Re: The ASSA leads to a unique utilitarism
On Oct 3, 12:23 pm, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I think that beauty is effectively a channel from our unconscious. When we think that something is beautiful (or conversely ugly), some unconscious processing has taken place according to some criterion and presented to the conscious mind on a scale of ugly to beautiful representing how desirable that thing is for the task at hand. Beauty often goes together with simplicity, or with symmetry, as these are very useful concepts evolutionary (finding a genetically superior mate - see literature on the effect of parasites; finding effective theories of the world - simpler is indeed better for various reasons). Cheers The specific things we find beautiful come from our evolutionary history, but that doesn't mean that there aren't objective 'platonic archetypes' . Our conscious experience of beauty is a communication between a mind and a thing. The thing is a *pointer* (reference) to an objective platonic form. Any number of things could potentially play the role of the pointer.The specific thing that triggers a conscious experience of 'beauty' is contingent on our evolutionary history, but the aeathetic value is not in the thing itself, but the platonic archetype it points to. Consciousness is the communication system of the mind and thus the entire sentient experience is based on signs and symbols (representations of things). Signs and Symbols are the true language of reflection and human experience - humans are the symbol using animals.Everything traces back to signs and symbols and thus all assessments of value ultimately trace back to assessments about the aesthetics of signs and symbols. The study of signs and symbols is known as semiotics and the American philosopher Charles Peirce was its champion. Peirce almost grasped 'the secret' so very long ago ;) Signs and symbols control the world, not phrases and laws. ~ Confucius (b 551 BCE), Chinese thinker, social philosopher --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Hi George, Le 03-oct.-07, à 01:52, George Levy a écrit : Hi Bruno, Yes I am still on the list, barely trying to keep up, but I have been very busy. Actually the ball was in my court and I was supposed to answer to your last post to me about a year ago!!!. Generally I agree with you on many things but here I am just playing the devils' advocate. The Maudlin experiment reminds me of an attempt to prove the falsity of the second law of thermodynamics using Newton's demon. As you probably know, this attempt fails because the thermodynamics effect on the demon is neglected when in fact it should not be The Newton Demon experiment is not thermodynamically closed. If you include the demon in a closed system, then the second law is correct. Similarly, Maudlin's experiment is not informationally closed because Maudlin has interjected himself into his own experiment! The accidentally correctly operating machines need to have their tape rearranged to work correctly and Maudlin is the agent doing the rearranging. So essentially Maudlin's argument is not valid as an attack on physical supervenience. I am not sure. physical supervenience is well defined (actually this is my terming, Maudlin just say supervenience). But here you are changing the definition of supervenience, and it seems to me you have to abandon comp for doing that. If comp and supervenience is correct the later machine (OLYMPIA + the KLARAs) should be conscious, with or without Maudlin's interjection. Yes, you are right from a logical point of view, but only by assuming some form of non-computationalism. With comp + physical supervenience, you have to attach a consciousness to the active boolean graph, and then, by physical supervenience, to the later process, which do no more compute. (And then Maudlin shows that you can change the second process so that it computes again, but without any physical activity of the kind relevant to say that you implement a computation. So, physical supervenience is made wrong. Yes but Maudlin cheated by interjecting himself into his experiment. So this argument does not count. I think that Maudlin refers to the conjunction of the comp hyp and supervenience, where consciousness is supposed to be linked (most of the time in a sort of real-time way) to the *computational activity* of the brain, and not to the history of any of the state occurring in that computation. If you decide to attach consciousness to the whole physical history, then you can perhaps keep comp by making the substitution level very low, but once the level is chosen, I am not sure how you will make it possible for the machine to distinguish a purely arithmetical version of that history (in the arithmetical plenitude (your wording)) from a genuinely physical one (and what would that means?). Hmmm... perhaps I am quick here ... May be I also miss your point. This is vastly more complex than the seven first steps of UDA, sure. I have to think how to make this transparently clear or ... false. I will also be more and more busy the next two month, so I can also take some time for commenting posts. Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The ASSA leads to a unique utilitarism
Youness Ayaita wrote: Directly speaking: Since all observers must expect to get their next observer moments out of the same ensemble of observer moments, there is no reason to insist on different preferences. Youness, ASSA does not mean what you think, that all observers must expect to get their next observer moments out of the same ensemble of observer moments. What it actually says is that each observer should reason as if his observer moment was randomly selected from some distribution. ASSA doesn't say anything about what to expect for the next observer moment. The type of reasoning you can do with ASSA does not depend on the concept of a next observer moment at all. I think what you have done is created a new philosophical assumption, that says each observer should act (as opposed to reason) as if he expects his next observer moment to be randomly selected from a universal distribution. (This is a bit reminiscent to John Rawls's veil of ignorance.) To avoid confusion, let's call it something else besides ASSA. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The ASSA leads to a unique utilitarism
On Thu, Oct 04, 2007 at 06:11:32PM -0700, Wei Dai wrote: Youness Ayaita wrote: Directly speaking: Since all observers must expect to get their next observer moments out of the same ensemble of observer moments, there is no reason to insist on different preferences. Youness, ASSA does not mean what you think, that all observers must expect to get their next observer moments out of the same ensemble of observer moments. What it actually says is that each observer should reason as if his observer moment was randomly selected from some distribution. This is actually the SSSA, as originally defined by Bostrom. The ASSA is the SSSA applied to next observer moments. I don't think Youness is meaning acting when he says expect. I expect he means reason :) ASSA doesn't say anything about what to expect for the next observer moment. The type of reasoning you can do with ASSA does not depend on the concept of a next observer moment at all. I think what you have done is created a new philosophical assumption, that says each observer should act (as opposed to reason) as if he expects his next observer moment to be randomly selected from a universal distribution. (This is a bit reminiscent to John Rawls's veil of ignorance.) To avoid confusion, let's call it something else besides ASSA. Lets not. Let's use Bostrom's orginal term SSSA for what you think the ASSA is. -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
