Personally I call the Platonic realm anything inextended. Anything outside of spacetime.

2012-09-03 Thread Roger Clough
Hi Craig Weinberg 

Personally I call the Platonic realm anything inextended.
Time necessarily drops out if space drops out.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/3/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Craig Weinberg 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-31, 16:32:54
Subject: Re: Re: Technological (Machine) Thinking and Lived Being (Erlebnis)




On Friday, August 31, 2012 5:53:24 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg 

You're on the right track, but everybody from Plato on 
says that the Platonic world is timeless, eternal.
And nonextended or spaceless (nonlocal).
Leibniz's world of monads satisfies these requirements.

But there is more, there is the Supreme  Monad, which
experiences all. And IS the All.


Hegel and Spinoza have the Totality, Kabbala has Ein Sof, There's the Tao, 
Jung's collective unconscious, there's Om, Brahman, Logos, Urgrund, Urbild, 
first potency, ground of being, the Absolute, synthetic a prori, etc. 

I call it the Totality-Singularity or just Everythingness. It's what there is 
when we aren't existing as a spatiotemporally partitioned subset. It is by 
definition nonlocal and a-temporal as there is nothing to constrain its access 
to all experiences.

Craig



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
8/31/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Craig Weinberg 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-30, 13:53:09
Subject: Re: Technological (Machine) Thinking and Lived Being (Erlebnis)


I think that the Platonic realm is just time, and that time is nothing but 
experience.

Thought is the experience of generating hypothetical experience.

The mistake is presuming that because we perceive exterior realism as a 
topology of bodies that the ground of being must be defined in those terms. In 
fact, the very experience you are having right now - with your eyes closed or 
half asleep...this is a concretely and physically real part of the universe, it 
just isn't experienced as objects in space because you are the subject of the 
experience. If anything, the outside world is a Platonic realm of geometric 
perspectives and rational expectations. Interior realism is private time travel 
and eidetic fugues; metaphor, irony, anticipations, etc. Not only Platonic, but 
Chthonic. Thought doesn't come from a realm, realms come from thought.

Craig


On Thursday, August 30, 2012 11:54:32 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: 

What is thinking ? Parmenides thought that thinking and being are one, which 
IMHO I agree with.
Thoughts come to us from the Platonic realm, which I personally, perhaps 
mistakenly, 
associate with what would be Penrose's incomputable realm. 
Here is a brief discussion of technological or machine thinking vs lived 
experience.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ref/10.1080/00201740310002398#tabModule
IMHO Because computers cannot have lived experience, they cannot think.
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 
Volume 46, Issue 3, 2003 

Thinking and Being: Heidegger and Wittgenstein on Machination and 
Lived-Experience
Version of record first published: 05 Nov 2010
Heidegger's treatment of 'machination' in the Beitr? e zur Philosophie begins 
the critique of technological thinking that would centrally characterize his 
later work. Unlike later discussions of technology, the critique of machination 
in Beitr? e connects its arising to the predominance of 'lived-experience' ( 
Erlebnis ) as the concealed basis for the possibility of a pre-delineated, 
rule-based metaphysical understanding of the world. In this essay I explore 
this connection. The unity of machination and lived-experience becomes 
intelligible when both are traced to their common root in the primordial Greek 
attitude of techne , originally a basic attitude of wondering knowledge of 
nature. But with this common root revealed, the basic connection between 
machination and lived-experience also emerges as an important development of 
one of the deepest guiding thoughts of the Western philosophical tradition: the 
Parmenidean assertion of the sameness of being and thinking. In the Beitr? e 's 
analysis of machination and lived-experience, Heidegger hopes to discover a way 
of thinking that avoids the Western tradition's constant basic assumption of 
self-identity, an assumption which culminates in the modern picture of the 
autonomous, self-identical subject aggressively set over against a 
pre-delineated world of objects in a relationship of mutual confrontation. In 
the final section, I investigate an important and illuminating parallel to 
Heidegger's result: the consideration of the relationship between experience 
and technological ways of thinking that forms the basis of the late 
Wittgenstein's famous rule-following considerations.
everything-list



Roger Clough, 

Re: Personally I call the Platonic realm anything inextended. Anything outside of spacetime.

2012-09-03 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Monday, September 3, 2012 8:33:34 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

  Hi Craig Weinberg 
  
 Personally I call the Platonic realm anything inextended.
 Time necessarily drops out if space drops out.


I see the opposite. If space drops out, all you have is time. I can count 
to 10 in my mind without invoking any experience of space. I can listen to 
music for hours without conjuring any spatial dimensionality. I think that 
space is the orthogonal reflection of experience, and that time, is that 
reflection (space) reflected again back into experience a spatially 
conditioned a posteriori reification of experience.

Craig
 

  
 Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net javascript:
 9/3/2012 
 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
 so that everything could function.

 - Receiving the following content - 
 *From:* Craig Weinberg javascript: 
 *Receiver:* everything-list javascript: 
 *Time:* 2012-08-31, 16:32:54
 *Subject:* Re: Re: Technological (Machine) Thinking and Lived Being 
 (Erlebnis)

  

 On Friday, August 31, 2012 5:53:24 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: 

  Hi Craig Weinberg 
  
 You're on the right track, but everybody from Plato on 
 says that the Platonic world is timeless, eternal.
 And nonextended or spaceless (nonlocal).
 Leibniz's world of monads satisfies these requirements.
  
 But there is more, there is the Supreme  Monad, which
 experiences all. And IS the All.
  


 Hegel and Spinoza have the Totality, Kabbala has Ein Sof, There's the Tao, 
 Jung's collective unconscious, there's Om, Brahman, Logos, Urgrund, Urbild, 
 first potency, ground of being, the Absolute, synthetic a prori, etc. 

 I call it the Totality-Singularity or just Everythingness. It's what 
 there is when we aren't existing as a spatiotemporally partitioned subset. 
 It is by definition nonlocal and a-temporal as there is nothing to 
 constrain its access to all experiences.

 Craig

   
 Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
 8/31/2012 
 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
 so that everything could function.

 - Receiving the following content - 
 *From:* Craig Weinberg 
 *Receiver:* everything-list 
 *Time:* 2012-08-30, 13:53:09
 *Subject:* Re: Technological (Machine) Thinking and Lived Being 
 (Erlebnis)

  I think that the Platonic realm is just time, and that time is nothing 
 but experience.

 Thought is the experience of generating hypothetical experience.

 The mistake is presuming that because we perceive exterior realism as a 
 topology of bodies that the ground of being must be defined in those terms. 
 In fact, the very experience you are having right now - with your eyes 
 closed or half asleep...this is a concretely and physically real part of 
 the universe, it just isn't experienced as objects in space because you are 
 the subject of the experience. If anything, the outside world is a Platonic 
 realm of geometric perspectives and rational expectations. Interior realism 
 is private time travel and eidetic fugues; metaphor, irony, anticipations, 
 etc. Not only Platonic, but Chthonic. Thought doesn't come from a realm, 
 realms come from thought.

 Craig


 On Thursday, August 30, 2012 11:54:32 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: 

  What is thinking ? Parmenides thought that thinking and being are 
 one, which IMHO I agree with. 

 Thoughts come to us from the Platonic realm, which I personally, perhaps 
 mistakenly, 

 associate with what would be Penrose's incomputable realm. 
 Here is a brief discussion of technological or machine thinking vs 
 lived experience. 
 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ref/10.1080/00201740310002398#tabModule IMHO 
 Because computers cannot have lived experience, they cannot think. Inquiry: 
 An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy Volume 
 46http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/sinq20?open=46#vol_46, 
 Issue 3 http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/sinq20/46/3, 2003 
   
  Thinking and Being: Heidegger and Wittgenstein on Machination and 
 Lived-Experience
  Version of record first published: 05 Nov 2010
  
 Heidegger's treatment of 'machination' in the Beitr锟�e zur Philosophie 
 begins the critique of technological thinking that would centrally 
 characterize his later work. Unlike later discussions of technology, the 
 critique of machination in Beitr锟�e connects its arising to the 
 predominance of 'lived-experience' ( Erlebnis ) as the concealed basis for 
 the possibility of a pre-delineated, rule-based metaphysical understanding 
 of the world. In this essay I explore this connection. The unity of 
 machination and lived-experience becomes intelligible when both are traced 
 to their common root in the primordial Greek attitude of techne , 
 originally a basic attitude of wondering knowledge of nature. But with this 
 common root revealed, the basic connection between machination and 
 lived-experience also emerges as an important development of one of the 
 deepest guiding thoughts of the Western philosophical tradition: the