Re: [Fis] ON INFORMATION THEORY--Mark Burgin, Colophon
Hi Mark, The only part that I take exception to is at the end of your colophon. Specifically, I disagree with the statement “it is evident that to consider that everything IS information is unreasonable and contradicts principles of science.” I see contrast, or difference, as fundamental to the concept of information. All ‘things’ must be bounded such that there is a distinction between the inside and outside of the thing; therefore I don’t see how it is possible or reasonable for anything not to be information. Regards, Guy On 6/7/11 6:34 PM, Mark Burgin mbur...@math.ucla.edu wrote: Discussion colophon Dear all participants of the discussion (active and passive), I would like to express my gratitude to Pedro for asking me to start a discussion about basic problems of information theory and methodology, in which many qualified researchers have participated. I also appreciate efforts of all active participants of the discussion, who shared their interesting ideas related to information theory and practice, and especially to Joseph Brenner, who expertly distilled communication of different participants separating more or less direct answer to the suggested questions. As these questions have quintessential importance for information theory and methodology, I would like to suggest tentative answers to these questions, giving arguments in support of this approach. Question 1. Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a strict distinction between information as a phenomenon and information measures as quantitative or qualitative characteristics of information? All educated people understand that a person and her/his measure, for example height, are essentially different entities. It’s impossible to reduce a person to one measure. The same is true for subatomic particles and other physical, chemical and biological objects. However, when it comes to information, even qualified researchers don’t feel a necessity to make a strict distinction between information as a phenomenon and information measures, although there are infinitely many information measures. We can often hear and read such expressions as “Shannon information” or “Fisher information”. Question 2. Are there types or kinds of information that are not encompassed by the general theory of information (GTI)? A grounded answer to this question depends what we understand when we say/write “types or kinds of information”, that is, on information definitions. If we take intrinsic information definitions, then the answer is YES as it is demonstrated in the book (Burgin, 2010). At the same time, if we take all information definitions suggested by different people, then the answer is NO because some of those definitions define not information but something else, e.g., information measure or knowledge or data. There are also other “definitions” that actually define nothing. Naturally, these definitions and related concepts (if there are any) are not encompassed by the GTI. However, GTI organizes all existing knowledge on information and information processes in one unified system, allowing one to discern information from other phenomena. Question 3. Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a distinction between information and an information carrier? In the mundane life, it is possible not to make a distinction between information and an information carrier. For instance, we do not make distinctions between an envelope with a letter and the letter itself, calling both things “a letter”, or between a book with a novel and the novel itself, calling both things “a novel”. At the same time, a proper theory of information demands to make a distinction between information and an information carrier, especially, because any thing contains information and thus, is an information carrier, but it is evident that to consider that everything IS information is unreasonable and contradicts principles of science. I would appreciate any feedback to the ideas from this e-mail. Sincerely, Mark ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] ON INFORMATION THEORY--Mark Burgin, Colophon
Dear Guy, Mark and FIS colleagues, This misunderstanding may be solved with simple step - if we will accept definition of information as a kind of reflection, which is internal structure in the thing but not the whole thing . Friendly regards Krassimir -Original Message- From: Guy A Hoelzer Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2011 7:08 PM To: Foundations of Information Science Information Science Cc: Mark Burgin Subject: Re: [Fis] ON INFORMATION THEORY--Mark Burgin, Colophon Hi Mark, The only part that I take exception to is at the end of your colophon. Specifically, I disagree with the statement “it is evident that to consider that everything IS information is unreasonable and contradicts principles of science.” I see contrast, or difference, as fundamental to the concept of information. All ‘things’ must be bounded such that there is a distinction between the inside and outside of the thing; therefore I don’t see how it is possible or reasonable for anything not to be information. Regards, Guy On 6/7/11 6:34 PM, Mark Burgin mbur...@math.ucla.edu wrote: Discussion colophon Dear all participants of the discussion (active and passive), I would like to express my gratitude to Pedro for asking me to start a discussion about basic problems of information theory and methodology, in which many qualified researchers have participated. I also appreciate efforts of all active participants of the discussion, who shared their interesting ideas related to information theory and practice, and especially to Joseph Brenner, who expertly distilled communication of different participants separating more or less direct answer to the suggested questions. As these questions have quintessential importance for information theory and methodology, I would like to suggest tentative answers to these questions, giving arguments in support of this approach. Question 1. Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a strict distinction between information as a phenomenon and information measures as quantitative or qualitative characteristics of information? All educated people understand that a person and her/his measure, for example height, are essentially different entities. It’s impossible to reduce a person to one measure. The same is true for subatomic particles and other physical, chemical and biological objects. However, when it comes to information, even qualified researchers don’t feel a necessity to make a strict distinction between information as a phenomenon and information measures, although there are infinitely many information measures. We can often hear and read such expressions as “Shannon information” or “Fisher information”. Question 2. Are there types or kinds of information that are not encompassed by the general theory of information (GTI)? A grounded answer to this question depends what we understand when we say/write “types or kinds of information”, that is, on information definitions. If we take intrinsic information definitions, then the answer is YES as it is demonstrated in the book (Burgin, 2010). At the same time, if we take all information definitions suggested by different people, then the answer is NO because some of those definitions define not information but something else, e.g., information measure or knowledge or data. There are also other “definitions” that actually define nothing. Naturally, these definitions and related concepts (if there are any) are not encompassed by the GTI. However, GTI organizes all existing knowledge on information and information processes in one unified system, allowing one to discern information from other phenomena. Question 3. Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a distinction between information and an information carrier? In the mundane life, it is possible not to make a distinction between information and an information carrier. For instance, we do not make distinctions between an envelope with a letter and the letter itself, calling both things “a letter”, or between a book with a novel and the novel itself, calling both things “a novel”. At the same time, a proper theory of information demands to make a distinction between information and an information carrier, especially, because any thing contains information and thus, is an information carrier, but it is evident that to consider that everything IS information is unreasonable and contradicts principles of science. I would appreciate any feedback to the ideas from this e-mail. Sincerely, Mark ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] ON INFORMATION THEORY--Mark Burgin, Colophon
Dear Mark, My concern about all recent discussions on FIS is the apparent tendency to endow the notion of information with an existential status that is unwarranted. Information does not exist beyond our conception and so the language you use here worries me since there is nothing that is actually carried. Therefore, any discussion of a carrier of information is either meaningless or a convenience. For me, at least, the term information is simply a way of speaking about the necessary distinctions of causality. It is that which identifies cause and adds to knowledge, where knowledge is our way of speaking about that which determines subsequent action. So for me it is difficult to imagine types of information unless we are referring to causal types. Any other categorization is cannot be general. There are, of course, special ways of speaking about information in the particular and in this we may find categorization convenient, not absolute. With respect, Steven -- Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith Institute for Advanced Science Engineering http://senses.info On Jun 7, 2011, at 6:34 PM, Mark Burgin wrote: Discussion colophon Dear all participants of the discussion (active and passive), I would like to express my gratitude to Pedro for asking me to start a discussion about basic problems of information theory and methodology, in which many qualified researchers have participated. I also appreciate efforts of all active participants of the discussion, who shared their interesting ideas related to information theory and practice, and especially to Joseph Brenner, who expertly distilled communication of different participants separating more or less direct answer to the suggested questions. As these questions have quintessential importance for information theory and methodology, I would like to suggest tentative answers to these questions, giving arguments in support of this approach. Question 1. Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a strict distinction between information as a phenomenon and information measures as quantitative or qualitative characteristics of information? All educated people understand that a person and her/his measure, for example height, are essentially different entities. It’s impossible to reduce a person to one measure. The same is true for subatomic particles and other physical, chemical and biological objects. However, when it comes to information, even qualified researchers don’t feel a necessity to make a strict distinction between information as a phenomenon and information measures, although there are infinitely many information measures. We can often hear and read such expressions as “Shannon information” or “Fisher information”. Question 2. Are there types or kinds of information that are not encompassed by the general theory of information (GTI)? A grounded answer to this question depends what we understand when we say/write “types or kinds of information”, that is, on information definitions. If we take intrinsic information definitions, then the answer is YES as it is demonstrated in the book (Burgin, 2010). At the same time, if we take all information definitions suggested by different people, then the answer is NO because some of those definitions define not information but something else, e.g., information measure or knowledge or data. There are also other “definitions” that actually define nothing. Naturally, these definitions and related concepts (if there are any) are not encompassed by the GTI. However, GTI organizes all existing knowledge on information and information processes in one unified system, allowing one to discern information from other phenomena. Question 3. Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a distinction between information and an information carrier? In the mundane life, it is possible not to make a distinction between information and an information carrier. For instance, we do not make distinctions between an envelope with a letter and the letter itself, calling both things “a letter”, or between a book with a novel and the novel itself, calling both things “a novel”. At the same time, a proper theory of information demands to make a distinction between information and an information carrier, especially, because any thing contains information and thus, is an information carrier, but it is evident that to consider that everything IS information is unreasonable and contradicts principles of science. I would appreciate any feedback to the ideas from this e-mail. Sincerely, Mark ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
