Re: bruno list
On Thu, Jul 14, 2011 at 10:45 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: It's not about whether other cells would sense the imposter neuron, it's about how much of an imposter the neuron is. If acts like a real cell in every physical way, if another organism can kill it and eat it and metabolize it completely then you pretty much have a cell. Whatever cannot be metabolized in that way is what potentially detracts from the ability to sustain consciousness. It's not your cells that need to sense DNA, it's the question of whether a brain composed entirely of, or significantly of cells lacking DNA would be conscious in the same way as a person. DNA doesn't play a direct role in neuronal to neuronal interaction. It is necessary for the synthesis of proteins, so without it the neuron would be unable to, for example, produce more surface receptors or the essential proteins needed for cell survival; however, if the DNA were destroyed the neuron would carry on functioning as per usual for at least a few minutes. Now, you speculate that consciousness may somehow reside in the components of the neuron and not just in its function, so that perhaps if the DNA were destroyed the consciousness would be affected - let's say for the sake of simplicity that it too would be destroyed - even in the period the neuron was functioning normally. If that is so, then if all the neurons in your visual cortex were stripped of their DNA you would be blind: your visual qualia would disappear. But if all the neurons in your visual cortex continued to function normally, they would send the normal signals to the rest of your brain and the rest of your brain would behave as if you could see: that is, you would accurately describe objects put in front of your eyes and honestly believe that you had normal vision. So how would this state, behaving as if you had normal vision and believing you had normal vision, differ from actually having normal vision; or to put it differently, how do you know that you aren't blind and merely deluded about being able to see? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's blasphemy.
On 18 Jul 2011, at 21:26, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 18.07.2011 14:21 ronaldheld said the following: Bruno: I do not know LISP. Any UD code written in Fortran? Ronald Very good book to learn LISP is http://mitpress.mit.edu/sicp/full-text/book/book.html A great classic book indeed. Very good indeed. For the beginners, The Little Lisper by Daniel P. Friedman is a chef- d'oeuvre of pedagogy. I don't find any version online, alas. Here are reference for its third edition (but it looks out of print!): http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2tid=4879 Just click Next page, read and so on. By the way, List is much nicer than Fortran. I have learned Lisp after Fortran - C - C++ and I should say that I love Lisp (well, I prefer Mathematica - it is a Lisp with a human face). I guess we have a different conception of what is a human face :) I do have problems with the syntax of Mathematica, but it might be that I have never succeeded in compiling it in the right way. It might be due also to the fact that I use cheap versions, I dunno. Yet, the real programmer must start with Lisp. If she will be scared by too many brackets, for example (define (fast-expt b n) (cond ((= n 0) 1) ((even? n) (square (fast-expt b (/ n 2 (else (* b (fast-expt b (- n 1)) then she should forget about programming. Of course, the brackets are what makes the syntax of Lisp so transparent. Indeed the programs have the structure of the data- structures handled naturally by Lisp (the lists). This makes meta- programming very easy. The Gödel number of (define ...) is just (quote (define ...)). Together with its functional nature, it makes Lisp particularly easy for (third person) self-reference. Lisp is very close, in spirit, with the combinators or the lambda calculus, on which I have talked about regularly. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's blasphemy.
On 7/19/2011 11:32 AM, ronaldheld wrote: Given limited resources and for only 1 program, it does not seem logical to learn LISP. Are there Windows or DOS executables of the UD? FWIW. I use MAPLE and not Mathematica. Ronald Maple is based on LISP. An executable UD wouldn't be very interesting. Since it doesn't halt what would you do with it? It's the program itself that is more interesting. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
I think there could be differences in how vision is perceived if all of the visual cortex lacked DNA, even if the neurons of the cortex exhibited superficial evidence of normal connectivity. A person could be dissociated from the images they see, feeling them to be meaningless or unreal, seen as if in third person or from malicious phantom/alien eyeballs. Maybe it would be more subtle...a sensation of otherhanded sight, or sight seeming to originate from a place behind the ears rather than above the nose. The non-DNA vision could be completely inaccessible to the conscious mind, a psychosomatic/ hysterical blindness, or perhaps the qualia would be different, unburdened by DNA, colors could seem lighter, more saturated like a dream. The possibilities are endless. The only way to find out is to do experiments. DNA may not play a direct role in neuronal to neuronal interaction, but the same could be said of perception itself. We have nothing to show that perception is the necessary result of neuronal interaction. The same interactions could exist in a simulation without any kind of perceived universe being created somewhere. Just because the behavior of neurons correlates with perception doesn't mean that their behavior alone causes perception. Materials matter. A TV set made out of hamburger won't work. What I'm trying to say is that the sensorimotive experience of matter is not limited to the physical interior of each component of a cell or molecule, but rather it is a completely other, synergistic topology which is as diffuse and experiential as the component side is discrete and observable. There is a functional correlation, but that's just where the two topologies intersect. Many minor physical changes to the brain can occur without any noticeable differences in perception - sometimes major changes, injuries, etc. Major changes in the psyche can occur without any physical precipitate - reading a book may unleash a flood of neurotransmitters but the cause is semantic, not biochemical. What we don't know is what levels of our human experience are essential and which ones may be vestigial or redundant. We don't know what the qualitative content of the individual neuron signals are, whether they contribute to a high level feeling upstream or whether that contribution requires a low level experience to be amplified. If a cell has no DNA, maybe it feels distress and that feeling is amplified in the aggregate signals. On Jul 19, 7:26 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Jul 14, 2011 at 10:45 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: It's not about whether other cells would sense the imposter neuron, it's about how much of an imposter the neuron is. If acts like a real cell in every physical way, if another organism can kill it and eat it and metabolize it completely then you pretty much have a cell. Whatever cannot be metabolized in that way is what potentially detracts from the ability to sustain consciousness. It's not your cells that need to sense DNA, it's the question of whether a brain composed entirely of, or significantly of cells lacking DNA would be conscious in the same way as a person. DNA doesn't play a direct role in neuronal to neuronal interaction. It is necessary for the synthesis of proteins, so without it the neuron would be unable to, for example, produce more surface receptors or the essential proteins needed for cell survival; however, if the DNA were destroyed the neuron would carry on functioning as per usual for at least a few minutes. Now, you speculate that consciousness may somehow reside in the components of the neuron and not just in its function, so that perhaps if the DNA were destroyed the consciousness would be affected - let's say for the sake of simplicity that it too would be destroyed - even in the period the neuron was functioning normally. If that is so, then if all the neurons in your visual cortex were stripped of their DNA you would be blind: your visual qualia would disappear. But if all the neurons in your visual cortex continued to function normally, they would send the normal signals to the rest of your brain and the rest of your brain would behave as if you could see: that is, you would accurately describe objects put in front of your eyes and honestly believe that you had normal vision. So how would this state, behaving as if you had normal vision and believing you had normal vision, differ from actually having normal vision; or to put it differently, how do you know that you aren't blind and merely deluded about being able to see? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at
Re: bruno list
On Tue, Jul 19, 2011 at 5:13 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: I think there could be differences in how vision is perceived if all of the visual cortex lacked DNA, even if the neurons of the cortex exhibited superficial evidence of normal connectivity. A person could be dissociated from the images they see, feeling them to be meaningless or unreal, seen as if in third person or from malicious phantom/alien eyeballs. Maybe it would be more subtle...a sensation of otherhanded sight, or sight seeming to originate from a place behind the ears rather than above the nose. The non-DNA vision could be completely inaccessible to the conscious mind, a psychosomatic/ hysterical blindness, or perhaps the qualia would be different, unburdened by DNA, colors could seem lighter, more saturated like a dream. The possibilities are endless. The only way to find out is to do experiments. So would the person dissociated from these images, or feeling them meaningless or unlreal, etc., ever report these different feelings? Remember, nerves control movement of the vocal cords, if the neural network was unaffected and its operation remained the same all outwardly visible behavior would also be the same. The person could not report any differences with their sense of vision, nor would other parts of their brain (such as those of thought, or introspection, etc.) have any indication that the nerves in the visual cortex has been modified (so long as they continued to send the right signals at the right times). DNA may not play a direct role in neuronal to neuronal interaction, but the same could be said of perception itself. We have nothing to show that perception is the necessary result of neuronal interaction. All inputs to the brain are the result of neuronal interaction, as are all outputs. Neurons are affected by other neurons. Now if I present an apple to a person, and I ask What is this? and the person reports An apple. that is an example of perception. In theory, one could trace the nerve signals from the optic and auditory nerves all the way to the nerves controlling the vocal cords. For perception to not be the result of neuronal interaction, you would need to find some point between the auditory and visual inputs and the verbal outputs where something besides other nerves are controlling or affecting the behavior of nerves. Do you have any proposal for what this thing might be? The same interactions could exist in a simulation without any kind of perceived universe being created somewhere. Just because the behavior of neurons correlates with perception doesn't mean that their behavior alone causes perception. Materials matter. A TV set made out of hamburger won't work. Humans can make TV sets using cathode ray tubes, liquid crystal displays, projection screens, plasma display panels, and so on. Obviously material does not matter for making a TV set, what is important is the functions and behaviors of the components. So long as the components allow emission of light at certain frequencies at specific locations on a grid it could be used to construct a television set. What I'm trying to say is that the sensorimotive experience of matter is not limited to the physical interior of each component of a cell or molecule, but rather it is a completely other, synergistic topology which is as diffuse and experiential as the component side is discrete and observable. There is a functional correlation, but that's just where the two topologies intersect. Many minor physical changes to the brain can occur without any noticeable differences in perception - sometimes major changes, injuries, etc. Major changes in the psyche can occur without any physical precipitate - reading a book may unleash a flood of neurotransmitters but the cause is semantic, not biochemical. The idea that two functionally equivalent minds made out of different material could determine a difference is contrary to the near universally accepted Church-Turing thesis. A result of the thesis is that it is not possible for a process to determine its ultimate implementation. This is the technology that allows one to play old atari or nintendo games on modern PCs, despite the completely different hardware and architecture. From the perspective of the old Nintendo game, it is running on a Nintendo console, it has no way to determine it is running on a Dell laptop running Windows. Similarly, if the mind is a process, it in principle, has no way of know whether it is implemented by a wet brain, or a cluster of super computers. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
