Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Le 27-déc.-06, à 20:11, Jef Allbright a écrit : Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Jef Allbright writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: But our main criterion for what to believe should be what is true, right? I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology is my misunderstanding, his transparent belief, a simple lack of precision, or something more. Thanks for the compliments about my writing. I meant that what we should believe does not necessarily have to be the same as what is true, but I think that unless there are special circumstances, it ought to be the case. I agree within the context you intended. My point was that we can never be certain of truth, so we should be careful in our speech and thinking not to imply that such truth is even available to us for the kind of comparisons being discussed here. We can know that some patterns of action work better than others, but the only truth we can assess is always within a specific context. I think we agree. Those context are always theoretical, with a large sense for theory. It could be an explicit theory, like quantum mechanics, ... or an implicit build in belief like our instinctive inference that our neighborhood exists or make sense. This last is a theory, which according to a more explicit one (Darwin) is a many millenia relative (and thus contextual) construct. Brent Meeker made a similar point: if someone is dying of a terminal illness, maybe it is better that he believe he has longer to live than the medical evidence suggests, but that would have to be an example of special circumstances. There are plenty of examples of self-deception providing benefits within the scope of the individual, and leading to increasingly effective models of reality for the group. Here's a recent article on this topic: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/26/science/26lying.html? pagewanted=print Thanks for this interesting reference. In the context of the theory I suggest, it is still an open problem if life itself is a logical descendant of a lie. Actually, although there are evidences to the contrary, even appearance of the physical universe could be a self-deception. This is a stronger statement than the one I am used to say, which is that the primitive character of the physical laws are self-deception (but this is only a consequence of taking the computationalist hypothesis seriously enough and is strictly speaking out of the present topic. If he had said something like our main criterion for what to believe should be what works, what seems to work, what passes the tests of time, etc. or had made a direct reference to Occam's Razor, I would be comfortable knowing that we're thinking alike on this point. But I've seen this stumbling block arise so many times and so many places that I'm very curious to learn something of its source. The question of what is the truth is a separate one, but one criterion I would add to those you mention above is that it should come from someone able to put aside his own biases and wishes where these might influence his assessment of the evidence. I agree, but would point out that by definition, one can not actually set aside one's one biases because to do so would require an objective view of oneself. But two observers can agree on some common context, so that some objective view of oneself can be done (although probably not recognize as such ...). So a second observer can, in some situation helps a first one to be less biased. Rather, one can be aware that such biases exist in general, and implement increasingly effective principles (e.g. scientific method) to minimize them. I agree with this. We might never be certain of the truth, so our beliefs should always be tentative, but that doesn't mean we should believe whatever we fancy. Here it's a smaller point, and I agree with the main thrust of the statement, but it leaves a door open for the possibility that we might actually be justifiably certain of the truth in *some* case, and I'm wonder where that open door is intended to lead. I said might because there is one case where I am certain of the truth, which is that I am having the present experience. Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of consciousness, on what basis can you claim that it actually is real? Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message, imo, of Descartes diagonal argument: it is the fixed point of doubt. If we decide to doubt everything, we will find ourselves, at some stage, doubting we doubt of everything. The same for relativization: we cannot relativize everything without an absolute base on which that relativization is effective. If you want (like David and George) consciousness is our criteria of absolute (but not 3-communicable) truth. I don't think we can genuinely doubt we are conscious, although we can doubt on any
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Brent Meeker writes: It's a strange quality of delusions that psychotic people are even more certain of their truth than non-deluded people are certain of things which have reasonable empirical evidence in their favour. Yet this seems understandable. The psychotic person is believing things because of some physical malfunction in his brain. So it is easy to see how it might be incorrigble. The normal persons is believing things because of perception, hearsay, and logic. But he knows that all of those can be deceptive; and so he is never certain. Sure, it's a defect in the brain chemistry, but the delusional person will give you his reasons for his belief: Someone entered my home while I was out yesterday and shifted a CD from the desk to the coffee table. Is it possible that you moved it yourself and forgot? No, I'm certain I didn't move it myself. Was there any sign of someone breakung in? No, they must have had keys. Had you given anyone the keys? No, but they might have copied them without my knowledge, or maybe they're just good at picking locks. Was anything else taken or disturbed? Not that I could tell, but I can't be certain. Why would anyone do such a strange thing? I agree it's strange, and I have no idea why anyone would go to such lengths to annoy me. There are some crazy people out there, you know! Would anything convince you that you had made a mistake? For example, if you had video evidence showing that nothing strange had happened on the day of the incident? I'm absolutely certain the CD was moved, and I don't believe in ghosts! Someone who went to such lengths to annoy me would probably be able to alter video recordings, so no, that wouldn't convince me I was crazy, as you seem to be implying. This is very similar to the arguments of people with religious convictions, who will cite evidence in support of their beliefs up to a point, but it soon becomes clear that no matter how paltry this evidence is shown to be, they will still maintain their belief. The difference is that these people do not change their way of thinking in response to antipsychotic medication. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
On Fri, 2006-12-29 at 00:37 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Sure, it's a defect in the brain chemistry, but the delusional person will give you his reasons for his belief: [...] This is very similar to the arguments of people with religious convictions, who will cite evidence in support of their beliefs up to a point, but it soon becomes clear that no matter how paltry this evidence is shown to be, they will still maintain their belief. I do wonder how many non-religious beliefs are the same way, i.e., incorrigible in spite of the absence of evidence, or even contrary to evidence, simply because they are convenient or permeate one's surrounding culture. The difference is that these people do not change their way of thinking in response to antipsychotic medication. Which is fascinating to behold, as I have witnessed this very same, in both directions, on many occasions, as patients have gone on and off their medication. They will also go to great lengths to justify their change in belief structure when it's obvious it's the effect of the chemical on their disease process. There is a subtlety to the religious qualification you make above, however. There are indeed religious-oriented delusions which go away on medication, but they tend to be ones that were only acquired through the course of the patient's illness. Those acquired through detailed indoctrination in youth tend to be unaffected, as you mention. -Johnathan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: ... This is very similar to the arguments of people with religious convictions, who will cite evidence in support of their beliefs up to a point, but it soon becomes clear that no matter how paltry this evidence is shown to be, they will still maintain their belief. The difference is that these people do not change their way of thinking in response to antipsychotic medication. Have you tried it? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
On 12/28/06, Johnathan Corgan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Fri, 2006-12-29 at 00:37 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Sure, it's a defect in the brain chemistry, but the delusional person will give you his reasons for his belief: [...] This is very similar to the arguments of people with religious convictions, who will cite evidence in support of their beliefs up to a point, but it soon becomes clear that no matter how paltry this evidence is shown to be, they will still maintain their belief. I do wonder how many non-religious beliefs are the same way, i.e., incorrigible in spite of the absence of evidence, or even contrary to evidence, simply because they are convenient or permeate one's surrounding culture. The difference is that these people do not change their way of thinking in response to antipsychotic medication. Which is fascinating to behold, as I have witnessed this very same, in both directions, on many occasions, as patients have gone on and off their medication. They will also go to great lengths to justify their change in belief structure when it's obvious it's the effect of the chemical on their disease process. There is a subtlety to the religious qualification you make above, however. There are indeed religious-oriented delusions which go away on medication, but they tend to be ones that were only acquired through the course of the patient's illness. Those acquired through detailed indoctrination in youth tend to be unaffected, as you mention. -Johnathan -- to Johnathan's I do wonder how many non-religious beliefs are the same way, i.e., incorrigible in spite of the absence of evidence, or even contrary to evidence, simply because they are convenient or permeate one's surrounding culture. JM: Evidence is tricky. An acceptance may be controlled by personal experience, but also by one's belief system. FOR ANOTHER INDIVIDUALITY (included: belief system) some 'hard evidence' may sound silly, and vice versa in an argument. Convenience is a good point IMO. This is in my opinion the futility of discussions (like this one here) about argumentation between different belief systems. Chemicals work on the strength of connecting parts (polarity change?) and so whatever looked unshakable, seems by those 'chemicals', in the changed connectivity volatile (and vice versa). (Chemicals don't 'make' thoughts - they work on the conveying tools). --~~--~--~--- --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Bruno Marchal wrote: Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of consciousness, on what basis can you claim that it actually is real? Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message, imo, of Descartes diagonal argument: it is the fixed point of doubt. If we decide to doubt everything, we will find ourselves, at some stage, doubting we doubt of everything. The same for relativization: we cannot relativize everything without an absolute base on which that relativization is effective. Here is a subtle, and non-traditional thought: Classical philosophy always put the Reasoner at the center of the structure of reasoning. But with our more developed awareness of evolution, evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, it is becoming clearer that this pure Copernican view of reasoning is invalid. We now can see that every Reasoner is embedded within some a priori framework such that there is an intrinsic bias or offset to any subjective construct. When we are aware that there is fundamental bias, it is clear that one can not validly reason to the point of doubting everything. When all that is in doubt is removed, we don't arrive at zero as is classically thought, but at some indistinct offset determined by our very nature as a reasoner embedded in a real environment. Understanding this eliminates the pressure to deal with conceptual identities leading to meaningless absolutes. This understanding also helps resolve other philosophical paradoxes such as solipsism, meaning of life, free-will and others hinging on the idea of a subjective center. If you want (like David and George) consciousness is our criteria of absolute (but not 3-communicable) truth. I don't think we can genuinely doubt we are conscious, although we can doubt on any content of that consciousness, but that is different. We can doubt having been conscious in some past, but we cannot doubt being conscious here and now, whatever that means. ... The truth here bears on the existence of the experience, and has nothing to do with anything which could be reported by the experiencer. On this basis I understand your point, and as long as we are very careful about conveying which particular meaning of knowing, certainty, and truth we are referring to, then there will be little confusion. But such dual usage leaves us at risk of our thinking repeatedly falling into the singularity of the self, from which there's no objective (and thus workable) basis for any claim. My personal experience is that there's no paradox at all if one is willing to fully accept that within any framework of description there is absolutely no difference at all between a person and a zombie, but even the most philosophically cognizant, being evolved human organisms, will snap back to defending the existence of a 1st person point of view even though it isn't detectable or measurable and has absolutely no effect on the physical world. It is virtually impossible for many people to see that even IF the 1st person experience actually exists, it can't be described, even by that person, except from a third person perspective. That voice in your own mind, those images in your imagination, none can be said to be experienced without being interpreted. The idea of direct experience is incoherent. It always carries the implication that there's some other process there to have the experience. It's turtles all the way down. The essence of Buddhist training is to accept this non-existence of Self at a deep level. It is very rare, but not impossible to achieve such an understanding, and while still experiencing the illusion, to see it as an illusion, with no actual boundary to distinguish an imagined self from the rest of nature. I think that a machine intelligence, while requiring a model of self, would have no need of this illusion which is a result of our evolutionary development. - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Jef Allbright wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of consciousness, on what basis can you claim that it actually is real? Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message, imo, of Descartes diagonal argument: it is the fixed point of doubt. If we decide to doubt everything, we will find ourselves, at some stage, doubting we doubt of everything. The same for relativization: we cannot relativize everything without an absolute base on which that relativization is effective. Here is a subtle, and non-traditional thought: Classical philosophy always put the Reasoner at the center of the structure of reasoning. But with our more developed awareness of evolution, evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, it is becoming clearer that this pure Copernican view of reasoning is invalid. We now can see that every Reasoner is embedded within some a priori framework such that there is an intrinsic bias or offset to any subjective construct. When we are aware that there is fundamental bias, it is clear that one can not validly reason to the point of doubting everything. When all that is in doubt is removed, we don't arrive at zero as is classically thought, but at some indistinct offset determined by our very nature as a reasoner embedded in a real environment. Understanding this eliminates the pressure to deal with conceptual identities leading to meaningless absolutes. That sounds good, but could you give some concrete examples. Talk of bias and offset seems to imply that there really is an absolute center - which I think is a very dubious proposition. This understanding also helps resolve other philosophical paradoxes such as solipsism, meaning of life, free-will and others hinging on the idea of a subjective center. If you want (like David and George) consciousness is our criteria of absolute (but not 3-communicable) truth. I don't think we can genuinely doubt we are conscious, although we can doubt on any content of that consciousness, but that is different. We can doubt having been conscious in some past, but we cannot doubt being conscious here and now, whatever that means. ... The truth here bears on the existence of the experience, and has nothing to do with anything which could be reported by the experiencer. On this basis I understand your point, and as long as we are very careful about conveying which particular meaning of knowing, certainty, and truth we are referring to, then there will be little confusion. But such dual usage leaves us at risk of our thinking repeatedly falling into the singularity of the self, from which there's no objective (and thus workable) basis for any claim. I think objective should just be understood as denoting subjective agreement from different viewpoints. My personal experience is that there's no paradox at all if one is willing to fully accept that within any framework of description there is absolutely no difference at all between a person and a zombie, but even the most philosophically cognizant, being evolved human organisms, will snap back to defending the existence of a 1st person point of view even though it isn't detectable or measurable and has absolutely no effect on the physical world. It is virtually impossible for many people to see that even IF the 1st person experience actually exists, it can't be described, even by that person, except from a third person perspective. That voice in your own mind, those images in your imagination, none can be said to be experienced without being interpreted. The idea of direct experience is incoherent. It always carries the implication that there's some other process there to have the experience. It's turtles all the way down. That sounds like a simple contradiction to me!?? I'd say experience is always direct, an adjective which really adds nothing. An experience just is. If it has to be interpreted *then* you've fallen into an infinite regress: who experiences the interpretation. The essence of Buddhist training is to accept this non-existence of Self at a deep level. It is very rare, but not impossible to achieve such an understanding, and while still experiencing the illusion, to see it as an illusion, with no actual boundary to distinguish an imagined self from the rest of nature. I think that a machine intelligence, while requiring a model of self, would have no need of this illusion which is a result of our evolutionary development. To call it an illusion goes too far. I'd say the self is a model or an abstract construct - but it models something, it has predictive power. If you start to call things like that illusions then everything is an illusion and the word has lost its meaning. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Brent Meeker wrote: Jef Allbright wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of consciousness, on what basis can you claim that it actually is real? Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message, imo, of Descartes diagonal argument: it is the fixed point of doubt. If we decide to doubt everything, we will find ourselves, at some stage, doubting we doubt of everything. The same for relativization: we cannot relativize everything without an absolute base on which that relativization is effective. Here is a subtle, and non-traditional thought: Classical philosophy always put the Reasoner at the center of the structure of reasoning. But with our more developed awareness of evolution, evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, it is becoming clearer that this pure Copernican view of reasoning is invalid. We now can see that every Reasoner is embedded within some a priori framework such that there is an intrinsic bias or offset to any subjective construct. When we are aware that there is fundamental bias, it is clear that one can not validly reason to the point of doubting everything. When all that is in doubt is removed, we don't arrive at zero as is classically thought, but at some indistinct offset determined by our very nature as a reasoner embedded in a real environment. Understanding this eliminates the pressure to deal with conceptual identities leading to meaningless absolutes. That sounds good, but could you give some concrete examples. Talk of bias and offset seems to imply that there really is an absolute center - which I think is a very dubious proposition. I don't know what other examples to give at this point, other than the comparison with the Copernican model. Knowing the actual center of our highly multidimensional basis of thought, even if it were possible, is not necessary--just as we don't need to know our exact physical location in the universe to know that we should no longer build theories around the assumption that we're at the center, with the unique properties that would imply. This understanding also helps resolve other philosophical paradoxes such as solipsism, meaning of life, free-will and others hinging on the idea of a subjective center. If you want (like David and George) consciousness is our criteria of absolute (but not 3-communicable) truth. I don't think we can genuinely doubt we are conscious, although we can doubt on any content of that consciousness, but that is different. We can doubt having been conscious in some past, but we cannot doubt being conscious here and now, whatever that means. ... The truth here bears on the existence of the experience, and has nothing to do with anything which could be reported by the experiencer. On this basis I understand your point, and as long as we are very careful about conveying which particular meaning of knowing, certainty, and truth we are referring to, then there will be little confusion. But such dual usage leaves us at risk of our thinking repeatedly falling into the singularity of the self, from which there's no objective (and thus workable) basis for any claim. I think objective should just be understood as denoting subjective agreement from different viewpoints. Yes, although we can say that a particular point of view is completely objective within a specified context. For example we can have completely objective proofs in mathematics as long as we agree on the underlying number theory. In our everyday affairs we can never achieve complete objectivity, but I agree with you that multiple points of view, in communication with each other, constitute an intersubjective point of view that increasingly approaches objectivity. My personal experience is that there's no paradox at all if one is willing to fully accept that within any framework of description there is absolutely no difference at all between a person and a zombie, but even the most philosophically cognizant, being evolved human organisms, will snap back to defending the existence of a 1st person point of view even though it isn't detectable or measurable and has absolutely no effect on the physical world. It is virtually impossible for many people to see that even IF the 1st person experience actually exists, it can't be described, even by that person, except from a third person perspective. That voice in your own mind, those images in your imagination, none can be said to be experienced without being interpreted. The idea of direct experience is incoherent. It always carries the implication that there's some other process there to have the experience. It's turtles all the way down. That sounds like a simple contradiction to me!?? I'd say experience is always direct, an adjective which really adds nothing. An experience just is. If it has to be interpreted *then* you've fallen into an infinite regress: who experiences the interpretation.
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases
Jef Allbright wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: Jef Allbright wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of consciousness, on what basis can you claim that it actually is real? Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message, imo, of Descartes diagonal argument: it is the fixed point of doubt. If we decide to doubt everything, we will find ourselves, at some stage, doubting we doubt of everything. The same for relativization: we cannot relativize everything without an absolute base on which that relativization is effective. Here is a subtle, and non-traditional thought: Classical philosophy always put the Reasoner at the center of the structure of reasoning. But with our more developed awareness of evolution, evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, it is becoming clearer that this pure Copernican view of reasoning is invalid. We now can see that every Reasoner is embedded within some a priori framework such that there is an intrinsic bias or offset to any subjective construct. When we are aware that there is fundamental bias, it is clear that one can not validly reason to the point of doubting everything. When all that is in doubt is removed, we don't arrive at zero as is classically thought, but at some indistinct offset determined by our very nature as a reasoner embedded in a real environment. Understanding this eliminates the pressure to deal with conceptual identities leading to meaningless absolutes. That sounds good, but could you give some concrete examples. Talk of bias and offset seems to imply that there really is an absolute center - which I think is a very dubious proposition. I don't know what other examples to give at this point, other than the comparison with the Copernican model. Knowing the actual center of our highly multidimensional basis of thought, even if it were possible, is not necessary--just as we don't need to know our exact physical location in the universe to know that we should no longer build theories around the assumption that we're at the center, with the unique properties that would imply. This understanding also helps resolve other philosophical paradoxes such as solipsism, meaning of life, free-will and others hinging on the idea of a subjective center. If you want (like David and George) consciousness is our criteria of absolute (but not 3-communicable) truth. I don't think we can genuinely doubt we are conscious, although we can doubt on any content of that consciousness, but that is different. We can doubt having been conscious in some past, but we cannot doubt being conscious here and now, whatever that means. ... The truth here bears on the existence of the experience, and has nothing to do with anything which could be reported by the experiencer. On this basis I understand your point, and as long as we are very careful about conveying which particular meaning of knowing, certainty, and truth we are referring to, then there will be little confusion. But such dual usage leaves us at risk of our thinking repeatedly falling into the singularity of the self, from which there's no objective (and thus workable) basis for any claim. I think objective should just be understood as denoting subjective agreement from different viewpoints. Yes, although we can say that a particular point of view is completely objective within a specified context. For example we can have completely objective proofs in mathematics as long as we agree on the underlying number theory. In our everyday affairs we can never achieve complete objectivity, but I agree with you that multiple points of view, in communication with each other, constitute an intersubjective point of view that increasingly approaches objectivity. My personal experience is that there's no paradox at all if one is willing to fully accept that within any framework of description there is absolutely no difference at all between a person and a zombie, but even the most philosophically cognizant, being evolved human organisms, will snap back to defending the existence of a 1st person point of view even though it isn't detectable or measurable and has absolutely no effect on the physical world. It is virtually impossible for many people to see that even IF the 1st person experience actually exists, it can't be described, even by that person, except from a third person perspective. That voice in your own mind, those images in your imagination, none can be said to be experienced without being interpreted. The idea of direct experience is incoherent. It always carries the implication that there's some other process there to have the experience. It's turtles all the way down. That sounds like a simple contradiction to me!?? I'd say experience is always direct, an adjective which really adds nothing. An experience just is. If it has to be interpreted *then* you've fallen into an infinite regress: who experiences
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Brent Meeker writes: This is very similar to the arguments of people with religious convictions, who will cite evidence in support of their beliefs up to a point, but it soon becomes clear that no matter how paltry this evidence is shown to be, they will still maintain their belief. The difference is that these people do not change their way of thinking in response to antipsychotic medication. Have you tried it? The local Mental Health Act forbids involuntary treatment of someone for their religious beliefs, but there are grey areas, for example in cases of religious conversion, where the family claims the patient has gone mad but the patient and his new friends insist he is just exercising freedom of worship. I have to admit, in all such cases I can recall the family is correct, even when there are no other obvious signs of mental illness, and the patient continues to deteriorate unless treated. I guess the family pick up on subtle changes in personality in addition to the religious conversion. But where a patient is started on an antipsychotic and has an incidental, long-standing religious (or other odd) belief, the medication seems to make no difference to that belief. Functionally, a (primary) delusion seems to bypass the mechanism whereby we take in empirical evidence, process it logically, and arrive at a conclusion or belief: that is, delusions create a ready-made belief, in the same way as hallucinations create a ready-made perception in the absence of a sensory stimulus. Normally acquired religious beliefs differ in that there is empirical evidence which is logically processed, even if that evidence is that it says so in the Bible and your parents taught you that the Bible doesn't lie. We have drugs for psychosis but there is no drug that stops you being gullible. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
