RE: [Fis] Re: fis Digest, Vol 501, Issue 5
Replying to Pedro, who said:
Those hierarchical schemes that with a few categories cover realms and
realms of knowledge have an undeniable allure --but are they useful?
S: This depends upon the meaning of useful. As my work is in
Natural Philosophy, they are useful there in the sense of allowing one to
grasp as a whole all of Nature as it has been constructed by science, along
with the logical relationships between its different realms. As for
pragmatic usefulness, I hope never to create anything of that kind of
usefulness for our culture.
When discussing about the complexity of human societies, or biological
complexity, etc., one should not dispatch their amazing boundary
conditions as mere constraints from the level above. I do not mean that
one cannot produce interesting philosophical reflections (like on almost
any theme), but probably the problem we are around on how a matrix of
informational operations do characterize the origin, maintenance, survival,
decay, etc. of the complex self-producing entity alive and also of its own
open self-producing parts, disappears from sight.
S: The hierarchy scheme I have presented in this discussion is meant
to show relations between realms of nature, and is not meant to be used for
the tasks you have mentioned here. For these we need other formalisms.
In the recent
exchanges, the interest of Jerry's chemical logics is that it contributes
to illuminate basic problems of form, formation, conformation ,
recognition, etc. upon which life combinatorics is founded molecularly
--and that is something. It is not my turf, but I am curious on the
relationship this approach shows with Michael Leyton's grammar process,
with Ted's category theory, and also with Karl's multidimensional
partitions. No doubt that Stan's principle of maximum entropy production
is also an important dynamic point within this molecular soup of complexity.
S: Yes, indeed. The principle (which has now been given formal
status in Physics (R. Dewar, 2005, J. Physics, A, Math. General 38:
L371-L381) states that dissipative systems that are capable of assuming
different configurations, will assume one that maximizes entropy
production, short of destroyng the system itself. The paper uses the
maximum (informational) entropy principle to derive maximum (physical)
entropy production (MEP). So this limits what configurations would be
possible in complex systems.
Later Pedro added
Dear Igor and colleagues,
IGOR: I have the impression that there is an agreement about the
existence of biological and sociocultural constraints that impact on our
ability to understand and manage socioeconomic complexity. These
constraints are organized hierarchically, as Stan puts it, {biological
{sociocultural }}.
PEDRO: I would agree that this is the way to organize our explanations.
But dynamically the real world is open at all levels: very simple
amplification or feed forward processes would produce phenomena capable of
escalating levels and percolate around (e.g., minuscule
oxidation-combustion phenomena initiating fires that scorch ecosystems,
regions). Socially there is even more openness: a very tenuous rumor may
destroy an entire company, or put a sector on its knees... Arguing
logically about those hierarchical schemes may be interesting only for
semi-closed, capsule like entities, but not really for say (individuals
(cities (countries)))... My contention is that we should produce a new
way of thinking going beyond that classical systemic, non-informational
view.
S: It is a mistake to suppose that hierarchies are imposing
semi-closed (?meaning?) boundaries around systems. With, e.g., the scale
hierarchy,[cities [individuals]], the major meaning is that cities impose
constraints, of the boundary condition type, upon individuals (who must
walk in the pattern of streets, for example), while individuals contribute
to work making possible the continuity of cities. Any hierarchy is only a
way organizing our thinking about different kinds of transactions between
individuals of different scope. Also, considering the specification
hierarchy,{physics {chemistry {biology}}}, note that the relations moving
from biology down the hierarchy are transitive -- they move through the
levels. As well, the boundaries here are erected from the lower to the
upper, and so in that direction as well, the boundary is fluid.
STAN
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RE: [Fis] Re: fis Digest, Vol 501, Issue 5
Dear colleagues, Maybe I should postpone these comments and have a careful reading of Bob's paper, John's list of bionfo articles, and the many well-crafted arguments exchanged these days---but as usual one is overwhelmed... On the discussion track about complexity info limits (followed by Joe, Igor, Bob and a few others), there is an important paper on the ecological universals of plants, by I.J. Wright (2004). He has established a surprising similarity relating to almost any type of leaf, from blade grass to beech leaves or the needles of cedars. Within any habitat, each square centimeter of leaf will process a roughly similar amount of carbon per unit are over its life span... Taking into account that plants are the primary producers upon which all other animal trophic levels have to depend, one may speculate that this economic limit behind primary productivity may force further limitations in the connectivity networks described by Bob (even more taking into account that each trophic level dissipates around 90% of the biomass energy below). Thereafter, I bet that in our mental processes there is also an economy on the personal limits handling external events; those limits also put a constraint on how do we handle the strong/weak barrage of social (trophic) bonds around each of us every day. Of course, we can ignore this or any other constraint in our human nature... At least, we all have the intuition that we have info limits, but in our conceptualizations do not recognize them, yet. Those hierarchical schemes that with a few categories cover realms and realms of knowledge have an undeniable allure --but are they useful? When discussing about the complexity of human societies, or biological complexity, etc., one should not dispatch their amazing boundary conditions as mere constraints from the level above. I do not mean that one cannot produce interesting philosophical reflections (like on almost any theme), but probably the problem we are around on how a matrix of informational operations do characterize the origin, maintenance, survival, decay, etc. of the complex self-producing entity alive and also of its own open self-producing parts, disappears from sight. In the recent exchanges, the interest of Jerry's chemical logics is that it contributes to illuminate basic problems of form, formation, conformation , recognition, etc. upon which life combinatorics is founded molecularly --and that is something. It is not my turf, but I am curious on the relationship this approach shows with Michael Leyton's grammar process, with Ted's category theory, and also with Karl's multidimensional partitions. No doubt that Stan's principle of maximum entropy production is also an important dynamic point within this molecular soup of complexity. best greetings Pedro ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es http://webmail.unizar.es/mailman/listinfo/fis
RE: [Fis] Re: fis Digest, Vol 501, Issue 5
Replying to LOET, who said:
Dear colleagues,I agree with most of what is said, but it does not
apply to social systems because these -- and to a lesser extent also
psychological ones -- operate differently from the hierarchical
formations that are generated naturally. That is why we oppose nature
to culture in the semantics: cultural (and social) systems enable us to
model the systems under study and this changes the hierarchical order. I
understand that Maturana et al. argue that the next-order systems always
model the lower-order ones, but then the word model is used
metaphorically. The model (e.g., the biological) model enables us to
reconstruct the system(s) under study to such an extent that we are able
to intervene in these systems, e.g. by using a technology. This inverts
the hierarchy. Thus, let me write in Stan's notation: biological
{psychological {social}} -- or is this precisely the opposite order, Stan?
S: The hierarchy is not inverted. {psychological {social}} states
both that the social realm arises out of, and is a refinement of, the
psychological, AND that the social regulates/ interprets/ controls/
contextualizes the psychological. It is likely that there are opposing
opinions on this relationship, as some might have it be reversed. This
decision rides on the question of whether psychology existed prior to
sociality in the biological realm. And THAT depends upon definitions of
sociality. I myself weakly favor the way Loet put it -- {biological
{psychological {social}}}, but I could likely be persuaded to acccept
instead {biological {social {psychological}}}.
-- then our scientific models enable us to change nature, for example,
by building dykes like in Holland and thus we get: {social {biological}
since the ecological changes can also be planned in advance.
S: This is in line with the standard view that the social realm is
higher than the biological, and regulates/ interprets/ controls/
contextualizes the biological, AND the lower levels down to the physical as
well. The relations, {physical constraints (material/chemical constraints
{biological constraints {sociocultural constraints, are transitive from
the higher levels. Loet's example is not significantly different from
beavers making a dam to create a pond. Note that this applies only to
those aspects of lower integrative levels that come under the purvue of a
particular social system.
While lower-order systems are able to entertain a model of the next-lower
ones -- and even have to entertain a model -- human language enables us
not only to exchange these models, but also to study them and to further
codify them.
S: I believe Loet is using lower-order here incorrectly for the
specification hierarchy formalism, which is {lower order {higher order}}.
The further codification sharpens the knife with which we can cut into
the lower-level ones. We are not constrained to the next-order lower
level, but we can freely move through the hierarchy and develop different
specialties accordingly (chemistry, biology, etc.).
S: This again is true of the specification hierarchy, which, as a
subsumptive hierarchy, is, as I say above, transitive from the higher
levels down.
Scientists are able to adjust the focus of the lense. This is a cultural
achievement which was generated naturally, but once in place also had the
possibility to distinguish between genesis and validity. No lower-level
systems can raise and begin to answer this question.
S: I have no reason, based in the hierarchy, to disagree with this.
This is why we must erect a sociocultursal level in the hierarchy.
And doubling reality into a semantic domain that can operate relatively
independently of the underlying (represented) layer increases the
complexity which can be absorbed with an order of magnitude. The issue
is heavily related to the issue of modernity as a specific form of social
organization. While tribes (small groups) can still be considered using
the natural metaphor, and high cultures were still organized
hierarchically (with the emperor or the pope at the top), modern social
systems set science free to pursue this reconstruction in a
techno-economic evolution. All that is solid, will melt into air
(Marx). Because of our biological body, we are part of nature, but our
minds are entrained in a cultural dynamics at the supra-individual level
(culture) which feeds back and at some places is able increasingly to
invert the hierarchy.
S: Again, true -- that is why we must erect a sociocultursal level in
the hierarchy!
Then STEVEN said:
I must disagree with the notion that there is any real separation of
nature and culture. There are things that can be known that do not exist -
as a general category that includes culture - but culture does not stand
alone - it's right up there with irrational numbers and televisions.
The force of natural ethics (inevitable behaviors) is mediated by
Re: [Fis] Re: fis Digest, Vol 501, Issue 5
Hi folks, I'll take a few minutes from my moving and dealing with academic emergencies at UKZN to make a comment here. Jerry brings up a point that keeps arising in the literature one constraints and information. Recall that Shannon said that they are the same thing. That is a clue. Loet and I dealt with this issue previously on this list about a year ago when he claimed that social communications channels open up new possibilities (analogous to Jerry's position here), and I asked him why this was so, since any further structure must reduce the possibilities, not increase them. We each promoted out view for a while, and then stopped, as it wasn't going anywhere. The reason is that there is nowhere to go with this issue. Both positions are correct, and they do not contradict each other; they are merely incompatible perspectives, much like Cartesian versus polar coordinates. The positions are not logically incompatible, but pragmatically incompatible, in that they cannot both be adopted at the same time. This is a fairly common phenomenon in science. In fact I wrote my dissertation on it. There is a paper of mine, Pragmatic Incommensurability, in the Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984 (PSA 1984) that goes into the issue in more detail, but not as much as in my thesis. I am kind of bored with the issue at the issue at this point, but it keeps coming up, so I'll say a bit more. Stan's bracket formulation is a logical restriction (constraint), with the outer bracketed items logically restricting the inner ones. It is a neat formulation for a system developed by W.E. Johnson in his book Logic, in which he called the inner elements determinates and the outer ones determinables. The idea is a basic one in the Philosophy business, and these are the technical terms used there, although they are somewhat awkward, being relative terms, and also not words used with their English meaning. Jerry's problem is that if the chemical opens up a huge range of possibilities not available to the physical, how can we call the physical a constraint on the chemical. I once asked Stan a similar question, and he gave me an answer that satisfied me enough not to pursue the issue. The answer requires a distinction concerning constraints (which, recall, is logically equivalent to information -- any connotative difference being irrelevant to my point here). My colleagues and coauthors Wayne Christensen and Cliff Hooker once referred to the difference between restricting and enabling constraints. The former restrict possibilities, while the latter are required in order to make things possible -- mush produces nothing. But there is no essential difference -- context, if anything, makes the difference. I say 'if anything' because in many cases constraints (indistinguishable from information by logic alone) do both: restrict and enable. There is no paradox here -- they are two sides of the same coin. A Taoist like me sees them as Yin and Yang -- the Yang element is the defined and restrictive, active, controlling part, while the Yin is the open, receptive and enabling part. We cannot view the same thing as both Yin and Yang at the same time (we can talk about it in the abstract, in the same way that we can talk about Cartesian and polar coordinates together, and even transform them on in to the other), but the thing itself is both, and the transformations between Yin and Yang have a logical form that is predictable and determinate. Just so with restricting and enabling constraints -- we can learn to transform one into the other, both in thought and in practice. I will now demonstrate this with Jerry's cases (though the ideas are hardly peculiar to Jerry's cases) At 05:16 PM 05/02/2007, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: To: Igor / Ted / Stan First, Igor. I found your perspective here to be 180 degrees off from mine! On Feb 5, 2007, at 6:01 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Reply to Steven and Ted By genetic constraints I assume you simply mean that we have certain capacities and are not omnipotent. Is not conflict and war an indicator of our individual failure to manage social complexity? Or would you argue that war is social complexity management? I was referring to the hypothesis that we have the propensity to function in relatively small groups bind by strong cultural bonds. From my perspective, enriched by chemical relations, genetic system serve as fundamentally creative activities. Genetic networks are not an amalgam of soft concepts, rather a genetic network is a discrete interdependent network of chemical relations. The enumeration of the creative genetic network is complete for some organisms, some species. In Aristotelian logical terms, the position of the species is between the individual point and the genus. It is the chemical capacity to create species that I find to be absent from your narrative. Thus, I would re-phrase your hypothesis generating sentence: From: I was referring to the hypothesis that we
Re: [Fis] Re: fis Digest, Vol 501, Issue 5
This is my reply to Jerry (acknowledging that John's reply to Jerry below
says it as well as -- probably better than -- I can), who said:
Stan's comment deserves to be attended to.
The many complexities facing us as society can be parsed as follows,
using a
specification hierarcy:
{physical constraints (material/chemical constraints {biological
constraints {sociocultural constraints.
As I search for the substance in this comment, I focus on what might be
the potentially misleading usage of the term parsed.
S: 'Parsed', as I use it loosely here, is just 'to divide into
component parts', as with a sentence -- {man {running {uphill {chasing his
hat {naked} -- the order here is not important.
Nor, do I understand why brackets, signifiers of separations, are used in
this context.
S: The set theoretic brackets are used here, as John says, to indicate
the logical relations between realms of nature, as we have constructed
them. So, as we think biology emerged from chemistry, we can note this as
{chemistry {biology}}. This -- importantly -- means that biology further
constrains (the traditional usage here is 'integrates') chemistry by
instituting rules that limit what chemistry may do in biologial systems.
I have no idea what it would mean to parse a material / chemical
constraint in this context.
S: I feel free to use a grammatical operation like this when
linguistically dealing with scientific concepts because our concepts ARE,
indeed, just grammatical / logical constructs.
Indeed, chemical logic functions in exactly the opposite direction.
The creative relations grow with the complexity of the system. Is this not
what we mean by evolution?
S: This elicits, as John notes, an interesting philosophical point.
The logic as I have used it indeed says that as evolution uncovers new
realms of nature, these are MORE restricted in their freedom than were
prior existing realms (in the ways that these prior realms were free to
explore). Each emergence reduces degrees of freedom that were open in
prior realms. An example I like to use is language. As we learn a
language, it opens up immense possibilties for unique statements, BUT it
closes off possibilties that might have been opened up if we had learned
another language instead (recall the Whorffian hypothesis), and, I believe,
it blots out some intuitive aspects of our cognition just by intense mental
focusing on language. So, a tornado is freer to attain different forms in
different locales than is an organism.
On a personal note to Stan: We have been discussing similar concepts since
the inception of WESS more than 20 years ago and it does not appear that
we are converging! :-) :-) :-) Unless you choose to embrace the
creative capacities of chemical logic, I fear your mind is doomed to the
purgatory of unending chaotic cycles, searching for a few elusive or
perhaps imaginary fixed points. ;-) :-) :-( !!!
S: I think the main problem in this particular case is that you need
to note the exact meaning of the set theoretic brackets. Having noted
that, then you would have understood -- even if not agreed.
John said --
Hi folks,
I'll take a few minutes from my moving and dealing with academic
emergencies at UKZN to make a comment here.
S; No wonder I haven't been able to contact you!
Jerry brings up a point that keeps arising in the literature one
constraints and information. Recall that Shannon said that they are the
same thing. That is a clue.
-snip-
Stan's bracket formulation is a logical restriction (constraint), with
the outer bracketed items logically restricting the inner ones. It is a
neat formulation for a system developed by W.E. Johnson in his book Logic,
in which he called the inner elements determinates and the outer ones
determinables. The idea is a basic one in the Philosophy business, and
these are the technical terms used there, although they are somewhat
awkward, being relative terms, and also not words used with their English
meaning. Jerry's problem is that if the chemical opens up a huge range of
possibilities not available to the physical, how can we call the physical
a constraint on the chemical. I once asked Stan a similar question, and he
gave me an answer that satisfied me enough not to pursue the issue. The
answer requires a distinction concerning constraints (which, recall, is
logically equivalent to information -- any connotative difference being
irrelevant to my point here). My colleagues and coauthors Wayne
Christensen and Cliff Hooker once referred to the difference between
restricting and enabling constraints. The former restrict possibilities,
while the latter are required in order to make things possible -- mush
produces nothing. But there is no essential difference -- context, if
anything, makes the difference. I say 'if anything' because in many cases
constraints (indistinguishable from information by logic alone) do both:
restrict and enable. There is no
RE: [Fis] Re: fis Digest, Vol 501, Issue 5
Dear colleagues,
I agree with most of what is said, but it does not apply to social systems
because these -- and to a lesser extent also psychological ones -- operate
differently from the hierarchical formations that are generated naturally.
That is why we oppose nature to culture in the semantics: cultural (and
social) systems enable us to model the systems under study and this changes
the hierarchical order. I understand that Maturana et al. argue that the
next-order systems always model the lower-order ones, but then the word
model is used metaphorically. The model (e.g., the biological) model
enables us to reconstruct the system(s) under study to such an extent that
we are able to intervene in these systems, e.g. by using a technology. This
inverts the hierarchy.
Thus, let me write in Stan's notation: biological {psychological {social}}
-- or is this precisely the opposite order, Stan? -- then our scientific
models enable us to change nature, for example, by building dykes like in
Holland and thus we get: social {biological} since the ecological changes
can also be planned in advance.
While lower-order systems are able to entertain a model of the next-lower
ones -- and even have to entertain a model -- human language enables us not
only to exchange these models, but also to study them and to further codify
them. The further codification sharpens the knife with which we can cut into
the lower-level ones. We are not constrained to the next-order lower level,
but we can freely move through the hierarchy and develop different
specialties accordingly (chemistry, biology, etc.). Scientists are able to
adjust the focus of the lense. This is a cultural achievement which was
generated naturally, but once in place also had the possibility to
distinguish between genesis and validity. No lower-level systems can raise
and begin to answer this question. And doubling reality into a semantic
domain that can operate relatively independently of the underlying
(represented) layer increases the complexity which can be absorbed with an
order of magnitude.
The issue is heavily related to the issue of modernity as a specific form of
social organization. While tribes (small groups) can still be considered
using the natural metaphor, and high cultures were still organized
hierarchically (with the emperor or the pope at the top), modern social
systems set science free to pursue this reconstruction in a
techno-economic evolution. All that is solid, will melt into air (Marx).
Because of our biological body, we are part of nature, but our minds are
entrained in a cultural dynamics at the supra-individual level (culture)
which feeds back and at some places is able increasingly to invert the
hierarchy.
With best wishes,
Loet
_
Loet Leydesdorff
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)
Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam
Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-20- 525 3681
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] ;
http://www.leydesdorff.net/ http://www.leydesdorff.net/
Now available:
http://www.universal-publishers.com/book.php?method=ISBNbook=1581129378
The Knowledge-Based Economy: Modeled, Measured, Simulated. 385 pp.; US$
18.95
http://www.universal-publishers.com/book.php?method=ISBNbook=1581126956
The Self-Organization of the Knowledge-Based Society;
http://www.universal-publishers.com/book.php?method=ISBNbook=1581126816
The Challenge of Scientometrics
_
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On
Behalf Of John Collier
Sent: Monday, February 05, 2007 5:18 PM
To: Jerry LR Chandler; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Re: fis Digest, Vol 501, Issue 5
Hi folks,
I'll take a few minutes from my moving and dealing with academic emergencies
at UKZN to make a comment here.
Jerry brings up a point that keeps arising in the literature one constraints
and information. Recall that Shannon said that they are the same thing. That
is a clue.
Loet and I dealt with this issue previously on this list about a year ago
when he claimed that social communications channels open up new
possibilities (analogous to Jerry's position here), and I asked him why this
was so, since any further structure must reduce the possibilities, not
increase them. We each promoted out view for a while, and then stopped, as
it wasn't going anywhere. The reason is that there is nowhere to go with
this issue. Both positions are correct, and they do not contradict each
other; they are merely incompatible perspectives, much like Cartesian versus
polar coordinates. The positions are not logically incompatible, but
pragmatically incompatible, in that they cannot both be adopted at the same
time. This is a fairly common phenomenon in science. In fact I wrote my
dissertation on it. There is a paper of mine, Pragmatic Incommensurability,
in the Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984 (PSA 1984)
that goes into the issue in more detail, but not as much as in my thesis. I
am kind of bored
Re: [Fis] Re: fis Digest, Vol 501, Issue 5
Dear List,
I must disagree with the notion that there is any real separation of
nature and culture. There are things that can be known that do not
exist - as a general category that includes culture - but culture
does not stand alone - it's right up there with irrational numbers
and televisions.
The force of natural ethics (inevitable behaviors) is mediated by
convention and manifest in the behavior of individuals - culture is
merely one such convention.
With respect,
Steven
--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science Engineering
http://iase.info
On Feb 5, 2007, at 11:37 PM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:
Dear colleagues,
I agree with most of what is said, but it does not apply to social
systems because these -- and to a lesser extent also psychological
ones -- operate differently from the hierarchical formations that
are generated naturally. That is why we oppose nature to
culture in the semantics: cultural (and social) systems enable us
to model the systems under study and this changes the hierarchical
order. I understand that Maturana et al. argue that the next-order
systems always model the lower-order ones, but then the word
model is used metaphorically. The model (e.g., the biological)
model enables us to reconstruct the system(s) under study to such
an extent that we are able to intervene in these systems, e.g. by
using a technology. This inverts the hierarchy.
Thus, let me write in Stan's notation: biological {psychological
{social}} -- or is this precisely the opposite order, Stan? -- then
our scientific models enable us to change nature, for example, by
building dykes like in Holland and thus we get: social {biological}
since the ecological changes can also be planned in advance.
While lower-order systems are able to entertain a model of the next-
lower ones -- and even have to entertain a model -- human language
enables us not only to exchange these models, but also to study
them and to further codify them. The further codification sharpens
the knife with which we can cut into the lower-level ones. We are
not constrained to the next-order lower level, but we can freely
move through the hierarchy and develop different specialties
accordingly (chemistry, biology, etc.). Scientists are able to
adjust the focus of the lense. This is a cultural achievement which
was generated naturally, but once in place also had the possibility
to distinguish between genesis and validity. No lower-level systems
can raise and begin to answer this question. And doubling reality
into a semantic domain that can operate relatively independently of
the underlying (represented) layer increases the complexity which
can be absorbed with an order of magnitude.
The issue is heavily related to the issue of modernity as a
specific form of social organization. While tribes (small groups)
can still be considered using the natural metaphor, and high
cultures were still organized hierarchically (with the emperor or
the pope at the top), modern social systems set science free to
pursue this reconstruction in a techno-economic evolution. All
that is solid, will melt into air (Marx). Because of our
biological body, we are part of nature, but our minds are entrained
in a cultural dynamics at the supra-individual level (culture)
which feeds back and at some places is able increasingly to invert
the hierarchy.
With best wishes,
Loet
Loet Leydesdorff
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)
Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam
Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-20- 525 3681
[EMAIL PROTECTED] ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/
Now available: The Knowledge-Based Economy: Modeled, Measured,
Simulated. 385 pp.; US$ 18.95
The Self-Organization of the Knowledge-Based Society; The Challenge
of Scientometrics
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:fis-
[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of John Collier
Sent: Monday, February 05, 2007 5:18 PM
To: Jerry LR Chandler; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Re: fis Digest, Vol 501, Issue 5
Hi folks,
I'll take a few minutes from my moving and dealing with academic
emergencies at UKZN to make a comment here.
Jerry brings up a point that keeps arising in the literature one
constraints and information. Recall that Shannon said that they are
the same thing. That is a clue.
Loet and I dealt with this issue previously on this list about a
year ago when he claimed that social communications channels open
up new possibilities (analogous to Jerry's position here), and I
asked him why this was so, since any further structure must reduce
the possibilities, not increase them. We each promoted out view for
a while, and then stopped, as it wasn't going anywhere. The reason
is that there is nowhere to go with this issue. Both positions are
correct, and they do not contradict each other; they are merely
incompatible perspectives, much like Cartesian versus polar
