Re: Re: On comp and the is-ought problem of Hume

2012-08-22 Thread Roger Clough
Hi Bruno Marchal 

Is is what we privately think, ought is what we think when another guy's 
around.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
8/22/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything 
could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-21, 14:31:50
Subject: Re: On comp and the is-ought problem of Hume




On 20 Aug 2012, at 15:01, Alberto G. Corona wrote:


In evolutionary terms, is and ougth reflect the double nature of a social being 
which has not lost is individuality, as individual and as a member of a bigger 
whole. Both are in tension. The social whole is also in our instinctive 
individual nature,and appear to the conscious trough intuitions and feelings of 
duty.  The Ought are our long term rules for survival as individuals as 
member of a society trough generations, which is accesibe trough intuition. The 
IS is more inmediate to our intuition (when social things are ok). But both are 
given, but are adapted to the social circunstances : We would not be here if 
our ancestors would not have been egoistic. Neither we would be here too if 
they would not attend their social duties and repress the deleterious  part of 
their selfish behaviours.


For this reason,John Maynard Smith, an evolutionist  http://meaningoflife.tv/   
said that the naturalistic fallacy is itself a fallacy, because the Ough is in 
an IS no less IS than the IS of our ordinary selfish behaviour, with some 
matizations. is in concordance with the Christian notion of the human nature of 
a man in permanent tension between the god (which he have knowledge thanks to 
his Soul or his Nous) and the evil of his socially and individually deleterous 
selfish impulses. 


This tension between deletereous individuality that endangers the common good 
appears in all the scales of evolution. there are parasite molecules, parasite 
genes, parasite intracellular organules, parasite tissues and parasite 
individuals against which the whole has a set of countermeasures. The 
transitions from a level to the next never is complete. The tension between 
individuality and sociality is ethernal, but in the human being this conflict 
is not only is carried out externally, but in its own conscience.


Well said.
Mathematical modal logic, like model theory and mathematical semantics, 
illustrates also that the ought can be made as an is by a change of level in 
the theories, as adding dimensions can sometimes do that in mathematical 
physics.
The tension between the higher self and the little selfish ego exists right 
at the start in all universal machine, even if this is not palpable when the 
machine is isolated from other machine. I mean that we can already justify a 
sort of ought by the logic of self-reference, (notably the one give by [[]p  
p)), and this might corroborate some of Leibniz insight. 


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/










2012/8/20 Roger rclo...@verizon.net

Hi meekerdb 

All's well in Heaven, but down here on earth things are a little messier.
Heaven is what should be, down here is what is.
This conflict earns preachers a nice life.

The Christian solution to this dilemma is that God solved it a long
time ago by allowing his son to be crucified and proved it by 
resurrecting Him.  IMHO.





Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/20/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything 
could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: meekerdb 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-18, 15:04:00
Subject: Re: On comp and the is-ought problem of Hume


Who? Afraid of the Naturalistic Fallacy?
Oliver Curry, Centre Research Associate, Centre for Philosophy of Natural and 
Social Science, London School of
Economics, UK WC2A 2AE, UK; Email: o.s.cu...@lse.ac.uk.

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Re: Re: On comp and the is-ought problem of Hume

2012-08-20 Thread Roger
Hi meekerdb 

All's well in Heaven, but down here on earth things are a little messier.
Heaven is what should be, down here is what is.
This conflict earns preachers a nice life.

The Christian solution to this dilemma is that God solved it a long
time ago by allowing his son to be crucified and proved it by 
resurrecting Him.  IMHO.





Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/20/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything 
could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: meekerdb 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-18, 15:04:00
Subject: Re: On comp and the is-ought problem of Hume


Who’s Afraid of the Naturalistic Fallacy?
Oliver Curry, Centre Research Associate, Centre for Philosophy of Natural and 
Social Science, London School of
Economics, UK WC2A 2AE, UK; Email: o.s.cu...@lse.ac.uk.

Abstract: David Hume argued that values are the projections of natural human 
desires, and that
moral values are the projections of desires that aim at the common good of 
society. Recent
developments in game theory, evolutionary biology, animal behaviour and 
neuroscience explain
why humans have such desires, and hence provide support for a Humean approach 
to moral
psychology and moral philosophy. However, few philosophers have been willing to 
pursue this
naturalistic approach to ethics for fear that it commits something called ‘the 
naturalistic fallacy’.
This paper reviews several versions of the fallacy, and demonstrates that none 
of them present an
obstacle to this updated, evolutionary version of Humean ethical naturalism.

http://www.epjournal.net/wp-content/uploads/ep04234247.pdf

Brent

On 8/18/2012 8:08 AM, Roger wrote: 
Hi Bruno Marchal 
 
This is probably just my ignorance of what comp is, but there seems to 
be a discrepancy between comp, which fits with Plato or Platonism,
and real life, which actually fits more with Aristotle. Plato is 
ought to be and Aristotle is is in fact.
 
There is a troubling dualism between the two, that while we live in the
Kingdom of Earth, we strive for the Kingdom of Heaven
(thy Kingdom come.). 
 
This is unreconciliable dualism Hume pointed out between
is and should be.  He said he knew of no way to go from
is to should be. Hume is a great prose stylist and thinker
so ihe's worth quoting:
 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is%E2%80%93ought_problem
 
Hume discusses the problem in book III, part I, section I of his work, A 
Treatise of Human Nature (1739):
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always 
remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of 
reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning 
human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the 
usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition 
that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is 
imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or 
ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it 
should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be 
given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a 
deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do 
not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the 
readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the 
vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and 
virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by 
reason.[1]
 
Hume calls for caution against such inferences in the absence of any 
explanation of how the ought-statements follow from the is-statements. But how 
exactly can an ought be derived from an is? The question, prompted by 
Hume's small paragraph, has become one of the central questions of ethical 
theory, and Hume is usually assigned the position that such a derivation is 
impossible.[2] This complete severing of is from ought has been given the 
graphic designation of Hume's Guillotine.[3]
Implications
The apparent gap between is statements and ought statements, when combined 
with Hume's fork, renders ought statements of dubious validity. Hume's fork 
is the idea that all items of knowledge are either based on logic and 
definitions, or else on observation. If the is–ought problem holds, then 
ought statements do not seem to be known in either of these two ways, and it 
would seem that there can be no moral knowledge. Moral skepticism and 
non-cognitivism work with such conclusions.
The is–ought problem has been recognised as an important issue for the validity 
of secular ethics and their defense from criticism—often religiously 
inspired.[4]
 
 
 
 
 
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/18/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything 
could function.
- Receiving the following

Re: Re: On comp and the is-ought problem of Hume

2012-08-20 Thread Alberto G. Corona
In evolutionary terms, is and ougth reflect the double nature of a social
being which has not lost is individuality, as individual and as a member of
a bigger whole. Both are in tension. The social whole is also in our
instinctive individual nature,and appear to the conscious trough intuitions
and feelings of duty.  The Ought are our long term rules for survival as
individuals as member of a society trough generations, which is accesibe
trough intuition. The IS is more inmediate to our intuition (when social
things are ok). But both are given, but are adapted to the social
circunstances : We would not be here if our ancestors would not have been
egoistic. Neither we would be here too if they would not attend their
social duties and repress the deleterious  part of their selfish behaviours.

For this reason,John Maynard Smith, an evolutionist
http://meaningoflife.tv/   said that the naturalistic fallacy is itself a
fallacy, because the Ough is in an IS no less IS than the IS of our
ordinary selfish behaviour, with some matizations. is in concordance with
the Christian notion of the human nature of a man in permanent tension
between the god (which he have knowledge thanks to his Soul or his Nous)
and the evil of his socially and individually deleterous selfish impulses.

This tension between deletereous individuality that endangers the common
good appears in all the scales of evolution. there are parasite molecules,
parasite genes, parasite intracellular organules, parasite tissues and
parasite individuals against which the whole has a set of countermeasures.
The transitions from a level to the next never is complete. The tension
between individuality and sociality is ethernal, but in the human being
this conflict is not only is carried out externally, but in its own
conscience.



2012/8/20 Roger rclo...@verizon.net

  Hi meekerdb

 All's well in Heaven, but down here on earth things are a little messier.
 Heaven is what should be, down here is what is.
 This conflict earns preachers a nice life.

 The Christian solution to this dilemma is that God solved it a long
 time ago by allowing his son to be crucified and proved it by
 resurrecting Him.  IMHO.





 Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
 8/20/2012
 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
 everything could function.

 - Receiving the following content -
 *From:* meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
 *Receiver:* everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
 *Time:* 2012-08-18, 15:04:00
 *Subject:* Re: On comp and the is-ought problem of Hume

  Who’s Afraid of the Naturalistic Fallacy?
 Oliver Curry, Centre Research Associate, Centre for Philosophy of Natural
 and Social Science, London School of
 Economics, UK WC2A 2AE, UK; Email: o.s.cu...@lse.ac.uk.

 Abstract: David Hume argued that values are the projections of natural
 human desires, and that
 moral values are the projections of desires that aim at the common good of
 society. Recent
 developments in game theory, evolutionary biology, animal behaviour and
 neuroscience explain
 why humans have such desires, and hence provide support for a Humean
 approach to moral
 psychology and moral philosophy. However, few philosophers have been
 willing to pursue this
 naturalistic approach to ethics for fear that it commits something called
 ‘the naturalistic fallacy’.
 This paper reviews several versions of the fallacy, and demonstrates that
 none of them present an
 obstacle to this updated, evolutionary version of Humean ethical
 naturalism.

 http://www.epjournal.net/wp-content/uploads/ep04234247.pdf

 Brent

 On 8/18/2012 8:08 AM, Roger wrote:

 Hi Bruno Marchal
  This is probably just my ignorance of what comp is, but there seems to
 be a discrepancy between comp, which fits with Plato or Platonism,
 and real life, which actually fits more with Aristotle. Plato is
 ought to be and Aristotle is is in fact.
  There is a troubling dualism between the two, that while we live in the
 Kingdom of Earth, we strive for the Kingdom of Heaven
 (thy Kingdom come.).
  This is unreconciliable dualism Hume pointed out between
 is and should be. He said he knew of no way to go from
 is to should be. Hume is a great prose stylist and thinker
 so ihe's worth quoting:
  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is%E2%80%93ought_problem

 Hume discusses the problem in book III, part I, section I of his work, *A
 Treatise of Human 
 Naturehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Treatise_of_Human_Nature
 * (1739):

 In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always
 remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of
 reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations
 concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised to find, that
 instead of the usual copulations of propositions, *is*, and *is not*, I
 meet with no proposition that is not connected with an *ought*, or an *ought
 not*. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last