Re: [Fis] Miracles and Natural Order Fis Digest, Vol 23, Issue 24

[Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic]

Dear Bob,

I agree with you that: neither of existing models (Newtonian physics, original 
Darwinian formulation of evolution) is sufficient for explaining how real 
change—in the form of creative advance or emergence—takes place in nature. And 
that: Chance and disarray in natural processes are necessary conditions for 
real change. Randomness contributes richness and autonomy to the natural world. 
(From the description of your book A Third Window: Natural Life beyond Newton 
and Darwin). Complex phenomena and self-organisation are subject of intense 
research within science and by no means understood as miraculous.

It seems to me that all depends on how we conceptualise “miracle” vs. “law”. 
“Laws” need not be deterministic and they can also evolve, as physicists are 
talking about unification of forces under conditions of early universe. In 
analogy with the previous posts regarding “miracles” we can imagine minimising 
“laws” to one in our model of the early universe and then follow how the “laws” 
emerge together with the rest of everything.
I imagine “miracle” as something going beyond our understanding forever, while 
natural phenomenon is something we believe to be able to find a good model for, 
no matter how long it may take.

If we imagine “miracles” as explanation for things we do not have good models 
for, the world would be full of miracles. As a scientist I just react to the 
word “miracle” being used to explain what we do not understand in nature. I 
have seen human laws in practice, and I was taught about “natural laws” in 
school. I have never seen a “miracle” and I do not believe in “miracles” other 
than poetic figures of speech.

All the best,
Gordana


On 23/02/16 02:20, "Robert E. Ulanowicz" 
mailto:u...@umces.edu>> wrote:

Dear Gordana,

"Law" is a slippery concept. Most physicists make the theological
assumption that the laws of physics pre-existed the Big Bang. I rather
doubt that. I see the laws as having evolved (precipitated?) out of
inchoate configurations of processes.


Under the prevailing metaphysics, miracles are impossible. For that
matter, so is real change! If we switch metaphysical foundations, however,
the boundary between law and miracle grows permeable.


Best wishes,
Bob

To me the miracle is not so much order, as it is relation, and thus as
Loet says "order is always constructed (by us)"-
but the miracle is the very existence of anything (us, the rest of the
universe).
Why there is something rather than nothing (that would be much simpler)?
To me miracle is how it all started. From vacuum fluctuations? But where
the vacuum comes from?
But then, why should we call it a miracle?
Perhaps the better name is just natural law, finally equally inexplicable
and given,
but sounds more general and less mystic.

Best,
Gordana


From: Fis
mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es>>
 on
behalf of Loet Leydesdorff
mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>>
Organization: University of Amsterdam
Reply-To: 
"l...@leydesdorff.net"
mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>>
Date: Monday 22 February 2016 at 20:36
To: 'Bruno Marchal' 
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>, 'fis
Science' 
mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>>
Subject: Re: [Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 23, Issue 24


All worldviews begin in a miracle. No exceptions.

I agree. Nevertheless, we should, and can, minimize the miracle.

Why would one need a worldview? The whole assumption of an order as a
Given (in a Revelation) is religious. Order is always constructed (by us)
and can/needs to be explained.

No "harmonia praestabilita", but ex post. No endpoint omega. No cosmology,
but chaology.

With due respect for those of you who wish to hold on to religion or
nature as a given; however, vaguely defined.

Best,
Loet

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default.xml
Description: default.xml
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Re: [Fis] Miracles and Natural Order Fis Digest, Vol 23, Issue 24

[Robert E. Ulanowicz]

Dear Gordana,

"Law" is a slippery concept. Most physicists make the theological
assumption that the laws of physics pre-existed the Big Bang. I rather
doubt that. I see the laws as having evolved (precipitated?) out of
inchoate configurations of processes.


Under the prevailing metaphysics, miracles are impossible. For that
matter, so is real change! If we switch metaphysical foundations, however,
the boundary between law and miracle grows permeable.


Best wishes,
Bob

> To me the miracle is not so much order, as it is relation, and thus as
> Loet says "order is always constructed (by us)"-
> but the miracle is the very existence of anything (us, the rest of the
> universe).
> Why there is something rather than nothing (that would be much simpler)?
> To me miracle is how it all started. From vacuum fluctuations? But where
> the vacuum comes from?
> But then, why should we call it a miracle?
> Perhaps the better name is just natural law, finally equally inexplicable
> and given,
> but sounds more general and less mystic.
>
> Best,
> Gordana
>
>
> From: Fis
> mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es>> on
> behalf of Loet Leydesdorff
> mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>>
> Organization: University of Amsterdam
> Reply-To: "l...@leydesdorff.net"
> mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>>
> Date: Monday 22 February 2016 at 20:36
> To: 'Bruno Marchal' mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>, 'fis
> Science' mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>>
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 23, Issue 24
>
>
> All worldviews begin in a miracle. No exceptions.
>
> I agree. Nevertheless, we should, and can, minimize the miracle.
>
> Why would one need a worldview? The whole assumption of an order as a
> Given (in a Revelation) is religious. Order is always constructed (by us)
> and can/needs to be explained.
>
> No "harmonia praestabilita", but ex post. No endpoint omega. No cosmology,
> but chaology.
>
> With due respect for those of you who wish to hold on to religion or
> nature as a given; however, vaguely defined.
>
> Best,
> Loet
>
> ___
> Fis mailing list
> Fis@listas.unizar.es
> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>


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Re: [Fis] Miracles and Natural Order Fis Digest, Vol 23, Issue 24

[Bob Logan]

Dear Friends - the miracle is not that there is stuff but rather that the stuff 
of which we are made can ask the question why is there stuff and what does that 
mean? The fact that the questions can not be answered does not matter because 
it is always the questions that are most important and not the answers. Warm 
regards and happy pondering - Bob Logan


__

Robert K. Logan
Prof. Emeritus - Physics - U. of Toronto 
Fellow University of St. Michael's College
Chief Scientist - sLab at OCAD
http://utoronto.academia.edu/RobertKLogan
www.physics.utoronto.ca/Members/logan
www.researchgate.net/profile/Robert_Logan5/publications










> On Feb 22, 2016, at 3:07 PM, John Collier  wrote:
> 
> Dear fis list: <>
>  
> It is impossible to have a system that does not have some order in it. Even a 
> mathematically random collection has regions the are ordered. So order itself 
> is hardly miraculous, given that there is something. 
>  
> I agree with Gordana that the question of why there is something rather than 
> nothing is currently, and on any projection of current understanding, 
> inexplicable. Invoking God doesn’t help (why God, rather than nothing?). It 
> would be nice to be able to show that some being is necessary, but so far all 
> attempts (and there are many in history of thought) have failed.
>  
> John Collier
> Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
> University of KwaZulu-Natal
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier 
>  
> From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Gordana 
> Dodig-Crnkovic
> Sent: Monday, 22 February 2016 12:53 PM
> To: l...@leydesdorff.net; 'Bruno Marchal'; 'fis Science'
> Subject: [Fis] Miracles and Natural Order Fis Digest, Vol 23, Issue 24
>  
> To me the miracle is not so much order, as it is relation, and thus as Loet 
> says “order is always constructed (by us)”-
> but the miracle is the very existence of anything (us, the rest of the 
> universe).
> Why there is something rather than nothing (that would be much simpler)?
> To me miracle is how it all started. From vacuum fluctuations? But where the 
> vacuum comes from?
> But then, why should we call it a miracle? 
> Perhaps the better name is just natural law, finally equally inexplicable and 
> given, 
> but sounds more general and less mystic.
>  
> Best,
> Gordana
>  
>  
> From: Fis  > on behalf of Loet Leydesdorff 
> mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>>
> Organization: University of Amsterdam
> Reply-To: "l...@leydesdorff.net " 
> mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>>
> Date: Monday 22 February 2016 at 20:36
> To: 'Bruno Marchal' mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>, 'fis 
> Science' mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>>
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 23, Issue 24
>  
> All worldviews begin in a miracle. No exceptions.
> 
>  
> I agree. Nevertheless, we should, and can, minimize the miracle. 
>  
> Why would one need a worldview? The whole assumption of an order as a Given 
> (in a Revelation) is religious. Order is always constructed (by us) and 
> can/needs to be explained. 
>  
> No “harmonia praestabilita”, but ex post. No endpoint omega. No cosmology, 
> but chaology.
>  
> With due respect for those of you who wish to hold on to religion or nature 
> as a given; however, vaguely defined.
>  
> Best,
> Loet
>  
> ___
> Fis mailing list
> Fis@listas.unizar.es
> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

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Re: [Fis] Miracles and Natural Order Fis Digest, Vol 23, Issue 24

[John Collier]

Dear fis list:

It is impossible to have a system that does not have some order in it. Even a 
mathematically random collection has regions the are ordered. So order itself 
is hardly miraculous, given that there is something.

I agree with Gordana that the question of why there is something rather than 
nothing is currently, and on any projection of current understanding, 
inexplicable. Invoking God doesn't help (why God, rather than nothing?). It 
would be nice to be able to show that some being is necessary, but so far all 
attempts (and there are many in history of thought) have failed.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Gordana 
Dodig-Crnkovic
Sent: Monday, 22 February 2016 12:53 PM
To: l...@leydesdorff.net; 'Bruno Marchal'; 'fis Science'
Subject: [Fis] Miracles and Natural Order Fis Digest, Vol 23, Issue 24

To me the miracle is not so much order, as it is relation, and thus as Loet 
says "order is always constructed (by us)"-
but the miracle is the very existence of anything (us, the rest of the 
universe).
Why there is something rather than nothing (that would be much simpler)?
To me miracle is how it all started. From vacuum fluctuations? But where the 
vacuum comes from?
But then, why should we call it a miracle?
Perhaps the better name is just natural law, finally equally inexplicable and 
given,
but sounds more general and less mystic.

Best,
Gordana


From: Fis mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es>> 
on behalf of Loet Leydesdorff 
mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>>
Organization: University of Amsterdam
Reply-To: "l...@leydesdorff.net" 
mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>>
Date: Monday 22 February 2016 at 20:36
To: 'Bruno Marchal' mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>, 'fis 
Science' mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>>
Subject: Re: [Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 23, Issue 24


All worldviews begin in a miracle. No exceptions.

I agree. Nevertheless, we should, and can, minimize the miracle.

Why would one need a worldview? The whole assumption of an order as a Given (in 
a Revelation) is religious. Order is always constructed (by us) and can/needs 
to be explained.

No "harmonia praestabilita", but ex post. No endpoint omega. No cosmology, but 
chaology.

With due respect for those of you who wish to hold on to religion or nature as 
a given; however, vaguely defined.

Best,
Loet

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[Fis] Miracles and Natural Order Fis Digest, Vol 23, Issue 24

[Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic]

To me the miracle is not so much order, as it is relation, and thus as Loet 
says "order is always constructed (by us)"-
but the miracle is the very existence of anything (us, the rest of the 
universe).
Why there is something rather than nothing (that would be much simpler)?
To me miracle is how it all started. From vacuum fluctuations? But where the 
vacuum comes from?
But then, why should we call it a miracle?
Perhaps the better name is just natural law, finally equally inexplicable and 
given,
but sounds more general and less mystic.

Best,
Gordana


From: Fis mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es>> 
on behalf of Loet Leydesdorff 
mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>>
Organization: University of Amsterdam
Reply-To: "l...@leydesdorff.net" 
mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>>
Date: Monday 22 February 2016 at 20:36
To: 'Bruno Marchal' mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>, 'fis 
Science' mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>>
Subject: Re: [Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 23, Issue 24


All worldviews begin in a miracle. No exceptions.

I agree. Nevertheless, we should, and can, minimize the miracle.

Why would one need a worldview? The whole assumption of an order as a Given (in 
a Revelation) is religious. Order is always constructed (by us) and can/needs 
to be explained.

No "harmonia praestabilita", but ex post. No endpoint omega. No cosmology, but 
chaology.

With due respect for those of you who wish to hold on to religion or nature as 
a given; however, vaguely defined.

Best,
Loet

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Re: [Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 23, Issue 24

[Loet Leydesdorff]

All worldviews begin in a miracle. No exceptions.

 

I agree. Nevertheless, we should, and can, minimize the miracle. 

 

Why would one need a worldview? The whole assumption of an order as a Given
(in a Revelation) is religious. Order is always constructed (by us) and
can/needs to be explained. 

 

No "harmonia praestabilita", but ex post. No endpoint omega. No cosmology,
but chaology.

 

With due respect for those of you who wish to hold on to religion or nature
as a given; however, vaguely defined. 

 

Best,

Loet

 

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Re: [Fis] Origin?

[Karl Javorszky]

Well now i can't withstand commenting on phenomenolgy, symbols and time.
This is too much screaming for formalisation.

The three concepts mentioned above can be abstracted into the mother of all
symbols, the collection of natural numbers.  Let us pose the question of
interrelatedness of time concepts to symbols and epistemolgy as follows:
"Is there a way to use numbers as symbols for the concepts discussed?"

In fact, the answer is affirmative. It takes changing the fundamentals of
our thinking (even worse, of our perception). We now do not regard thing,
thing's properties, place, quantity as independent ideas, but use the term
"order /or: succession/." to demonstrate the interlinkedness of the ideas
enumerated as separate above.

Once we understand that numbers can serve as tokens for ideas, an important
first step has been made.

Generally speaking, the discussion in FIS is delightfully peripathetic. Let
us hope that a consensus will emerge, that simple and obvious rules that
Nature appers to obey (even if we humans do not understand them) will
probably be reflected in simple and obvious rules of arithmetic.

The encouraging news is that the answer is ready and waiting. The hope is
that the consensus will emerge that the problem can be formulated as a
question.

Karl
On 22 Feb 2016 15:40, "Stanley N Salthe"  wrote:

> Marcus -- You have an interesting point regarding plants and
> phenomenology.  Their behavior occurs over a time scale where we
> phenomenologists see nothing happening. This slow time scale was
> illuminated by non-phenomenological science studies, while also inquiring
> into faster-than-phenomenological time scale events. Is phenomenology to be
> grounded in our animal time scale only? Or, in what way or sense can
> phenomenology transcend that scale?
>
> STAN
>
> On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 12:05 AM, Marcus Abundis <55m...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Dear Stanley & Loet,
>> Gentlemen, when you speak of "origin" I am unsure of what *exactly*
>> you have in mind. Is it the "origin of the capacity for movement" that you
>> think about? The origin of life, itself, along with all its causal roles?
>> Or?
>> > Then, many of the living do not ‘move’. . . Plants move slowly by
>> growth. How could a phenomenologist view this at all?<
>> I think studying *differential movement* could fall within
>> phenomenology, but explaining the *origination* of autonomous movement,
>> would not. Also, it seems (to me) a bit unreasonable to think such an
>> origination (origin of life) narrative would be addressed in this group. Or
>> do I mistake your meaning, or the group's ultimate aim? Thanks!
>>
>> Maxine,
>> I am unclear from your extended abstract on what exactly you aim to
>> accomplish in the study you present. Also, are we to read the
>> "Phenomenology and Life Sciences" piece as well? I read its abstract and
>> its mention of "coordinated dynamics" seemed to say "yes!" but I am unsure.
>> The emphasis you seem to offer in "Phenomenology and Evolutionary
>> Biology" I find interesting. Also, your mention of "static" and "genetic"
>> aspects along with movement. To my mind this points to kinematics, statics,
>> and dynamics in a more directly mechanical sense – but which you now wish
>> to tie to evolutionary biology? Is that correct? I find that an interesting
>> line of thought.
>> Also, I like Pedro's notion of a connection between dance and mate
>> selection. Dance then being a display behavior demonstrating an
>> advantageous capacity for navigating the evolutionary landscape.
>> Still, I find what you present a bit "too raw" and I am not exactly
>> sure how I should view the material. For example jumping form
>> dance/movement to teeth leaves me with a big gap in joining the two. I get
>> the sense that you aim to close "a gap" but I am not clear on how exactly
>> you do so. "Where did the notion of a tool come from?" This is an important
>> question, but how is it precisely answered or addressed? Do you attribute
>> the entire genesis of "six simple machines" all to teeth?
>> Lastly, I too work in this area and I am just now finishing (very
>> rough draft) a piece that looks at this issue. I agree that it is an
>> overlooked area of study. I am happy to share what I have wth you, if you
>> might find it of interest.
>>
>> ___
>> Fis mailing list
>> Fis@listas.unizar.es
>> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>>
>>
>
> ___
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>
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Re: [Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 23, Issue 24

[Bruno Marchal]

Dear Malcolm,


On 21 Feb 2016, at 22:51, Malcolm Dean wrote:


All worldviews begin in a miracle. No exceptions.



I agree. Nevertheless, we should, and can, minimize the miracle.

With the digital mechanist assumption, the miracle can be limited to  
the axioms of elementary arithmetic (or combinatory algebra or any  
Turing Universal System) + at the meta-level, the assumption that  
consciousness is an invariant for some digital functional substitution.


So the "origin" can be taken as being elementary arithmetic (or Turing- 
equivalent).


God created "only" the natural numbers together with the laws of  
addition and multiplication. This, then, can be explained as being  
something that we cannot derive from anything else (except some Turing- 
equivalent theory), which confirms somehow your idea that at least one  
miracle is needed, but this illustrates that it can be kept quite  
minimal.


Eventually, this makes Mechanism testable, as it gives no choice for  
the physical laws(*), and until now, thanks to quantum-mechanics- 
without-collapse, it looks like nature confirms quite well the digital  
mechanist hypothesis. This fits very well with the information based  
approaches, notably your own work, even if the starting motivation and  
the intended applications can be different.


Best,

Bruno

(*) I am not pretending this is obvious, but that is explained in my  
papers, notably the recent one in the issues of the Progress in  
Biophysics and Molecular Biology under discussion.





Malcolm

On Feb 21, 2016 3:00 AM,  wrote:
>-
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Sun, 21 Feb 2016 07:37:09 +0100
> From: "Loet Leydesdorff" 
> To: "'Pedro C. Marijuan'" , "'fis'"
> 
> Subject: Re: [Fis] _ Re:  Maxine?s presentation
> Message-ID: <001801d16c72$4a89c730$df9d5590$@leydesdorff.net>
> Content-Type: text/plain;   charset="utf-8"
>
> Dear Maxine and colleagues,
>
> It seems to me that the assumption of an origin takes a heavy load  
on this theory. We know that order can emerge from chaos. Any order  
will also disappear in the longer run.

>
> Why would one wish to make such assumptions? Meta-physical?
>
> Best,
> Loet


Malcolm

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: [Fis] Origin?

[Stanley N Salthe]

Marcus -- You have an interesting point regarding plants and
phenomenology.  Their behavior occurs over a time scale where we
phenomenologists see nothing happening. This slow time scale was
illuminated by non-phenomenological science studies, while also inquiring
into faster-than-phenomenological time scale events. Is phenomenology to be
grounded in our animal time scale only? Or, in what way or sense can
phenomenology transcend that scale?

STAN

On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 12:05 AM, Marcus Abundis <55m...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Dear Stanley & Loet,
> Gentlemen, when you speak of "origin" I am unsure of what *exactly*
> you have in mind. Is it the "origin of the capacity for movement" that you
> think about? The origin of life, itself, along with all its causal roles?
> Or?
> > Then, many of the living do not ‘move’. . . Plants move slowly by
> growth. How could a phenomenologist view this at all?<
> I think studying *differential movement* could fall within
> phenomenology, but explaining the *origination* of autonomous movement,
> would not. Also, it seems (to me) a bit unreasonable to think such an
> origination (origin of life) narrative would be addressed in this group. Or
> do I mistake your meaning, or the group's ultimate aim? Thanks!
>
> Maxine,
> I am unclear from your extended abstract on what exactly you aim to
> accomplish in the study you present. Also, are we to read the
> "Phenomenology and Life Sciences" piece as well? I read its abstract and
> its mention of "coordinated dynamics" seemed to say "yes!" but I am unsure.
> The emphasis you seem to offer in "Phenomenology and Evolutionary
> Biology" I find interesting. Also, your mention of "static" and "genetic"
> aspects along with movement. To my mind this points to kinematics, statics,
> and dynamics in a more directly mechanical sense – but which you now wish
> to tie to evolutionary biology? Is that correct? I find that an interesting
> line of thought.
> Also, I like Pedro's notion of a connection between dance and mate
> selection. Dance then being a display behavior demonstrating an
> advantageous capacity for navigating the evolutionary landscape.
> Still, I find what you present a bit "too raw" and I am not exactly
> sure how I should view the material. For example jumping form
> dance/movement to teeth leaves me with a big gap in joining the two. I get
> the sense that you aim to close "a gap" but I am not clear on how exactly
> you do so. "Where did the notion of a tool come from?" This is an important
> question, but how is it precisely answered or addressed? Do you attribute
> the entire genesis of "six simple machines" all to teeth?
> Lastly, I too work in this area and I am just now finishing (very
> rough draft) a piece that looks at this issue. I agree that it is an
> overlooked area of study. I am happy to share what I have wth you, if you
> might find it of interest.
>
> ___
> Fis mailing list
> Fis@listas.unizar.es
> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
>
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Re: [Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 23, Issue 25

[Srecko Sorli]

*Dear Editors, *

*on file attached is my comment on Dr. Plamen essay on time. *

*Yours Sincerely, Amrit Srečko Šorli*
* Beauty of Physics is elegant Simplicity. *

*Foundations of Physics Institute - FOPI*
www.fopi.info

*ORCID ID* http://orcid.org/-0001-6711-4844


essay on time - comments.pdf
Description: Adobe PDF document


essay on time - comments.docx
Description: MS-Word 2007 document
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[Fis] _ Re: _ Re: Maxine’s presentation

[Mark Johnson]

Dear FIS colleagues,


I didn’t know Maxine’s work, and I’m very glad to have been introduced to
it – I’ve been reading through the 1972 edition of the Phenomenology of
Dance.


In reading this, and in reading the contributions on the list, I’ve found
myself reflecting on the relationship between “ontological speculation”
(e.g., speculations about origins) and measurement. Speculations about
origins can only ever be speculations, yet they inevitably assume the
status of ‘foundations’ where their speculative and tentative character is
(at best) obscured in various ways. Measurement, at some level, rests on
speculations – yet measurement contributes to the ‘solidifying’
(stultifying?) of speculations. I’m reminded that it was precisely this
insight into the foundational assumptions of Frege’s mathematics and their
positivistic implications in the sciences which led Husserl into his
phenomenological search in the first place!


The methodological problem of thinking about the experience of dance is a
good place to look for the weaknesses of existing foundations. Personally,
I have preferred to think about music (it's my background) – but it’s a
very similar problem. These topics are on fault-lines that comprise the
intellectual domain that Searle calls “epistemic subjectivity” – not facts
of common knowledge (epistemic objectivity), physical phenomena
(ontological objectivity) or social structures (ontological subjectivity) –
but feelings and accounts of feelings – like headaches and itches.


I wonder if the problem has to do with indexicallity, or more basically,
“pointing”: In wishing to uncover the structure of consciousness, Husserl
wished for ‘structures of consciousness’ to point at which others could
also point to (and agree) what it was which was being indexed. In the end
what he was able to point to was his method, which most of his followers
were dissatisfied with. The problem was (Husserl knew this well) that what
he pointed to was a relation where the pointing was part of the relation. I
think it is for this reason that intersubjectivity becomes a major theme in
his work – although I agree with Alfred Schutz that Husserl’s concept of
intersubjectivity is deficient (Schutz refines it considerably in my
opinion).


What has this got to do with information?


If I have detected any kind of consensus on this list in the past few
months, it is on the importance of constraint, or absence, in the study of
information. It may be that information is the study of constraint; that in
Bob U.’s words, the most important thing  about information is
“not-information”. As Bob acknowledges, Bateson said it first…


Processes of measurement, and indeed processes of scientific knowledge, are
constrained processes. Scientists deliberately constrain their experiments
within laboratories. How can we characterise that constraint and the
various biopsychosocial constraints bearing upon the ensuing processes of
arriving at agreement about causal mechanisms? Or the constraints that bear
upon the selection of apparatus? This is what recent sociomaterial theories
of scientific practice have been digging at (Barad, Rouse, Harraway).
Whilst I find myself approving of their general point, I also see science
disappearing in a kind beautifully-written mystical haze which I find
distressing, but other seem to quite enjoy!


But what about dance? Is it more or less constrained? If we were to analyse
the constraints of dance, where would we start?

We start with many of the categories which Maxine identifies: rhythm,
weight, space, time, force, and so on. But then there are the interlocking
constraints of human biology, psychology, anatomy, and so on. As an
intersubjective relation, is dance more constrained than a Wheatstone
bridge experiment? And sex and mating rituals? (well, it’s all about sex,
isn’t it?) how constrained is that? What about Wittgenstein’s ‘wriggling
fly’ (Philosophical Investigations, p284) – is it dancing?


I find this a fascinating thought because it asks many questions about the
assumptions of modern science around ‘objectivity’, and the relation
between social and physical science. It also seems consistent (if I
understand him right) with what Bob U. has been saying about ecology. Loet
has been pushing at a similar boundary.


There seems to be many questions about methodologies for examining
constraint. Personally, I think Shannon has a useful contribution to make
with regard to measurement (that’s not to exclude critique of his formulae)
– but understanding what it is to use a relational calculation (which is
what it is) within scientific investigation is poorly understood – it is
not causal relations we are examining. At a broader methodological level,
the cybernetic error-driven approach (Ashby is the key figure here) may be
more profound than current popular realist theories.


I've ended up a question and a sub-question...

“What are the conditions within which a coherent scientific discourse can
add