Re: [Fis] Shannonian Mechanics?

[Hector Zenil]

I think complaining about Shannon entropy as a measure of information is
completely justified because it is steam-engine physics unfortunately still
widely used despite its many flaws and limitations.

But to think that Shannon entropy is at the front-end in the mathematical
discussion of information is a mistake and this, and other groups, have
perpetually been entrapped in a 60s and 70s discussion on a fake ancient
theory of information that not even Shannon himself thought was worth to be
used for anything meaningful in information but for communication measuring
purposes only.

Indeed, Shannon entropy is nothing else but a counting function of
states/symbols, at best it is a measure of diversity, a bound on
information transfer. The technical and philosophical discussion here and
everywhere else should be (and has been among those at the scientific
front) focused on what has been done in the last 50 years to leave Shannon
entropy behind, but nobody here (and almost nowhere else) are people
discuss about algorithmic randomness, Levin's universal distribution,
measures of sophistication, etc. but prefer to be in a continuous state of
pre 60s Shannon entropy discussion.

Shannon entropy should not even be mentioned any longer in serious
discussions about information, we moved on a long time ago (unfortunately
not even many physicists have done)

Trying to be constructive. All best,

- Hector
http://www.hectorzenil.net/


On Wed, Jun 29, 2016 at 3:16 PM, joe.brenner  wrote:

> Dear Loet,
> The way you have asked it, I think the answer to your question is known:
> both order and disorder are universals, linked  dialectically. Never one
> without the other, as for symmetry and asymmetry, except in trivially
> simple cases.
> Cheers,
> Joseph
>
>
> Sent from Samsung Mobile.
>
>
>  Original message 
> From: Loet Leydesdorff
> Date:29/06/2016 14:40 (GMT+01:00)
> To: "'Pedro C. Marijuan'" , fis@listas.unizar.es
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Shannonian Mechanics?
>
> Dear Pedro and colleagues,
>
>
>
> The figure from Weaver in Loet's excellent posting leaves a few aspects
> outside. The why, the what, the how long, the with whom, and other aspects
> of the information phenomenon do not enter. By doing that we have
> streamlined the phenomenon... and have left it ready for applying a highly
> successful theory, in the technological and in many other realms
> (linguistics, artif. intelligence, neurodynamics, molec. networks, ecol.
> networks, applied soc. metrics, etc). Pretty big and impressive, but is it
> enough? Shouldn't we try to go beyond?
>
> In my opinion, “The why, the what, the how long, the with whom, and other
> aspects …” are subject to substantive theorizing. The type of answers will
> be very different when studying biological or other systems of reference.
> But then the information is provided with meaning by these theories and we
> discuss “meaningful information” as different from Shannon-type
> information. There will in this case a dimension to the information.
>
>
>
> For example, when particles collide, there is exchange of momenta and
> energy. The dissipation is then dimensioned as Joule/Kelvin (S = k H). In
> chemistry one assumes a mass balance and thus a redistribution of atoms
> over molecules, etc. The dimensionality of interhuman communication is
> hitherto not specified.
>
>
> I wonder whether a far wider "phenomenology of information" is needed
> (reminding what Maxine argued months ago about the whole contemplation of
> our own movement, or Plamen about the "war on cancer"?). If that inquiry is
> successful we could find for instance that:
>
> This is not successful. It does not lead to a research program, but to
> “philosophie spontanée des savant” (Althusser) as your comprehensive
> question for “The why, the what, the how long, the with whom, and other
> aspects” illustrates. The hidden program is biologistic:
>
>
> 2. Those UNIVERSALS are SPECIES' SPECIFIC.
>
>
>
> “ESSENTIAL CORES” are discipline specific!
>
>
> 3. Those UNIVERSALS would be organized, wrapped, around an ESSENTIAL CORE.
> It would consist in the tight ingraining of self-production and
> communication (almost inseparable, and both information based!). In the
> human special case, it is the whole advancement of our own lives what
> propels us to engage in endless communication --about the universals of our
> own species-- but with the terrific advantage of an open-ended
> communication system, language.
>
> 4. Those UNIVERSALS would have been streamlined in very different ways and
> taken as "principles" or starting points for a number of
> disciplines--remembering the discussion about the four Great Domains of
> Science. A renewed Information Science should nucleate one of those
> domains.
>
> “Should” is an expression of uneasiness? In my opinion, the assumption of
> an origin is problematic: order is not given (ex ante) and then branching,
> but emerging (ex post) from disorder 

Re: [Fis] Shannonian Mechanics?

[joe.brenner]

Dear Loet, 
The way you have asked it, I think the answer to your question is known: both 
order and disorder are universals, linked  dialectically. Never one without the 
other, as for symmetry and asymmetry, except in trivially simple cases.
Cheers, 
Joseph


Sent from Samsung Mobile.

 Original message From: Loet Leydesdorff 
 Date:29/06/2016  14:40  (GMT+01:00) 
To: "'Pedro C. Marijuan'" , 
fis@listas.unizar.es Subject: Re: [Fis] Shannonian Mechanics? 

Dear Pedro and colleagues,
 
The figure from Weaver in Loet's excellent posting leaves a few aspects 
outside. The why, the what, the how long, the with whom, and other aspects of 
the information phenomenon do not enter. By doing that we have streamlined the 
phenomenon... and have left it ready for applying a highly successful theory, 
in the technological and in many other realms (linguistics, artif. 
intelligence, neurodynamics, molec. networks, ecol. networks, applied soc. 
metrics, etc). Pretty big and impressive, but is it enough? Shouldn't we try to 
go beyond?

In my opinion, “The why, the what, the how long, the with whom, and other 
aspects …” are subject to substantive theorizing. The type of answers will be 
very different when studying biological or other systems of reference. But then 
the information is provided with meaning by these theories and we discuss 
“meaningful information” as different from Shannon-type information. There will 
in this case a dimension to the information.
 
For example, when particles collide, there is exchange of momenta and energy. 
The dissipation is then dimensioned as Joule/Kelvin (S = k H). In chemistry one 
assumes a mass balance and thus a redistribution of atoms over molecules, etc. 
The dimensionality of interhuman communication is hitherto not specified.  

I wonder whether a far wider "phenomenology of information" is needed 
(reminding what Maxine argued months ago about the whole contemplation of our 
own movement, or Plamen about the "war on cancer"?). If that inquiry is 
successful we could find for instance that:

This is not successful. It does not lead to a research program, but to 
“philosophie spontanée des savant” (Althusser) as your comprehensive question 
for “The why, the what, the how long, the with whom, and other aspects” 
illustrates. The hidden program is biologistic:

2. Those UNIVERSALS are SPECIES' SPECIFIC.
 
“ESSENTIAL CORES” are discipline specific!

3. Those UNIVERSALS would be organized, wrapped, around an ESSENTIAL CORE. It 
would consist in the tight ingraining of self-production and communication 
(almost inseparable, and both information based!). In the human special case, 
it is the whole advancement of our own lives what propels us to engage in 
endless communication --about the universals of our own species-- but with the 
terrific advantage of an open-ended communication system, language.

4. Those UNIVERSALS would have been streamlined in very different ways and 
taken as "principles" or starting points for a number of 
disciplines--remembering the discussion about the four Great Domains of 
Science. A renewed Information Science should nucleate one of those domains. 

“Should” is an expression of uneasiness? In my opinion, the assumption of an 
origin is problematic: order is not given (ex ante) and then branching, but 
emerging (ex post) from disorder (entropy). Is “disorder” perhaps a universal? 
In which specific system? (I would have a provisional answer/ hypothesis; but 
this is my second penny for this week.)
 
Best,
Loet

Best regards to all, 
(and particular greetings to the new parties joined for this discussion)
--Pedro
   

El 27/06/2016 a las 12:43, Marcus Abundis escribió:
 
Dear Loet,
 
I hoped to reply to your posts sooner as of all the voices on FIS I often 
sense a general kinship with your views. But I also confess I have difficulty 
in precisely grasping your views – the reason for my delay.
 
>[while Shannon’s] concept of information (uncertainty) <
> is counter-intuitive. It enables us among other things <
> to distinguish between "information" and "meaningful <
> information". <
• Easily agreed; *how* to distinguish a presumed meaning (or meaningless-ness) 
then becomes the remaining issue.
 
> Providing . . . meaning presumes the specification <
> of a system of reference; for example, an observer.< 
• It is telling for me (in viewing our differences and likenesses) that you 
suggest an observer. My “system of relating“ accommodates but does not require 
an observer (okay – observer, defined how?), as shown immediately below.
 
>Different[ly] . . . expected information is dimensionless<
> ("a priori"). <
• I suggest the act of “expectation“ already infers minimal dimensions – for 
example, who/what/how is doing the expecting? Thus, in my view, this is not 
truly a priori. A “readiness“ or a compelling functional need innate to any 
“system of relating“ has bearing. For 

Re: [Fis] Shannonian Mechanics?

[Loet Leydesdorff]

Dear Pedro and colleagues, 

 

The figure from Weaver in Loet's excellent posting leaves a few aspects
outside. The why, the what, the how long, the with whom, and other aspects
of the information phenomenon do not enter. By doing that we have
streamlined the phenomenon... and have left it ready for applying a highly
successful theory, in the technological and in many other realms
(linguistics, artif. intelligence, neurodynamics, molec. networks, ecol.
networks, applied soc. metrics, etc). Pretty big and impressive, but is it
enough? Shouldn't we try to go beyond?



In my opinion, “The why, the what, the how long, the with whom, and other
aspects …” are subject to substantive theorizing. The type of answers will
be very different when studying biological or other systems of reference.
But then the information is provided with meaning by these theories and we
discuss “meaningful information” as different from Shannon-type information.
There will in this case a dimension to the information. 

 

For example, when particles collide, there is exchange of momenta and
energy. The dissipation is then dimensioned as Joule/Kelvin (S = k H). In
chemistry one assumes a mass balance and thus a redistribution of atoms over
molecules, etc. The dimensionality of interhuman communication is hitherto
not specified.  


I wonder whether a far wider "phenomenology of information" is needed
(reminding what Maxine argued months ago about the whole contemplation of
our own movement, or Plamen about the "war on cancer"?). If that inquiry is
successful we could find for instance that:



This is not successful. It does not lead to a research program, but to
“philosophie spontanée des savant” (Althusser) as your comprehensive
question for “The why, the what, the how long, the with whom, and other
aspects” illustrates. The hidden program is biologistic:


2. Those UNIVERSALS are SPECIES' SPECIFIC.

 

“ESSENTIAL CORES” are discipline specific!


3. Those UNIVERSALS would be organized, wrapped, around an ESSENTIAL CORE.
It would consist in the tight ingraining of self-production and
communication (almost inseparable, and both information based!). In the
human special case, it is the whole advancement of our own lives what
propels us to engage in endless communication --about the universals of our
own species-- but with the terrific advantage of an open-ended communication
system, language.

4. Those UNIVERSALS would have been streamlined in very different ways and
taken as "principles" or starting points for a number of
disciplines--remembering the discussion about the four Great Domains of
Science. A renewed Information Science should nucleate one of those domains.




“Should” is an expression of uneasiness? In my opinion, the assumption of an
origin is problematic: order is not given (ex ante) and then branching, but
emerging (ex post) from disorder (entropy). Is “disorder” perhaps a
universal? In which specific system? (I would have a provisional answer/
hypothesis; but this is my second penny for this week.)

 

Best,

Loet


Best regards to all, 
(and particular greetings to the new parties joined for this discussion)
--Pedro
   

El 27/06/2016 a las 12:43, Marcus Abundis escribió:

 

Dear Loet,

 

I hoped to reply to your posts sooner as of all the voices on FIS I
often sense a general kinship with your views. But I also confess I have
difficulty in precisely grasping your views – the reason for my delay.

 

>[while Shannon’s] concept of information (uncertainty) <

> is counter-intuitive. It enables us among other things <

> to distinguish between "information" and "meaningful <

> information". <

• Easily agreed; *how* to distinguish a presumed meaning (or
meaningless-ness) then becomes the remaining issue.

 

> Providing . . . meaning presumes the specification <

> of a system of reference; for example, an observer.< 

• It is telling for me (in viewing our differences and likenesses) that you
suggest an observer. My “system of relating“ accommodates but does not
require an observer (okay – observer, defined how?), as shown immediately
below.

 

>Different[ly] . . . expected information is dimensionless<

> ("a priori"). <

• I suggest the act of “expectation“ already infers minimal dimensions – for
example, who/what/how is doing the expecting? Thus, in my view, this is not
truly a priori. A “readiness“ or a compelling functional need innate to any
“system of relating“ has bearing. For example, a single Oxygen atom has a
compelling/innate need to react with other elements, just as any agent is
compelled to react to “nutrients.“ Both imply dimensional expectations, no?
(obviously – of different orders/types).

 

> In my opinion, a "real theory of meaning" should enable <

> us to specify/measure meaning as redundancy / reduction <

> of uncertainty given . . . I took this further in . . . <

> The Self-Organization of Meaning and the Reflexive . . .<

• My weak grasp of the concepts in this paper leads me to 

[Fis] Reply 2 to Michel (A Priori Modeling)

[Marcus Abundis]

In an offline exchange, Michel asks some questions (on my reply to
Annette), summarized below.
===
> Your "material variation" seems identical to "spatial <
> structure" which is classically used in informational <
> ecology. Why not ? <
• “Why not?“ what? I am unsure of what you are asking. In general material
variation and spatial structure are similar, but the latter (as far as I
know) is used only in urban planning and ecology. That some similar
concepts exist here is unsurprising.

> Could you explain more what is dis-functioning? <
• I focus on an informational continuum, so a simple answer is not
possible. For example, “driving a car“ *might* exemplify functioning, but
“driving a car OFF a cliff“ might typify dis-functioning OR functioning –
depending on whether the driver *intended* to die (via suicide). OR,
“driving a car OFF a cliff“ due to tie-rod (steering) failure might
exemplify dis-function, OR if the tie-rod failed after 800,000 km (max
intended life 300,000 km) might be highly functional. This question can
only be considered within a specified *intensional* context.

> "meaningful" is it a scientific materialistic concept or<
> a philosophical one ? <
• Again, as I focus on an informational continuum a simple answer is not
possible. I detail three (minimum) types of meaning in paper #2, so you can
answer this question for yourself – or you can ask questions specific to
that paper.

> "pro temp" is it equivalent to temporal ? If yes, this <
> merits a long discussion about [ecological?] stability, <
• The type of stability you seem to emphasize is NOT what I study. I focus
on a priori informational aspects, please keep this in mind as you develop
your questions. I do not dismiss your interests, but I cannot make useful
comments on your topic.

> This problem is exactly "emergence" (and not emergency)<
> in its scientific signification, . . .<
• I am unsure why you mention emergency here as I only ever explore
emergence (detailed mostly in paper #4).
===

Michele also asks a question on my reply to Stan and Bob.
===
> Could you explain what you mean by rather paradoxical? <
• I merely emphasize that information and uncertainty are “bizarre
partners“ in terms of statistical entropy. Two types of entropic roles are
implied here, but of opposite characters. Type theory is needed to resolve
this supposed paradox.

Thank you for your questions.

Marcus
___
Fis mailing list
Fis@listas.unizar.es
http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

[Fis] Shannonian Mechanics?

[Pedro C. Marijuan]

Dear Marcus, Loet, Bob... and All,

Again very briefly, your exchanges make clear the limits of the received 
Shannonian approach and the (narrow?) corridors left for advancement. I 
find this situation highly reminiscent of what happened with Mechanics 
long ago: an excellent theory (but of limited scope) was overstretched 
and used as a paradigm of what All science should be... it contributed 
well to technology and to some other natural science disciplines, but 
was far from useful --nefarious?-- for humanities and for the future of 
psychological and social science studies.


The figure from Weaver in Loet's excellent posting leaves a few aspects 
outside. The why, the what, the how long, the with whom, and other 
aspects of the information phenomenon do not enter. By doing that we 
have streamlined the phenomenon... and have left it ready for applying a 
highly successful theory, in the technological and in many other realms 
(linguistics, artif. intelligence, neurodynamics, molec. networks, ecol. 
networks, applied soc. metrics, etc). Pretty big and impressive, but is 
it enough? Shouldn't we try to go beyond?


I wonder whether a far wider "phenomenology of information" is needed 
(reminding what Maxine argued months ago about the whole contemplation 
of our own movement, or Plamen about the "war on cancer"?). If that 
inquiry is successful we could find for instance that:


1. There are UNIVERSALS of information. Not only in the transmission or 
in the encoding used, well captured by the present theory, but also in 
the generation, in the "purpose", the "meaning", the targeted subject/s, 
in the duration, the cost, the value, the fitness or adaptive 
"intelligence", etc.


2. Those UNIVERSALS are SPECIES' SPECIFIC.

3. Those UNIVERSALS would be organized, wrapped, around an ESSENTIAL 
CORE. It would consist in the tight ingraining of self-production and 
communication (almost inseparable, and both information based!). In the 
human special case, it is the whole advancement of our own lives what 
propels us to engage in endless communication --about the universals of 
our own species-- but with the terrific advantage of an open-ended 
communication system, language.


4. Those UNIVERSALS would have been streamlined in very different ways 
and taken as "principles" or starting points for a number of 
disciplines--remembering the discussion about the four Great Domains of 
Science. A renewed Information Science should nucleate one of those 
domains.


Best regards to all,
(and particular greetings to the new parties joined for this discussion)
--Pedro


El 27/06/2016 a las 12:43, Marcus Abundis escribió:


Dear Loet,

I hoped to reply to your posts sooner as of all the voices on FIS 
I often sense a general kinship with your views. But I also confess I 
have difficulty in precisely grasping your views – the reason for my 
delay.


>[while Shannon’s] concept of information (uncertainty) <
> is counter-intuitive. It enables us among other things <
> to distinguish between "information" and "meaningful <
> information". <
• Easily agreed; *how* to distinguish a presumed meaning (or 
meaningless-ness) then becomes the remaining issue.


> Providing . . . meaning presumes the specification <
> of a system of reference; for example, an observer.<
• It is telling for me (in viewing our differences and likenesses) 
that you suggest an observer. My “system of relating“ accommodates but 
does not require an observer (okay – observer, defined how?), as shown 
immediately below.


>Different[ly] . . . expected information is dimensionless<
> ("a priori"). <
• I suggest the act of “expectation“ already infers minimal dimensions 
– for example, who/what/how is doing the expecting? Thus, in my view, 
this is not truly a priori. A “readiness“ or a compelling functional 
need innate to any “system of relating“ has bearing. For example, a 
single Oxygen atom has a compelling/innate need to react with other 
elements, just as any agent is compelled to react to “nutrients.“ Both 
imply dimensional expectations, no? (obviously – of different 
orders/types).


> In my opinion, a "real theory of meaning" should enable <
> us to specify/measure meaning as redundancy / reduction <
> of uncertainty given . . . I took this further in . . . <
> The Self-Organization of Meaning and the Reflexive . . .<
• My weak grasp of the concepts in this paper leads me to think you 
are actually modeling the “processing of meaning,“ 
related-to-but-distinct-from “generating meaning“ that I target. I 
also vaguely recall(?) in an offline exchange I asked you if you saw 
this paper as presenting a “theory of meaning“ and you answered “No.“


• In your later response to Pedro, I found your citation matrix a 
interesting example of your thinking, but still too “high-order“ for 
my reductive-but-meaningful aim. Your matrix (for me) presents an 
essential complexity of high-order views, but in itself it is too 
simple to detail *how* a