Eric: do I detect in your 'circumstances' some 'anthropocentric/metric/logic' restrictions? is the multiverse exclusively built according to the system we devised on this planet as 'our physical laws'? (your 'factor' #1, although you oincluded in factor #2 the (CLASSICAL existence) modifier.)
Brings to mind Mr Square's opponents in Abbott's Flatland, with the 2-D vs 3-D joke. John Mikes ----- Original Message ----- From: "Eric Hawthorne" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Friday, January 17, 2003 12:40 PM Subject: Constraints on "everything existing" > Hal Finney wrote: > > >the purpose of the list, to > >discuss the implications of the various ideas that "everything exists". > >Everything we say is implicitly prefaced by the conditional clause, > >"If all <whatever>s exist, then". > > > I would propose (as I layed out in some detail in a post about > 3 months ago) that their are in fact many constraints on those > states-of-affairs that can be said to "exist". > > I would put it this way: Only those states and state changes > capable of supporting communities of communicating intelligent > observers "exist". Other, weirder states only "potentially exist", > but a better way of saying it is that they are "partially > qualified to exist, but not fully". They are "partially qualified" > in the sense of being configurations of information, as are the > more self-consistent "existable" states, but they are not > self-consistent enough to exist. > > This amounts to a definition of "exist" more than anything else. > > Factors: > > 1. The "consistent enough to exist (and be commonly perceived)" > states must not only be able to support a single observer, but > the whole ecosystem of observers that allows that observer to > exist, and the whole physical set-up (planet, gravity, particular > gaseous mixtures, particular energy and temperature regimes etc) > that allows communities of intelligent agents to exist and observe. > > Any state changes (at any time) that would deviate from the > maintenance of the consistent physical laws that allow for > conventional existence of stable emergent systems and > intelligent observers will be automatically disqualified > from full observable existence. > > 2. My contention is that this is an onerous constraint on > "fully existable states", and that the number of possible > configurations of such states is probably very limited. > It wouldn't surprise me if something very close to the known > physical constants and laws turned out to be actually > "logically necessary" for the continual self-consistency > requirement of existable states that I propose. It could be > that ALL other configurations of matter, energy, information > become inconsistent (or too disordered, or too ordered) quickly, > and disqualify themselves from "observer production" and > "full-fledged (classical) existence". > > 3. This is not to say that every action that every person > for example takes is "necessary" for continued full existence > of the classical, existing, "way things actually are" state. > But it means that such personal actions are heavily > constrained by the way things had to be in the historical > development of our species, and its body's capabilities and > its brain's capabilities. > And so human behaviour, on average, will be as determined > by our nature, and all of that (narrow) range of behaviour > will be within the narrow bounds of "fully existable" states. > > 4. It seems to me that "self-consistency" and > "rule-governed, effectively continuous, localized change" of > state are the necessary pre-conditions of sequences of > states that can be fully existent (observable). > > Bear in mind that these requirements must be met to the full > extent of allowing non-locally consistent existence. i.e. > a whole consistent universe (observable and agreeable by all > observers in it) must be possible with those > state-change rules, not just one person's consistent life-story. > > That's a very heavy constraint on state-changes. ALL of those > state changes must conserve the non-locally-consistent full > universe life-story without discrepency. > > 5. My intuition says that these very heavy consistency and > continuity requirements (on "fully existable state change sequences") > would probably rule out travel or communication by observers between > different possible worlds. > > > And would probably rule out there being a different calculus > of consequence and probability in a MWI compared to an SWI. > > Only each "self-consistent world" can be a "possible world". > Most sets S where S is a "set of alternative possible worlds" > will not be themselves (as a set S) able to be self-consistent > enough to be a fully existent "world". Or another way of putting it is > that if a set S of alternative possible worlds is itself > self-consistent (over spatiotemporal evolution of its states) then > it collapses by definition into being a single world, not > a set of different worlds. > > > > > >
