[FairfieldLife] Re: More on Nagel's Mind Cosmos
--- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, authfriend authfriend@... wrote: Interesting, yes, but I think it misses the point. The first comment on that post does a good job explaining the real point, but Feser's response to it completely misses it again! Well at first I thought no, it's commenter Ingx24 that has mised the point. Then hang on, maybe not. That's because there do seem to be two closely related issues: * The existence of mental stuff (the itch sensation experienced by Judy) - qualia * The existence of things that can *have* qualia (Judy) Whether this is a good distinction, I don't know. But I think Feser is primarily focused on the first issue in his blog post, whereas Ingx24 is interested in the second. Having said that, I wonder if Ingx24 just set Feser going by putting it in these terms: Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does. That seems to be about the first issue. And in putting it like this he/she wears her Cartesianism on her sleeve. She seems to be saying that we *know* that the self, the person, consciousness *is* physical processing, thereby signing up 100% to the materialist side of the Cartesian dualism. Feser (I assume) would not grant that assumption. To put it another way, the question isn't why things-- including mental experience--seem to us the way they do, but *why should there be such a thing as seeming* in the first place? Feser or no Feser, that particular itch just won't go away. I think Feser's route would involve navigating through a very tangled thicket of Aristotelean ideas of 'matter', 'form' and 'substance'. Oh, Lordie! http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/ So much philosophical discussion of consciousness takes seeming for granted, when it's the very thing that requires explanation. Indeed. --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, PaliGap compost1uk@ wrote: This is an interesting blog post IMO: http://edwardfeser.blogspot.co.uk/2013/03/nagel-and-his- critics-part-viii.html Or http://goo.gl/QulfS How much of our existential anguish can be laid at the feet of Monsieur R. Descartes? From the concrete material objects of everyday life, Descartes and the moderns who have followed him derived two abstractions (as I discussed in an earlier post). First, they abstracted out those features that could be captured in exclusively quantitative terms, reified this abstraction, and called that reified abstraction matter, or the physical, or that which is objective. Second, they abstracted those qualitative features that would not fit the first, quantitative picture, reified that abstraction, and called it the mental, or that which is subjective. Once this move was made, there was never in principle going to be a way to get mind and matter together again, since they were in effect defined by contrast with one another.
[FairfieldLife] Re: More on Nagel's Mind Cosmos
--- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, PaliGap compost1uk@... wrote: --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, authfriend authfriend@ wrote: Interesting, yes, but I think it misses the point. The first comment on that post does a good job explaining the real point, but Feser's response to it completely misses it again! Well at first I thought no, it's commenter Ingx24 that has mised the point. Then hang on, maybe not. That's because there do seem to be two closely related issues: * The existence of mental stuff (the itch sensation experienced by Judy) - qualia * The existence of things that can *have* qualia (Judy) Whether this is a good distinction, I don't know. But I think Feser is primarily focused on the first issue in his blog post, whereas Ingx24 is interested in the second. It's an important distinction qua distinction, but Feser explicitly identifies the hard problem as a function of Cartesian dualism, whereas Chalmers--who coined the term--is interested in the more fundamental issue of, as you put it, the existence of things that can *have* qualia--the phenomenon of seeming. Having said that, I wonder if Ingx24 just set Feser going by putting it in these terms: Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does. That seems to be about the first issue. And in putting it like this he/she wears her Cartesianism on her sleeve. She seems to be saying that we *know* that the self, the person, consciousness *is* physical processing, thereby signing up 100% to the materialist side of the Cartesian dualism. Feser (I assume) would not grant that assumption. To put it another way, the question isn't why things-- including mental experience--seem to us the way they do, but *why should there be such a thing as seeming* in the first place? Feser or no Feser, that particular itch just won't go away. I think Feser's route would involve navigating through a very tangled thicket of Aristotelean ideas of 'matter', 'form' and 'substance'. Oh, Lordie! http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/ Yeah, never mind! So much philosophical discussion of consciousness takes seeming for granted, when it's the very thing that requires explanation. Indeed. If you don't *start* with that, it seems to me you're never going to get there from anywhere else. But does the fact that what you're looking *for* is what you're looking *with*, as it were, leave you in an ouroboric circle that you can't break out of? --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, PaliGap compost1uk@ wrote: This is an interesting blog post IMO: http://edwardfeser.blogspot.co.uk/2013/03/nagel-and-his- critics-part-viii.html Or http://goo.gl/QulfS How much of our existential anguish can be laid at the feet of Monsieur R. Descartes? From the concrete material objects of everyday life, Descartes and the moderns who have followed him derived two abstractions (as I discussed in an earlier post). First, they abstracted out those features that could be captured in exclusively quantitative terms, reified this abstraction, and called that reified abstraction matter, or the physical, or that which is objective. Second, they abstracted those qualitative features that would not fit the first, quantitative picture, reified that abstraction, and called it the mental, or that which is subjective. Once this move was made, there was never in principle going to be a way to get mind and matter together again, since they were in effect defined by contrast with one another.
[FairfieldLife] Re: More on Nagel's Mind Cosmos
--- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, authfriend authfriend@... wrote: --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, PaliGap compost1uk@ wrote: --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, authfriend authfriend@ wrote: Interesting, yes, but I think it misses the point. The first comment on that post does a good job explaining the real point, but Feser's response to it completely misses it again! Well at first I thought no, it's commenter Ingx24 that has mised the point. Then hang on, maybe not. That's because there do seem to be two closely related issues: * The existence of mental stuff (the itch sensation experienced by Judy) - qualia * The existence of things that can *have* qualia (Judy) Whether this is a good distinction, I don't know. But I think Feser is primarily focused on the first issue in his blog post, whereas Ingx24 is interested in the second. It's an important distinction qua distinction, but Feser explicitly identifies the hard problem as a function of Cartesian dualism, whereas Chalmers--who coined the term--is interested in the more fundamental issue of, as you put it, the existence of things that can *have* qualia--the phenomenon of seeming. Having said that, I wonder if Ingx24 just set Feser going by putting it in these terms: Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does. That seems to be about the first issue. And in putting it like this he/she wears her Cartesianism on her sleeve. She seems to be saying that we *know* that the self, the person, consciousness *is* physical processing, thereby signing up 100% to the materialist side of the Cartesian dualism. Feser (I assume) would not grant that assumption. To put it another way, the question isn't why things-- including mental experience--seem to us the way they do, but *why should there be such a thing as seeming* in the first place? Feser or no Feser, that particular itch just won't go away. I think Feser's route would involve navigating through a very tangled thicket of Aristotelean ideas of 'matter', 'form' and 'substance'. Oh, Lordie! http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/ Yeah, never mind! So much philosophical discussion of consciousness takes seeming for granted, when it's the very thing that requires explanation. Indeed. If you don't *start* with that, it seems to me you're never going to get there from anywhere else. But does the fact that what you're looking *for* is what you're looking *with*, as it were, leave you in an ouroboric circle that you can't break out of? The world is illusion; only Brahman is real; the world is Brahman. There is a circularity that the intellect cannot get out of; if true, the problem cannot be resolved by thinking about it. If we suppose there is a kind of experience that resolves the matter (e.g., enlightenment) it would not be possible to explain that experience in a way that ultimately made sense. --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, PaliGap compost1uk@ wrote: This is an interesting blog post IMO: http://edwardfeser.blogspot.co.uk/2013/03/nagel-and-his- critics-part-viii.html Or http://goo.gl/QulfS How much of our existential anguish can be laid at the feet of Monsieur R. Descartes? From the concrete material objects of everyday life, Descartes and the moderns who have followed him derived two abstractions (as I discussed in an earlier post). First, they abstracted out those features that could be captured in exclusively quantitative terms, reified this abstraction, and called that reified abstraction matter, or the physical, or that which is objective. Second, they abstracted those qualitative features that would not fit the first, quantitative picture, reified that abstraction, and called it the mental, or that which is subjective. Once this move was made, there was never in principle going to be a way to get mind and matter together again, since they were in effect defined by contrast with one another.
[FairfieldLife] Re: More on Nagel's Mind Cosmos
Interesting, yes, but I think it misses the point. The first comment on that post does a good job explaining the real point, but Feser's response to it completely misses it again! The commenter quotes Chalmers at length, concluding with this: How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion? ...Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does. To put it another way, the question isn't why things-- including mental experience--seem to us the way they do, but *why should there be such a thing as seeming* in the first place? So much philosophical discussion of consciousness takes seeming for granted, when it's the very thing that requires explanation. --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, PaliGap compost1uk@... wrote: This is an interesting blog post IMO: http://edwardfeser.blogspot.co.uk/2013/03/nagel-and-his-critics-part-viii.html Or http://goo.gl/QulfS How much of our existential anguish can be laid at the feet of Monsieur R. Descartes? From the concrete material objects of everyday life, Descartes and the moderns who have followed him derived two abstractions (as I discussed in an earlier post). First, they abstracted out those features that could be captured in exclusively quantitative terms, reified this abstraction, and called that reified abstraction matter, or the physical, or that which is objective. Second, they abstracted those qualitative features that would not fit the first, quantitative picture, reified that abstraction, and called it the mental, or that which is subjective. Once this move was made, there was never in principle going to be a way to get mind and matter together again, since they were in effect defined by contrast with one another.
