ones you may die to bad keep on sending me these email and the curse will get stronger so get fucked
about Flynn dragqueen
Dear Mr? Mrs Frank: Please if you are not interested get out the list. If you need maddly anal sex go to the nearest harbour and the boys out there will give you 10 inch of hard meet. I hope that you enjoy that fuxxstastic experience. --- Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free. Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com). Version: 6.0.534 / Virus Database: 329 - Release Date: 31/10/2003
Deutsch on SSA
Dear Russel Do you have any comment to this comment by Deutsch on another list about these matters? Regards Lennart - Original Message - From: David Deutsch [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, October 31, 2003 3:07 PM Subject: Re: The Turing Principle and the SSA On 31 Oct 2003, at 4:59 am, Brian Scurfield wrote: First, I think we should be careful to distinguish the Self-Sampling Assumption (SSA) from the Strong Self-Sampling Assumption (SSSA). SSA: One should reason as if one were a random sample from the set of all observers in one's reference class. SSSA: Each observer-moment should reason as if it were randomly selected from its reference class. One problem with both of these is that there is no preferred meaning to sampling *randomly* from an infinite set, except in certain very special cases. A discrete infinity of copies of me is not one of those cases, so I don't think it is meaningful to select randomly from the set of all observers who will ever be created who are (in any sense) like me. So doesn't the thing fall down at the first hurdle? -- David Deutsch - Original Message - From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sunday, November 02, 2003 5:45 AM Subject: Re: Quantum accident survivor I disagree. You can only get an effect like this if the RSSA is invalid. You've been on this list long enough to remember the big debates about RSSA vs ASSA. I believe the ASSA is actually contrary to experience - but never mind - in order to get the effect you want you would need an SSA that is neither RSSA nor ASSA, but something *much* weirder. Cheers Saibal Mitra wrote: There have been many replies to this. I would say that you wouldn't expect to survive such accidents. Assume that we are sampled from a probability distribution over a set of possible states. E.g. in eternal inflation theories all possible quantum states the observable universe can be in are all realized, so all possible situations you can be in, do occur with some finite probability. In such theories you ''always'' exist. But this doesn't mean that if you are Mohammed Atta saying your prayer just before impact with the WTC, your next experience is that the plane has tunneled through the WTC without doing any harm. This is because there are many more Mohammed Attas in the universe that do not have this experience. So, you would ''survive'', but in a different branch with memory loss plus some aditional ''false'' memories. In that branch you wouldn't have been in that plane to begin with. You should think of yourself at any time as if you were chosen by a random generator sampled from a fixed probability distribution over the set of all possible states you can be in. The state that corresponds to you have experienced flying through the WTC is assigned an extremely small probability. How does this square with the normal experience of continuity through time? Well, every ''observer moment'' as chosen by the random generator has a memory of past experiences. So, if you go to bed now and wake up the next morning, you have the feeling of continuity, but this is only because the person waking up has the memory of going to bed. You could just as well say that the person going to bed survives in any one of the possible states he can be in. The state that happens to have the memory of going to bed is just one of these possible states. That particular state has the illusion of being the continuation of the first state. Oorspronkelijk bericht - Van: David Kwinter [EMAIL PROTECTED] Aan: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Verzonden: Friday, October 31, 2003 02:58 AM Onderwerp: Quantum accident survivor Another quickie: Assume I survive a car/plane crash which we assume could have many different quantum outcomes including me (dead || alive) Since I was the same person (entire life history) up until the crash/quantum 'branch' - then can't I assume that since there was at least one outcome where I survived, that TO ME I will always survive other such life/death branches? Furthermore if I witness a crash where someone dies can I assume that the victim will survive in their own world so far as at least one quantum branch of survivability seems possible? David Kwinter -- -- A/Prof Russell StandishDirector High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile) UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 () Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 -- --
Re: Deutsch on SSA
David Deutsch wrote about the Self Selection Assumption, on the Fabric-of-Reality list: One problem with both of these is that there is no preferred meaning to sampling *randomly* from an infinite set, except in certain very special cases. A discrete infinity of copies of me is not one of those cases, so I don't think it is meaningful to select randomly from the set of all observers who will ever be created who are (in any sense) like me. So doesn't the thing fall down at the first hurdle? First, I'm not so sure it is true that you can't select randomly from an infinite set. In the level 1 multiverse, there are an infinite number of copies of me. On some philosophical perspectives, I am exactly one of those copies. This represents an actual choice from an infinite set. Anyone who accepts both of these principles (the level 1 multiverse and the fact that he is actually in a single location) must accept the possibility of random selection from an infinite set. But suppose we do accept that this is impossible. The SSA could still work if it turned out that there were only a finite number of observers and observer-moments in the reference class. This is plausible if two conditions hold. The first is that each observer is described by only a finite amount of information. This is established by our current theories of physics. The second is that there is an upper limit on the size an observer could have; that is, that there are no infinitely or arbitrarily large observers. That is a little harder to defend, but for an observer of arbitrary size to come about, the universe (its universe, that is) would have to last subjectively forever, and have an infinite amount of information in it. Therefore I think it is rather problematic to suppose that there is no upper limit on the size of an observer, as it requires infinities to creep into the physics of the universe in several places. If observers do have an upper limit, then there are only a finite number of possible observers, and possible observer-moments, and Deutsch's objection fails on that basis. Hal Finney
Re: Deutsch on SSA
I unsubscribed for the FOR list about 6 months ago, as I found I could
no longer put up with the dross on that list (not that DD is dross, of
course!).
I must admit, I'm not entirely sure what problem DD is alluding to
here. In order to apply the SSA requires a measure on the reference
class. Perhaps he is commenting that there is often no preferred
measure.
In the case of the RSSA, the measure is uniquely defined by the
Schroedinger wavefunction. In the case of ASSA, an absolute measure is
assumed to exist.
For me, a bigger problem with the SSA, and with Anthropic arguments
generally, is that the reference class is ambiguous.
Cheers
Lennart Nilsson wrote:
Dear Russel
Do you have any comment to this comment by Deutsch on another list about
these matters?
Regards
Lennart
- Original Message -
From: David Deutsch [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, October 31, 2003 3:07 PM
Subject: Re: The Turing Principle and the SSA
On 31 Oct 2003, at 4:59 am, Brian Scurfield wrote:
First, I think we should be careful to distinguish the Self-Sampling
Assumption (SSA) from the Strong Self-Sampling Assumption (SSSA).
SSA: One should reason as if one were a random sample from the set of
all observers in one's reference class.
SSSA: Each observer-moment should reason as if it were randomly
selected from its reference class.
One problem with both of these is that there is no preferred meaning to
sampling *randomly* from an infinite set, except in certain very
special cases.
A discrete infinity of copies of me is not one of those cases, so I
don't think it is meaningful to select randomly from the set of all
observers who will ever be created who are (in any sense) like me. So
doesn't the thing fall down at the first hurdle?
-- David Deutsch
- Original Message -
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Sunday, November 02, 2003 5:45 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum accident survivor
I disagree. You can only get an effect like this if the RSSA is
invalid. You've been on this list long enough to remember the big
debates about RSSA vs ASSA. I believe the ASSA is actually contrary to
experience - but never mind - in order to get the effect you want you
would need an SSA that is neither RSSA nor ASSA, but something *much*
weirder.
Cheers
Saibal Mitra wrote:
There have been many replies to this. I would say that you wouldn't
expect
to survive such accidents.
Assume that we are sampled from a probability distribution over a set of
possible states. E.g. in eternal inflation theories all possible quantum
states the observable universe can be in are all realized, so all
possible
situations you can be in, do occur with some finite probability. In such
theories you ''always'' exist.
But this doesn't mean that if you are Mohammed Atta saying your prayer
just
before impact with the WTC, your next experience is that the plane has
tunneled through the WTC without doing any harm. This is because there
are
many more Mohammed Attas in the universe that do not have this
experience.
So, you would ''survive'', but in a different branch with memory loss
plus
some aditional ''false'' memories. In that branch you wouldn't have been
in
that plane to begin with.
You should think of yourself at any time as if you were chosen by a
random
generator sampled from a fixed probability distribution over the set of
all
possible states you can be in. The state that corresponds to you have
experienced flying through the WTC is assigned an extremely small
probability.
How does this square with the normal experience of continuity through
time?
Well, every ''observer moment'' as chosen by the random generator has a
memory of past experiences. So, if you go to bed now and wake up the
next
morning, you have the feeling of continuity, but this is only because
the
person waking up has the memory of going to bed.
You could just as well say that the person going to bed survives in any
one
of the possible states he can be in. The state that happens to have the
memory of going to bed is just one of these possible states. That
particular
state has the illusion of being the continuation of the first state.
Oorspronkelijk bericht -
Van: David Kwinter [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Aan: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Verzonden: Friday, October 31, 2003 02:58 AM
Onderwerp: Quantum accident survivor
Another quickie:
Assume I survive a car/plane crash which we assume could have many
different quantum outcomes including me (dead || alive)
Since I was the same person (entire life history) up until the
crash/quantum 'branch' - then can't I assume that since there was at
least one outcome
Re: Deutsch on SSA
I think a related point is touched on in my paper Complexity and Emergence, as in Why Occam's razor. In both of these cases, one is selecting from an infinite discrete set (of descriptions), which have a uniform measure associated with them. The answer you get, is the the probability of selection is related in a simple way to the complexity of the description, as perceived by the observer. There are no paradoxes, but the results are observer dependent in a way that makes a lot of scientists uncomfortable. Cheers Hal Finney wrote: David Deutsch wrote about the Self Selection Assumption, on the Fabric-of-Reality list: One problem with both of these is that there is no preferred meaning to sampling *randomly* from an infinite set, except in certain very special cases. A discrete infinity of copies of me is not one of those cases, so I don't think it is meaningful to select randomly from the set of all observers who will ever be created who are (in any sense) like me. So doesn't the thing fall down at the first hurdle? First, I'm not so sure it is true that you can't select randomly from an infinite set. In the level 1 multiverse, there are an infinite number of copies of me. On some philosophical perspectives, I am exactly one of those copies. This represents an actual choice from an infinite set. Anyone who accepts both of these principles (the level 1 multiverse and the fact that he is actually in a single location) must accept the possibility of random selection from an infinite set. But suppose we do accept that this is impossible. The SSA could still work if it turned out that there were only a finite number of observers and observer-moments in the reference class. This is plausible if two conditions hold. The first is that each observer is described by only a finite amount of information. This is established by our current theories of physics. The second is that there is an upper limit on the size an observer could have; that is, that there are no infinitely or arbitrarily large observers. That is a little harder to defend, but for an observer of arbitrary size to come about, the universe (its universe, that is) would have to last subjectively forever, and have an infinite amount of information in it. Therefore I think it is rather problematic to suppose that there is no upper limit on the size of an observer, as it requires infinities to creep into the physics of the universe in several places. If observers do have an upper limit, then there are only a finite number of possible observers, and possible observer-moments, and Deutsch's objection fails on that basis. Hal Finney A/Prof Russell Standish Director High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile) UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 () Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centrehttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
Re: Frank Flynn
It's a chatterbot. Considering the poor syntax and misspelled words, it was probably designed by a Russian teen. RMiller
Re: Dark Matter, dark eneggy, conservation
Thank you list for the welcome. I look forward to many congenial debates! On 2 Nov 2003 at 22:05, Joao Leao wrote: On Nov 2, 2003, at 5:16 PM, Ron McFarland wrote: Greetings list members. This is my joining post. Recent headlines indicate that there is empirical evidence now that our known universe is about 13 billion years old, it is essentially flat, and that space/time continues to be inflationary (we are in a continuing big bang state) after experiencing an initial expansion phase originating from a singular point -- followed a few billion years later by some sort of phase change that cause the universe to change from a slowing down expansion rate to a speeding up expansion rate. The properties of dark energy are postulated now to be the cause of continued and ever increasing in rate expansion of space/time, the continuing big bang state. The properties of dark matter are postulated to be the cause of observed gravitational interactions within the universe as a whole and where there is insufficient observable normal matter to account for the observations. Dark matter is now said to greatly exceed the amount of matter that we are able to measure and verify as existent. Ron I am sorry but you seem to contradict yourself below! You state, quite correctly as far as I can tell, what the outcome of the most recent cosmic observations on our universe is. But them you state that Neither dark energy nor dark matter has been proven by experiment or measurement to exist. Both seem as pure postulates at this writing. Both dark matter and dark energy express little more than our puzzling with two sets of consistently observed effects which we aren't able to accommodate in the so-called concordance model of standard cosmology. What these terms designate are not (yet) definite entities so it is a bit early to even call them postulates. Theorists have sought to explain these effects along several distinct hypothetical lines but the word is still out on which one of those will prevail. Correct, and I did not define my terms. By postulate I mean the expression of an idea not yet represented by a defining mathematical statement. By theory I mean an idea supported by mathematical statement but not yet verified in all possible ways by apparent empirical evidence. By law I mean an idea supported by a mathematical statement that can not be ruled out by empirical evidence. To me, dark energy seems to be the more important postulate. It appears to me that if the universe will forever keep expanding at an ever increasing rate then within a non infinite time period no elementary particle of matter will be able to interact with another. What makes you think so? The supposition that redshift is an observable component of inflation of the universe. It is not the distance that contributes, it is the relative rate of expansion that contributes to the apparent redshift (all other factors that can contribute to redshift being ignored for the purpose of concentrating only on the affect caused by inflation itself). The further something is away from us, relatively speaking, then the faster it is moving away from us. With inflation being on an ever increasing rate, there comes a point in finite time when the expansion rate reaches a level that causes the entire universe to appear dark and at absolute zero in temperature in reference to all its matter relative to itself. In other words, the redshift at all points within the universe will have shifted to a level of absolute zero observable energy at some future time because the universe is then expanding (at every point within itself) at or beyond a rate that would allow energy to find anything in the universe that it could be relative to. In that situation a particle would never be able to travel from any point A to any point B, although it might try to do so for as long as it existed. Eventually the particle could no longer exist, because it itself would loose coherency as its integral parts moved away from each other as a consequence of the space it occupies continuing to inflate, and thereby move its parts away from each other until nuclear forces could no longer maintain the attraction that keeps the particle (of any type whatsoever) from totally disintegrating. That condition seems to indicate that relativity would thus be meaningless when that point in time occurs. To my logic this argument appears to violate conservation of energy law. If the argument is nonetheless true, then it follows that said law is not a real law and that our entire theory structure is faulty at a fundamental level. That may very well be the case but it is again, to early to tell. As you have probably heard General Relativity has always had an open place for something like Dark Energy, namely the cosmological term. So it may be worth our while to
