Re: UDA query
Sorry I accidently posted my previous message twice. A pity because now I think the conclusion I came to in them was wrong. Because I assume comp to be true and the line of reasoning implies a simulated realityy because of comp then it doesn't make comp any less contingent. Oh well!, the rest was insightful to think over. If anyone sees any other errors in my thinking then please do let me know because I don't want to take anything on board that is wrong and has been cleared up in the past. Nick Prince On Dec 23, 1:02 am, Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk wrote: On Dec 23, 12:55 am, Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk wrote: Hi Bruno My background is in mathematical physics but I am trying to read up a bit of this new stuff as I go along. Thank you for being patient with me. However, I think you have confirmed some things - let me know if any of these is fundamentally wrong. I want to put aside the platonic arithmetical UD for the moment but will come back to that. Just supposing that there is as yet NO UD operating. Comp says it is possible to build a concrete one and in step 7 of your paper you say that the UD could provide infinitely many possible consistent extensions of me. (I am thinking of descriptions of simulated worlds with me in them as bit strings) I quote you from the sane paper: Then, it follows from the six preceding steps that it will generate all possible Turing machine states, infinitely often (why?), which (by comp) includes all your virtual reconstitutions corresponding to (hopefully) consistent extensions of yourself, in all possible (locally) emulable environments or computational histories. And this, with comp, even in the case you consider that your ‘‘generalised brain’’ (the ‘‘whatever’’ which is needed to be emulated by a DU digital body/brain to survive) is the whole Milky Way galaxy. And we don’t need any Science Fiction like devices to make this concrete, if we make exception of the robust universe. Actually the kind of teleportation I am interested in, for reasons as you will see is the usual simple one which takes us from moment to moment. I am being teleported into the next observer moment all the time ( if this is because I'm already being computed by a UD then as I say lets just ignore this possibility for now as you did in your paper). If someone is blown to bits, then we have lost the chance to make a decent copy of them. However, Once the “concrete” UD is run then it computes all possible futures for all possible virtual extensions. Then there will be an (infinitely many) extension(s) for the blown to bits person. The blowing to bits is just the equivalent of the annhiallation part of your earlier steps. So here we have the basic quantum immortality thing coming in again. However, if it takes the UD a long time to generate sufficient extensions then the delay will be considerable before the blown to bits man continues consciousness - although to him it will seem instantaneous. From 3d person, well - they see the delay. Now is the interesting bit. Because this future UD creates all possible extensions of all possible states of the blown to bits man then what’s to stop him finding continuation with a consistent extension prior to the blowing up! In other words every observer moment of his life (not just the one just before being blown up - but any of them) could just as easily be followed by a suitable one in the virtual UD rather than one in the initial run of the universe. In conclusion, from our ist person point of view we do not know whether our next observer moment will occur in the “real” universe or in a simulated one- this is 1-indeterminacy again. If the UD can simulate all possible observer moments then it will have those associated with our very first sense of consciousness and hence we will have very quickly slipped, without knowing it, into the UD’s virtual world. We never noticed any delay of course but there may have been a huge time difference assuming Russell’s time postulate has meaning here! Hence if a UD is possible, then only the first observer moment(s) -or fraction of our conscious lives - were ever lived in a “basic/real” universe at all. The rest is all simulation. The very existence of a UD implies that we are in a simulation. If they exist platonically then it's all simulation and computationalism must be necessary rather than contingent. It's a very fumbling line of thinking but it helps me to learn about things as I go along. Best Nick On Dec 22, 6:41 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Dec 2009, at 18:48, Nick P wrote: Hence by it generating all possible emulations of stages of my life) that I could just as easily experience for my next OM as opposed to the one i would expect to experience on the current wetware (or
Re: UDA query
Hi Nick, On 23 Dec 2009, at 01:55, Nick Prince wrote: My background is in mathematical physics but I am trying to read up a bit of this new stuff as I go along. Thank you for being patient with me. However, I think you have confirmed some things - let me know if any of these is fundamentally wrong. I want to put aside the platonic arithmetical UD for the moment but will come back to that. Just supposing that there is as yet NO UD operating. Comp says it is possible to build a concrete one and in step 7 of your paper you say that the UD could provide infinitely many possible consistent extensions of me. (I am thinking of descriptions of simulated worlds with me in them as bit strings) I quote you from the sane paper: Then, it follows from the six preceding steps that it will generate all possible Turing machine states, infinitely often (why?), which (by comp) includes all your virtual reconstitutions corresponding to (hopefully) consistent extensions of yourself, in all possible (locally) emulable environments or computational histories. And this, with comp, even in the case you consider that your ‘‘generalised brain’’ (the ‘‘whatever’’ which is needed to be emulated by a DU digital body/brain to survive) is the whole Milky Way galaxy. And we don’t need any Science Fiction like devices to make this concrete, if we make exception of the robust universe. Actually the kind of teleportation I am interested in, for reasons as you will see is the usual simple one which takes us from moment to moment. I am being teleported into the next observer moment all the time ( if this is because I'm already being computed by a UD then as I say lets just ignore this possibility for now as you did in your paper). If someone is blown to bits, then we have lost the chance to make a decent copy of them. However, Once the “concrete” UD is run then it computes all possible futures for all possible virtual extensions. Then there will be an (infinitely many) extension(s) for the blown to bits person. The blowing to bits is just the equivalent of the annhiallation part of your earlier steps. So here we have the basic quantum immortality thing coming in again. OK. TO be sure it is the older comp immortality, and it is an open problem if the quantum interference and immortality *is* a result of the comp interference and immortality. It looks like that, and up to now the math confirms formally the resemblance. However, if it takes the UD a long time to generate sufficient extensions then the delay will be considerable before the blown to bits man continues consciousness - although to him it will seem instantaneous. From 3d person, well - they see the delay. Yes. (would they live long enough) Now is the interesting bit. Because this future UD creates all possible extensions of all possible states of the blown to bits man then what’s to stop him finding continuation with a consistent extension prior to the blowing up! Sure. (that happens all the time, and that's why we have to justify the apparent stable laws from that). In other words every observer moment of his life (not just the one just before being blown up - but any of them) could just as easily be followed by a suitable one in the virtual UD rather than one in the initial run of the universe. Absolutely. Would a real *singular* concrete material universe exist, the probability to stay in that universe is zero. In conclusion, from our ist person point of view we do not know whether our next observer moment will occur in the “real” universe or in a simulated one- this is 1-indeterminacy again. If the UD can simulate all possible observer moments then it will have those associated with our very first sense of consciousness and hence we will have very quickly slipped, without knowing it, into the UD’s virtual world. We never noticed any delay of course but there may have been a huge time difference assuming Russell’s time postulate has meaning here! It has meaning, because it is neither physical time nor subjective time, but just the natural numbers with the successor operation, or the number of steps taken by the UD to reach the computational states. And the step 8 explains why, even if a real physical time exists, it just cannot compete with the UD time. It is no more than 0, 1, 2, 3, ... or a set having a computable bijection with N. Hence if a UD is possible, Well, the mathematical existence of the UD is a logical consequence of Church thesis + Turing's theorem in computer science. There is number U such that for all x and y, phi_U(x, y) = phi_x(y). U can emulate x on y. Once you can emulate all x, you can dovetail on all emulations possible, including those with oracles in some rings. then only the first observer moment(s) -or fraction of our conscious lives - were ever lived in a “basic/real” universe at all. The rest is all simulation.
Re: UDA query
Thanks Bruno I want to have a good think about your answers and also the eighth step in your paper. I think it is the most difficult for me and yet I sense its somehow. Schmidhuber assumes a great programmer runs the UD but you effectively dispense with him. If a universal turing machine necessarilly exists platonically which is capable of running UD's that can simulate our minds then our experience of reality follows. Yet I still feel that somehow this will be confusing the map of the territory with the reality, the equations of physics with the physically real. Best wishes Nick On Dec 23, 2:15 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Nick, On 23 Dec 2009, at 01:55, Nick Prince wrote: My background is in mathematical physics but I am trying to read up a bit of this new stuff as I go along. Thank you for being patient with me. However, I think you have confirmed some things - let me know if any of these is fundamentally wrong. I want to put aside the platonic arithmetical UD for the moment but will come back to that. Just supposing that there is as yet NO UD operating. Comp says it is possible to build a concrete one and in step 7 of your paper you say that the UD could provide infinitely many possible consistent extensions of me. (I am thinking of descriptions of simulated worlds with me in them as bit strings) I quote you from the sane paper: Then, it follows from the six preceding steps that it will generate all possible Turing machine states, infinitely often (why?), which (by comp) includes all your virtual reconstitutions corresponding to (hopefully) consistent extensions of yourself, in all possible (locally) emulable environments or computational histories. And this, with comp, even in the case you consider that your ‘‘generalised brain’’ (the ‘‘whatever’’ which is needed to be emulated by a DU digital body/brain to survive) is the whole Milky Way galaxy. And we don’t need any Science Fiction like devices to make this concrete, if we make exception of the robust universe. Actually the kind of teleportation I am interested in, for reasons as you will see is the usual simple one which takes us from moment to moment. I am being teleported into the next observer moment all the time ( if this is because I'm already being computed by a UD then as I say lets just ignore this possibility for now as you did in your paper). If someone is blown to bits, then we have lost the chance to make a decent copy of them. However, Once the “concrete” UD is run then it computes all possible futures for all possible virtual extensions. Then there will be an (infinitely many) extension(s) for the blown to bits person. The blowing to bits is just the equivalent of the annhiallation part of your earlier steps. So here we have the basic quantum immortality thing coming in again. OK. TO be sure it is the older comp immortality, and it is an open problem if the quantum interference and immortality *is* a result of the comp interference and immortality. It looks like that, and up to now the math confirms formally the resemblance. However, if it takes the UD a long time to generate sufficient extensions then the delay will be considerable before the blown to bits man continues consciousness - although to him it will seem instantaneous. From 3d person, well - they see the delay. Yes. (would they live long enough) Now is the interesting bit. Because this future UD creates all possible extensions of all possible states of the blown to bits man then what’s to stop him finding continuation with a consistent extension prior to the blowing up! Sure. (that happens all the time, and that's why we have to justify the apparent stable laws from that). In other words every observer moment of his life (not just the one just before being blown up - but any of them) could just as easily be followed by a suitable one in the virtual UD rather than one in the initial run of the universe. Absolutely. Would a real *singular* concrete material universe exist, the probability to stay in that universe is zero. In conclusion, from our ist person point of view we do not know whether our next observer moment will occur in the “real” universe or in a simulated one- this is 1-indeterminacy again. If the UD can simulate all possible observer moments then it will have those associated with our very first sense of consciousness and hence we will have very quickly slipped, without knowing it, into the UD’s virtual world. We never noticed any delay of course but there may have been a huge time difference assuming Russell’s time postulate has meaning here! It has meaning, because it is neither physical time nor subjective time, but just the natural numbers with the successor operation, or the number of steps taken by the UD to reach the computational states. And the