On Monday, September 3, 2012 8:33:34 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
> Hi Craig Weinberg
> Personally I call the Platonic realm "anything inextended".
> Time necessarily drops out if space drops out.
I see the opposite. If space drops out, all you have is time. I can count
to 10 in my mind without invoking any experience of space. I can listen to
music for hours without conjuring any spatial dimensionality. I think that
space is the orthogonal reflection of experience, and that time, is that
reflection (space) reflected again back into experience a spatially
conditioned a posteriori reification of experience.
> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
> so that everything could function."
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> *Time:* 2012-08-31, 16:32:54
> *Subject:* Re: Re: Technological (Machine) Thinking and Lived Being
> On Friday, August 31, 2012 5:53:24 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
>> Hi Craig Weinberg
>> You're on the right track, but everybody from Plato on
>> says that the Platonic world is timeless, eternal.
>> And nonextended or spaceless (nonlocal).
>> Leibniz's world of monads satisfies these requirements.
>> But there is more, there is the Supreme Monad, which
>> experiences all. And IS the All.
> Hegel and Spinoza have the Totality, Kabbala has Ein Sof, There's the Tao,
> Jung's collective unconscious, there's Om, Brahman, Logos, Urgrund, Urbild,
> first potency, ground of being, the Absolute, synthetic a prori, etc.
> I call it the Totality-Singularity or just "Everythingness". It's what
> there is when we aren't existing as a spatiotemporally partitioned subset.
> It is by definition nonlocal and a-temporal as there is nothing to
> constrain its access to all experiences.
>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
>> so that everything could function."
>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>> *From:* Craig Weinberg
>> *Receiver:* everything-list
>> *Time:* 2012-08-30, 13:53:09
>> *Subject:* Re: Technological (Machine) Thinking and Lived Being
>> I think that the Platonic realm is just time, and that time is nothing
>> but experience.
>> Thought is the experience of generating hypothetical experience.
>> The mistake is presuming that because we perceive exterior realism as a
>> topology of bodies that the ground of being must be defined in those terms.
>> In fact, the very experience you are having right now - with your eyes
>> closed or half asleep...this is a concretely and physically real part of
>> the universe, it just isn't experienced as objects in space because you are
>> the subject of the experience. If anything, the outside world is a Platonic
>> realm of geometric perspectives and rational expectations. Interior realism
>> is private time travel and eidetic fugues; metaphor, irony, anticipations,
>> etc. Not only Platonic, but Chthonic. Thought doesn't come from a realm,
>> realms come from thought.
>> On Thursday, August 30, 2012 11:54:32 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
>>> What is thinking ? Parmenides thought that thinking and being are
>>> one, which IMHO I agree with.
>>> Thoughts come to us from the Platonic realm, which I personally, perhaps
>>> associate with what would be Penrose's incomputable realm.
>>> Here is a brief discussion of technological or machine thinking vs
>>> lived experience.
>>> http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ref/10.1080/00201740310002398#tabModule IMHO
>>> Because computers cannot have lived experience, they cannot think. Inquiry:
>>> An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy Volume
>>> Issue 3 <http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/sinq20/46/3>, 2003
>>> Thinking and Being: Heidegger and Wittgenstein on Machination and
>>> Version of record first published: 05 Nov 2010
>>> Heidegger's treatment of 'machination' in the Beitr锟�e zur Philosophie
>>> begins the critique of technological thinking that would centrally
>>> characterize his later work. Unlike later discussions of technology, the
>>> critique of machination in Beitr锟�e connects its arising to the
>>> predominance of 'lived-experience' ( Erlebnis ) as the concealed basis for
>>> the possibility of a pre-delineated, rule-based metaphysical understanding
>>> of the world. In this essay I explore this connection. The unity of
>>> machination and lived-experience becomes intelligible when both are traced
>>> to their common root in the primordial Greek attitude of techne ,
>>> originally a basic attitude of wondering knowledge of nature. But with this
>>> common root revealed, the basic connection between machination and
>>> lived-experience also emerges as an important development of one of the
>>> deepest guiding thoughts of the Western philosophical tradition: the
>>> Parmenidean assertion of the sameness of being and thinking. In the
>>> Beitr锟�e 's analysis of machination and lived-experience, Heidegger hopes
>>> to discover a way of thinking that avoids the Western tradition's constant
>>> basic assumption of self-identity, an assumption which culminates in the
>>> modern picture of the autonomous, self-identical subject aggressively set
>>> over against a pre-delineated world of objects in a relationship of mutual
>>> confrontation. In the final section, I investigate an important and
>>> illuminating parallel to Heidegger's result: the consideration of the
>>> relationship between experience and technological ways of thinking that
>>> forms the basis of the late Wittgenstein's famous rule-following
>>> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
>>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
>>> everything could function."
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