Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

2008-08-09 Thread Quentin Anciaux

1) Why 1 is more than 0 and simpler than n ?

'Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem'... It follows by
looking at it in a first sight that it would means the one universe
hypothesis is simpler than MW. Yes, one universe involves many less
than MW (either there exists a finite number of other universes or
infinitely many)... Then by O'R we should take the one universe
hypothesis as simpler because requiring less universes (in this case
1). But it's an ill way of understanding O'R... It should be
understood as saying something about the premises, the axioms... One
shouldn't add an axiom unnecessarily. And in this case none of one
univers, 42 universes or infinitely many hypothesis are simpler
relative to each other... and O'R could not help you choose or if it
could help for something would be to choose the 0 univers
hypothesis... well 0 < 1 << oo and this for all values of 0 even big
ones :)

2) Why turing emulability of the mind entails first person
undeterminacy and/or MW ?

Because if you're a computation then you're not dependant on the
substrate of the computation... but only to the computation itself. A
computation is substrate independant.
Well you'd say it may be substrate independent but still it needs a
substrate to 'exist'. Ok let's accept that, but let's return on the
mind and on the hypothesis that the mind is a computation and the
brain the substrate on which it is run. As a computation is substrate
independant then what follows is if the mind is a computation it can
be run on other computational substrate for example on a... computer
for example. And 'the mind' wouldn't be able to tell if it is run on a
brain or on a computer. By our hypothesis the mind is a computation,
and a computation is dependant only on it's state and transition rule,
if the same input is given to the same algorithm it will yield the
same result so seeing a brain is of no help because you would see a
brain even run somewhere else if the same input is given.
So why this entails first person undeterminacy and/or MW ? let's
assume we could replicate the computation of your mind (I have assume
by hypothesis that it is a computation, so replication can be done,
even if currently we don't have a clue and even we don't know if the
mind is a computation... but here I assume it just for the argument to
see what it entails) then I could execute the 'you' computation on a
computer then if I can, I can also run the 'you' computation not only
on one computer but on many computers. Ok so now I have at least two
computers running the same mind (computation)... I switch off one
computer, the mind die ? hell no, by our hypothesis mind is
computation and the computation is still running on the other
computer. So from the point of view of the mind unplugging one of the
two computers didn't change a thing. Now I'm a real serail killer I
switch of the last computer running the computation/mind... so now the
mind die now ?? Let's say I've done a program dump before stopping the
last computer and I decide 5 years later to rerun the computation from
this save point and on. Wasn't the mind dead ? If it is and mind ==
the computation, how can I have the ability to run the computation
without it being the mind ? It means also that if you're a computation
you can't know at which 'level' you're run (if you're run on a VM
running in a VM running in a VM or a non emulated substrate). So if
mind is a computation to make correct prediction about the next state
you must take all computation having the same state into account. Even
using the 'real switch' theory a mind could be run on different 'real'
(composed of substance) substrate... and the mind will *have* to take
into account these runs on real substrate to make correct prediction.
And unplugging one real substrate run will not kill the mind,
unplugging them all also. The only way would be to not only unplug
them all but to garantee that it wil *never and ever* be run *again*
(even only one).


If I'm run on another computational substrate than
my brain, If someone pull the plug, I die ?

Quentin Anciaux
-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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Re: Intelligence, Aesthetics and Bayesianism: Game over!

2008-08-09 Thread Tom Caylor

I believe that nature is not primarily functional. It is primarily
beautiful.
And this from a theist?  Yes!  This is actually to the core point of
why I am a theist.  I don't blame people for not believing in God if
they think God is about functionality.

Tom

On Jul 29, 2:20 am, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Two issues I wish to mention, here.
>
> Firstly, I present a few rapid-fire ideas about objective morality,
> culminating in an integration of aesthetics, intelligence, and
> morality, all in a few brief sentences ;)
>
> Secondly, I give a mention to computer scientist Randy Pausch, who
> recently died.
>
> As regards the first issue:
>
> It’s been said there are clear ways to determine physical and
> mathematical facts, but nothing similar for values. But, in point (2)
> below I point out what appears to be an objectively existing set of
> values which underlies *all* of science.  I present two brief but
> profound points that I what readers to consider and ponder carefully:
>
> Point (1) there is a clear evolution to the universe. It started from
> a low-entropy-density state, and is moving towards a higher-entropy
> density, which, remarkably, just happens to coincide with an increase
> in physical complexity with time. In the beginning the universe was in
> a state with *the lowest possible* entropy. This is expressed in the
> laws of thermodynamics and big bang cosmology. So it simply isn’t true
> that there is no teleology (purpose) built into the universe. The laws
> of thermodynamics and modern cosmology (big bang theory) clearly
> express the fact that there is.
>
> Point (2) the whole of science relies on Occam’s razor, the idea that
> the universe is in some sense ‘simple’. It must be emphasized that
> Occam’s razor pervades all of science – it is not simply some sort of
> ‘add on’. As Popper pointed out, an infinite number of theories could
> explain any given set of observations; therefore any inductive
> generalization requires a principle – Occam’s razor – to get any
> useful results at all.
>
> Here is the point that most haven’t quite grasped - Occam’s razor is
> *a set of aesthetic principles* - the notion of ‘simplicity’ is *a set
> of aesthetic principles*; Why? Because it is simply another way of
> saying that some representations are more *elegant* than others, which
> is the very notion of aesthetics! I repeat: the whole of science only
> works because of a set of *aesthetic principles* - a *set of values*.
>
> If all values are only subjective preferences, it would follow that
> the whole of science relies on subjective preferences. But subjective
> preferences have only existed as long as sentiments – therefore how
> could physical laws have functioned before sentiments? The idea that
> all values are subjective leads to a direct and blatant logical
> contradiction.
>
> Both these points are related and simply inexplicable without
> appealing to objective terminal values. At the beginning of time the
> universe was in the simplest possible state (minimal entropy density).
> Why? Occam’s razor is wide-ranging and pervades the whole of science.
> The simple is favored over the complex – that is– Occam’s razor is a
> set of aesthetic value judgments without which not a single Bayesian
> result could be obtained.
>
> *Every single Bayesian result rests on these implicit value judgments*
> to set priors. It must be repeated that *not one single scientific
> result could be obtained* without these secret (implicit) value
> judgments which set priors, that our defenders of the Bayesian faith
> on these forums are trying to pretend are not part of science!
>
> The secret to intelligence is aesthetics, not Bayesian math.
> Initially, this statement seems preposterous, but the argument in the
> next paragraph is my whole point, so it merits careful reading (the
> paragraph is marked with a * to show this is the crux of this post):
>
> *As regards the optimization of science, the leverage obtained from
> setting the priors (Occam’s razor – aesthetics – art) is far greater
> that that obtained from logical manipulations to update probabilities
> based on additional empirical data (math). Remember, the aesthetic
> principles used to set the priors (Occam’s razor) reduce a potentially
> infinite set of possible theories to a manageable (finite) number,
> whereas laborious mathematical probability updates based on incoming
> empirical data (standard Bayesian theory) is only guaranteed to
> converge on the correct theory after an infinite time, and even then
> the reason for the convergence is entirely inexplicable.
>
> The * paragraph suggests that aesthetics is the real basis of
> intelligence, not Bayesian math, and further that aesthetic terminal
> values are objectively real.
>
> For those who do initially find these claims preposterous, to help
> overcome your initial disbelief, I point to a superb essay from well-
> respected computer hacker, Paul Graham, who explains why aesthetics
> pl