Re: An invisible fuzzy amoral mindless blob, aka God

2017-01-20 Thread Brent Meeker
The number machine Nu must be defined by some specific encoding. The 
polynomials depend on X and Nu.  So what is an X and Nu for which they 
have a solution and what enumeration is phi_mu?


Brent
P.S. I can believe statements are true without believing their referents 
exist: "The Mad Hatter is insane and makes hats" is true.


On 1/20/2017 9:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I think you miss the discovery of purely mathematical, even 
arithmetical Turing universal relations. Just for the beauty of it, I 
copy again below a system of diophantine relations which defines a 
Turing universal system.


Bruno

Only bad faith fears reason.
Only bad reasons fear faith.

The Putnam-Davis-Robinson-Matiyasevich-Jones Polynomial equations:

We have that X is in W_Nu, that is  phi_Nu(X) is defined, that is the 
number/machine Nu stops on input data X,  if and only if the following 
system of  polynomial equations ha a solution. It is short, and one 
degree is very high (5^60), but we can diminish the degree to 4, 
easily, by introducing a lot of other variables though. We can also 
limit the syetm to one equation. From this you can conceive that once 
you believe that 2+2=4 independently of you, then such a system 
polynomial equation has or not solution, but this encoded the entire 
universal dovetailing, including the non computable redundancy.


Nu = ((ZUY)^2 + U)^2 + Y

ELG^2 + Al = (B - XY)Q^2

Qu = B^(5^60)

La + Qu^4 = 1 + LaB^5

Th +  2Z = B^5

L = U + TTh

E = Y + MTh

N = Q^16

R = [G + EQ^3 + LQ^5 + (2(E - ZLa)(1 + XB^5 + G)^4 + LaB^5 + + 
LaB^5Q^4)Q^4](N^2 -N)

 + [Q^3 -BL + L + ThLaQ^3 + (B^5 - 2)Q^5] (N^2 - 1)

P = 2W(S^2)(R^2)N^2

(P^2)K^2 - K^2 + 1 = Ta^2

4(c - KSN^2)^2 + Et = K^2

K = R + 1 + HP - H

A = (WN^2 + 1)RSN^2

C = 2R + 1 Ph

D = BW + CA -2C + 4AGa -5Ga

D^2 = (A^2 - 1)C^2 + 1

F^2 = (A^2 - 1)(I^2)C^4 + 1

(D + OF)^2 = ((A + F^2(D^2 - A^2))^2 - 1)(2R + 1 + JC)^2 + 1


*you* emerges from the first person view on all solutions of that 
equations.
The physical reality is given by the competition of infinitely many 
universal numbers operating below your substitution level.
The bio-psychological reality the same, with finitely many universal 
systems operating above your substitution level.


The goal is not doing a new physics. The goal is in applying reason in 
metaphysics, and with the computationalist hypothesis, this is almost 
... metamathematics (an "old" name of mathematical logic).


Bruno



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Re: An invisible fuzzy amoral mindless blob, aka God

2017-01-20 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 19 Jan 2017, at 18:27, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 1/19/2017 12:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Using God in the sense of whatever is needed to have a reality, and  
maybe just that reality, helps to keep in mind that Primitive- 
Matter existence needs an act of faith. Nobody can prove its  
exoistence, and a materialist assumes that such a Primitive Matter  
is at the origin of all other realities (biologicl, psychological,  
etc.). It is your theology, apparently.


You're beating on your straw man.  Nobody tries to prove the  
existence of matter - it's an hypothesis used to explain the world.  
It's defined ostensively.


That is not the "matter" we are talking about. Ostensive definitions  
works also in multi-user sharable video games. The matter you are  
talking about is the matter of the physicists, who will, in its own  
field, be neutral on the primary or not aspect of that matter.  
Physicalism/materialism is a metaphysical assumption, not a physical  
one. I am talking on primary matter, not the indexically ostensive  
reality we assume beyond the appearances. The question is: is there a  
physical universe, we agree that there is a physical reality well  
described by the observers.
We were doing metaphysics/theology here, not physics. It becomes math  
with the computationalist hypothesis, and the appearance of matter is  
a very special sort of universal number persistent and sharable  
hallucinations (say). As they are token precise we can test that  
physics with the usual observations to see if that fits (and that fits  
'till now).




Whatever is the basic ontology of a theory of everything can be  
nominated "primitive" - adding "matter" or "computation" or just  
"stuff" doesn't add anything except confusion.


We don't need to elude the metaphysical question.

The problem, for the monist, is to explain the appearances, the  
possible laws, from the less assumptions possible, and without hiding  
realities, phenomenal or not, under the rug.


A theory of everything is a theory which unifies all domains of  
sciences, and beyond, that is the relation between science and truth  
based on the limitations of machines, formalisms and other finitely  
describable things with respect to everything, notably the infinite,  
which exists, or not.









For our topic, you need to explain how that God-Matter succeeds in  
selecting some computation(s) among all computations.


You don't need to explain that if you don't assume all computations  
exist.


I'm afraid there is not much choice in the matter.

You miss the creative bomb of the 20th century. If you believe in  
"there is no biggest prime number", you have to believe in all  
computations. If you can survive a physical digital functional  
substitution at some finite level of substitution, you need some  
amount of magic to influence your first person indetermination on  
(2^aleph_0) computational histories (on machine's computations +  
Oracles) realized in a tiny part of the arithmetical reality, which is  
assumed already by anyone believing in *any* theory rich enough to  
define or represent a universal number, be it physical or not.


I just translate the mind body problem in arithmetic (using  
computationalism), and then it happens that the universal machine has  
already the propositional solution (G1, G1*, S4Grz1, X1*, Z1*, and  
their differences with the same minus the "1", for the qualia).


Astonishingly, it works, at least for the quanta. I doubt such a  
simple and transparent approach will continue to work, as improvement  
in the dialog with the numbers will no doubt progress. The theology of  
machines is something rather simple, compared to their psychology.  
Biology and embryology are conceptually solved by Kleene's second  
recursion theorem, and generalizations and exploitations by John Case  
and his students, who have extended the work of Putnam, Gold, and  
others on the theoretical learning theory, notably. Like in theology,  
many results are limitations and no-go theorems.


I think you miss the discovery of purely mathematical, even  
arithmetical Turing universal relations. Just for the beauty of it, I  
copy again below a system of diophantine relations which defines a  
Turing universal system.


Bruno

Only bad faith fears reason.
Only bad reasons fear faith.

The Putnam-Davis-Robinson-Matiyasevich-Jones Polynomial equations:

We have that X is in W_Nu, that is  phi_Nu(X) is defined, that is the  
number/machine Nu stops on input data X,  if and only if the following  
system of  polynomial equations ha a solution. It is short, and one  
degree is very high (5^60), but we can diminish the degree to 4,  
easily, by introducing a lot of other variables though. We can also  
limit the syetm to one equation. From this you can conceive that once  
you believe that 2+2=4 independently of you, then such a system  
polynomial equation has or not solution, but this encoded the entire  
universal