Re: Constraints on "everything existing"
My comments at the bottom too. Jean-Michel At 08:51 AM 1/22/2003 -0800, Eric Hawthorne wrote: My comment at the bottom of the message. Eric Jean-Michel Veuillen wrote: Eric Hawthorne wrote: Unless a world (i.e. a sequence of information state changes) has produced intelligent observers though, there will be no one around in it to argue whether it exists or not. Then our universe did not exist before there were intelligent observers in it, which is not true. I think that is better to say that all self-consistent mathematical structures exist. To restrict existence to universes containing SASs (self-aware structures) is not only is very cumbersome but leads to contradictions. Perhaps we're just quibbling about terminology. My argument for a narrower definition of "exists" would be that if everything (or even just "everything self consistent") exists, then perhaps existence in that sense is not that interesting a concept. So I posit that a better definition of "exists" or "classically exists" is: "self-consistent, and metric and organized to the degree to be observable" Notice that this does not require "is observed". It requires "would be observable if observers happened to be around." So our Earth 3 billion years ago was still "observable" in this sense, even though we weren't there yet. So, in otherwords, I define "exists" as "that which is an aspect of a structure which is of the form/behaviour as to be, in principle, observable". I think we will be able to define a set of properties (stronger than just self-consitency) that will define "in principle, observable". <-- difficult exercise. All other "self-consistent mathematical structures" are, to me, just "potentially or partially existent", because there is something wrong with their properties that would make them, in principle, unobservable. Vague statement building up this intuition: The operative question is whether a mathematical structure can only be "abstract" (without observable instantiation) or whether it can also be "tract". I would argue that these other less-than-existent "self-consistent mathematical structures" may be part of "quantum potentiality" but can never be part of an existent world that exhibits classical physical properties. Eric I agree that "in principle, observable" is difficult to define. If, instead of looking at the Earth 3 billion years ago, you looked at our universe 1 second after the Big Bang, would you say that it was "in principle, observable" ? Even if you managed to show that the answer should be Yes, you would then have to show that for another universe whose parameters would differ by only the slightest amounts, the answer should be No. One of these universes would exist one second after the Big Bang, not the other one, which would be very much against intuition. And if you answer No, you have to cope with the fact the answer is now Yes, so you would have our universe which did not exist one second after the Big Bang and which exists now. Here is what I would propose: Following David Lewis and Modal Realism (http://users.ox.ac.uk/~worc0337/modal.realism.html) all possible worlds exist. Max Tegmark proposes in http://www.hep.upenn.edu/~max/toe.pdf that only worlds which have mathematical existence exists. This gives the self-consistent constraint. I agree with that. Tegmark then goes on and gives an "operational definition" of existence which requires SAS's. I think that this unfortunate: If we were the only SAS's in this universe and blew up the Earth, our universe would not cease to exist. If we agreed that it did and if SAS's appeared somewhere else later, would they say that they universe did not exist, then existed when it was inhabited by us, then did not exist and then existed again ? I find it absurd to make the existence of an universe depend on the fact that it contains SAS's or not. I simply propose that we say that some universes contain SAS's and some do not, without any consequence on the existence of these universes. Jürgen Schmidhuber proposes that possible universe means computable universe (without any reference to SAS's). See: http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/everything/html.html http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/everything/node1.html Again, I think it is simpler to say that some possible universes are computable, and that some are not, and that what Schmidhuber says in his article applies to computable universes only. Jean-Michel
Re: Constraints on "everything existing"
My comment at the bottom of the message. Eric Jean-Michel Veuillen wrote: Eric Hawthorne wrote: Unless a world (i.e. a sequence of information state changes) has produced intelligent observers though, there will be no one around in it to argue whether it exists or not. Then our universe did not exist before there were intelligent observers in it, which is not true. I think that is better to say that all self-consistent mathematical structures exist. To restrict existence to universes containing SASs (self-aware structures) is not only is very cumbersome but leads to contradictions. Perhaps we're just quibbling about terminology. My argument for a narrower definition of "exists" would be that if everything (or even just "everything self consistent") exists, then perhaps existence in that sense is not that interesting a concept. So I posit that a better definition of "exists" or "classically exists" is: "self-consistent, and metric and organized to the degree to be observable" Notice that this does not require "is observed". It requires "would be observable if observers happened to be around." So our Earth 3 billion years ago was still "observable" in this sense, even though we weren't there yet. So, in otherwords, I define "exists" as "that which is an aspect of a structure which is of the form/behaviour as to be, in principle, observable". I think we will be able to define a set of properties (stronger than just self-consitency) that will define "in principle, observable". <-- difficult exercise. All other "self-consistent mathematical structures" are, to me, just "potentially or partially existent", because there is something wrong with their properties that would make them, in principle, unobservable. Vague statement building up this intuition: The operative question is whether a mathematical structure can only be "abstract" (without observable instantiation) or whether it can also be "tract". I would argue that these other less-than-existent "self-consistent mathematical structures" may be part of "quantum potentiality" but can never be part of an existent world that exhibits classical physical properties. Eric
Re: Constraints on "everything existing"
Jean-Michel Veuillen wrote: > Then our universe did not exist before there were > intelligent observers in it, which is not true. > > I think that is better to say that all > self-consistent mathematical structures exist. > To restrict existence to universes containing > SASs (self-aware structures) is not only is > very cumbersome but leads to contradictions. The stipulation that a universe involves principly, if not fully, population by SAS's .. could be seen as a 'restriction'. However, that only happens when self-awareness .. as a relationship and property .. is narrowly defined or acsribed to limited types of organization(s) within a 'universe'. If instead, it is a property that is relevant to the generic class "relationship(s)", then self-awareness becomes synonymous with self-relationship(s). And when -that- is the dominating and established characteristic of 'being', then it is natural and unavoidable .. and complete .. that some degree of associative awareness is present and operating in all systems in all universes. The forms and extents may vary. The behaviors may be more cognizable 'in' some instantiations and relevant 'to' some instantions, but the core phenomenon is there none the less, in -all- instantiations. Co-relevance. Where it is only secondary and higher relations, through which may emerge, and via which may be instituted .. conditional 'disconnects' .. such that information is locally blocked and some parts of the totality de facto exist 'numb' to other extant 'information'; at least if that barrier remains intact and not bridged (as is its potential). I.e., disparate information might be accessible if the correct transduction (transform) arrangements are made, and translations made real. Jamie Rose Ceptual Institute
Re: Constraints on "everything existing"
At 08:40 PM 1/17/2003 -0800, Eric Hawthorne wrote: John M wrote: Eric: do I detect in your 'circumstances' some 'anthropocentric/metric/logic' restrictions? is the multiverse exclusively built according to the system we devised on this planet as 'our physical laws'? (your 'factor' #1, although you oincluded in factor #2 the (CLASSICAL existence) modifier.) Brings to mind Mr Square's opponents in Abbott's Flatland, with the 2-D vs 3-D joke. It may seem that way (anthropocentric) but when I say "intelligent observer" I mean "any kind of intelligent observer" or couched in some more terminology "any emergent system or pattern that functions as an intelligent observer." So no, I'm not talking about a human-centric anthropic principle, I'm talking about an "arbitrary intelligent observer", generically defined. As you would expect, I would guess that there are some pretty tight constraints on how an intelligent observer would have to function to be considered such, but "human" is definitely too narrow a definition of it. I see "intelligent observer production" as being a threshold level of organization achieved by certain constraint regimes on "all sequences of state changes". Of course, as a thought experiment, you could set a lower threshold criterion for "fully existing worlds", such as the ability to be organized enough to produce "some interesting (non-trivial) stable emergent systems that seem to exhibit some higher-level functions including self-preserving functions". Unless a world (i.e. a sequence of information state changes) has produced intelligent observers though, there will be no one around in it to argue whether it exists or not. Then our universe did not exist before there were intelligent observers in it, which is not true. I think that is better to say that all self-consistent mathematical structures exist. To restrict existence to universes containing SASs (self-aware structures) is not only is very cumbersome but leads to contradictions. On another subject, I read on the list that different universes cannot communicate. I see at least one possibility for communication: One scientist in our universe implements a computer simulation of an universe containing SASs. The scientist could then communicate with them. There is also of course the possibility that we ourselves live in a computer simulation Which brings us around to the conclusion that after all, the question of "classical existence or not" of some world is only ever a concern of intelligent observers. It is not really a concern for the non-thinking aspects of worlds or potential worlds, precisely because those parts are content to just be, or maybe be, as the case may be. Those parts are just "the potential for information". Only when something comes along that cares to conceptualize about the various possibilities borne of different states of information, does there arise a question of existence, and then, it is a question of existence from the perspective of those that can observe and care about such things.
Re: Constraints on "everything existing"
Dear Eric, I have a question. How do you allow for the range of 1-person"experienciability" such that we can recover in our model both the "normal"psychology and the "pathologies" such as schizophrenia and dismorphia?Kindest regards,Stephen- Original Message -From: "Eric Hawthorne" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>Sent: Friday, January 17, 2003 11:40 PMSubject: Re: Constraints on "everything existing"> John M wrote:>> >Eric:> >> >do I detect in your 'circumstances' some 'anthropocentric/metric/logic'> >restrictions? is the multiverse exclusively built according to the system> >we devised on this planet as 'our physical laws'? (your 'factor' #1,> >although you oincluded in factor #2 the (CLASSICAL existence) modifier.)> >> >Brings to mind Mr Square's opponents in Abbott's Flatland,> >with the 2-D vs 3-D joke.> >> >> It may seem that way (anthropocentric) but when I say "intelligent> observer" I mean "any kind of intelligent observer" or couched> in some more terminology "any emergent system or pattern> that functions as an intelligent observer.">> So no, I'm not talking about a human-centric anthropic principle,> I'm talking about an "arbitrary intelligent observer", generically> defined. As you would expect, I would guess that there are> some pretty tight constraints on how an intelligent observer> would have to function to be considered such, but "human" is> definitely too narrow a definition of it.>> I see "intelligent observer production" as being> a threshold level of organization achieved by certain> constraint regimes on "all sequences of state changes".>> Of course, as a thought experiment, you could set a lower> threshold criterion for "fully existing worlds", such as> the ability to be organized enough to produce> "some interesting (non-trivial) stable emergent systems> that seem to exhibit some higher-level functions> including self-preserving functions".>> Unless a world (i.e. a sequence of information state changes)> has produced intelligent observers though, there will be> no one around in it to argue whether it exists or not.>> Which brings us around to the conclusion that after all,> the question of "classical existence or not" of some world> is only ever a concern of intelligent observers. It is> not really a concern for the non-thinking aspects of> worlds or potential worlds, precisely because those parts> are content to just be, or maybe be, as the case may be.> Those parts are just "the potential for information".> Only when something comes along that cares to conceptualize> about the various possibilities borne of different states> of information, does there arise a question of existence,> and then, it is a question of existence from the perspective> of those that can observe and care about such things.
Re: Constraints on "everything existing"
John M wrote: Eric: do I detect in your 'circumstances' some 'anthropocentric/metric/logic' restrictions? is the multiverse exclusively built according to the system we devised on this planet as 'our physical laws'? (your 'factor' #1, although you oincluded in factor #2 the (CLASSICAL existence) modifier.) Brings to mind Mr Square's opponents in Abbott's Flatland, with the 2-D vs 3-D joke. It may seem that way (anthropocentric) but when I say "intelligent observer" I mean "any kind of intelligent observer" or couched in some more terminology "any emergent system or pattern that functions as an intelligent observer." So no, I'm not talking about a human-centric anthropic principle, I'm talking about an "arbitrary intelligent observer", generically defined. As you would expect, I would guess that there are some pretty tight constraints on how an intelligent observer would have to function to be considered such, but "human" is definitely too narrow a definition of it. I see "intelligent observer production" as being a threshold level of organization achieved by certain constraint regimes on "all sequences of state changes". Of course, as a thought experiment, you could set a lower threshold criterion for "fully existing worlds", such as the ability to be organized enough to produce "some interesting (non-trivial) stable emergent systems that seem to exhibit some higher-level functions including self-preserving functions". Unless a world (i.e. a sequence of information state changes) has produced intelligent observers though, there will be no one around in it to argue whether it exists or not. Which brings us around to the conclusion that after all, the question of "classical existence or not" of some world is only ever a concern of intelligent observers. It is not really a concern for the non-thinking aspects of worlds or potential worlds, precisely because those parts are content to just be, or maybe be, as the case may be. Those parts are just "the potential for information". Only when something comes along that cares to conceptualize about the various possibilities borne of different states of information, does there arise a question of existence, and then, it is a question of existence from the perspective of those that can observe and care about such things.
Re: Constraints on "everything existing"
Eric: do I detect in your 'circumstances' some 'anthropocentric/metric/logic' restrictions? is the multiverse exclusively built according to the system we devised on this planet as 'our physical laws'? (your 'factor' #1, although you oincluded in factor #2 the (CLASSICAL existence) modifier.) Brings to mind Mr Square's opponents in Abbott's Flatland, with the 2-D vs 3-D joke. John Mikes - Original Message - From: "Eric Hawthorne" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Friday, January 17, 2003 12:40 PM Subject: Constraints on "everything existing" > Hal Finney wrote: > > >the purpose of the list, to > >discuss the implications of the various ideas that "everything exists". > >Everything we say is implicitly prefaced by the conditional clause, > >"If all s exist, then". > > > I would propose (as I layed out in some detail in a post about > 3 months ago) that their are in fact many constraints on those > states-of-affairs that can be said to "exist". > > I would put it this way: Only those states and state changes > capable of supporting communities of communicating intelligent > observers "exist". Other, weirder states only "potentially exist", > but a better way of saying it is that they are "partially > qualified to exist, but not fully". They are "partially qualified" > in the sense of being configurations of information, as are the > more self-consistent "existable" states, but they are not > self-consistent enough to exist. > > This amounts to a definition of "exist" more than anything else. > > Factors: > > 1. The "consistent enough to exist (and be commonly perceived)" > states must not only be able to support a single observer, but > the whole ecosystem of observers that allows that observer to > exist, and the whole physical set-up (planet, gravity, particular > gaseous mixtures, particular energy and temperature regimes etc) > that allows communities of intelligent agents to exist and observe. > > Any state changes (at any time) that would deviate from the > maintenance of the consistent physical laws that allow for > conventional existence of stable emergent systems and > intelligent observers will be automatically disqualified > from full observable existence. > > 2. My contention is that this is an onerous constraint on > "fully existable states", and that the number of possible > configurations of such states is probably very limited. > It wouldn't surprise me if something very close to the known > physical constants and laws turned out to be actually > "logically necessary" for the continual self-consistency > requirement of existable states that I propose. It could be > that ALL other configurations of matter, energy, information > become inconsistent (or too disordered, or too ordered) quickly, > and disqualify themselves from "observer production" and > "full-fledged (classical) existence". > > 3. This is not to say that every action that every person > for example takes is "necessary" for continued full existence > of the classical, existing, "way things actually are" state. > But it means that such personal actions are heavily > constrained by the way things had to be in the historical > development of our species, and its body's capabilities and > its brain's capabilities. > And so human behaviour, on average, will be as determined > by our nature, and all of that (narrow) range of behaviour > will be within the narrow bounds of "fully existable" states. > > 4. It seems to me that "self-consistency" and > "rule-governed, effectively continuous, localized change" of > state are the necessary pre-conditions of sequences of > states that can be fully existent (observable). > > Bear in mind that these requirements must be met to the full > extent of allowing non-locally consistent existence. i.e. > a whole consistent universe (observable and agreeable by all > observers in it) must be possible with those > state-change rules, not just one person's consistent life-story. > > That's a very heavy constraint on state-changes. ALL of those > state changes must conserve the non-locally-consistent full > universe life-story without discrepency. > > 5. My intuition says that these very heavy consistency and > continuity requirements (on "fully existable state change sequences") > would probably rule out travel or communication by observers between > differen
Constraints on "everything existing"
Hal Finney wrote: the purpose of the list, to discuss the implications of the various ideas that "everything exists". Everything we say is implicitly prefaced by the conditional clause, "If all s exist, then". I would propose (as I layed out in some detail in a post about 3 months ago) that their are in fact many constraints on those states-of-affairs that can be said to "exist". I would put it this way: Only those states and state changes capable of supporting communities of communicating intelligent observers "exist". Other, weirder states only "potentially exist", but a better way of saying it is that they are "partially qualified to exist, but not fully". They are "partially qualified" in the sense of being configurations of information, as are the more self-consistent "existable" states, but they are not self-consistent enough to exist. This amounts to a definition of "exist" more than anything else. Factors: 1. The "consistent enough to exist (and be commonly perceived)" states must not only be able to support a single observer, but the whole ecosystem of observers that allows that observer to exist, and the whole physical set-up (planet, gravity, particular gaseous mixtures, particular energy and temperature regimes etc) that allows communities of intelligent agents to exist and observe. Any state changes (at any time) that would deviate from the maintenance of the consistent physical laws that allow for conventional existence of stable emergent systems and intelligent observers will be automatically disqualified from full observable existence. 2. My contention is that this is an onerous constraint on "fully existable states", and that the number of possible configurations of such states is probably very limited. It wouldn't surprise me if something very close to the known physical constants and laws turned out to be actually "logically necessary" for the continual self-consistency requirement of existable states that I propose. It could be that ALL other configurations of matter, energy, information become inconsistent (or too disordered, or too ordered) quickly, and disqualify themselves from "observer production" and "full-fledged (classical) existence". 3. This is not to say that every action that every person for example takes is "necessary" for continued full existence of the classical, existing, "way things actually are" state. But it means that such personal actions are heavily constrained by the way things had to be in the historical development of our species, and its body's capabilities and its brain's capabilities. And so human behaviour, on average, will be as determined by our nature, and all of that (narrow) range of behaviour will be within the narrow bounds of "fully existable" states. 4. It seems to me that "self-consistency" and "rule-governed, effectively continuous, localized change" of state are the necessary pre-conditions of sequences of states that can be fully existent (observable). Bear in mind that these requirements must be met to the full extent of allowing non-locally consistent existence. i.e. a whole consistent universe (observable and agreeable by all observers in it) must be possible with those state-change rules, not just one person's consistent life-story. That's a very heavy constraint on state-changes. ALL of those state changes must conserve the non-locally-consistent full universe life-story without discrepency. 5. My intuition says that these very heavy consistency and continuity requirements (on "fully existable state change sequences") would probably rule out travel or communication by observers between different possible worlds. And would probably rule out there being a different calculus of consequence and probability in a MWI compared to an SWI. Only each "self-consistent world" can be a "possible world". Most sets S where S is a "set of alternative possible worlds" will not be themselves (as a set S) able to be self-consistent enough to be a fully existent "world". Or another way of putting it is that if a set S of alternative possible worlds is itself self-consistent (over spatiotemporal evolution of its states) then it collapses by definition into being a single world, not a set of different worlds.
