Re: Connes, Changeux and Comp
ameroff/papers/decoherence/decoherenc e.html ) but have found a possible loophole that seems to allow coherence to occur in long enough durations for quantum computations to take place.) It would change nothing. Why? Because the only assumption I am using is that we are (turing) emulable, and all known physical unitary transformations (solutions of SWE) are turing emulable (albeit "slowly" but this does not matter in UD*, given than the first person cannot be aware of the slowness (and even of any "actualness" of an execution) of the UD. Cf UDA. (If the brain is a quantum machine following a NON computable unitary evolution like Nielsen's one, that is something like e^(i.Omega t), with Omega being the Chaitin number of some universal machine, then it could change things, but then comp would be false, and we go out of my working hypothesis ;) BTW, with comp, the existence of such a non comp unitary evolution is highly undecidable. Bruno - Original Message - From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Friday, June 18, 2004 6:06 AM Subject: Connes, Changeux and Comp > Hi all, > > I am rather busy finishing my (french, alas again) paper on the debate > between the french biologist J.P. Changeux and the french mathematician > Alain Connes. > Actually the book has been translated: > http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0691004056/wwwlink-software-21/202-7192216-8003069 > Changeux is a materialist elimininativist. He believes in monistic > materialism. Mathematics, according to him, is exclusively a construction > of the human brain. > Connes is platonist for mathematical truth, but seems to accept some form > of physical realism, so that he accepts a form of platonistic dualism (an > invention of Aristotle, not Plato: it is the position of realism with > respect to both math and physics). Connes acknowledges that his position > entails the mystery of the relation between math and physics (the > unreasonable effectiveness of math in physics). Obviously the comp hyp can > reconcile them, but at the price of dismissing physical realism. I > recommend the book. It makes clear the inevitability of a clash between two > forms of realism in science. It is also interesting that Connes uses the > term of "bifurcation" both in relation with Everett's quantum mechanics and > Godel's theorem; that's a point which is made utterly clear in the comp > approach I follow for the fundamental questions. > > I hope also you have been able to buy the little and cheap book "Forever > Undecided" by Smullyan, which > has been re-edited recently, but seems to be again out of print. I will > make some critical comments about it soon. I definitely consider that book > as a royal introduction to the modal logic G, which, as you (should) know > is the basic material on which the technical comp derivation of physics is > extracted. (Well the beginning of the derivation, of course ...). Be sure > you have no more problem with the Universal Dovetailer Argument, and please > don't hesitate to send last minute objections ;) > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Connes, Changeux and Comp
Dear Bruno, Thank you for bringing this book to our attention. I will see if I can get a copy ASAP. I am very interested in how Changeux deals with the epiphenomena problem, if he even addresses it. I have read the Smullyan book and found that it strenghend my insistence that we need to give a more detailed explanation as to how, at least, the appearence of physical implementations are necessary; he did not address physicality at all. Hopefully your explanation of G and G* will help. One question to leave you with: If it can be proved that a physical implementation of quantum computation exist in Nature (in microtubles to be specific), what effect would this have in your thinking? (I am very aware of Tegmark's paper (http://www.consciousness.arizona.edu/hameroff/papers/decoherence/decoherenc e.html ) but have found a possible loophole that seems to allow coherence to occur in long enough durations for quantum computations to take place.) Kindest regards, Stephen - Original Message - From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Friday, June 18, 2004 6:06 AM Subject: Connes, Changeux and Comp > Hi all, > > I am rather busy finishing my (french, alas again) paper on the debate > between the french biologist J.P. Changeux and the french mathematician > Alain Connes. > Actually the book has been translated: > http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0691004056/wwwlink-software-21/202-7192216-8003069 > Changeux is a materialist elimininativist. He believes in monistic > materialism. Mathematics, according to him, is exclusively a construction > of the human brain. > Connes is platonist for mathematical truth, but seems to accept some form > of physical realism, so that he accepts a form of platonistic dualism (an > invention of Aristotle, not Plato: it is the position of realism with > respect to both math and physics). Connes acknowledges that his position > entails the mystery of the relation between math and physics (the > unreasonable effectiveness of math in physics). Obviously the comp hyp can > reconcile them, but at the price of dismissing physical realism. I > recommend the book. It makes clear the inevitability of a clash between two > forms of realism in science. It is also interesting that Connes uses the > term of "bifurcation" both in relation with Everett's quantum mechanics and > Godel's theorem; that's a point which is made utterly clear in the comp > approach I follow for the fundamental questions. > > I hope also you have been able to buy the little and cheap book "Forever > Undecided" by Smullyan, which > has been re-edited recently, but seems to be again out of print. I will > make some critical comments about it soon. I definitely consider that book > as a royal introduction to the modal logic G, which, as you (should) know > is the basic material on which the technical comp derivation of physics is > extracted. (Well the beginning of the derivation, of course ...). Be sure > you have no more problem with the Universal Dovetailer Argument, and please > don't hesitate to send last minute objections ;) > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > >
Connes, Changeux and Comp
Hi all, I am rather busy finishing my (french, alas again) paper on the debate between the french biologist J.P. Changeux and the french mathematician Alain Connes. Actually the book has been translated: http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0691004056/wwwlink-software-21/202-7192216-8003069 Changeux is a materialist elimininativist. He believes in monistic materialism. Mathematics, according to him, is exclusively a construction of the human brain. Connes is platonist for mathematical truth, but seems to accept some form of physical realism, so that he accepts a form of platonistic dualism (an invention of Aristotle, not Plato: it is the position of realism with respect to both math and physics). Connes acknowledges that his position entails the mystery of the relation between math and physics (the unreasonable effectiveness of math in physics). Obviously the comp hyp can reconcile them, but at the price of dismissing physical realism. I recommend the book. It makes clear the inevitability of a clash between two forms of realism in science. It is also interesting that Connes uses the term of "bifurcation" both in relation with Everett's quantum mechanics and Godel's theorem; that's a point which is made utterly clear in the comp approach I follow for the fundamental questions. I hope also you have been able to buy the little and cheap book "Forever Undecided" by Smullyan, which has been re-edited recently, but seems to be again out of print. I will make some critical comments about it soon. I definitely consider that book as a royal introduction to the modal logic G, which, as you (should) know is the basic material on which the technical comp derivation of physics is extracted. (Well the beginning of the derivation, of course ...). Be sure you have no more problem with the Universal Dovetailer Argument, and please don't hesitate to send last minute objections ;) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
