Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-16 Thread 1Z


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 Peter Jones writes:

  Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 
   Russell Standish writes:
  
If the same QM state is associated with different observer moments,
you must be talking about some non-functionalist approach to
consciousness. The QM state, by definition, contains all information
that can be extracted from observation.
  
   Functionalism explicitly allows that different physical states may 
   implement
   the same observer moment. For example, OM1 could be implemented on a
   computer running Mac OS going through physical state S1, or by an 
   equivalent
   program running on the same computer emulating Windows XP on Mac OS
   going through state S2. In this way, there is potentially a large number 
   of
   distinct physical states S1, S2... Sn on the one machine all implementing 
   OM1.
  
   Is there any reason to suppose inclusion of a physical state in this set 
   S1... Sn
   prevents it from implementing any OM other than OM1?
 
  If this set is the set of all phsyical states that possibly implement
  OM1, the any physical state either in the set, or doesn't belong there.

 But does that mean that a physical state which belongs in this set implements 
 OM1
 and only OM1, or is it possible that a physical state may implement more than 
 one
 OM?

Under physicalism, one physical state corresponds to one total
conscious state.

I suppose it is possible, even under constraints which exlude baroque
re-intrerpretations, for one physical state to implement more than
one computational state. A computational state is basically a subset of
 a physical
state. A physical state could have two disjoint computational subsets.
This
is just parallel processing. I suppose the human
equivalent would be patients who have had split brain surgery for
epilepsy.


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Re: To observe is to......

2006-10-16 Thread David Nyman


Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:

 a) assume that there is an 'objective reality in the Bruno sense: a
 reality exists. _any_ sort of reality will do.
 b) draw a purely notional boundary around any portion of it at any
 spatiotemporal scale.

Do you think it's possible *not* to start with this assumption? The
problem with natural language is that it implicitly assumes the AIV is
'out there' as the primary reality, and it can be tough to work
back from this point of departure. I was trying to develop a language
that started from the APV and worked outwards, as it were, so that it
was easier to see how emergent information boundaries were shaping and
structuring the APV and the AIV while at the same time contingently
creating the 'not-X', without fundamentally creating novel ontic
(as opposed to epistemic) categories. Unfortunately, the terminology
tended to become impenetrable and in the end a barrier to
communication.  I don't have a solution to this.

Somehow it's like:

a) we mentally step outside of the APV to see what it's like in the
'external world'
b) we make models of what we see out there (the AIV), including our
'brains'
c) then we forget about step a), get stranded outside, and take the AIV
for 'reality'
d) leaving us in a panic about how to get back inside our 'brains'

Somebody once asked what is the external world 'external' to?
Do you know?

 some people here think the APV is '3-person'
 some people here think the AIV is '3-person'

My view is that the *fact of * the APV is 1-person, and everything else
is 3-person. That is, the 1-person is the unmediated intuitive grasp of
3-person information by the 'underlying reality'. What lies within
the APV, the AIV, or the 'external world' to which they refer, then
depends solely on contingent boundaries emerging from 3-person
information gradients and horizons.  Essentially this is categorising
the ontology as 1-person, and the epistemology as 3-person. However, I
realise that this is a minority approach, and has caused much
confusion, so I've more or less given up trying to promote it.

I think the general view is that the APV is 1-person, and the AIV is
3-person. But then, the AIV *model* of the APV is 3-person, and the
distinction between this and the 1-person APV is confusing (the 'hard
problem').

 The easiest way to think of it is to regard X as a finger puppet. The
 'fingers' are behaving atomly in that the fingers are painted (appear -
 APV) to deliver the appearance of 'atom-ly (AIV) behaviour'. The AIV says
 nothing about FINGERS. Then note that whatever the fingers are - you, the
 observer - are made of the SAME FINGERS and those fingers are painting the
 APV in your head. The reason no-one ever gets a physics of qualia is that
 nobody EVER gets scientific about _fingers_ - the underling physics -
 Everyone thinks the AIV generalisations ARE the fingers.

Conventional physics, I think, denies that the fingers exist - all
that can be said is what QM / string theory / model of the month
describes, and this is equivalent to saying that that's all there is
folks. Comp, however, would say that the fingers are something like
mathematical ontic / epistemic categories (see some of Marc Geddes'
posts), and that these support the emergence of 3-person relata. Sets
of these 1-person / 3-person relationships can be nested recursively,
the whole resting on the 'turtle' of a tightly constrained
'number reality' (e.g. AR+CT+UDA). The 'modest' assumption here
is that not to force 'faith' in comp, but rather study and test it
for its interesting and surprising results and generative power. The
most powerful result would be to pin down the 'emergence direction'
of 1-person -- 3-person once and for all.

David

 [Colin]
 snip
 Indeed I would hold that our subjective experience (subjectivity)is our
 one and only intimate and complete connection to the underlying reality
 and it is the existence of it (subjectivity) 'at all' which is most
 telling/instructive  of the true nature/structure of the underlying
 reality, not the appearances thus delivered by subjectivity.

 [DAVID]
  Yes, and as I've said, I was trying to convey the essence of this
 thought with what became (unfortunately) confused with 1-person primacy on
 this list. I'd be grateful for help on reformulating this more
 coherently if possible. The heart of it is the primary intension of
 'exists', whose fons et origo I take to be: 'exists in the sense that I
 exist subjectively'.

 [COLIN]
 Yes. The subtlety is extreme. My way of unpacking it is to  think of the
 concept of 'perspective view':

 a) assume that there is an 'objective reality in the Bruno sense: a
 reality exists. _any_ sort of reality will do.
 b) draw a purely notional boundary around any portion  of it at any
 spatiotemporal scale.

 Now realise that innate to the situation is that 'being' the notionally
 segregated portion of the reality innately, automatically
 prescribes/defines a perspective view of the rest of the universe.

 

RE: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-16 Thread Stathis Papaioannou


Peter Jones writes:

 Under physicalism, one physical state corresponds to one total
 conscious state.
 
 I suppose it is possible, even under constraints which exlude baroque
 re-intrerpretations, for one physical state to implement more than
 one computational state. A computational state is basically a subset of
  a physical
 state. A physical state could have two disjoint computational subsets.

 This
 is just parallel processing. I suppose the human
 equivalent would be patients who have had split brain surgery for
 epilepsy.

Parallel processing is a case of many physical states - one computational 
state, isn't it? I don't think this is at all problematic in computer science, 
and 
it is the basis of any functionalist theory of consciousness. However, the 
reverse relationship, one physical state - many computational states is 
deeply problematic if computation is taken to be the basis of consciousness, 
because it destroys the supervenience thesis as commonly understood. 

Stathis Papaioannou
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