Dear Russel Do you have any comment to this comment by Deutsch on another list about these matters?
Regards Lennart ----- Original Message ----- From: "David Deutsch" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Friday, October 31, 2003 3:07 PM Subject: Re: The Turing Principle and the SSA > On 31 Oct 2003, at 4:59 am, Brian Scurfield wrote: > > > First, I think we should be careful to distinguish the Self-Sampling > > Assumption (SSA) from the Strong Self-Sampling Assumption (SSSA). > > > > SSA: One should reason as if one were a random sample from the set of > > all observers in one's reference class. > > > > SSSA: Each observer-moment should reason as if it were randomly > > selected from its reference class. > > One problem with both of these is that there is no preferred meaning to > sampling *randomly* from an infinite set, except in certain very > special cases. > > A discrete infinity of copies of me is not one of those cases, so I > don't think it is meaningful to select randomly from the "set of all > observers who will ever be created who are (in any sense) like me". So > doesn't the thing fall down at the first hurdle? > > -- David Deutsch ----- Original Message ----- From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Sunday, November 02, 2003 5:45 AM Subject: Re: Quantum accident survivor > I disagree. You can only get an effect like this if the RSSA is > invalid. You've been on this list long enough to remember the big > debates about RSSA vs ASSA. I believe the ASSA is actually contrary to > experience - but never mind - in order to get the effect you want you > would need an SSA that is neither RSSA nor ASSA, but something *much* > weirder. > > Cheers > > Saibal Mitra wrote: > > > > There have been many replies to this. I would say that you wouldn't expect > > to survive such accidents. > > > > Assume that we are sampled from a probability distribution over a set of > > possible states. E.g. in eternal inflation theories all possible quantum > > states the observable universe can be in are all realized, so all possible > > situations you can be in, do occur with some finite probability. In such > > theories you ''always'' exist. > > > > But this doesn't mean that if you are Mohammed Atta saying your prayer just > > before impact with the WTC, your next experience is that the plane has > > tunneled through the WTC without doing any harm. This is because there are > > many more Mohammed Attas in the universe that do not have this experience. > > So, you would ''survive'', but in a different branch with memory loss plus > > some aditional ''false'' memories. In that branch you wouldn't have been in > > that plane to begin with. > > > > You should think of yourself at any time as if you were chosen by a random > > generator sampled from a fixed probability distribution over the set of all > > possible states you can be in. The state that corresponds to you have > > experienced flying through the WTC is assigned an extremely small > > probability. > > > > How does this square with the normal experience of continuity through time? > > Well, every ''observer moment'' as chosen by the random generator has a > > memory of past experiences. So, if you go to bed now and wake up the next > > morning, you have the feeling of continuity, but this is only because the > > person waking up has the memory of going to bed. > > > > You could just as well say that the person going to bed survives in any one > > of the possible states he can be in. The state that happens to have the > > memory of going to bed is just one of these possible states. That particular > > state has the illusion of being the continuation of the first state. > > > > > > > > > > ---- Oorspronkelijk bericht ----- > > Van: "David Kwinter" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > Aan: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > Verzonden: Friday, October 31, 2003 02:58 AM > > Onderwerp: Quantum accident survivor > > > > > > > Another quickie: > > > > > > Assume I survive a car/plane crash which we assume could have many > > > different quantum outcomes including me (dead || alive) > > > > > > Since I was the same person (entire life history) up until the > > > crash/quantum 'branch' - then can't I assume that since there was at > > > least one outcome where I survived, that TO ME I will always survive > > > other such life/death branches? > > > > > > Furthermore if I witness a crash where someone dies can I assume that > > > the victim will survive in their own "world" so far as at least one > > > quantum branch of survivability seems possible? > > > > > > > > > David Kwinter > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- > A/Prof Russell Standish Director > High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile) > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 (") > Australia [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks > International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 > -------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- >