EAP-TLS and TLS record protocol

2013-05-24 Thread Pieter Hulshoff
Hello all,

I'm new to the list, relatively new to authentication, and I'm trying to figure 
out some details regarding the RFCs. I was hoping some of you might be able 
and willing to help me out here.

As I understand it, using TLS you can authenticate the server and optionally 
the client, negotiate the encryption/signing algorithm(s) for the TLS record 
protocol, and exchange the key information before switching to the selected 
encryption/signing algorithm(s) for secure data transport. EAP-TLS however 
seems focused on authorization and exchanging the key information, leaving the 
actual data encryption to be determine by other means (e.g. IEEE 802.1X MKA 
i.c.w. MACsec).

My questions:
1. Is this understanding correct?
2. Does this imply that the negotiated encryption/signing algorithm(s) are 
only used for the EAP-TLS Finished messages?

Any and all insights would be most welcome. :)

Kind regards,

Pieter Hulshoff

-
List info/subscribe/unsubscribe? See http://www.freeradius.org/list/users.html


Re: EAP-TLS and TLS record protocol

2013-05-24 Thread Phil Mayers

On 05/24/2013 09:12 AM, Pieter Hulshoff wrote:

Hello all,

I'm new to the list, relatively new to authentication, and I'm trying to figure
out some details regarding the RFCs. I was hoping some of you might be able
and willing to help me out here.

As I understand it, using TLS you can authenticate the server and optionally
the client, negotiate the encryption/signing algorithm(s) for the TLS record
protocol, and exchange the key information before switching to the selected
encryption/signing algorithm(s) for secure data transport. EAP-TLS however
seems focused on authorization and exchanging the key information, leaving the
actual data encryption to be determine by other means (e.g. IEEE 802.1X MKA
i.c.w. MACsec).

My questions:
1. Is this understanding correct?


Sort of. You've focussed on EAP-TLS, but that's misleading. *All* EAP 
methods are solely for authentication; the EAP protocols are not used to 
forward traffic, they merely authenticate and, if the link-layer 
requries it, derive encryption keys.


By way of illustrating the implications - note that, on a non-MACSEC 
802.1x wired connection, you can (but shouldn't!) use EAP-MD5 which does 
not derive key material, because there's no link-layer encryption.


Similarly, on wireless 802.1x, you can use EAP-PWD or EAP-EKE, both of 
which derive key material and both of which have nothing to do with TLS.



2. Does this imply that the negotiated encryption/signing algorithm(s) are
only used for the EAP-TLS Finished messages?


For *all* EAP methods, the only output is success/failure and optionally 
key material, and the key material is just a securely-derived set of 
bits. The cryptographic primitives used by the EAP method have no 
bearing on the cryptographc primitives used by the link layer.


Also - this not not a FreeRADIUS question really, and if you have more 
questions, they might be better off in another forum.

-
List info/subscribe/unsubscribe? See http://www.freeradius.org/list/users.html