Re: Universes from Nothing-What about the “Laws”?

[Brent Meeker]

On 8/27/2018 12:43 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Monday, August 27, 2018 at 1:52:41 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Monday, August 27, 2018 at 1:20:53 PM UTC-5, meekerdb wrote:



On 8/27/2018 12:26 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Sunday, August 26, 2018 at 5:51:58 PM UTC-5, meekerdb wrote:



On 8/26/2018 4:54 AM, spinozalens via Free Thinkers
Physics Discussion Group wrote:



uuu
-Original Message-
From: Brent Meeker 
To: atvoid-2 
Sent: Sun, Aug 26, 2018 2:02 am
Subject: Re: Universes from Nothing-What about the “Laws”?


Brent

*
We are talking past each other. It's probably my
fault. I have lost the tread on what we disagree about.*


I don't think I disagree about anything with you. I
disagreed with phil because he wants to banish the
concept of thoughts. The problem is that thoughts, and
especially perceptions, are epistemologically prior to
matter.  We have perceptions, which are an incorrigble
and fundamental basis of knowledge.  Then based on that
knowledge/observation we arrive at a theory that says
nothing exists but matter and material processes.  That
theory may well be true.  But without explicating which
material processes produce perceptions and other
thoughts, as compared to processes that don't, the
theory that only matter and material processes exist is
aspirational. If only matter exist, then thoughts and
perceptions must be explained in terms of matter.  You
can't just dismiss them as "immaterial" because they are
the basis of knowledge about matter.

*Well I don't agree with Phil. As I have made clear my
viewpoint is neither materialistic or idealistic. There
is no causality  between mind and matter, mind and
matter are two available attributes of reality. This is
neutral monism. This position , in my opinion, provides
an answer to the question posed by Vilenkin at the end
of his book " Many Worlds in One" and provides the
missing piece in Lawrence Krauss's book " A Universe
From Nothing" These are not scientific views , though I
hope they are based in our current  scientific
understanding.
*


So you reject the pure materialist idea that matter
causes mind by doing certain computations.  This would
imply that a computer, made of silicon, copper,...,
cannot produce mind by simply performing the same
computations as a brain does.  It might conceivably
produce some different kind of mind.

Bertrand Russell's idea of neutral monism was that there
were something like "atoms of reality" that would be
events like time-stamped propositions.  Mind would be one
way of collecting these events into coherent threads
constituting persons and the physical world would be
another way of collecting them into a "reality" shared by
the different minds.




It's the mirror image of the argument I have with Bruno
Marchal who says if computation (and he means the
Platonist version) is all that exists then matter must
be an aspect of computation, e.g. as it might be in a
holodeck simulation.  This too might be true, but
without explaining matter it's also aspirational.

*
*
*The implicit mistake here is assuming casualty between
mind and matter in my opinion*


There's just one thing in Bruno's ontology, computation. 
Mind and matter are just aspects of computation.  Think
of "The Matrix" or Star Trek's holodeck in which the
people are also part of the simulation.

Brent





 I know Brent hates seeing the citing of references, but here
is the reference *[pdf, 11 pages]*  to Marchal's theory:

MECHANISM AND PERSONAL IDENTITY
Bruno MARCHAL

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/M&PI_15-MAI-91.pdf


[Mechanistic Platonism]

"Note the Platonism I use is the minimal one which permits me
to embed other (i.e. independent of oneself) mind"in an
independent reality. It is the Platonism of a will writer."


And I know Phil thinks "Platonism" is a sufficient epithet to
shut off any discussion.  I've read Bruno's paper and I argue
with him regularly over on the "everything" email list.

 

Re: Church-Turing Thesis

[agrayson2000]

On Friday, August 24, 2018 at 3:22:39 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Aug 2018, at 00:53, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, August 23, 2018 at 5:55:33 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, August 23, 2018 at 3:28:13 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>> Why don't we all chip in an buy Alan a computer so he can look stuff up 
>>> on Wikipedia.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> *I will when you have the courtesy to explain your contradictory 
>> statements about the instantaneous, infinite extent of the wf. Oh BTW, with 
>> your big brain, I suppose it never occurred to you that I wanted to hear 
>> Bruno's definition, which if experience is worth anything, could be wildly 
>> DIFFERENT from Wiki. While you assess all that, why don't you go fuck 
>> yourself, and then tell us how it felt. OK? AG*
>>
>
> *FWIW, comparing Bruno's description with Wiki, which was my intent, 
> confirms, at least for me, that the postulates of QM are easier to 
> understand, even though many of the defining functions of a Turing Machine 
> are known to those who have programmed modern computers, notwithstanding 
> that the latter use random access memory. I don't see why the use of RAM is 
> decisively important in distinguishing a Turing Machine from how modern 
> computers are designed. AG*  
>
>
>
> You are right. You can see a von Neumann computer as a Turing machine. As 
> the set of symbols, and state are arbitrary, you can even see a brain as a 
> Turing machine. 
>

*From my naive pov, I initially think a Turing machine can manipulate 
arbitrary symbols and logical commands, and is limited to computable 
functions, whatever they are. If so, and you consider a brain a Turing 
machine, what does it do with non-computable functions? AG*
 

> That is why eventually Gödel accepted Turing’s argument for the Church’s 
> thesis.
>
> Note that the wikipedia is often bad on logic or on computation, ...not 
> mentioning computationalism. 
>
> Have you understood Cantor’s diagonal proof of the non enumerability of 
> the set of infinite sequence, in my yesterday post. If not I can explain 
> again, with different notation. There is a real surprise at the end of that 
> thread, you will see (I think and hope).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>> On 8/22/2018 5:58 PM, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 8:26 PM,  wrote:
>>>
>>> >>
> Yes, the Busy Beaver Function is not computable. We know that: 
>
> BB(1) =1
> BB(2) =6
> BB(3) =21
> BB(4) =107
>

 * > You haven't *written* the function, just its alleged values for 
 1,2,3,4.  What is the function? *

>>>  
>>>
>>> Starting with a all zero tape BB(N) is the number of operations any N 
>>> state Turing Machine performs after it writes the largest number of 1's and 
>>> then halts. It is very important that it halt, some machines will go on 
>>> forever but they don't count. For example we know for sure that BB(5) is at 
>>> least 47,176,870 because one 5 state Turing Machine has been found that 
>>> halts after it goes through 47,176,870 operations (and prints 4098 1’s on 
>>> the tape), but there are 28 other 5 state machines displaying non-regular 
>>> behavior that are well past 47,176,870 operations and 4098 1's. If one of 
>>> them eventually halts then that larger number of operations will be BB(5), 
>>> if none of them ever halts then 47,176,870 really is BB(5); but the trouble 
>>> is we'll never be able to know it’s 47,176,870 because we'll never know 
>>> that none of those other 28 5 state machines will never halt because the 
>>> Halting problem is insolvable.
>>>
>>> John K Clark
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> -- 
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google 
>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send 
>>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>>
>>>
>>>
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com .
> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>
>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.c

Re: : Many-minds interpretation?

[agrayson2000]

On Thursday, August 23, 2018 at 11:49:08 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, August 23, 2018 at 3:16:24 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 23 Aug 2018, at 02:05, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>
>> From: Bruno Marchal >
>> On 22 Aug 2018, at 01:54, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>
>> From: Bruno Marchal 
>>
>> The other sort of infinity, the one which I think you disagree with, is 
>> typical for the  superposition of tensor products, like the singlet state 
>> ud - du. Before measurement Alice has the same probability of finding u, or 
>> d for any measurement she can do in any direction. Both Alice and Bob are 
>> maximally ignorant of their possible measurement results. The MW on this, 
>> or a MW way to interpret this, to keep the rotational symmetry, is that we 
>> have an infinity of couples Alice+Bob, with each couple being correlated.  
>> If not, some implicit assumption is made on u and d, like it is a preferred 
>> base.
>>
>>
>> But the problems with any such suggestion are obvious. Firstly, Alice 
>> does not choose her measurement angle in that way, so there is no 
>> super-superposition created. Secondly, this construction does not restore 
>> the rotational symmetry in any case. You might have an infinite number of 
>> Alices, measuring the singlet at all possible angles, but that 
>> multi-multiverse is not rotationally symmetric either! All it needs is for 
>> Alice number 7,234,826 to poke her tongue out and the rotational symmetry 
>> is lost! Of course, you could add yet more multiverses to cover every 
>> possible deviation of Alice from the stationary state. But the process 
>> rapidly becomes ridiculous.
>>
>> So this Rube Goldberg construction of additional multiverses of 
>> superpositions does not actually restore stable rotational symmetry. So why 
>> propose such a construction? William of Ockham will rise out of his grave 
>> to haunt you for such pointless extravagance of entities!
>>
>>
>> Alice destroys the rotational symmetry in all its universe. Not of the 
>> whole wave, where Alice does not exist as a determinate subsystem.
>>
>>
>> I can't really parse this. The point is that when Alice interacts with 
>> the singlet with her magnet she destroys the rotational symmetry of the 
>> state. This symmetry is not restored by considering and large system, or 
>> the whole wave. If anything, enlarging the context in this way simply 
>> lessens any symmetry that might remain.
>>
>> I think what you have in mind is a situation such as arises if you shine 
>> a light through a small aperture. The photon emerges as a spherical wave, 
>> with the rotational symmetry of such a (hemi-)spherical wave. If there is a 
>> hemispherical screen downstream, the photon will interact with the screen 
>> at some single point. If you consider only one branch of the SWE evolution, 
>> this interaction point breaks the rotational symmetry. But if you consider 
>> all branches of the wave function together, there is a branch for every 
>> single point at which the photon can hit the screen, so that the symmetry 
>> is preserved in the wave function as a whole -- over the ensemble of all 
>> branches. But that is a situation in which the environment with which the 
>> photon interacts is itself symmetrical. If the screen, rather than being a 
>> smooth equidistant hemisphere, is just the rough walls of the laboratory, 
>> there is no symmetry in the points at which the photon can hit the walls, 
>> and the rotational symmetry is lost, even in the wave function as a whole, 
>> even by considering the superposition of all possible branches.
>>
>> The take away message from this is that the symmetry of the original 
>> system can be lost by interaction with a non-symmetrical environment. The 
>> boundary conditions of the total system may not have the symmetries of the 
>> original state. So loss of symmetry is ubiquitous in the universe, even for 
>> Everettian no-collapse quantum mechanics. If you introduce a 
>> non-symmetrical interaction into the system, the symmetry is lost. That is 
>> all that is happening with the measurement of the spin projection of the 
>> singlet state by Alice. Your idiosyncratic interpretation of the tensor 
>> product, and your insistence the the symmetry be preserved regardless of 
>> the non-symmetrical environment, are just misguided. There is no need to 
>> try to preserve symmetry given non-symmetrical boundary conditions.
>>
>> Since the symmetry is broken, the singlet state no longer exists in its 
>> original form, and the state that Bob measured is affected by the 
>> measurement Alice makes. There is no more to it than this. If Alice and Bob 
>> are space-like separated, there are some interpretational issues with this 
>> instantaneous influence at a distance.
>>
>>
>> Nice to hear that. It was basically my point.We have never disagreed 
>> except on some definition. I use “symmetry” in a larger sense, and I take 
>> superposition at face valu

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[agrayson2000]

On Saturday, August 25, 2018 at 9:11:47 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sat, Aug 25, 2018 at 2:21 AM > wrote:
>  
>
>> *>I plan to study Cantor's theorem on the Internet and compare it with 
>> your proof.*
>
>
> Every time Bruno useless a personal pronoun in the "proof" that involves 
> people duplicating machines ask yourself what exactly is the referent. If 
> you can figure it out let me know because I can't and neither can Bruno. 
>
> John K Clark
>

*Thanks. I'll keep that in mind when I study Cantor's theorem, by Cantor 
and Bruno. I've always been fascinated with the levels of infinity 
discovered by great mathematicians, whom I hold in the highest esteem. AG *

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Church-Turing Thesis

[agrayson2000]

On Saturday, August 25, 2018 at 1:11:47 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 25 Aug 2018, at 01:15, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, August 24, 2018 at 12:25:03 PM UTC, telmo_menezes wrote:
>>
>> On 23 August 2018 at 06:31,   wrote: 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > On Thursday, August 23, 2018 at 2:01:24 AM UTC, Jason wrote: 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 4:43 PM  wrote: 
>> >>> 
>> >>> 
>> >>> 
>> >>> On Tuesday, August 21, 2018 at 3:22:04 PM UTC, Jason wrote: 
>>  
>>  
>>  
>>  On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 1:16 AM  wrote: 
>> > 
>> > I've been looking at the Wiki article on this topic. I find that I 
>> > really don't understand what it is, or why it's important. Maybe a 
>> few 
>> > succinct words from the usual suspects can be of help. TIA. 
>> > 
>> > 
>>  
>>  
>>  Bruno provided a great definition and background of the 
>> Church-Turing 
>>  Thesis. I will try to answer why it is important and comes up often 
>> in our 
>>  discussion. 
>>  
>>  
>>  The Church-Turing thesis says that anything that is computable is 
>>  computable by any computer.  In other words, there is nothing that 
>> the 
>>  computer in your cell phone can't compute, that your laptop or that 
>> a super 
>>  computer (or even a quantum computer) can.  It just comes down to 
>> having 
>>  enough time and memory. 
>>  
>>  This is why you don't need to buy a new phone with new hardware 
>> every 
>>  time you want to install a new app.  Regardless of the type of CPU 
>> in your 
>>  phone, it can be extended in its power of what it might compute only 
>> given 
>>  some new software.  It is in this sense that computers are 
>> "Universal", they 
>>  are universal in the same sense that of a universal remote, or in 
>> the sense 
>>  that a record player is a universal sound imitating device.  A 
>> record player 
>>  might emulate the sounds of an orchestra, Britney Spears, whale 
>> songs, etc., 
>>  all it needs is the appropriate record and it can produce the sound. 
>>  
>>  In the same sense, all a Turing Machine (computer) needs to imitate 
>> (or 
>>  emulate) the right program or function is the right software. 
>>  Because of 
>>  this, anything that can be described in software, be it a brain 
>> emulation, 
>>  an AI, a virtual environment, a virtual machine or operating system, 
>> can 
>>  never know what hardware is running it, because the Church-Turing 
>> thesis 
>>  says that any computer is capable of running it. 
>>  
>>  This is why if consciousness is computable (the computational theory 
>> of 
>>  mind) we cannot know what is computing us (e.g. we could be in a 
>> matrix type 
>>  simulation for all we know).  The other implication is that if 
>> computations 
>>  exist in mathematics (and they do), then we exist within 
>> mathematics. 
>>  Mathematics (or at least the part necessary to describe 
>> computations) 
>>  becomes the fundamental science of what we experience and what is 
>> possible 
>>  to experience or what we may predict about our future experiences 
>> (physics). 
>>  
>>  
>>  Jason 
>> >>> 
>> >>> 
>> >>> If someone digitizes (emulates) the Mona Lisa, is this equivalent to 
>> the 
>> >>> Mona Lisa? 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> If you digitize a person and put the digitized Mona Lisa before them, 
>> it 
>> >> is equivalent to the real Mona Lisa to that person, at least as far as 
>> they 
>> >> can tell. 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >>> 
>> >>> Can you write a function which is not computable? AG 
>> >>> 
>> >>> 
>> >> 
>> >> If by not computable you mean it never returns, then this is easy: 
>> >> 
>> >> function foo(): 
>> >>   while (true) 
>> >>   { 
>> >>  // loop forever 
>> >>   } 
>> >> 
>> >> There are also programs for which no one knows if they are computable 
>> or 
>> >> not.  If you can prove whether or not this function ever completes, 
>> you will 
>> >> be world famous, and may even earn a million dollars (though I think 
>> the 
>> >> prize has been retracted, it might be oferred again): 
>> >> 
>> >> Step 1: Set X = 4 
>> >> Step 2: Set R = 0 
>> >> Step 3: For each Y from 1 to X, if both Y and (X – Y) are prime, set R 
>> = 1 
>> >> Step 4: If R = 1, Set X = X + 2 and go to Step 2 
>> >> Step 5: If R = 0, print X and halt 
>> >> 
>> >> All you have to prove is the computer either never gets to step 5 or 
>> that 
>> >> it does get to step 5.  Mathematicians have been working on a related 
>> >> problem for 300 years, no one has solved it yet. 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> Jason 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > I was asking about a well-defined mathematical function that can be 
>> written 
>> > in closed form, or possibly as an infinite series. I believe that all 
>> such 
>> > functions are computable. I was not discussing subroutines that might 
>> never 
>> > terminate. If all well de