On Monday, September 3, 2012 8:33:34 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: > > Hi Craig Weinberg > > Personally I call the Platonic realm "anything inextended". > Time necessarily drops out if space drops out. >
I see the opposite. If space drops out, all you have is time. I can count to 10 in my mind without invoking any experience of space. I can listen to music for hours without conjuring any spatial dimensionality. I think that space is the orthogonal reflection of experience, and that time, is that reflection (space) reflected again back into experience a spatially conditioned a posteriori reification of experience. Craig > > Roger Clough, [email protected] <javascript:> > 9/3/2012 > Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him > so that everything could function." > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > *From:* Craig Weinberg <javascript:> > *Receiver:* everything-list <javascript:> > *Time:* 2012-08-31, 16:32:54 > *Subject:* Re: Re: Technological (Machine) Thinking and Lived Being > (Erlebnis) > > > > On Friday, August 31, 2012 5:53:24 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: >> >> Hi Craig Weinberg >> >> You're on the right track, but everybody from Plato on >> says that the Platonic world is timeless, eternal. >> And nonextended or spaceless (nonlocal). >> Leibniz's world of monads satisfies these requirements. >> >> But there is more, there is the Supreme Monad, which >> experiences all. And IS the All. >> >> > > Hegel and Spinoza have the Totality, Kabbala has Ein Sof, There's the Tao, > Jung's collective unconscious, there's Om, Brahman, Logos, Urgrund, Urbild, > first potency, ground of being, the Absolute, synthetic a prori, etc. > > I call it the Totality-Singularity or just "Everythingness". It's what > there is when we aren't existing as a spatiotemporally partitioned subset. > It is by definition nonlocal and a-temporal as there is nothing to > constrain its access to all experiences. > > Craig > > >> Roger Clough, [email protected] >> 8/31/2012 >> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him >> so that everything could function." >> >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> *From:* Craig Weinberg >> *Receiver:* everything-list >> *Time:* 2012-08-30, 13:53:09 >> *Subject:* Re: Technological (Machine) Thinking and Lived Being >> (Erlebnis) >> >> I think that the Platonic realm is just time, and that time is nothing >> but experience. >> >> Thought is the experience of generating hypothetical experience. >> >> The mistake is presuming that because we perceive exterior realism as a >> topology of bodies that the ground of being must be defined in those terms. >> In fact, the very experience you are having right now - with your eyes >> closed or half asleep...this is a concretely and physically real part of >> the universe, it just isn't experienced as objects in space because you are >> the subject of the experience. If anything, the outside world is a Platonic >> realm of geometric perspectives and rational expectations. Interior realism >> is private time travel and eidetic fugues; metaphor, irony, anticipations, >> etc. Not only Platonic, but Chthonic. Thought doesn't come from a realm, >> realms come from thought. >> >> Craig >> >> >> On Thursday, August 30, 2012 11:54:32 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: >>> >>> What is thinking ? Parmenides thought that thinking and being are >>> one, which IMHO I agree with. >>> >>> Thoughts come to us from the Platonic realm, which I personally, perhaps >>> mistakenly, >>> >>> associate with what would be Penrose's incomputable realm. >>> Here is a brief discussion of technological or machine thinking vs >>> lived experience. >>> http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ref/10.1080/00201740310002398#tabModule IMHO >>> Because computers cannot have lived experience, they cannot think. Inquiry: >>> An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy Volume >>> 46<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/sinq20?open=46#vol_46>, >>> Issue 3 <http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/sinq20/46/3>, 2003 >>> >>> Thinking and Being: Heidegger and Wittgenstein on Machination and >>> Lived-Experience >>> Version of record first published: 05 Nov 2010 >>> >>> Heidegger's treatment of 'machination' in the Beitr锟�e zur Philosophie >>> begins the critique of technological thinking that would centrally >>> characterize his later work. Unlike later discussions of technology, the >>> critique of machination in Beitr锟�e connects its arising to the >>> predominance of 'lived-experience' ( Erlebnis ) as the concealed basis for >>> the possibility of a pre-delineated, rule-based metaphysical understanding >>> of the world. In this essay I explore this connection. The unity of >>> machination and lived-experience becomes intelligible when both are traced >>> to their common root in the primordial Greek attitude of techne , >>> originally a basic attitude of wondering knowledge of nature. But with this >>> common root revealed, the basic connection between machination and >>> lived-experience also emerges as an important development of one of the >>> deepest guiding thoughts of the Western philosophical tradition: the >>> Parmenidean assertion of the sameness of being and thinking. In the >>> Beitr锟�e 's analysis of machination and lived-experience, Heidegger hopes >>> to discover a way of thinking that avoids the Western tradition's constant >>> basic assumption of self-identity, an assumption which culminates in the >>> modern picture of the autonomous, self-identical subject aggressively set >>> over against a pre-delineated world of objects in a relationship of mutual >>> confrontation. In the final section, I investigate an important and >>> illuminating parallel to Heidegger's result: the consideration of the >>> relationship between experience and technological ways of thinking that >>> forms the basis of the late Wittgenstein's famous rule-following >>> considerations. >>> everything-list >>> >>> >>> >>> Roger Clough, [email protected] >>> 8/30/2012 >>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so >>> everything could function." >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/WEvmwMTgZdoJ. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/FR6988TpGPsJ. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> > . > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected] <javascript:>. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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