Re: An invisible fuzzy amoral mindless blob, aka God

[John Clark]

On Sat, Jan 7, 2017 at 5:23 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​>>​
>>  How can anything be "used" by anything if matter that obeys the laws of
>> physics
>> ​ ​
>> is not involved somewhere along the line ?
>
>
> ​> ​
> because with the standard definition of computation, they exist
>

​A definition can't make something exist!​


> ​> ​
> and are realized in all models of Robinson Arithmetic.
>

​
And dragons are realized in all the Harry Potter books, but none of them
can burn my finger
​.​

​And
 without matter that obeys the laws of physics Robinson Arithmetic
​ can't balance my checkbook, or do anything else either.​


> ​> ​
> The definition of computation does not involve matter
>

​You can make any definition you want but if that's what you call
"computation" then I don't see why anybody would be interested in it.


​> ​
> You do the same mistake than the people who say that a (physical)
> simulation of a typhoon cannot make us wet. The usual answer to this is
> that a simulation of "you + the typhoon" will make a "you" feeling being
> wet in a relative way.
>

I agree but there is a difference. I could ask the simulated person if the
simulated typhoon makes him feel wet, but I don't know how to ask 3 if
​
Robinson Arithmetic
​ makes it feel like it's half of 6.​

>  ​
> No universal Turing machine can distinguish the following situations:
> A physical device simulating Robinson arithmetic simulating a Lisp
> universal program simulating that universal Turing machine,
> and
> Robinson arithmetic simulating a physical device simulating Robinson
> arithmetic simulating a Lisp universal program simulating that universal
> Turing machine.
>

That is incorrect, It's extraordinarily easy to distinguish between the
two, one will produce an output and one will not. If you start with
Robinson arithmetic rather than a physical device you'll end up with
nothing, not even the null set.


> ​> ​
> Is this OK for everybody?
>

​No I don't believe we are.​


*​​>> ​**A definition is NOT a construction!*
>
>
> ​> ​
> Yes, that is exactly the point.
> ​
> We can define the set of arithmetical true statements, and so we can
> *talk* about it, without being able to construct it, or to generate it
> mechanically.
>

​
Talk is cheap. We can talk about Faster That Light Spaceships, Star Trek
does it all the time, but we can't build one and that's why it's called
"fiction".

>
​​
>> ​>> ​
>> Does "Primary Physical Reality
>> ​" mean a belief that ​matter is all there is?
>>
>
> ​> ​
> No. It means that a Physical Reality which has to be assumed.
>

​You don't need to assume that bowling ball falling toward your head will
hurt when it hits, unlike pure mathematics physics will continue to do its
thing regardless of what you assume define or classify. If you don't
believe me just wait a fraction of a second.


> ​> ​
> It means a Physical reality which would not been able to be explained
> without assuming that matter.
>

​Nothing can be explained without matter ​and the laws of physics because
there would be nothing doing the explaining and nothing doing the
understanding.


> ​>> ​
>> A
>> personal​​
>> God
>> ​who might grant us immortality if we flatter Him ​enough
>> is the only type of God that 99.9% of the 1.2 Billion Catholics are
>> interested in.
>> ​ That's why they go to Mass on Sunday, to butter Him up.​
>> If He's not personal then God is about as useful
>> ​to them ​
>> as a screen door on a submarine
>> ​.
>>
>
> ​> ​
> Who care?
>

1.2 Billion Catholics care and the
​y​
care very much! When they use the word "God" they mean something* RADICALLY*
different from what you mean when you use the
​same ​
word
​,​

​and that ​makes
​
communication almost impossible
​
, and yet you insist on using that
​same damn ​
word. And people wonder why philosophy gets so muddled.

​> ​
> You illustrate again that you want to keep the pope and the
> pseudo-religious believers happy.
> ​
> You illustrate again that Gnostic Atheism is a form of catholicism.
>

​I'm sure glad I found my trusty old rubber stamp.

Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that
one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

John K Clark

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Re: An invisible fuzzy amoral mindless blob, aka God

[Brent Meeker]

On 1/7/2017 2:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 07 Jan 2017, at 02:42, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Jan 5, 2017 at 3:18 AM, Bruno Marchal >wrote:


​
​>>​
It is insufficient to explain what a computation is, what is
needed is an explanation of how to perform a calculation. In
textbooks on arithmetic it will say something like "take this
number and place it in that set"  but how do I "take" a
number and how do I "place" it in a set without matter that
obeys the laws of physics?


By using the representation of finite sequence of number by a
number, for example by using Gödel's numbering


​
What!? that's just passing the buck! How can anything be "used" by 
anything if matter that obeys the laws of physics

​ ​
is not involved somewhere along the line ?



because with the standard definition of computation, they exist and 
are realized in all models of Robinson Arithmetic. The definition of 
computation does not involve matter, and indeed we can eventually 
understand that matter is an appearance from the points of view of 
immaterial machine implemented in an non material reality.


You do the same mistake than the people who say that a (physical) 
simulation of a typhoon cannot make us wet. The usual answer to this 
is that a simulation of "you + the typhoon" will make a "you" feeling 
being wet in a relative way. It is the same in arithmetic, where a 
simulation (actually infinitely many) of "you", below your 
substitution level, will make you feel the appearance of matter 
relatively to you.


No universal Turing machine can distinguish the following situations:

A physical device simulating Robinson arithmetic simulating a Lisp 
universal program simulating that universal Turing machine,


and

Robinson arithmetic simulating a physical device simulating Robinson 
arithmetic simulating a Lisp universal program simulating that 
universal Turing machine.


Is this OK for everybody?


No.  What would it mean for a UTM, a logical abstraction, to 
"distinguish situations"?  Sounds like a category error.


And what does it mean to simulate a physical device?  All the 
simulations of physical devices that I'm familiar with are really just 
simulations of some high-level model of the device.  Given the ubiquity 
of quantum entanglement, I doubt that it is possible to simulate a 
physical device in an absolute sense.






If someone believes that some primary matter is needed to get 
consciousness of that matter appearance, it is up to them to explain 
how that primary matter can have a role in the computation. But if you 
succeed, then some primary matter has a rôle in consciousness which is 
no more Turing emulable, and computationalism is false.







​>> ​
And I still don't see how you can be blithely talking about
the set that contains all true mathematical statements and no
false ones when you must know there is no way to construct
such a set even in theory. 



​> ​
That set cannot be defined in arithmetic, but admit a simple
definition in set theory or in analysis.


*​*
*A definition is NOT a construction!*



Yes, that is exactly the point. We can define the set of arithmetical 
true statements, and so we can *talk* about it, without being able to 
construct it, or to generate it mechanically.


The collection of definable set of numbers is larger than the 
collection of semi-computable, or recursively enumerable sets. The set 
of computable or recursive sets of numbers is not computable.


The set of solutions of a universal diophantine polynomial equation is 
semi-computable, but the set of numbers which are not solutions of a 
that universal diophantine equation, although easily definable, so 
that we can talk about, is not semi-computable (it is pi_1 instead of 
sigma_1).







**It's extraordinarily easy to define a Faster
​ ​
Than Light Spaceship, it's right there in the very name of the thing, 
it's a spaceship that can move faster than light, but that doesn't 
mean anybody can

​ ​
construct such a thing
​.​
  The very laws of mathematics
​
you keep talking about
​ ​
tell
​ us​
there is NO WAY even in theory to construct a set that has all true 
mathematical statements and no false ones

​;​
 forget practicalities you can't do it even in theory, not
​ ​
even if you had a
​ ​
infinite amount of
​ ​
time to
​ ​
work on it. So using such a set to tell us something about reality is 
not permissible

​ ​
under the rules of logic.

​> ​
The whole chapter of mathematical logic known as recursion theory
studies and classifies the degree of unsolvability of such set.


*​A classification is NOT a construction anymore than a definition is!*



Of course. Again that is what I was saying. Nobody said that all sets 
of numbers are constructible, indeed the set of definable sets is 
larger than the set of recursively 

Re: An invisible fuzzy amoral mindless blob, aka God

[Bruno Marchal]

On 07 Jan 2017, at 02:42, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Jan 5, 2017 at 3:18 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


​​>>​It is insufficient to explain what a computation is, what  
is needed is an explanation of how to perform a calculation. In  
textbooks on arithmetic it will say something like "take this number  
and place it in that set"  but how do I "take" a number and how do I  
"place" it in a set without matter that obeys the laws of physics?


By using the representation of finite sequence of number by a  
number, for example by using Gödel's numbering


​What!? that's just passing the buck! How can anything be "used" by  
anything if matter that obeys the laws of physics​ ​is not  
involved somewhere along the line ?



because with the standard definition of computation, they exist and  
are realized in all models of Robinson Arithmetic. The definition of  
computation does not involve matter, and indeed we can eventually  
understand that matter is an appearance from the points of view of  
immaterial machine implemented in an non material reality.


You do the same mistake than the people who say that a (physical)  
simulation of a typhoon cannot make us wet. The usual answer to this  
is that a simulation of "you + the typhoon" will make a "you" feeling  
being wet in a relative way. It is the same in arithmetic, where a  
simulation (actually infinitely many) of "you", below your  
substitution level, will make you feel the appearance of matter  
relatively to you.


No universal Turing machine can distinguish the following situations:

A physical device simulating Robinson arithmetic simulating a Lisp  
universal program simulating that universal Turing machine,


and

Robinson arithmetic simulating a physical device simulating Robinson  
arithmetic simulating a Lisp universal program simulating that  
universal Turing machine.


Is this OK for everybody?

If someone believes that some primary matter is needed to get  
consciousness of that matter appearance, it is up to them to explain  
how that primary matter can have a role in the computation. But if you  
succeed, then some primary matter has a rôle in consciousness which is  
no more Turing emulable, and computationalism is false.







​>> ​And I still don't see how you can be blithely talking about  
the set that contains all true mathematical statements and no false  
ones when you must know there is no way to construct such a set even  
in theory.


​> ​That set cannot be defined in arithmetic, but admit a simple  
definition in set theory or in analysis.


​A definition is NOT a construction!



Yes, that is exactly the point. We can define the set of arithmetical  
true statements, and so we can *talk* about it, without being able to  
construct it, or to generate it mechanically.


The collection of definable set of numbers is larger than the  
collection of semi-computable, or recursively enumerable sets. The set  
of computable or recursive sets of numbers is not computable.


The set of solutions of a universal diophantine polynomial equation is  
semi-computable, but the set of numbers which are not solutions of a  
that universal diophantine equation, although easily definable, so  
that we can talk about, is not semi-computable (it is pi_1 instead of  
sigma_1).






It's extraordinarily easy to define a Faster​ ​Than Light  
Spaceship, it's right there in the very name of the thing, it's a  
spaceship that can move faster than light, but that doesn't mean  
anybody can​ ​construct such a thing​.​  The very laws of  
mathematics​ you keep talking about​ ​tell​ us​ there is NO  
WAY even in theory to construct a set that has all true mathematical  
statements and no false ones​;​ forget practicalities you can't  
do it even in theory, not​ ​even if you had a​ ​infinite  
amount of​ ​time to​ ​work on it. So using such a set to tell  
us something about reality is not permissible​ ​under the rules  
of logic.


​> ​The whole chapter of mathematical logic known as recursion  
theory studies and classifies the degree of unsolvability of such set.


​A classification is NOT a construction anymore than a definition  
is!



Of course. Again that is what I was saying. Nobody said that all sets  
of numbers are constructible, indeed the set of definable sets is  
larger than the set of recursively enumerable set, itself larger than  
the set of totally computable, recursive, sets. You make my point.





​ ​The ​Faster Than Light Spaceship is in the "vehicle" class  
and in the "spaceship" class but unfortunately it is also in the  
"fictional" class because nobody can construct one.


By mocking the possibility of doing theology in the scientific way,  
the gnostic-atheists (believers in a Primary Physical Reality


​​Does "Primary Physical Reality​" mean a belief that ​matter  
is all there is?


No. It means that a Physical Reality which has to be assumed. It means  
a Physical reality which would not been able to