Re: Jack's partial brain paper
Bruno, Your response is most appreciated. Your publications will keep me busy for while. You also mentioned earlier some of your publications that are not on your URL. That reference has gone missing in my labyrinthine filing system. Would you please post those references again. William On Mar 19, 2010, at 2:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: William, On 18 Mar 2010, at 18:06, L.W. Sterritt wrote: Bruno and others, Perhaps more progress can be made by avoiding self referential problems and viewing this issue mechanistically. I don't see what self-referential problems you are alluding too, especially when viewing the issue mechanistically. Self-reference is where computer science and mathematical logic excel. A self-duplicator is just a duplicator applied to itself. If Dx gives xx, DD gives DD. Note the double diagonalization. That basic idea transforms mechanically "self-reference problem" into amazing feature about machines. The most in topic, imo, is that it leads to two modal theories G and G* axiomatizing (completely at the propositional level) the provable and true, respectively, logics of self-reference. Machines can prove their own limitation theorems, and study the productive geometry of their ignorance, and indetermination. They can easily infer a large class of true but unprovable propositions, and used them in different ways. Useful when an argument (UDA) shows that matter (physical science) are a product of that indetermination reflexion. It makes comp testable. Actually it leads to a general arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus neoplatonist theory of everything (God-without, God-within, the universal soul, intelligible Matter, sensible matter (qualia) etc.). The theory is there. It is also the theory on which converge the self-referentially correct machines which look inward. It is computer science. The key of comp. Where I start: Haim Sompolinsky, "Statistical Mechanics of Neural Networks," Physics Today (December 1988). He discussed "emergent computational properties of large highly connected networks of simple neuron-like processors," HP has recently succeeded in making titanium dioxide "memristors" which behave very like the synapses in our brains, i.e. the memristor's resistance at any time depends upon the last signal passing through it. Work is underway to make brain-like computers with these devices; see Wei Lu, Nano letters, DOI:10.1021/nl904092h. It seems that there is a growing consensus that conscious machines will be built, and perhaps with the new Turing test proposed by Koch and Tonini, their consciousness may be verified. Then we can measure properties that are now speculative. I think the contrary. If a scientist speculates that consciousness can be tested, he has not understood what consciousness is. We may evaluate it by bets, and self-identification. Any way, this is the strong AI thesis, which is implied by comp (*I* am a machine). With *I* = you, really, hoping you know that you are conscious. Tononi has interesting ideas, typically he belongs to comp. He is not aware, or interested, in the body problem to which comp leads (and he is wrong on Mary). But the comp body problem is not just a problem. Like evolution theory, it is the beginning of an explanation of where the appearance of a material world comes from, and why it is necessary, once you believe in 0, 1, 2, 3, ..., and addition and multiplication. I guess I'm in the QM camp that believes that what you can measure is what you can know. What I say depends only of saying yes to a doctor at some level. No problem if you choose the quantum level. In all case physics has to be derived, in a precise way (based on the logics of self-reference) from arithmetic (see my url for the papers). Bruno William On Mar 18, 2010, at 1:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Mar 2010, at 19:12, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/17/2010 10:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Mar 2010, at 13:47, HZ wrote: I'm quite confused about the state of zombieness. If the requirement for zombiehood is that it doesn't understand anything at all but it behaves as if it does what makes us not zombies? How do we not we are not? But more importantly, are there known cases of zombies? Perhaps a silly question because it might be just a thought experiment but if so, I wonder on what evidence one is so freely speaking about, specially when connected to cognition for which we now (should) know more. The questions seem related because either we don't know whether we are zombies or one can solve the problem of zombie identification. I guess I'm new in the zombieness business. I know I am conscious, and I can doubt all content of my consciousness, except this one, that I am conscious. I cannot prove that I am conscious, neither to some others. Dolls and sculptures are, with respect to what they represent,
Re: Free will: Wrong entry.
Bruno, Thanks for this great refresher course. marty a. - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Friday, March 19, 2010 5:59 AM Subject: Re: Free will: Wrong entry. Marty, Can you clarify the origins of the Lobian Machine? Does it arise out of the theorem of Hugo Martin Lob? Yes. I have often explained that theorem, years ago on this list (and elsewhere) and I can have opportunities to explain it again. You can see some of my papers where I explain it, including SANE2004. Löb's theorem is a generalization of Gödel's theorem. It is related to a funny proof of the existence of Santa Klauss, for those who remember. Löb's theorem is very weird. It says that Peano Arithmetic PA (and all Lobian entity) are close for the following inference rule. If the theory proves Bp -> p, then the theory proves p. It makes the theory (machine) modest: it proves Bp -> p, only when he proves p (in which case Bp -> p follows from elementary classical logic). PA can prove its own Löb's theorem, and this leads to the Löb formula: B(Bp -> p) -> Bp. And this *is* the (main) axiom of G and G*. (Bp = provable p, p some arithmetical proposition (or its gödel number when in the scope of "B"). In particular the theory cannot prove Bf -> f (f = constant false proposition), they would prove B(Bf->f), and by modus ponens and Löb's formula Bf, and by modus ponens again: f. Thus they cannot prove their own consistency (Bf -> f = ~Bf = ~~D~f = Dt). This is Gödel's second incompleteness theorem. Löb's discovery is a key event in the mathematical study of self-reference. Is it shorthand for the "lobes" of the human brain? No. :) What is the difference between a lobian machine and a universal lobian machine? And how do they relate to the question of free will? Many thanks, It happens that universal machines become Löbian (obey Löb's rule, and prove its formal version: Löb's formula) once they know (in some very weak technical sense) that they are universal. So you can just keep this in mind: a lobian machine is a universal machine which knows that she is universal. It obeys to the Löb's formula and indeed of the whole of G and G*. It has the arithmetical "Plotinian theology". Knowing that they are universal, they can study they own limitations, develop theologies (distinguishing proof and true), and develop free-will, from their own point of views. They can distinguish all the person-notions, the 8 hypostases, etc. They are also sort of "universal dissident", i.e. capable to refute any complete theory about them. They provide a tool for demolishing all reductionist interpretation of reductive comp theories. Some reduction are not reductionist. Their existence is responsible for the mess in Platonia: the impossibility to unify in one theory the whole arithmetical truth. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Free will: Wrong entry.
Marty, Can you clarify the origins of the Lobian Machine? Does it arise out of the theorem of Hugo Martin Lob? Yes. I have often explained that theorem, years ago on this list (and elsewhere) and I can have opportunities to explain it again. You can see some of my papers where I explain it, including SANE2004. Löb's theorem is a generalization of Gödel's theorem. It is related to a funny proof of the existence of Santa Klauss, for those who remember. Löb's theorem is very weird. It says that Peano Arithmetic PA (and all Lobian entity) are close for the following inference rule. If the theory proves Bp -> p, then the theory proves p. It makes the theory (machine) modest: it proves Bp -> p, only when he proves p (in which case Bp -> p follows from elementary classical logic). PA can prove its own Löb's theorem, and this leads to the Löb formula: B(Bp -> p) - > Bp. And this *is* the (main) axiom of G and G*. (Bp = provable p, p some arithmetical proposition (or its gödel number when in the scope of "B"). In particular the theory cannot prove Bf -> f (f = constant false proposition), they would prove B(Bf->f), and by modus ponens and Löb's formula Bf, and by modus ponens again: f. Thus they cannot prove their own consistency (Bf -> f = ~Bf = ~~D~f = Dt). This is Gödel's second incompleteness theorem. Löb's discovery is a key event in the mathematical study of self- reference. Is it shorthand for the "lobes" of the human brain? No. :) What is the difference between a lobian machine and a universal lobian machine? And how do they relate to the question of free will? Many thanks, It happens that universal machines become Löbian (obey Löb's rule, and prove its formal version: Löb's formula) once they know (in some very weak technical sense) that they are universal. So you can just keep this in mind: a lobian machine is a universal machine which knows that she is universal. It obeys to the Löb's formula and indeed of the whole of G and G*. It has the arithmetical "Plotinian theology". Knowing that they are universal, they can study they own limitations, develop theologies (distinguishing proof and true), and develop free- will, from their own point of views. They can distinguish all the person-notions, the 8 hypostases, etc. They are also sort of "universal dissident", i.e. capable to refute any complete theory about them. They provide a tool for demolishing all reductionist interpretation of reductive comp theories. Some reduction are not reductionist. Their existence is responsible for the mess in Platonia: the impossibility to unify in one theory the whole arithmetical truth. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Jack's partial brain paper
William, On 18 Mar 2010, at 18:06, L.W. Sterritt wrote: Bruno and others, Perhaps more progress can be made by avoiding self referential problems and viewing this issue mechanistically. I don't see what self-referential problems you are alluding too, especially when viewing the issue mechanistically. Self-reference is where computer science and mathematical logic excel. A self-duplicator is just a duplicator applied to itself. If Dx gives xx, DD gives DD. Note the double diagonalization. That basic idea transforms mechanically "self-reference problem" into amazing feature about machines. The most in topic, imo, is that it leads to two modal theories G and G* axiomatizing (completely at the propositional level) the provable and true, respectively, logics of self-reference. Machines can prove their own limitation theorems, and study the productive geometry of their ignorance, and indetermination. They can easily infer a large class of true but unprovable propositions, and used them in different ways. Useful when an argument (UDA) shows that matter (physical science) are a product of that indetermination reflexion. It makes comp testable. Actually it leads to a general arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus neoplatonist theory of everything (God-without, God-within, the universal soul, intelligible Matter, sensible matter (qualia) etc.). The theory is there. It is also the theory on which converge the self- referentially correct machines which look inward. It is computer science. The key of comp. Where I start: Haim Sompolinsky, "Statistical Mechanics of Neural Networks," Physics Today (December 1988). He discussed "emergent computational properties of large highly connected networks of simple neuron-like processors," HP has recently succeeded in making titanium dioxide "memristors" which behave very like the synapses in our brains, i.e. the memristor's resistance at any time depends upon the last signal passing through it. Work is underway to make brain-like computers with these devices; see Wei Lu, Nano letters, DOI:10.1021/nl904092h. It seems that there is a growing consensus that conscious machines will be built, and perhaps with the new Turing test proposed by Koch and Tonini, their consciousness may be verified. Then we can measure properties that are now speculative. I think the contrary. If a scientist speculates that consciousness can be tested, he has not understood what consciousness is. We may evaluate it by bets, and self-identification. Any way, this is the strong AI thesis, which is implied by comp (*I* am a machine). With *I* = you, really, hoping you know that you are conscious. Tononi has interesting ideas, typically he belongs to comp. He is not aware, or interested, in the body problem to which comp leads (and he is wrong on Mary). But the comp body problem is not just a problem. Like evolution theory, it is the beginning of an explanation of where the appearance of a material world comes from, and why it is necessary, once you believe in 0, 1, 2, 3, ..., and addition and multiplication. I guess I'm in the QM camp that believes that what you can measure is what you can know. What I say depends only of saying yes to a doctor at some level. No problem if you choose the quantum level. In all case physics has to be derived, in a precise way (based on the logics of self-reference) from arithmetic (see my url for the papers). Bruno William On Mar 18, 2010, at 1:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Mar 2010, at 19:12, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/17/2010 10:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Mar 2010, at 13:47, HZ wrote: I'm quite confused about the state of zombieness. If the requirement for zombiehood is that it doesn't understand anything at all but it behaves as if it does what makes us not zombies? How do we not we are not? But more importantly, are there known cases of zombies? Perhaps a silly question because it might be just a thought experiment but if so, I wonder on what evidence one is so freely speaking about, specially when connected to cognition for which we now (should) know more. The questions seem related because either we don't know whether we are zombies or one can solve the problem of zombie identification. I guess I'm new in the zombieness business. I know I am conscious, and I can doubt all content of my consciousness, except this one, that I am conscious. I cannot prove that I am conscious, neither to some others. Dolls and sculptures are, with respect to what they represent, if human in appearance sort of zombie. Tomorrow, we may be able to put in a museum an artificial machine imitating a humans which is sleeping, in a way that we may be confused and believe it is a dreaming human being ... The notion of zombie makes sense (logical sense). Its existence may depend on the choice of theory. With the axiom of comp, a cou
Re: Jack's partial brain paper
On 18 Mar 2010, at 23:04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 19 March 2010 04:01, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/17/2010 11:01 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 18 March 2010 16:36, Brent Meeker wrote: Is it coherent to say a black box "accidentally" reproduces the I/ O? It is over some relatively small number to of I/Os, but over a large enough number and range to sustain human behavior - that seems very doubtful. One would be tempted to say the black box was obeying a "natural law". It would be the same as the problem of induction. How do we know natural laws are consistent - because we define them to be so. Jack considers the case where the black box is empty and the remaining neurological tissue just happens to continue responding as if it were receiving normal input. That, of course, would be extremely unlikely to happen, to the point where it could be called magic if it did happen. But if there were such a magical black box, it would contribute to consciousness. Suppose there were a man with no brain at all but who just happened act exactly like a normal person. Suppose there are no people and your whole idea that you have a body and you are reading an email is an illusion. But I don't believe in magic. I don't believe it is possible but in the spirit of functionalism, the empty-headed man would still be conscious, just as a car would still function normally if it had no engine but the wheels turned magically as if driven by an engine. Jack's point was that fading or absent qualia in a functionally normal brain was logically possible because "obviously" some qualia would be absent if a part of the brain were missing and the rest of the brain carried on normally. But I don't see that that is obvious. Me neither. On the contrary, it is what required magic. Bruno Marchal http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
