Re: [Fis] FW: [Fwd: Re: Physics of computing]--Plamen S.

[joe.bren...@bluewin.ch]

Dear Koichiro,

With due respect for you and for the people you mention, there may be a fatal 
error in the initial description of the key relationships you mention as 
dichotomies. Unless, in all but the most trivial cases, you allow for 
interaction and sharing of the effective dynamic properties of the phenomena 
you are looking at, getting new insights into the way they evolve will continue 
to be difficult. In particular, neither actuality nor potentiality go to 0 or 1.

The major contribution of Lupasco was to break through the strait-jacket of the 
concept of totally independent classes that follow standard bivalent logic. You 
seem to hint at this in your last point which talks in terms of "probabilistic 
events". However, having "explicit and definite distributions" is hardly 
possible in the real world, except as idealized, unrealizable abstractions.

I am hoping that some readers of this note may be moved to consider what, in 
principle, might be achieved by opening up our language in the direction I 
suggest. We might lose some rigor in the narrow sense, but this is proving a 
dead end in any case. Its loss would be compensated by having a greater array 
of logical conceptual tools to work with. 

Thank you and best wishes,

 Joseph




Ursprüngliche Nachricht
Von: cxq02...@nifty.com
Datum: 19.03.2012 23:24
An: 
Betreff: Re: [Fis] FW:  [Fwd: Re:  Physics of computing]--Plamen S.

Folks,

   A nice thing about the dichotomies such as the actual-potential (Peirce),
einselection-superposition (Schroedinger), figure-background (Merleau-Ponty), 
filling-up - void
(Marijuan), presence-absence (Deacon) and the like is the appraisal of the 
individual-class
dichotomy even if an exhaustive list of the individuals constituting the class 
is not available. The
price we have to pay for this, however, is that first person descriptions would 
have to be employed
for appreciating the presence of some individuals that are currently absent on 
the spot for whatever
reasons. In contrast, the individual-class dichotomy accessible to third person 
descriptions such as
the dichotomy of each probabilistic event and its distribution would have to be 
explicit and
definite with regard to both the individuals and the class from the outset.

   Cheers,
   Koichiro Matsuno

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Re: [Fis] FW: [Fwd: Re: Physics of computing]--Plamen S.

[Koichiro Matsuno]

Folks,

   A nice thing about the dichotomies such as the actual-potential (Peirce),
einselection-superposition (Schroedinger), figure-background (Merleau-Ponty), 
filling-up - void
(Marijuan), presence-absence (Deacon) and the like is the appraisal of the 
individual-class
dichotomy even if an exhaustive list of the individuals constituting the class 
is not available. The
price we have to pay for this, however, is that first person descriptions would 
have to be employed
for appreciating the presence of some individuals that are currently absent on 
the spot for whatever
reasons. In contrast, the individual-class dichotomy accessible to third person 
descriptions such as
the dichotomy of each probabilistic event and its distribution would have to be 
explicit and
definite with regard to both the individuals and the class from the outset.

   Cheers,
   Koichiro Matsuno

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[Fis] Semantic and physical information

[Robin Faichney]

I'm once again stimulated by these discussions to promote my own
theory, involving two complementary concepts, physical and semantic
information. I actually prefer the phrase "intentional information"
for the latter concept, but "intentionality" is a technical term in
philosophy of mind that is often misunderstood outside that context.

Physical information is a concept that's well established within
physics, and is basically just material form, physical patterns,
such as those of these coloured dots on your screen. Physicists can
usefully quantify material form with techniques deriving from Shannon,
thus this non-semantic but historically justified use of the word
"information".

My concept of semantic or intentional information is very broad,
encompassing all "natural meaning" and significance as well as human
communications.

Semantic/intentional information is distinguished from physical
information but is not metaphysically distinct from it: meaningful
information is, as I see it, best considered to be encoded in physical
information, being decoded in use. In strictly objective terms there
is nothing but material form, but some kinds of entity can effectively
use that to inform themselves and each other. This aligns with
Wittgenstein's later concept of meaning. We might say that meaning, or
semantic/intentional information, is the intersubjective aspect of the
use of material form.

My "big picture" includes the concepts of mind, consciousness and
empathy: it is our tendency to empathize with some processors of
information (those like ourselves) that elevates them to the status of
information users, ie minds.

The best account at present of this theory is my dissertation:
http://www.robinfaichney.org/pdf/MScDissertation.pdf

The abstract and slides of my presentation at DTMD2011 are also on my
website, see below. The resulting paper has been submitted for the
forthcoming journal article devoted to that meeting.

-- 
Robin Faichney


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